it li 



THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 

OF 

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 



IN THREE VOLUMES 
VOLUME ONE 



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

C. F. CLAY, Manager 
LONDON : FETTER LANE, E.C.4 




NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN CO. 

BOMBAY \ 

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THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 

OF 

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 

1783-1919 



EDITED BY 

SIR A. W. WARD, Litt.D., F.B.A. 

AND 

G. P. GOOCH, M.A., Litt.D. 



VOLUME I 
1783-1815 



CAMBRIDGE 

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1922 



PREFACE 

IN offering to our readers the First Volume of The Cambridge History 
of British Foreign Policy, from the beginning of Pitt's first Adminis- 
tration (1783) to the Peace of Versailles (19 19), we have little to add 
to the announcement put forth by our University Press less than two 
years and a half ago. The work was designed as a connected narrative 
of the subject and a consecutive account of its bearing on the political 
history of this country and empire, and on that of the world at large. 
As such, it is intended to combine with a strict adherence to historical 
truth, wherever ascertainable, a national point of view — in other 
words, an avowed regard for the interests, and above all for the 
honour, of Great Britain ; and the list of contributors to it has been 
confined to historical scholars who are British subjects by birth. 
Our work has accordingly not shrunk, and will not shrink as it pro- 
gresses, from seeking to vindicate for British Foreign Policy that 
claim to consistency which in certain respects has been denied to it 
by some of its censors, and in others allowed to it only in the way of 
sarcasm. Its relations to political aims or ideals not confined to a 
single nation, or to particular groups of thinkers and their followers 
within it, have been neither overlooked nor, we believe, prejudged — 
whether or not these aims have in the past been submerged with 
efforts made to accomplish them, and whether or not on the fulfilment 
of these ideals depend the future peace and prosperity of the world. 

Our readers will understand that, in the several chapters of this 
History, military and naval events, as well as the progress of parlia- 
mentary legislation and administrative changes at home or in other 
parts of the empire, due to the influence of the Crown, of parties 
and movements in Church and State, and to the voice of public 
opinion and the Press, have been kept in constant view, without 
being themselves discussed. The successive stages of Indian and 
(British) Colonial history have in no instance been regarded as 
detached from that of Great Britain and Ireland. The narrative is 
throughout based on documentary evidence and has, so far as possible, 
been arranged in chronological sequence, though without any attempt, 
more especially in certain summarising sections of the later Volumes, 
to maintain a synchronistic system of dates. 

This History is divided into six Books, each consisting of a very 
small number of Chapters, which again are, in the large majority 
of cases, subdivided into sections of varying length, dealing with 



vi PREFACE 

particular subjects, episodes or aspects of British Foreign Policy. The 
First of these Books is preceded by an Introduction, which attempts 
to summarise the course of English, or British, Foreign Policy, in the 
whole of the period to which these terms may be held applicable, and 
to indicate some of the threads lending coherence to its processes and 
tendencies. Though the narrative is continued till the Peace of 1919, 
our readers will be prepared to regard the sketch of the War of 1914- 
191 8 and of the settlement in the character of an Epilogue. The narra- 
tive as a whole will be followed by a brief general survey, undertaken 
with the cognisance and approval of authoritative opinion, of the 
administrative system of the British Foreign Office, from 1793 (at 
which date an important change was introduced into it) to the present 
time. 

Both narrative and Introduction are accompanied by brief notes, 
chiefly references or of the nature of such, or reproductions of extracts 
from important documents, treaties, Instructions, despatches, or 
speeches. In the Appendices to vols. 1 and II, particular documents 
of this kind, hitherto either unpublished or inaccessible without 
difficulty, are printed in extenso or in extract. To each Volume is 
appended a short Bibliography, which in no instance pretends to be 
exhaustive or to do more than supply titles of some of the books and 
papers not mentioned in the Bibliographies to corresponding portions 
of The Cambridge Modern History, or to similar works, with the 
addition of those of a few specially used by the writers of Chapters or 
shorter sections of the present History. 

It has been thought well to find room for a brief general character- 
isation of the principles and achievements in Foreign Policy of the 
chief British statesmen and diplomatists engaged in it in the course 
of the period here surveyed. In the case of Castlereagh or Canning, 
Palmerston or Salisbury, whose foreign policy left its mark not only 
on its own age, and also in the case of Stratford Canning and a few 
other representatives of Great Britain at the contemporary centres 
of diplomatic activity, a summary estimate of the sort seems irre- 
sistibly called for. On the other hand, our narrative will abstain from 
attempting to influence a general judgment of the public services of 
the agents, at home or abroad, of our Foreign Policy by remarks or 
suggestions as to their personalities. 

In issuing the First Volume of this work, the Editors desire, on 
behalf of the Syndics of the Press as well as on their own, to express 
their thanks for the countenance and goodwill shown to their project 



PREFACE vii 

by those to whom it was notified before being carried into execution. 
The Most Hon. the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., H.M.'s 
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, kindly permitted resort, 
under proper conditions, to the Archives of the Foreign Office, and 
Sir J. A. C. Tilley, K.C.M.G. (British Assistant Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, and now His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary in Brazil), and Mr S. Gaselee, C.B.E., Librarian, 
have already facilitated our proceedings in this direction 1 . We owe 
a similar debt to the Public Record Office, more especially to 
Mr Hubert Hall, Litt.D., Assistant Keeper of the Records and 
Literary Director of the Royal Historical Society, whose support is 
never denied to any endeavour for securing or widening the founda- 
tions of historical knowledge. The Editors are, also, particularly 
indebted to the advice and encouragement of the Right Hon. Lord 
Sanderson, .G.C.B., whose great experience as Permanent Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Right Hon. Lord 
Fitzmaurice whose public services as Under Secretary of State, 
together with his eminence as a political historian, gave high value 
to their counsel. They desire to add their thanks for similar suggestive 
aid to the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce, O.M., who at an early period 
in his public career (1886) held the office of Under Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, and was, as we all know and rejoice, our 
Ambassador to the United States from 1907 to 191 3; to the Right 
Hon. Sir Ernest Satow, G.C.M.G., late His Majesty's Minister at 
Tokyo and Pekin and author of the invaluable Guide to Diplomatic 
Practice; to Sir G. W. Prothero, Litt.D., F.B.A., who knows how 
gladly they would have welcomed him as a collaborator ; to Professor 
C. H. Firth, LL.D., Litt.D., F.B.A., and other friends. Special 
instances of assistance will be duly acknowledged as the work pro- 
gresses ; but the Editors are anxious to take the first opportunity of 
recording their deep sense of the generous confidence with which 
the Rev. J. Wallace Kidston and the other Executors of the late Sir 
Donald Mackenzie Wallace, K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O., have placed in their 
hands a very large collection of MSS. designed by him as materials 
for a History of European Policy. They consist mainly of classified 
extracts and notes concerning the Foreign Policy of the chief European 
States from the 16th century onwards — Russia of course occupying 

1 To the latter we owe the permission to print, at the head of the successive 
Books of this History, the list of Secretaries and Under Secretaries of State for 
Foreign Affairs from 1873, published in the Foreign Office List. 



viii PREFACE 

the most prominent place among them. This varied collection was 
carried on by Sir D. M. Wallace in connexion with his lifelong study 
of modern politics and history and his services from 1891 to 1898 as 
Director of the Foreign Department of The Times. It is obvious that, 
as the lines on which Sir D. M. Wallace's contemplated History would 
have been constructed differed from those followed by the present 
work, so our references to his MSS., could not but be, in the main, 
incidental. As such, should any particular use be made of his MSS., it 
will be duly acknowledged in the course of these volumes ; but, in the 
meantime, the Editors are desirous on behalf of the Syndics and of 
themselves of acknowledging the obligation under which they have 
been generously laid by his Executors. 

The Editors have to thank the officials and staff of the University 
Press for the care they have bestowed upon the production of the 
present volume, and Miss M. Pate for her indefatigable assistance in 
preparing its contents for the Press. They are also much obliged to 
Miss A. D. Greenwood for undertaking, at an inevitably short notice, 
to supply the Index. 

A. W. W. 
G. P. G. 
December ; 1921. 

Since the above Preface was in print, Lord Bryce, whose interest 
in our scheme is noted there, has died — seemingly in the very midst 
of his long and unwearied labours. In him has passed away a scholar, 
who, just sixty years ago, by a University prize essay illuminated a 
path of historical enquiry hitherto rarely trodden among ourselves, and 
whose contributions to political history as a whole cover a uniquely 
wide range of observation, research and deduction in the fields suc- 
cessively surveyed by him. And there has also passed away a statesman 
whose services, especially in the sphere of foreign policy and diplomatic 
action, have found their consummation in helping, more directly than 
those of any of his contemporaries, to draw closer the bonds of friend- 
ship, based on mutual understanding, between a great kindred nation 
and our own. The relations thus established, largely through his insight 
and influence, will we believe constitute one of the firmest foundations 
of a world's union of peace, and will, in any event, transcend in their 
intrinsic strength any of the alliances, compacts and concerts dis- 
cussed in these pages. 

February, 1922. 



CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTION 

By Sir A. W. WARD, Litt.D., F.B.A. 
Master of Peterhouse 

I. England's insularity before the Norman Conquest. Political and military 
relations with France, and commercial with Flemish and Low-German 
towns, under the Norman and the Plantagenet Kings. Foreign policy of 
Edward III, and of Henry VII and VIII. The Balance of Power. The 
vicissitudes of the Reformation period and the development of Elizabethan 
policy. Pacificism of James I. Beginnings of English Colonisation page I 

II. The Civil War and the Peace of Westphalia. Foreign policy of the 
Commonwealth and the Protectorate. Spain and the United Provinces. 
Treaty with France (1655). Sum of the foreign policy of Cromwell. Be- 
ginnings of Charles II. Aix-la-Chapelle, Dover and Westminster. Isolation 
of English policy of Charles II . . . . . . . 13 

III. William III and his purpose. The Partition Treaties and the Grand 
Alliance Treaty. The War of the Spanish Succession and the Utrecht 
Settlement. British interests at Utrecht. The Barrier Treaties . . 39 

IV. George I and the Personal Union. The Hanoverian Junto-. Great 
Britain and the Northern War. Hanoverian acquisition of Bremen and 
Verden. Stanhope and the Quadruple Alliance. Carteret and the Swedish- 
Settlement. Peace of Nystad. Pacific policy of Walpole. The Alliance of 
Hanover. The Congress of Soissons and the Second Treaty of Vienna. 
Great Britain and the Bourbon Family Compact. Great Britain and the War 
of the Austrian Succession and the Second Silesian War. Foreign policy 
of the Pelhams, and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Continued rivalry between 
France and Great Britain ......... 58 

V. The Reversion of Alliances. 'Treaty of Westminster' (1756). Great 
Britain and the Austro-French Alliance. The Seven Years' War. Pitt's first 
Ministry, and the Foreign and Colonial policy of Great Britain. The Russo- 
Austrian Alliance. Prussian victories in 1757. Convention of Kloster-Zeven. 
British successes in Bengal and Canada (1757-8). Virtual establishment of 
naval supremacy of Great Britain. Failure of Pitt's Italian scheme. De- 
claration of Ryswyk. French peace overtures refused. The Schouvaloff 
Treaties. Death of George II. Resignation of Pitt and War with Spain. 
British maritime and colonial successes (1762). Peace negotiations with 
France and Spain. The Peace of Paris. Conclusion of the Seven Years' 
War ............. 97 

VI. Ministerial changes: the Grenville and Rockingham Governments. The 
North American Colonies and the Repeal of the Stamp Act. Ministry of 
Grafton, with Pitt. The Tea Duty. Ministry of North. The Falkland Islands 



x CONTENTS 

incident. The American War of Independence. France and the American 
Governments. Restricted British proposals. Armed Neutrality. Declaration 
of Catharine II. Peace negotiations (1782) and definitive signature of 
Treaties (1783). Results of 1763 and of 1783 127 



CHAPTER I 

PITT'S FIRST DECADE 

1783-1792 

By J. H. CLAPHAM, Litt.D., C.B.E. 
Fellow and Tutor of King's College 

The international situation after the Peace of 1783. British isolation. The 
Family Compact. Austro-Russian cooperation. Pitt nursing British re- 
sources. Ireland. India . . . . . . . . .143 

The American desire for a ' Family Compact.' Difficulties in carrying out 
the Treaty of 1 783 . Failure to arrange a commercial treaty. Anglo-American 
diplomatic relations 1783-97. The Jay Treaty . . . .149 

British Ambassadors and British policy. Harris. The problem of the 
United Provinces. The Franco-Dutch treaty of 1785. Decline of British 
influence . . . . . . . . . . . .157 

Vergennes' policy and the commercial treaty of 1786 . . ..164 

Great Britain, Prussia and the United Provinces. The Prussian invasion of 
Holland. Hertzberg's diplomatic projects. British policy in Poland. The 
Triple Alliance of 1788 170 

Wars in Eastern and Northern Europe. British intervention between 
Denmark and Sweden, 1788. Reform in Poland . . . .181 

Troubles in the Habsburg dominions, 1789. The Revolution of Brabant. 
Pitt's Memorandum of August 1788. France supposed to be crippled, 
1789 186 

Prussia's forward policy against Austria. Death of Joseph II, Feb. 1790. The 
policy of Leopold. Great Britain and the Convention of Reichenbach . 190 

The affair of Nootka Sound. Its relation to Britain's policy towards France 
in 1790 ............ 197 

The Congress of Sistova. Oczakoff. Great Britain again isolated. She with- 
draws into herself .......... 202 

Great Britain and France in 1792. Resolute neutrality. Talleyrand's 
abortive Missions. The mistaken confidence of 1792 . . .212 



CONTENTS xi 

CHAPTER II 

THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE ' y 

i 792-1 802 

By J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D. 

Late Fellow of Christ's College 

Vere Harmsworth Professor of Naval History 

I. Non-intervention policy of the Pitt Cabinet. The situation in Europe. 
The French Decrees of Nov. — Dec. 1792. Attitude of Catharine II. 
Declaration of War by France . . . . . . . .216 

II. Great Britain and her Allies. The Polish Question. Tension with Spain. 
Vacillations of Prussia. Malmesbury's Mission. Loss of Belgium. A 
Weakening of the First Coalition. The Triple Alliance (1795). Hostility of 
the Dutch Republic and Defection of Spain. Rupture with Spain. British 
peace overtures (1795, 1796) 236 

III. Opposed Aims of Pitt and Burke. Failure of the Peace Overture. 
Austria's Aloofness. The Peace Proposals of 1797. Results of their Failure. 
Frederick William III. Effects of Bonaparte's Eastern Expedition . 265 

IV. Preliminaries to a Second Coalition. The fiasco at Naples. Anglo- 
Russian Alliance. Friction with Austria. Collapse of the Second Coalition. 
British Mediterranean policy. Action against the Armed Neutrals. The 
Compromise of June 17, 1801. Egypt. Preliminaries of Peace. The Treaty 
of Amiens ........... 286 

CHAPTER III 

THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

1 802-1812 

By Professor J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D. 

I. Problems of the Peace. Complaisance of Addington towards Napoleon's 
Encroachments. Egypt and the Maltese Question. Negotiations with France. 
Rupture of the Peace of Amiens. Responsibilities for this event. The Whig 
Opposition. Pitt's Return to Office 309 

II. Anglo-Russian rapprochement. Rupture with Spain. Aims of Alexander I 
and Czartoryski. Attitude of Pitt. Negotiations with Russia. The Third 
Coalition and its Collapse. Death of Pitt 331 

III. The Ministry of All the Talents. Sicily and N.W. Germany. Fox and 
the Negotations with France. Their Breakdown. Death of Fox. Napoleon's 
'Coast System' and the British retort. The Berlin Decree. Failure of 
British military policy. The Portland Cabinet. Canning and the Copenhagen 
Expedition. Arrangements with Portugal. The Orders in Council and 
friction with the United States. Great Britain and the Spanish National 
Rising. The Convention of Cintra 348 



xii CONTENTS 

IV. Great Britain and Austria. Unsuccessful coastal Expeditions. Collapse of 
Austria and Sweden. Wellesley and French Peace Proposals. The Sea Power 
and the Land Power. Castlereagh's overtures to Sweden. Stratford Canning 
and the Russo-Turkish Peace. Beginnings of a new Coalition . -371 



CHAPTER IV 

THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE 
1813-1815 

By C. K. WEBSTER, M.A. 

Late Fellow of King's College ; Professor of Modern History 

in the University of Liverpool 

I. From the Treaty of Kalisch to the end of the year 18 13 

The New Coalition and the New Cabinet. Castlereagh and his subordinates. 
Main lines of British policy. Maintenance of colonial and maritime supremacy, 
obligations to Allies, erection of 'Barrier' against France, Abolition of the 
Slave Trade. Cathcart and Lord Stewart. Instructions of April 9th, 1813. 
Treaties of Reichenbach (June 14th). Austrian intervention and the Ar- 
mistice. Instructions of July 5th, and July 13th, 1813. Renewal of the 
struggle. Mission of Aberdeen. Instructions of September 18th, 181 3. 
A new kind of Alliance desired : Aberdeen and Metternich. Castlereagh's 
attitude towards Austria. The ' Frankfort Proposals.' Aberdeen and the 
negotiations with St Aignan. Stewart's protests. Failure of the Alliance nego- 
tiations. Friction between Austria and Russia. British policy and Holland. 
Castlereagh and the ' Frankfort Proposals.' Castlereagh and the Alliance. 
Resolve of the Cabinet to send Castlereagh to the Continent . . 392 

II. The Fall of Napoleon and the First Peace of Paris 

Castlereagh's Instructions of December 26th, 1813. The 'Memorandum on 
a Maritime Peace.' Castlereagh's role. The question of the Bourbons. 
Castlereagh and Metternich. The meeting at Langres. The negotiations at 
Chatillon. The discussions at Troyes. Castlereagh and the Armistice 
Proposal. The Treaty of Chaumont. Rupture of the Chatillon negotiations. 
The Cabinet and the Bourbons. Castlereagh and Metternich agree to their 
Restoration. The Allies at Paris. The Treaty of Fontainebleau. Castlereagh 
and the Peace. The Slave Trade. The Treaty of Paris. Failure to decide 
the reconstruction of the Continent. Castlereagh and Spain. Castlereagh, 
Bentinck and Murat. Castlereagh and Constitutional liberty . . 429 

III. The Congress of Vienna 

The Allies visit to England. Preliminary negotiations. Castlereagh and 
Talleyrand. The British Staff at Vienna. The Cabinet and the Negotiations. 
Castlereagh's plans. The ' Balance of Power.' Preliminary Discussions. The 
Polish-Saxon Question. Castlereagh and Alexander. Castlereagh's plan of 
an Austro-Prussian alliance. Its failure. Dissatisfaction of the Cabinet. 
Castlereagh's new plan. Castlereagh and Talleyrand. Crisis of the negotia- 
tions. The Treaty of January 3rd, 1815. Castlereagh's role of Mediator in 



CONTENTS xiii 

the final settlement. Castlereagh and the Poles. The Italian questions. 
Castlereagh and Murat. Negotiations leading to the Restoration of the 
Sicilian Bourbons. Castlereagh's 'Project of Guarantee.' Wellington at 
Vienna. British policy on minor Questions. The Abolition of the Slave 
Trade. Negotiations with France, Spain and Portugal. The 'Declaration' 
at Vienna ........... 459 

IV. The Return of Napoleon and the Second Peace of Paris. 

Great Britain and Elba. Attitude of the Cabinet to Napoleon on his return. 
The surrender of Napoleon and St Helena. Castlereagh and the 'Traitors.' 
Castlereagh and France. Differences with the Cabinet. The proposal of 
Temporary Occupation. The proposals of the Allies. Castlereagh and 
dismemberment. The Cabinet and the Allies won over. The terms offered 
to France. Treaties of November 20th, 1815. The 'Holy Alliance.' The 
' Quadruple Alliance.' Castlereagh's position as a Foreign Minister. His 
' European ' policy. His weaknesses ....... 500 

CHAPTER V 

THE AMERICAN WAR AND THE TREATY OF GHENT 

1812-1814 
By Professor C. K. WEBSTER, M.A. 

I. Causes of the American War. Impressment and the British Right of 
Search. The Orders in Council. Difficulties of the American Government. 
The rupture. Attempts to obtain peace. Armistice offered. Russian Media- 
tion. American acceptance and British refusal. Castlereagh's offer of direct 
negotiations accepted. The American and the British Commissions . 522 

II. British and American Instructions. Importance of Gallatin. Far- 
reaching British demands. Skilful American diplomacy. Gradual growth 
of British desire for peace. Wellington's opinion. American Counter-project. 
Both sides abandon claims. Signature of the Treaty. Reception by public 
opinion in England and America . . . . . . • 535 

APPENDICES TO CHAPTERS II— III 

A. The Causes of the Rupture with France .... 543 

B. British War Policy (February 1793 to April 1795) . . . 549 

C. The Spanish Crisis (April 1795 to September 1796) . . . 561 

D. Anglo- Austrian Relations (November 1795 to November 1797) 564 

E. Attempts to form the Second Coalition (1798) . . . 578 

F. Letters of Lord Mulgrave to Pitt 587 

G. Negotiations with Sweden and Russia (181 1-1 8 1 2) . . . 589 
H. Extracts from Stratford Canning's Despatches from Constanti- 
nople (1812) ......... 599 

BIBLIOGRAPHIES 603 

INDEX 610 



INTRODUCTION 

I 

THIS work proposes to treat, within definite chronological limits, 
the history of British Foreign Policy — in other words, to discuss 
the relations in that period of the British Empire to Foreign Powers, 
the conditions at home and abroad which governed the conduct of 
those relations, the principles more or less consistently followed in 
the conduct of them, and the personal influence of the principal 
British agents responsible for it. However interesting, it cannot be 
imperative, in setting forth upon such an undertaking, to go back at 
length into a past which, as a matter of course, contained in it in- 
numerable germs of the future, but which differed essentially from 
the period marked out for present treatment in many of the con- 
ditions of its public as well as of its private life. 

A brief sketch indicating some at least of the threads connecting 
earlier with later epochs of our Foreign Policy as a State and as an 
Empire is, therefore, all that can be attempted here by way of intro- 
duction to the narrative that is to follow. 

Whether or not a people is only to be held happy when its rulers 
are without a foreign policy, none can assuredly afford to dispense 
with such unless it has no foreign affairs. In our own records, an era 
of the kind could hardly be found from the time onwards when, 
under Egbert, the English nation first achieved political unity, and 
the kingdom, as a polity moulded by its great monarchs Alfred and 
Edgar, after in turn resisting and accepting Danish sway, became 
the prize of what was no longer a dynastic, but a national struggle, 
to be apparently settled by the Norman Conquest in its own 
favour. But England still remained merely the extreme Western home 
of civilisation — an ultima Thule, it has been grandly said, as of old; 
and her insularity was a chief determining element in the early course 
of her historical life — making her exceptionally strong in unity — long 
before the seas engirdling her carried her into the world of modern 
life and assigned to her a controlling place in it. 

Meanwhile, William the Conqueror had not only prepared, but 
throughout his reign maintained and developed, his great achievement 

w. sea. i. i 



2 INTRODUCTION 

by a system of foreign alliances, of which the most signally 
important was that with the Papacy — in the Hildebrandine age in 
particular. With his active and efficient diplomacy began that long 
chapter of medieval history which is concerned with the political 
and military relations to France of England and her ruling dynasty. 
Little more than a century after the Conquest, Henry II (the first 
conqueror of Ireland) might be described as a greater potentate in 
France than his French suzerain; but his power was feudal, and, even 
of this, most was lost in the reign of John. Yet this unhappy King, 
too, followed a foreign policy of his own. His quarrel with Pope 
Innocent III, though not especially of the King's making, rendered 
Magna Carta possible ; but the victory of the Barons did not suffice 
to overthrow his Throne. Soon after his death, Lewis of France was 
driven from England ; and, after John's successor had come of age, he 
and his dynasty, encouraged by a continuous growth of national con- 
sciousness, showed every desire to revive the aggressive foreign policy 
of their predecessors. Henry III accepted the Crown of Sicily for 
his son Edmund, and his brother Richard of Cornwall was elected 
German King. The interests of the Papacy, together with those of 
the dynasty, lay heavy upon all classes of the subjects of the Crown; 
and, while Pope Alexander IV duly declared the Provisions of Oxford 
void, their immediate sequel was the expulsion of foreigners from 
the realm. Notwithstanding the catastrophe of Simon de Montfort, 
England's first great Protector, a memorable constitutional change 
— borough representation — was finally established under Edward I, 
reflecting what, like all sound reforms, was already a historical fact 
— viz. the importance of the towns (from London downwards) in 
the public life of the nation. English foreign policy, moreover, had 
ceased to be absorbed in dynastic enterprises or designs, or satisfied 
with the advantages to be gained by the landed magnates, no longer 
isolated as these were by their nationality from the rest of the popu- 
lation. On the other hand, a different kind of foreign connexion had 
steadily advanced. Flemish and Low-German towns — not sea-ports 
only, but towns in the interior of the Empire also — had maintained 
trade relations with this country already before the Norman Con- 
quest. Henry II had confirmed the privileges of the Cologne "fac- 
tory" in London, before its parent association had been outrivalled 
by a body of Lower-Saxon towns, headed by Lubeck, which, in the 
course of the thirteenth century, appropriated to itself the once 
generic name of the Hansa. The progress of this intercourse, and of 



FOREIGN POLICY OF EDWARD I AND III 3 

that with the Flemish towns, which reached its height at a later date, 
could not otherwise than directly affect the continental relations of 
England and her Government and shape the beginnings of a com- 
mercial, which became an integral element in her foreign, policy. 

But as yet the sword was the determining factor. The great reign 
of Edward I, who came out of the midst of a crusade to enter upon 
the mighty task awaiting him nearer home, was one of widespread 
foreign conquest, though at the same time of the firm planting of 
domestic reforms. He mastered both Wales and Scotland, though 
the principality was not incorporated in the English State till the 
reign of the second Tudor King, while Scotland retained her re- 
covered autonomy even after the personal union under our first 
Stewart. Edward I's relations with France had become embittered 
before he entered upon his first conquest of Scotland, and had led 
to his conclusion of a futile alliance with the German King Adolphus ; 
on the other hand, the defensive alliance concluded with France by 
John Balliol before his deposition, established the tradition of a 
Scoto-French league, which beset English foreign policy almost 
continuously down to the days of Elizabeth. But, if it was Scotland 
herself which at Bannockburn undid the English Conquest, that 
Conquest itself and the whole of Edward I's overbearing policy could 
not have been carried out by the King without a nation at his back, 
or without the widespread resources of a singularly active commercial 
diplomacy 1 . When, under his grandson Edward III, after an unstable 
settlement with Scotland, the country resumed warlike action against 
France, which now remained, for a hundred years, its dominant 
passion, diplomatic transactions of a directly political kind were an 
inevitable necessity. The chain of foreign alliances concluded by 
Edward III with the German Princes along the Lower Rhine, and 
thence even with the potentates of the Palatinate, Wiirttemberg 
and Savoy, forms an early example of the series of subsidy treaties 
which is, perhaps, the most long-lived feature of British foreign 
policy; and (in 1337) the "system" was extended so as to include 
the Emperor, Lewis the Bavarian, himself. But the Peace of 
Bretigny (1360), which, by a drastic partition, was to have at last 
ended the struggle for the throne of France, held good for less 
than nine years; and the renewed War speedily led to disastrous 

1 When his supply of money fell short in consequence of his banishment of 
the Jews, Parliament came temporarily to the rescue, and he was able, with ad- 
vantage to the Crown, to fall back upon the banking guilds in the North Italian 
cities. 



4 INTRODUCTION 

results for the English dominion in France. Thus, in the tragic reign 
of Richard II, the efforts against France, following on that of 
England's Flemish ally, broke down in their turn, as did the attempted 
invasion of Scotland ; and failure abroad, coupled with the effects of 
the social catastrophe at home, brought the national life to the state 
of despair which precedes dissolution. In the end, the unfortunate 
King, lured back to England from an expedition to Ireland, lost his 
English Crown. The kinsman who took it from him was a prince of 
wide foreign experience acquired by travel, and would have willingly 
entered into the inheritance of the foreign policy of Edward I. But 
the insecurity of his tenure at home deprived him of the power of 
action in France, though the distracted internal condition of that 
kingdom offered so favourable an opportunity for intervention in 
its affairs. 

The renewal of the French policy of Edward III, and the asser- 
tion of claims at once wider and weaker, fell to Henry V, in whose 
settlement, as after Agincourt it found expression in the Treaty of 
Troyes, the Alliance with Burgundy was a necessary factor. But 
it was not written in the book of fate that England should be per- 
manently burdened by the inheritance of a great foreign dominion, 
which, had she retained possession of it, must have strained beyond 
bearing the powers of the nation in the satisfaction of an unnatural 
ambition. The Wars of the Roses, while they went far towards de- 
stroying the ascendancy of the great Houses, left the economic con- 
dition of the people largely untouched ; so that, at the close of the 
struggle, the country stood face to face with the intelligent despotism 
(a phrase to which the Eighteenth Century has no prerogative claim) 
of the Tudors. At the same time (since foreign policy is a branch of 
government to which public opinion, accustomed as it is to judge 
mainly by results, is not wont to apply logical reasoning), there can 
be no doubt that the dissatisfaction caused by the loss of France 
sensibly contributed to the downfall of the rule of Henry VI; or 
that his rival, after seating himself on the Throne, had actually to 
seek a momentary refuge against French intrigue in the Netherlands. 
With their master, Charles the Bold, Edward IV was on friendly 
terms, though he could not depend on him as an ally against France, 
and death overtook him on the eve of a struggle with an adversary 
whose equal he had never proved himself. 

This counterplay of foreign rivalry and domestic plot still con- 
tinued, when, after the brief and bloody epilogue of the reign of 



FOREIGN POLICY OF HENRY VII 5 

Richard III, the long dynastic and baronial conflict had corne to an 
end with the accession of our first Tudor Sovereign. By far the most 
dangerous of the Pretenders who tried to oust Henry VII from the 
Throne of which he had, at the time of Buckingham's rebellion, 
sought to possess himself, was Perkin Warbeck, an adventurous 
Fleming whose first attempt was "financed" by the Roman King 
Maximilian. He was afterwards made welcome as the true heir to the 
English throne by King James IV of Scotland, whose goodwill King 
Henry VII more effectively secured by bestowing on him the hand 
of his daughter Margaret — a step which ultimately led to the Union 
of the two kingdoms. 

The foreign policy of Henry VII — for, in this age marriages were 
coming to constitute a very notable feature in the foreign policy of 
the European dynasties — was a combination of circumspection, if not 
of foresight, with caution. Naturally enough, its beginnings display 
more of the latter, and its subsequent developments more of the 
former, characteristic; but they rarely fail to be blended with each 
other. The monarchical rule of the Tudors transmuted the land — 
which had been the battle-field of a turbulent Baronage — into a State 
peacefully united in itself and thus gradually grown fit to find its 
place in the group of rival European nations. And, so early as the 
beginning of the sixteenth century, England began, likewise, to pur- 
sue an economical policy of her own in lieu of one which merely 
suited itself, as best it might, to the interest of her customers. It 
took a century, more or less, to break the domination of the Hansa 
over English trade, and for English trade to assert itself in the North- 
ern Seas ; and the Tudor age was approaching its close, when England 
began to enter into the maritime life of the Atlantic, and thus at last 
to realise the true value of her insular position and to face the gradual 
unfolding of the possibilities of her imperial future. 

But the process was both slow and full of interruptions, and re- 
fuses to be detailed even in a chronological sequence of reigns. Before 
mounting the English Throne, the future King Henry VII had found 
a refuge in Brittany; and, soon after his accession, he assisted its 
ducal House in its struggle against the French Crown, though he 
could not prevent the incorporation, in the end, of the duchy in the 
monarchy. But he went out of his way in safeguarding the position 
of England in the event of future troubles between France and the 
Spanish monarchy, as is shown by his extreme caution in the method 
of the successive marriages of his sons Arthur and Henry to the 



6 INTRODUCTION 

Infanta Catharine. While it seems questionable whether Henry VII 
actually contemplated a decided resumption of the anti-French policy 
of the Plantagenets, he was certainly alive to the chances opening for 
a relatively weak country like England in the age of Discovery, and 
was, in different ways, interested in both Columbus and the Cabots, 
though unequal, afterwards, to the thought of disputing the Spanish- 
Portuguese control of the New World sanctioned by Papal Bulls. 
Before England could claim her place in the sun, the mercantile 
marine had to be fostered, and rendered capable of service to the 
royal navy, of which a beginning was once more made. 

With Henry VIII, the foreign policy of the English Crown once 
more, but under new conditions, enters into the main current of 
European affairs, and thus contributes to the beginning of a new 
period — the Habsburg period, as it has been appropriately called, 
though this subdivides itself into several chapters of the international 
history of Europe. By acknowledging the Spanish Infanta as his 
legitimate consort, Henry seemed to have declared that he had 
definitively ranged himself on the side which had not yet come to 
be the "monstrous aggregate" of Spanish-Austrian power; and, in 
1 5 12-14, he took part in a war with France which brought him no 
profit. The vagueness of his own political ambitions is illustrated by 
his posing, on the death of Maxmilian I in 15 19, as a candidate for 
the succession to the Imperial Throne. But, in the great contest 
which ensued between the Emperor Charles and King Francis, he 
again chose his side, and proposed to his victorious ally a further 
enterprise which should restore to himself the French Crown worn 
by his predecessors. He was disappointed in his designs, and in the 
Emperor; and, by the advice of Cardinal Wolsey, he thereupon 
brought to pass one of the most notable renversements des alliances 
recorded in European diplomatic history. In general English his- 
tory, this political episode is above all noticeable as forming part of 
the transactions which ended in Henry's divorce from Catharine, 
followed though it was by a very different marriage from that originally 
contemplated by Wolsey. In the history of our foreign policy in 
particular, the significance of this episode lies in its having been the 
first application, in a critical connexion, of a conception which was 
afterwards to become, and to remain longer than is always allowed, 
the guiding principle of English, and subsequently, of British foreign 
policy. This principle was that of the Balance of Power. 

The Balance of Power is, as has been well pointed out, an idea 



THE SYSTEM OF THE BALANCE OF POWER 7 

practically inseparable from all policy properly so called — nor in the 
domain of international relations or "foreign affairs" only. But, in 
this domain — to pass by whatever precedent Italy, the mother of 
modern diplomacy, may have to offer in her sixteenth century his- 
tory — the action or conduct of the English Government after the 
first great self-assertion of the united Habsburg Power may be de- 
scribed as the beginning of a new "system." To this system the 
political world of Europe was not to cease to have recourse in the 
succession of crises undergone by it from the times in question 
onward to those of the Thirty Years' War, of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, of the Napoleonic rule, and of the German design of 
overwhelming the world. So far as England is concerned, the English 
archer's motto Cui adhaereo praeest might seem to denote sufficiently 
the way in which this country has, by prescribing its remedy, been 
wont to apply the doctrine of the Balance of Power; and, for our 
present purpose, it is needless to enquire in what measure the changes 
in the attitude of the Papacy towards King Henry's divorce proposal 
was a cause, and in what a consequence, of the change in his general 
foreign policy. 

In any case, the English Reformation was long left by Charles V 
to proceed on its way, nor was it till after the critical dates of 1544 
and 1547 — Crepy and Miihlberg — that the head of the House of 
Habsburg brought the whole weight of his designs, political and 
religious, to bear on our national future. This was now that of a 
monarchy whose unity and independence seemed both to have been 
consolidated, like those of no other European kingdom, with the final 
aid of the Reformation. But the two reigns which followed brought 
with them the extreme of vicissitudes. Under Edward VI, Somerset 
planned the achievement of a union between England and Scotland 
— this design, also, taking the form of a marriage-scheme, between 
the young King Edward and the still younger Queen Mary Stewart, 
which was to result in the hegemony of the united realms over Pro- 
testant Europe (whose refugees had already found a welcome on 
English soil). The plan came to nothing; nor was it even possible to 
maintain the good understanding with France which was a necessary 
preliminary condition for such an enterprise. Mary Tudor's re- 
ligious creed combined with the traditions of her descent in bring- 
ing about the return of England to the Spanish Alliance ; though it 
may savour of the Castilian style to magnify as "the Habsburg in- 
vasion of England" her marriage to the master of Spain and the 



8 INTRODUCTION 

champion of Rome, followed by the persecution of heresy and the 
humiliation inflicted on Queen and country by the loss of its naval 
outpost of more than two hundred years' standing. Under Elizabeth, 
English foreign policy slowly shook itself free, and thus gradually 
recovered an influence upon the political relations of the European 
States which Henry VII had tentatively striven to acquire by means 
of foreign alliances, and Henry VIII had exercised in action within 
restricted limits. As the aggressive strength of Spain and Rome 
combined — we are now in the age of the so-called Counter-reforma- 
tion — the goodwill of European Protestantism (from which in form, 
and largely in spirit, the ecclesiastical system of England remained 
aloof) was a sure support against them. A special advantage, which 
might almost be called adventitious, was derived by Elizabeth from 
her encouragement of the Reformation in Scotland. For, as the deeply 
rooted contention between herself and the Scottish Mary merged 
into the European religious conflict at large (so early as 1562, Eng- 
lish aid was promised by Treaty to the French Huguenots, but the 
price demanded was not obtained), Elizabeth was at last driven by 
Spanish machinations and Roman arrogance into an attitude of con- 
sistent opposition, and the English Throne and its policy became 
identified with the resistance of Europe to the general undoing of 
her Peace. 

The English goodwill, at first permissive only, towards the Re- 
volt of the Netherlands, and the daring piracies of Drake, provoked 
the final despatch of the Armada — the combined effort of Spanish 
southern Europe, undertaken with no less a design than that of se- 
curing to Philip Mary Stewart's bequest of the English Throne. The 
effort was, necessarily, made by sea, and by sea it was scattered. This 
one great victory — comparable only to Salamis — had at the same time 
placed England in the position of a Great Power, and shown that, 
unapproachable herself by sea, it was by sea that her national des- 
tinies were to be accomplished. But, both before and after the 
critical years 1586-8, the safety of England and that of her Sovereign 
depended on a resolute vigilance which, alike in the observation of 
European (more especially Spanish) policy in all its windings and in 
the use of an incomparable spy-intelligence system, called for the 
single-minded devotion of diplomatic statesmanship. This was the 
period of the Cecils, of whom the elder (Burleigh) served the Crown 
as Secretary of State (with a five years' interval) and Lord Treasurer 
for nearly half a century of indefatigable and unflinching labours. 



THE PACIFICISM OF JAMES I 9 

At the height of these, he had the assistance of Sir Francis Walsingham 
as Secretary of State (less fortunate than Burleigh in the requital ol 
his zeal), and, later, that of his second son. Sir Robert Cecil, after- 
wards Earl of Salisbury, was sworn Principal Secretary to the Queen 
in 1597, in which year he returned to England after a futile mission 
to Henry IV of France, in time to take his father's place in the con- 
duct of foreign (and not a few other) affairs. He gave the most un- 
equivocal proofs of his staunchness in the unhappy Essex episode, 
which followed soon after Burleigh's death in 1598, and remained in 
authority till his own decease. This took place in 1 612, the year before 
the arrival in King James's Court of the most notable of Spanish 
diplomatists, Gondomar, under whose influence English policy once 
more swerved from its course, and began to lie low without really 
competent guidance. 

To go back, for a moment, to the beginning of James I's reign. 
By land, the settlement of the English Crown and the consequent 
Personal Union with the northern kingdom, were effected without 
resistance. Great Britain was henceforth, as Lord Acton expresses it, 
politically as well as geographically an island, and no apprehensions 
of the designs of a warlike neighbour any longer entered into the 
foreign policy of its larger half. Moreover, the age into which King 
James was born was one of limitless conceptions of monarchical 
authority. These conceptions, as adopted by James I, included not 
only questions of religion (treated by him after a fashion which failed 
to commend itself to his subjects, Protestant or Catholic) but also 
questions, often mixed up with these, of foreign policy. He began as 
a peacemaker, proclaiming the blessedness of this task to the Spanish 
grandee who came over to conclude peace with him immediately 
after his accession 1 . And it was as a peacemaker that, though "on 
all hands he heard the call of battle," the younger of the Cecils, in 
the words of his descendant and biographer, carried on "the tradi- 
tions of peace he had learnt from his father." But the forces at work 
against James I's persistent desire to remain on friendly terms with 
Spain were too strong for him; so that, before he died, the two coun- 
tries were again to all intents and purposes at war with one another, 
and an immediate French marriage was arranged for his successor. As 
for the Dutch, it is worth noticing that what in much later times was 

1 Beati Pacifici (the phrase put into King James's mouth by Scott) was the 
inscription in the apartment in Somerset House occupied by the Constable of 
Castile, who negotiated the Peace with Spain of 1604. 



io INTRODUCTION 

to become an accepted maxim of British policy — a strong and, in a 
wider sense, United Netherlands, both Protestant and Catholic — only 
very slowly became even so much as a pious wish. While Salisbury, 
a true Conservative like his father before him, directed the foreign 
policy of James I, there was no fear of extravagances or paradoxes. 
After that (from 1612), the King reckoned altogether amiss when, 
though no longer guided by proved principle and matured experi- 
ence, he credited himself with the power of adjusting the scales 
swinging in the political atmosphere around him. The marriage of 
his daughter to the leader of German Calvinism, in other words of the 
actual opposition to the Habsburg designs for the future of the Em- 
pire and Western Europe, brought him a strong breeze of popularity 
at home; but the match was incompatible with the repeated proofs 
given by him of his desire to cement his friendship with Spain, who 
was still planning a revival of the Habsburg monarchy of Charles V 1 . 
Meanwhile, the fierce disillusionment experienced by James early in 
his reign as to Catholic goodwill towards himself at home by no means 
remained without effect, but led to no decisive move in the game. He 
seized the opportunity of a quarrel between Pope Paul V and the 
Signory of Venice (which culminated in 1606) to instruct his willing 
Ambassador there (Sir Henry Wotton) to denounce Pope and Papacy 
as "the chief authors of all the mischiefs of Christendom." And 
after, ten years later, the great Religious War had already begun in 
Bohemia, the same diplomatist was chosen (though Lord Doncaster 
was ultimately appointed in his place) to conduct the negotiations 
as to the acceptance of the Bohemian Crown by the King's son-in- 
law, in which the King himself played a part which it would be a 
euphemism to describe as ambiguous. So early as 1619, Wotton had 
entered into negotiations with the heads of the Protestant Union, which 
turned a deaf ear to his inglorious proposals for an anti-Papal propa- 
ganda, and while the star of the Emperor Ferdinand soon rose tri- 
umphant over that of the unfortunate Winter-king, the foreign policy 
of his father-in-law had to concentrate itself upon the attempted re- 
covery of the Palatinate for the Elector and his family, who had 
"lost it in Bohemia." But the efforts of English volunteers under 
Sir Horace Vere, Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick were futile, 
and before, quite at the end of James's reign, Mansfeld's plan of 

1 Bourgeois (vol. 1. p. 19) dwells on the successive attempts of Philip III to 
secure the Imperial Succession for himself or his son. The various Spanish mar- 
riage projects of King James for his children are well known. 



BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION n 

settling the claim with an imposing English force had, in the midst 
of Anglo-French misunderstandings, miserably collapsed (1625), 
James had fallen back upon the last and most ill-starred of his futile 
Spanish marriage schemes. But Charles, Prince of Wales, who, to 
bring it to an issue, had travelled to Spain with Buckingham, had 
come home free (1623); and, when he actually mounted his father's 
Throne, England was once more, in conjunction with the Dutch 
Republic, at war with Spain, and the alliance with France was con- 
firmed by the marriage of Charles to Henrietta Maria, the daughter 
of Henry IV. 

Meanwhile, and largely in consequence of the altered conditions 
of the relations between England and Spain under which Queen 
Elizabeth's reign had drawn to its close, the island Kingdom had 
definitively entered into the paths of overseas colonisation. The power 
of Spain, the dreaded adversary of rival transatlantic adventure, was 
shaken, though not annihilated ; and her acquisition of Portugal (1580), 
without adding to her political strength in Europe, had diverted enter- 
prise to the Portuguese settlements in Brazil and the East Indies, 
inevitably leading to angry jealousy between the English and the 
Dutch. The English attempts, in Elizabeth's days, upon Spanish 
possessions on land and sea, however conspicuously supported (on 
occasions by the Queen herself), cannot properly be described as 
measures of colonial policy, but are simply evidence of desire for 
gain, stimulated by jealousy and hatred; just as the charge of a 
broken promise to which Raleigh was (so late as 1617) sacrificed 
was a signal demonstration of accumulated Spanish wrath. But the 
early course of English Colonial history was consistently attended 
by the rivalry of other Powers. The English East India Company 
(more strictly, the East India Company of London) received its 
original Charter in 1600, nearly two years before the Dutch, and 
within the following decade the two were at open war. But the first 
settlement directly controlled by the English Crown, and therefore 
the actual beginning of our colonial system, dates from the grant to 
"Virginia" of her earliest Royal Charter in 1606, followed by the 
second in 1609, and later by the Charters secured by the several 
new English Colonies. The early history of these shows their safety 
in constant danger from Dutch, and more particularly from French, 
enterprise or ambition; while, to the north, France, after a struggle 
terminating, in 1632, with the Peace of St Germain, maintained her 
power in her province of Acadia (Nova Scotia). Hence, too, the 



12 INTRODUCTION 

earliest suggestions of a scheme of federation among the English 
North American Colonies, which might very possibly have earlier 
taken lasting shape, but for the Civil War at home. The action of the 
Crown towards the beginnings of our Colonial system cannot safely 
be criticised as closely connected with the turns and changes of our 
foreign policy ; but the time was not far off when the two currents 
were effectively to unite. 

Under Charles I, so long as his Government was able to carry 
on any foreign policy at all, it may be regarded as having been chiefly 
actuated by the motive of gaining for the King and Buckingham 
some of the popularity which their method of government at home 
was rapidly forfeiting. The French marriage of Charles I had seemed 
likely to bring about friendly relations with the French Court and 
Government, and to favour an anti-Habsburg Alliance, as to which 
negotiations were in progress with both Sweden and Denmark so 
early as August 1624. Apart from other friction, Buckingham's 
failure at Cadiz (1625) promised ill for the Spanish War; and the 
French Government would have nothing to say to the agreement 
into which the English Government had actually entered with the 
States-General for the recovery of the Palatinate by a force under 
the command of Christian IV of Denmark, Mansfeld cooperating. 
But the English supplies failed; and the defeat of Christian IV at 
Lutter (1626) put an end to the whole design, as it did to England's 
futile participation in the Great War. Before long (1627), the tension 
between France and England had ended in the outbreak of hostilities ; 
and Buckingham, who two years earlier had been fain to lend English 
ships to Richelieu for the suppression of the Huguenots of Rochelle, 
now threw his French policy to the winds, taking command of the 
expedition for their relief. The attempt, the success of which was to 
have rejoiced the hearts of Protestant Englishmen, broke down; and, 
like an unlucky gambler, its author at once entered upon a vaster 
design against the adversaries of Protestantism, in which the relief 
of Rochelle was to be but the initial step. The assassin's dagger, 
however, settled his account with an angry Parliament; the last re- 
fuge of the Huguenots soon fell ; and the failure in France had been 
as complete as that in Germany (1628). The time was at hand when 
the domestic strife in which the second Stewart reign had opened 
was to end in the Civil War. 



THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA 13 

II 

The eminent historian of European Foreign Policy 1 may seem to 
go too far in saying that England, at the end of a half-century during 
which hardly more weight had attached to her in European politics 
than to Venice or Saxony, suddenly became the first Power of the 
world. But it is true, that few, if any, later generations have wit- 
nessed a transformation at once so astonishing in itself, and one so 
full of the promise of endurance. The period in question covered the 
Thirty Years' War, the great European struggle in which England 
interfered only after the fitful and insignificant fashion to which 
reference has been made; while the late but decisive intervention of 
France finally shaped the close of the War and the Pacification which 
ended it, thus, as has been well said, preparing her hegemony in 
Europe during the half-century that was to follow. In settling that 
Pacification, neither England nor Poland, nor the Grand-duke of 
Muscovy, had taken any part; but they were named in the Peace as 
Allies of the Allies of the Emperor and Sweden (the Grand-duke, 
of Sweden only), and thus became parties to the Peace, so that it 
bore the character of a fundamental act and international procedure 
of Christian Europe. And it is in this sense that the conditions of 
the Peace of Westphalia, as a whole, served to recast the State-system 
{societas gentium) of which England (or Great Britain) formed part, 
and essentially affected or modified, in accordance with their respec- 
tive circumstances and interests, the foreign policy of the several 
States (England with the rest) included in it. In the first place, from 
the Peace of Westphalia onwards, the Empire was no longer, as such, 
an organic factor in the European State-system in question, not- 
withstanding its own formal endurance and the glamour of tradition 
which still attached a lingering weight to its occasional self-asser- 
tion 2 . For the Estates of the Empire were now in possession of the 
rights of sovereignty expressly recognised in the Peace as theirs. 
Moreover, the Empire could now no longer lay claim to control, in 
any way, the foreign relations of the United Provinces or of Switzer- 
land. The independence of the former, which specially interests us 
here, was recognised in the Peace by Spain herself, who retained her 
direct or (since 1598) indirect control over the Belgic Provinces, till, 
in the Peace of Rastatt (1714), they became the Austrian, instead of the 

1 M. £mile Bourgeois. 

a More especially, as the leader of Christendom in its resistance to the Turks. 



i 4 INTRODUCTION 

Spanish, Netherlands. Again, however absolutely the Vatican might, 
for this very reason, denounce the Westphalian Treaties, the re- 
ligious affairs of the Empire were henceforth definitely regulated by 
a recognition of the rights of the three Confessions — for none besides 
these three were taken into account; and this provision took away 
(though, as it proved, not altogether) future occasions for religious 
conflicts within the Empire in which foreign Powers might seek to 
interfere 1 . 

Such were the chief general changes to which the European State- 
system was subjected by the Peace of Westphalia — changes of high 
importance, but not such as to mark any signal advance towards 
international relations favourable to an enduring Peace of the World. 
So far as England in particular was concerned, the War had brought 
about, and the Peace established, relations between the Continental 
Powers which she could not possibly ignore and which, in one way 
or another, must, for a time at all events, greatly affect her foreign 
policy. The long-sustained military enterprise of Sweden, and the 
well-timed intervention of France, had enabled them to obtain, in 
the Peace, compensations ("satisfactions") which gave to the former 
a strong footing in northern, and provided France with continuous 
opportunities for action in western, Germany; while Sweden had ac- 
quired the command of the mouths of Oder, Elbe and Weser, and was 
placed in antagonism to Brandenburg, whose Elector held Ducal 
(Western) Poland as a fief of the Polish Crown. France had, by 
acquiring Breisach and the right of garrisoning Philippsburg, secured 
direct access to the German South-west, had taken the place of Austria 
in Alsace, and had secured sure opportunities for future intervention 
in the affairs of the Empire and its Estates at large. The acquisition 
of the Belgic Provinces themselves remained an unachieved project 
of French political ambition, as it had under Richelieu, and the 
"natural frontiers" of France were proclaimed by him in his last 
will (now accepted as genuine) as a legitimate claim of the France 
of the future 2 . As for the sea, though at the close of the Great War 
(which did not include peace between France and Spain) Mazarin's 

1 It is true that, although the idea of a United Christendom was thus, in Church 
as well as in State, abandoned, an attempt was made at Munster to provide the 
settled system of States now adopted with a tentative guarantee, in the form of a 
"wish" that, in case of any dispute, three years would be allowed for securing a 
solution sanctioned by all the States not parties to that dispute. But the guarantee 
included no appeal to arms ; and no instance seems to be on record of its having 
ever been called into operation. 

2 Cf. Hanotaux, Melanges Historiques, vol. ill. (1880), pp. 705 ff. 



ENGLISH POLICY AFTER PEACE OF WESTPHALIA 15 

Italian policy had not achieved complete success, there was now 
every prospect that the Mediterranean would henceforth be under 
French rather than Spanish control. The command of the Baltic, 
on the other hand, ultimately a matter of far more importance to 
Great Britain than it was to the United Netherlands, the Suedo- 
French Alliance had assured to Sweden for the period immediately 
following on the conclusion of the Peace; whether it could be re- 
tained by her depended in the first instance on her relations with her 
neighbour and ancient rival, Denmark. 

From the settlement or discussion of all these questions, the Eng- 
lish Government and people, which, in the early stages of the Thirty 
Years' War, had shown so keen an interest in its progress, held aloof 
at its close. The country was on the very eve of the termination of 
the long struggle between Crown and Parliament, by the transfer of 
supreme authority to a section of the House of Commons. The foreign 
policy of the Commonwealth was at first out of touch with either of 
the belligerents still in arms against each other (France and Spain) ; 
nor was it even clear what line the new Government would pursue 
towards the Power which was at the time in command of the carry- 
ing-trade of Europe at large. Would mercantile jealousy prevail, in 
this latter day, over the religious sympathies which, in Elizabeth's 
time, had induced England to take the side of the now Free Nether- 
lands in their long struggle with Spain ? 

Meanwhile, soon after Europe, as a whole, had accepted the 
Westphalian settlement designed to govern the future relations be- 
tween her States, England signified, as it were once for all, what was 
the part she proposed to play among them. This she accomplished by 
the assertion of her sea-power; which not only made possible the 
great Victory (Dunbar), but put an end to such resistance as was 
offered by Continental Europe to her new Commonwealth. French 
piracy was suppressed, and Lisbon was blockaded (1650) — the capital 
of a nation which, a decade earlier, had secured its independence and 
had, without loss of time, concluded Treaties with France and the 
United Provinces, and another with the English Government (1642). 
The last of these was the precursor of the still more important Treaty 
with Portugal, negotiated in 1654 by the Rump and signed by Crom- 
well, and may thus be regarded as having laid the foundation of the 
most long-lived, as well as the oldest, of all European Alliances 1 . Its 

1 Cf. Guernsey Jones, Beginnings of the Oldest European Alliance (Washington, 
1919). 



16 INTRODUCTION 

beginnings were, however, interrupted by the catastrophe of the 
Stewart Throne, of which, among contemporary Sovereigns, King 
John IV of Portugal alone took note by acts of overt hostility, though 
his Government was, also, the earliest to enter into diplomatic 
relations with that of "the Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
England." Before long, King John's cherished design of the marriage 
of the Prince of Wales to a Portuguese Infanta was to be resumed, 
and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance to enter into a new stage of its 
long-protracted course. But, for the present, Prince Rupert, the 
stormy petrel of the Restoration, had fluttered away into Medi- 
terranean waters, and English foreign policy had been revolutionised. 
In order to achieve these results, Blake, one of the greatest of our 
naval heroes, had found it necessary to complete the creation of a 
permanent English navy of war and to secure its requisite bases of 
action. When, therefore, an English fleet entered the Mediterranean 
in 1 65 1, it could not do so without the goodwill of some Power pos- 
sessed of harbours where English vessels could be refitted or re- 
victualled ; and this Power could be no other than Spain (by means of 
the Spanish ports in the Two Sicilies and Sardinia), so long the foe 
of England and sure to become such again. For the moment, political 
advantage had drawn the two nations nearer together ; how could the 
Government of Philip IV remain on unfriendly terms with a Power 
which had swept the seas clear of French and Portuguese ships ? Thus, 
so early as May 1650, the Spanish Government had recognised that of 
the Commonwealth; and a resident diplomatic agent had been sent 
to Madrid. But the murder of that agent (Ascham), on the day after 
his arrival, could not but lead to friction with Spain; and the effect 
of this was a friendly turn in the relations between the Common- 
wealth and the French Government, more especially as the Hugue- 
not interest for a time made head in France against the sway of 
Mazarin. French commerce, however, continued to suffer from 
English naval activity, and the Commonwealth was now strong 
enough to pass an Act prohibiting trade with such of the American 
and West India Colonies as adhered to the Royalist cause (1650). 
By sea and land, the Commonwealth had resolved to be master 
where the Crown had been. 

As for the relations at this time between England and the Free 
Netherlands, they passed with most notable suddenness from extreme 
to extreme. At first, the States-General, under Orange influence, 
refused to enter into other than commercial negotiations with the 



THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE UNITED PROVINCES 1 7 

Commonwealth. But the death (October, 1650) of the Stadholder 
William II (before the birth of his son, the future William III) led 
to a complete change in the conduct of the affairs of the Dutch Re- 
public, which now, with the exception of the two Provinces acknow- 
ledging the Orange Stadholdership, fell under the control of the 
Province of Holland. This change caused the Government of the 
Commonwealth to form the design of concluding as close as possible 
an Alliance with the United Provinces, and even to entertain, as a 
possible result of negotiations to this end, the notion of converting 
the Alliance into a political union between the two countries. But the 
Commonwealth leaders and their envoys (Chief Justice St John and 
Strickland) insufficiently understood the political organisation of the 
body politic with which they had to deal, and they made no allow- 
ance for the violent Orange predilections of the populace. Thus, 
after a protracted negotiation, at an early stage of which the Dutch 
had proposed as the basis of a treaty the Intercursus Magnus (agreed 
upon in 1495, at the time of the Perkin Warbeck scare), this far- 
reaching design was allowed to drop — chiefly on the narrow ground 
that the English negotiators insisted on the strict exclusion of the 
English Royalists from the Netherlands. The immediate result of 
the attempt and its failure was a growth of illwill between the two 
communities — stimulated, on the part of England, by the conscious- 
ness that her sea-power was no longer inferior to the Dutch, and by 
the acceptance of the Commonwealth Government (notwithstanding 
Prince Rupert) in the greater part of the English New World. 

Hereupon, the Parliament carried on, with increased determina- 
tion, the restrictive policy on which it had fallen back after the col- 
lapse of the Dutch Alliance or "Union" project, and of which the 
main end was to advance English commerce at the expense of that 
of the Provinces. Their legislation and diplomacy had been long, and 
at times unscrupulously, directed to the maintenance of their com- 
mercial ascendancy, north and east as well as west, at a height danger- 
ously near to monopoly; and the first Navigation Act, of October, 
165 1 , which practically annihilated Dutch trade with the English West 
Indies, though not intended to provoke war with the United Provinces, 
was very intelligibly looked upon as conceived in the spirit of 
retaliation 1 . Thus, when, in 1652, the first of the Wars between 

1 It was, at the same time, in thorough agreement with the economic ideas of 
the age. Gardiner points out that this was the one legislative achievement of the 
Commonwealth which not only found favour in the eyes of the Convention Parlia- 
ment, but was reenacted by it in a more stringent form (1660). 

W.&G.I. 2 



18 INTRODUCTION 

England and the Dutch Republic broke out, though not occasioned 
by the Navigation Act, it was largely due to the commercial tension 
which culminated in this memorable piece of legislation. 

Meanwhile, the turn taken by domestic affairs in France had in- 
evitably reacted upon the party in the Long Parliament by which 
that Parliament was itself to be overthrown, and of which Cromwell 
himself stood at the head. The rally round Conde of the Huguenot 
nobles of the South, supported by Bordeaux and other southern 
towns, had aroused Cromwell's interest. He had dreamt of a Pro- 
testant and republican France; but, of course, it was only a dream, 
and the notion of persuading the French radical organisation called 
the Ormee to construct a Constitution on the Fifth Monarchy model 
(though the precursor of later political fancies) proved equally futile. 
On the other hand, Conde had taken the paradoxical step of applying 
for aid to both Spain and England ; and, for a time, Cromwell and his 
following, while desirous for the preservation, if possible, of peace, 
hesitated between two possible alliances. They were drawn to Spain 
by her recognition of the Commonwealth, which France had hitherto 
persistently refused, and to France by the possibility of her transfer 
of Dunkirk to England, as well as by the further possibility of her 
being induced to put an end to the persecution of the Huguenots. 
Early in 1652, Mazarin was once more at the helm, and though a 
proclamation of the young King Lewis XIV confirmed the Edict of 
Nantes and paid a tribute to the loyalty of his Huguenot subjects, 
the French recognition of the Commonwealth was still distant, and 
the transfer of Dunkirk quite out of the question. When, therefore, 
in the same year (against Cromwell's wish), hostilities began between 
the English and the Dutch, there was no little danger of a speedy 
declaration of war by England against France, and Blake lost no time 
in inflicting reprisals on French ships. But, the fall of Gravelines 
and the surrender of Dunkirk into Spanish hands notwithstanding, 
Mazarin was unwilling to hasten an open conflict with England ; where 
there was a corresponding wish not to break with France, unless an 
understanding should have been reached with Spain. Neither Power 
was, or could be, welcome as an ally to the Commonwealth, although, 
near the end of 1652, it had been (at first with a doubtful grace) recog- 
nised by the King of France. The Dutch War, which opened in 1652, 
at first, notwithstanding several well-contested battles, remained 
unattended by any decisive result. A period of uncertainty seemed 
to have befallen the foreign policy of England, and one which even 



EARLIER FOREIGN POLICY OF OLIVER CROMWELL 19 

the most expert diplomacy would have found it difficult to bring to 
a satisfactory close. Meanwhile, it was not to any question of foreign 
affairs that the dissolution of the Long Parliament was due ; and the 
day of the Lord- General was not yet quite at hand. When it came, 
the moving spirit in every branch of foreign as well as of home 
affairs was the same militant Protestantism that had, in turn, re- 
modelled the army and succeeded in transforming the State, and 
that was, also, more and more potently impressing itself upon the 
beginnings of English Colonial life. Thus, far more distinctly than 
the tentative efforts of Elizabeth's later years, Oliver's conduct of 
our foreign policy in the middle of the seventeenth century, while 
advancing the material interests of England, put her in the van of 
the process of reconstituting Europe. The problem of effecting this 
by securing her the command of the sea, and, incidentally, depressing 
the Papacy to a thing, or at least a Power, of the past, was not one 
for which even the genius of Oliver Cromwell could find an enduring 
solution ; but the attempt lit up the scene of the world for a brief and 
brilliant period of national action. After these years — fewer even 
than those which sufficed Bismarck for establishing the new Ger- 
many as a dominating European Power — English foreign policy soon 
sank back into a restricted sphere, but not without retaining the 
consciousness of impulses and traditions which it could not easily 
resist or lightly abandon. 

But Oliver's was a political genius, and as such dealt with 
political realities. The consummation was, therefore, not achieved 
suddenly or at once. In 1653, while the control of English govern- 
ment had been committed to a doctrinaire assembly, but when the 
public mind was already looking to the Lord- General for the direction 
of its foreign affairs, he continued for some time to lean towards the 
paradoxical combination which would have allied England with 
Spain and the French Dissidents. Although, in July, 1653, the city 
of Bordeaux surrendered to the King, and the Huguenot outlook 
darkened, Cromwell continued in this mood even beyond the be- 
ginning of the Protectorate, irritated by the plots hatched in France 
against the English Government, and notwithstanding the overtures 
of Mazarin early in 1654. 

He had, in fact, made up his mind that, before choosing between 
France and Spain, England must be at peace with the United Nether- 
lands. In carrying out this resolution he showed his greatness as a poli- 
tician ; but in the several stages of the process he displayed that other 



20 INTRODUCTION 

quality of his mind — its imaginative impetus — which was in a different 
way, an essential element in his greatness. The Dutch War, after a 
series of grandly contested naval battles, had, by Tromp's defeat off 
Portland in February, 1653, left the command of the Channel in 
English hands, and the battle of the Gabbard (June) had proved the 
inability of the Dutch to recover it. The peace negotiations hitherto 
carried on between the belligerents had broken down through the 
severity of the terms demanded by the English Council of State, and 
the new negotiation proposed by the States-General at the instance of 
de Witt (before he was named Pensionary of Holland) had been re- 
jected by the new Council. But now, de Witt's insistence upon the 
necessities of the case, and the despair of the Dutch population, led 
to the appointment of four Dutch Peace Commissioners to England 
(June), and the moment had arrived for Cromwell's intervention. 
Whether or not (and it seems more than doubtful) he had been in 
favour of the War, he was now certainly in favour of peace, and the 
advantages of an intimate alliance in his mind outbalanced those of 
the abasement of England's chief mercantile naval and mercantile 
rival. As for the United Provinces, they must make their choice 
between a territorial sacrifice to France, and joining hands with 
England — though not precisely falling into her arms. Peace must be 
made, but on a generous basis — not of jealousy, but of amity, between 
two great Protestant nations. Thus, Cromwell first informally pro- 
posed, as the security of peace, the appointment of a small number 
of Dutchmen and Englishmen respectively to the English and Dutch 
Councils of State (or States-General). And, when the Dutch Com- 
missioners were unable to see their way to this, or to a fresh sug- 
gestion by Cromwell of a religious and commercial union only, to 
which the Council of State had added the demand of a complete 
political blending of political power and policy under one Supreme 
Head, Cromwell made one more effort — the most astonishing, as it 
was the most characteristic, of all. There was no longer — and with 
Cromwell there cannot be said to have been during the whole of this 
crisis — any thought of a revival of St John's grandiose but impractic- 
able idea of a political union between the two peoples, which had 
broken down on a previous occasion. What was now informally asked 
for was at once less and more than this. Instead of political amalgama- 
tion a Perpetual Alliance was to be established between the two nations. 
This Alliance was, together with them, to include Denmark, Sweden, 
the Protestant Princes of the Empire and France — but the last- 



CROMWELL AND THE UNITED PROVINCES 21 

named on condition that her Government should grant full liberty 
to the Huguenots. It was to be directed against all Princes and States 
who employed the services of the Inquisition and acknowledged the 
authority of the Pope. To this sufficiently vast scheme was added a 
particular plan for the partition of the New World — England to be 
assigned America, with the exception of Brazil, and to be assisted 
by the United Provinces in accomplishing the necessary conquest. 
Each of the two Allies was to establish a Commission consisting of 
four representatives of each. Finally, the Christian purpose of this 
strange League of Nations was to be attested by the sending of mis- 
sionaries to any people willing to receive them. 

Cromwell's design — for, though not of his drafting, it seems cer- 
tainly to have commended itself to him as a basis for future action — 
is invaluable as indicating the present state of his mind and the bent 
of his future policy. It is possible that the bitter hostility to Spain 
which marks the document may have been partly due to the refusal 
of the Spanish Government (at the dictation of the Inquisition) to 
entertain any proposal for the toleration of Protestants in its dominions, 
and by its natural efforts to obstruct the Anglo-Dutch Peace which 
Cromwell and his followers had at heart. In any case, the States- 
General deferred consideration of it, either in its first (both wider 
and cruder) or in a subsequently modified (narrower and less aggres- 
sive) form. Hereupon, after his installation as Protector, Cromwell 
suggested to the Dutch Commissioners, once more in London, a far 
less comprehensive scheme as a basis of peace. A Defensive League 
was to be concluded between the two Powers, binding each side alike 
to enter into no treaty without the consent of the other, and pro- 
claiming freedom of trade between them, but leaving their existing 
laws (the Navigation Act, of course, included) untouched. After not 
a few hitches, the Treaty of Peace was signed and ratified in April, 
1654, and the Act of Exclusion which barred the admission of any 
member of the House of Orange to civil or military office was, thanks 
to the management of de Witt, passed by the States-General in the 
same month. 

What Cromwell had obtained could hardly be considered as a 
diplomatic victory ; but the success of the War had not been used by 
him in vain; for the eyes of France were once more bent on Flanders. 
As for the Protector's wider views, nothing might seem left of them 
but words; yet his ideas were not dead, and inspired fresh efforts on 
behalf of the combined interests which he had at heart. 



23 INTRODUCTION 

Whitelocke, on leaving for his Swedish embassy (at the end of 
1653), had been charged by Oliver himself to "bring us back a Pro- 
testant Alliance." This he was not likely to obtain from Queen 
Christina; but he brought back with him a Commercial Treaty, 
which, together with one concluded with Denmark (now at peace 
with Sweden), placed English commerce on the same footing as Dutch 
in the Baltic. While thus at least a good understanding was effected 
with the Protestant Powers of the North, the Protectorate had entered 
into similar relations with certain Protestant Princes and Cities of the 
Empire, and with the Swiss Protestant Cantons, aided no doubt by 
the negotiations of John Dury throughout Europe on behalf of 
Christian unity. And it may be added, in the same twofold con- 
nexion, that, about the same time (1657), a Treaty with Portugal 
secured to English trade with that country and its dependencies the 
intimate commercial relations which were to be consummated by the 
Treaty of 1661 between the two monarchies. The free intercourse, 
and the immunity from interference by the Inquisition, were the 
very concessions which it had been sought in vain to secure from 
Spain. 

In the meantime, the great changes effected by the Thirty Years' 
War in the general condition of European politics, together with the 
continuance of the contest between France and Spain in particular, 
favoured the realisation of, at least, part of the Protector's plans. 
Though his vision of a new European conflict on a religious basis 
seemed unlikely to take shape, yet England was rapidly assuming a 
position of decisive influence among the States of Europe. For 
different reasons, neither France nor, even more manifestly, Spain 
was strong enough to assert an undisputed predominance; while 
they were alike anxious to add to their respective weight in the scales 
by securing the alliance of England. For a time, as has been seen, 
Oliver inclined to a Spanish combination, and asked for Dunkirk as an 
eventual pledge for Calais. But secret preparations were, meanwhile, 
made for assailing the Spanish Power in the remote, but attractive 
quarter of the West Indies; and, moved as he always was, in the 
last resort, by religious convictions, Oliver, as he settled down firmly 
in the seat of supreme authority at home, proceeded to find his bear- 
ings in the sea of foreign policy. Thus, once more, the ship of State 
consciously and decisively pursued the course which it had followed 
in Elizabeth's unforgotten days. 

To weaken, if not to put an end to, Spain's hold upon the New 



BREACH WITH SPAIN AND TREATY WITH FRANCE 23 

World was, now as then, but under conditions already different from 
those obtaining when Drake singed King Philip's beard, a funda- 
mental part of the Protestant policy which England found herself 
carrying out. But the Protector had rated too low the difficulty of a 
West Indian conquest, when he deluded himself into the belief that 
he could make war upon Spain in America while remaining at peace 
with her in Europe. The attack on Hispaniola (San Domingo) was 
abandoned; but Jamaica, little esteemed in comparison by its first 
conquerors, was occupied (1655). Spanish pride, however, took fire; 
and Philip IV, who had more than countenanced the damage inflicted 
by Blake upon French Mediterranean commerce, now laid an em- 
bargo upon all English vessels and goods in his dominions. By the 
end of October, 1655, the breach was complete; and Oliver was left 
to defend in high-sounding words, which may have convinced him- 
self, a course of action irreconcilable with good faith, but seeming 
to be imposed on him by resistless forces. 

The effect of England's breach with Spain upon France was im- 
peded by the indignation aroused in the Protector, and assiduously 
spread by him through the country at large, at the news of the Duke 
of Savoy's persecution of the Vaudois Protestants. Neither in the 
remonstrance to the Duke (composed by Milton) nor in the appeal 
to the good offices of the King of France (erroneously rumoured to 
have taken part in the outrage) was there anything in the nature of 
a threat. But so far were these efforts from being mere demonstra- 
tions of sympathy, that the other Protestant Powers of Europe were 
called upon to join in seeking redress. The tone of Mazarin's reply 
reveals his anxiety that the incident should not thwart the conclusion 
of the expected Anglo-French Alliance; and, before the memor- 
able agitation in England on the subject had subsided, Duke Charles 
had promised an amnesty to his insurgent subjects, as a concession 
to England. The concession was mainly due to the policy of Mazarin, 
and to some fear of Swiss armed intervention; but the main credit 
of the whole transaction rested with "the World's Protector." 

The Treaty hereupon concluded with France was, as yet, only 
concerned with the establishment of friendly relations : the question 
of an Alliance could not be treated while England was ostensibly 
at peace with Spain. In the final negotiations preceding the con- 
clusion of the compact, the prohibition of the assistance of "rebels" 
to either party was limited to the case of rebels "now declared"; 
but a secret agreement was added banishing the Stewarts and their 



24 INTRODUCTION 

adherents from France and excluding Conde and his House from 
England. On October 21, 1655, the Treaty was at last signed. The 
mixture of motives which impelled Cromwell to conclude it lay at 
the root of a foreign policy in which a personal element cannot for a 
moment be ignored. Nevertheless, together with the actual Treaty 
of Alliance which followed a year later, it marks the beginning of an 
epoch of the utmost significance in the history of English foreign 
policy — the epoch of a cooperation between English and French 
interests, which, though with certain interruptions, may be said to 
have lasted for the better part of a quarter of a century — till the 
European Coalition of 1674 and the change in English policy con- 
sequent upon it. 

Nov/ that Cromwell had declared for a policy which meant war 
with Spain — whom he was soon to denounce (to his second Parlia- 
ment) as England's "natural enemy" — he found himself involved in 
foreign complications hardly less difficult to meet than the designs 
of Royalists and Levellers at home. A war with Spain, as a naval 
war on many coasts, necessitated the constant use of the right of 
search against the Dutch, with whom it was most desirable to avoid 
a renewal of hostilities. Fortunately for England, the Dutch navy 
was at this time actively employed in the Baltic. When, in this year 
1655, tne new King Charles Gustavus had taken up arms against 
Poland, he was, in accordance with the political canon now obtaining 
at Whitehall, regarded as a militant champion of Protestantism 
against Popery. (He was, in truth, anxious to add to the territorial 
gains of Sweden in the Peace of Westphalia, and to lower the ascend- 
ancy of the Dutch trade in the Baltic, where it then quadrupled that 
of the rest of the world.) 

In the face of Sweden's designs, and of the Counter-alliance of 
the Powers threatened by her advance, Oliver hesitated about re- 
sponding to the overtures made to him on either the one or the other 
side. He would have rejoiced to see Charles X's war against Poland 
extended into a general Protestant League against the supposed de- 
signs of the Emperor Ferdinand III and their supposed originator, 
Pope Alexander VII ; yet he could not but perceive that the ambition 
of the Swedish King constituted a serious menace to English as well 
as to Dutch trade in the Baltic. Thus (partly in consequence of the 
financial embarrassments of the Protectorate Government, and partly 
because, with the unprofitable war with Spain and the effort to hold 
Jamaica, it already had enough on its hands and must have left 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 25 

operations against the House of Austria mainly in those of its 
Allies) the sole result of the negotiations between the English and 
Swedish Governments amounted not even to a political alliance. 
The Treaty between them (July, 1656) merely permitted Charles X 
to levy a certain number of volunteers in England and placed this 
country on the footing of the most favoured nation with regard to 
Baltic ports actually in Swedish hands. Much the same terms as to 
duties were shortly afterwards secured for themselves and other 
nations by the Dutch, though at the cost of a naval demonstration, 
which England's good understanding with Sweden had saved her. 
But, if so far satisfactory, this was a tame ending of the whole of this 
episode in the foreign policy of the Protector; and the design of a 
League against Pope and Emperor had once more vanished into thin 
air. 

But the War with Spain and the definitive Alliance with France 
had to be pressed on. Mazarin had again wavered in the direction 
of peace, and there were rumours of a Papal mediation between the 
belligerents. Oliver's manifesto justifying the breach with Spain 
was published on the day after the earlier agreement with France, 
and Spain was (in accordance with diplomatic precedent) declared 
to have begun the War. In April, 1656, Charles II made his con- 
tribution to the conflict by concluding a compact with Spain; and 
the War now ran its course, at first indecisive. In November, the 
Treaty of Alliance between France and England against Spain was 
concluded, though not put into its final form till five months later 
(March, 1657). Mazarin had succeeded in preventing the extension 
of the Treaty into a general league of the Powers adverse to the House 
of Austria; and Cromwell had obtained the substantial pledge of a 
transfer to England of Dunkirk, after it should have been jointly re- 
taken by the French and English forces. Then, at the time when the 
Protector seemed to have reached the height of his power at home, 
there came the news of Blake's great victory over the Spanish fleet 
at Vera Cruz (April, 1657) which crippled the resources of Spain, 
put a stop to her invasion of Portugal and seriously shook her general 
position. The fall of Dunkirk, however, did not take place till more 
than a year later (June, 1658); and before Cromwell could thus feel 
assured of the pledge he had exacted from France, his foreign policy 
had to face new difficulties. 

Though he could not call into being the Protestant League to 
which from religious motives he aspired, he persistently clung to the 



26 INTRODUCTION 

supreme necessity of maintaining peace between the Protestant 
Powers. Notwithstanding the seductive efforts of Sweden, which 
actually made him an offer of the duchy of Bremen as the price of 
his cooperation (November, 1657), he declined to join her in crush- 
ing Denmark, with whom she was now at war, into utter in- 
feriority ; but neither could he see his way to the demand for a settle- 
ment by a Congress brought forward by Denmark under Dutch 
instigation. The process of Cromwell's attempted mediation between 
the Scandinavian Powers thus depended, with much else, upon the 
relations between England and the United Provinces. These relations 
were growing more and more strained — mainly in consequence of 
the long-standing contention as to the right of search, heightened by 
the many occasions for friction offered by the Anglo- Spanish War, 
in whose aspect as a Protestant crusade the Dutch showed scant 
interest. (Moreover, they had picked a quarrel with England's ally 
Portugal about Brazil.) But, when Dutch goodwill to the Danes 
seemed not unlikely to take the form of actual naval aid against the 
Swedes, the Protector held to the way of peace. He determined to 
utilise the French alliance in this direction, and suggested to Mazarin 
joint diplomatic action on the part of England and France for the 
settlement of the Suedo-Danish, as well as the Portuguese-Spanish 
question. The Cardinal (without paying any formal attention to the 
accompanying, as it were indispensable, proposal of an offensive 
and defensive alliance against the House of Austria) entered into the 
suggestion, and the result was that the Danes found themselves able 
to accept the terms imposed by the victorious Charles X in the Peace 
of Roeskilde (February, 1658). The Treaty, by which each of the 
two Northern Powers renounced any alliance hostile to the other and 
closed the Sound to any fleet hostile to both, was a diplomatic vic- 
tory for Cromwell and his agent Meadowe, though followed neither 
by a Suedo-English treaty of alliance nor by any other approach to 
the idea of a Protestant League. The Dutch, who could not but re- 
gard it in the light of a discomfiture, and notwithstanding the efforts 
of de Witt, drew back from the conclusion of a defensive alliance 
with England and France (though they nominally accepted English 
mediation with Portugal about Brazil). 

When at last (June, 1658) after the brilliant victory on the Dunes, 
in which Cromwell's soldiery took part, Dunkirk capitulated and was 
placed by Mazarin in English hands, his policy was seen to have, at 
last, with England's aid prevailed over Spain. This was made mani- 



THE SUM OF CROMWELL'S FOREIGN POLICY 27 

fest by the Elective Capitulation signed by the Head of the German 
Habsburgs before he assumed the Imperial Crown as Leopold I — a 
Capitulation which marked the isolation of Spain. It was followed 
by the League of the Rhine (August, 1658), which, though, in the 
end, redounding to the advantage of France (against whom nearly all 
national feeling had died out), closed any prospect of a participation 
of the German Princes in a Protestant league against the House of 
Austria. 

Before the success of Mazarin's designs thus encouraged France 
and her King to look forward hopefully to the developments of the 
future, Oliver Cromwell died (September 2nd, 1658), with the high 
hopes and aspirations unfulfilled, of which his foreign policy at no 
time lost sight — sometimes almost suddenly recurring to them. With 
the Dutch he had, largely owing to de Witt's single-minded efforts, 
kept the peace ; but his patience was sorely tried, not only from first 
to last by the old trade grievances, but in the end also by the violent 
action of Charles X of Sweden, who had broken through the Treaty of 
Roeskilde and was manifestly intent on incorporating the Danish 
dominions into one great Scandinavian monarchy. The Dutch, here- 
upon, determined on the relief of Copenhagen; and it was widely 
believed in Europe that Cromwell was an accomplice in the present 
designs of "the King of the North" in expectancy. What is certain 
is that Cromwell's design of a twofold Northern Alliance was in 
ruins, and that the danger of a breach with the United Provinces, to 
avoid which was a more difficult, as well as a more important part of 
the same general policy, was greater than ever. The chief balance to 
this twofold political failure — apart from the acquisition of Jamaica, 
and its maintenance in the teeth of the efforts of Spain and her ad- 
joining possessions — was the success of the Anglo-French Alliance 
in Flanders, and the actual tenure of Dunkirk. Yet no survey of the 
Protector's foreign policy and its results could rest satisfied with a 
reference to its material gains; the power of the country was now 
acknowledged by friend and foe alike, and known, at home as well 
as abroad, in Colonies and in Motherland, to be largely the product of 
the religious zeal which, resting in the last resort upon his army, he 
had inspired in the Government personified in him. 

No change of principle or method in this foreign policy could be 
in question during the months of domestic faction and civil strife 
which ensued after the great Protector's death and brought the Puritan 
Revolution to a close. With the Restoration, the foreign policy of 



28 INTRODUCTION 

England, although no longer animated by the religious convictions 
and aspirations that held possession of Oliver's soul, underwent no 
such complete revulsion as might have a priori been supposed. In 
1659, the Peace of the Pyrenees was at last concluded between France 
and Spain; and, while any possibility of a future union between the 
Spanish and the French Crowns 1 was at present ignored by Spain, 
Spain was left so weak that her efforts to recover Portugal proved in 
vain. Nor could the Empire, under its new Habsburg Chief, revive 
any of its former pretensions to direct the course of European politics, 
wholly dependent as he was (except in his Turkish Wars) upon the 
resources of his own hereditary dominions. But, though the gains of 
France and the losses of Spain had been great, the policy of Lewis 
XIV, professedly conducted after Mazarin's death (1661) by the 
King himself, with the aid of Mazarin's pupil and successor, de 
Lionne, called for unremitting vigilance. On the death (in 1665) of 
Philip IV of Spain, Lewis XIV, on behalf of the Infanta his consort, 
pressed her claim to the Spanish Netherlands by "right of Devolu- 
tion," thus laying bare his desire for the acquisition of, at least, part 
of the Spanish inheritance. The attempt might be prevented by a 
combination of the other Powers against France, such as was advo- 
cated with extraordinary persistence and resource by the eminent 
Austrian diplomatist Lisola. But for the execution of this the time 
had not yet arrived; and, of the two Powers most directly con- 
cerned, the United Provinces and England, the former, though well 
aware of the French appetite for the Flemish coastline, remained 
under the guidance of de Witt in favour of a pacific attitude, and in 
1662 had concluded a defensive alliance with France. 

It may be that the fact of this Alliance was unknown to, as well 
as left unnoticed by, Charles II and Clarendon, still his Chief Minister, 
and himself generally well inclined to France. They were, at the 
time, much perturbed by the state of the British finances, and all 
the more ready to gratify French national feeling by the sale of 
Dunkirk (1662) — a transaction which afterwards contributed to 
Clarendon's downfall. For the present, the acquiescence of England 
in the aggressive schemes of France might thus seem assured. The 

1 It can hardly be an error to regard the conditions under which King Philip IV 
accepted Lewis XIV's suit for the hand of the Infanta Maria Teresa — her re- 
nunciation of her rights to the whole Spanish Succession — as illusory, and intended 
to be such. The contention that, in consequence of the local laws of Brabant, this 
renunciation did not apply to the greater part of the Spanish Netherlands, was 
thus, actually or virtually, an afterthought. 



THE EARLY POLICY OF CHARLES II 29 

growth of political intimacy between the two Governments had been 
marked by the ominous marriage of King Charles IPs sister Henrietta 
to Philip Duke of Orleans. Soon afterwards (May, 1662), Charles II 's 
own marriage with the Infanta Catharine of Portugal, as placing 
England in direct antagonism to Spanish interests, and therefore in 
accord with those of France, amounted to a resumption, in its most 
important issue, of the foreign policy of Cromwell. The policy of 
Charles was in accordance with that of the Protector in conciliating 
the mercantile interest by showing hostility to Spain, with a view to 
keeping hold of Jamaica, while at the same time securing access to 
the East Indies by the proposed cession of Bombay as part of the 
Infanta's dowry. Thus, after some vacillation on the part of Charles II, 
the marriage was concluded which, in the end, brought to Portugal, 
with England's aid, the recognition of her independence by Spain 
and to England the beginnings of her Indian Empire. 

The adherence of England to the policy of France might now 
seem a working entente, while amicable relations had continued 
between the dominant party in the United Provinces and the French 
Government. But material interests and popular feeling combined, 
as of old, to keep asunder the two Maritime Powers, with both of 
whom France desired to remain on friendly terms. There had been 
acts of aggression on both sides, in America and in Africa; and in 
1664, notwithstanding the unwillingness of King Charles II, Eng- 
land and the United Provinces were again at war. For a time, it 
seemed as if the continuance of hostilities might be transitory; for 
the course of the War was favourable to England ; and in Holland 
the republican party continued to desire peace. But, before long, 
the catastrophic events of the years 1665-6, and the continuance of 
the contest at sea, made the situation one of greater danger and 
difficulty; and, at the same time, the problem of the impending 
action of France overshadowed the Anglo-Dutch War. The death 
of Philip IV of Spain (1665) had decided Lewis XIV to put forward 
the claims of the Infanta his consort to the Spanish Netherlands by 
"right of Devolution"; and with this end in view, he, early in 1666, 
as bound by his defensive alliance with the States-General to take 
their side, declared war against England (January, 1666). But he 
had no intention of preventing either of the combatants, alike reduced 
in naval strength, from concluding a peace which would suit his own 
policy. In this sense, he entered into an agreement with Charles II 
(March, 1667), binding him to abstain from any interference with 



30 INTRODUCTION 

the action of France in the matter of the Spanish Netherlands, in return 
for an undertaking that France would abstain from further assistance 
to the Dutch. Safe as he thought himself against England and sure of 
her adversary, his way now seemed clear ; and shortly afterwards, he in- 
vaded the Spanish Netherlands, and the "War of Devolution " began. 

But, though Charles II wrote to the Queen-mother in France that 
he would not for a year enter into any contention against that country, 
de Witt had already perceived whither the situation was tending, and 
that the future of the United Provinces lay with the designs of Lisola. 
Thus a Peace, though not such a peace as Lewis XIV had had in 
view, was rapidly concluded between the English and the Dutch 
Governments at Breda (July, 1667), which, so far as their colonial 
rivalry was concerned, might perhaps be regarded as a fair com- 
promise. Its European significance consisted in the curb which it 
put upon French aggression, before a more comprehensive effort 
was made in the same direction. 

In January, 1668, when the hand of France lay heavy on the 
Spanish Netherlands, and her King was negotiating in grand style 
with the pacific Emperor (Leopold I) as to the future partition of the 
Spanish inheritance at large, the Treaty called par excellence the 
Triple Alliance was concluded at the Hague. De Witt had, a few 
years earlier, pointed out to Sir Willam Temple, the clear-sighted 
English Ambassador there, that the choice for the United Provinces 
lay between two alternatives — a corrupt bargain with France, and 
a fair but effective pressure upon her, which would be impossible 
without the cooperation of England. Very unwillingly, but unable 
to resist the flow of home opinion, to which his policy always re- 
mained sensitive, Charles II instructed Temple to offer a defensive 
alliance between England and the United Provinces, which should 
insist upon peace between France and Spain, on terms allowing 
France to retain what she had conquered in her campaign in the 
Spanish Netherlands, or an equivalent; with a secret proviso that 
the contracting Powers might in the pursuit of their object have re- 
sort to arms. The Triple Alliance, of which Sweden had become a 
member on the day after its conclusion (subsidies being promised 
her as a condition of her accession), was not, in any sense, a final 
settlement of the French design. It was a rebuff, and an exposure of 
the policy of France before the eyes of Europe ; but, even within these 
limits and with many reservations as to its effect upon the aggressor, 
it justifies the opinion of Lord Acton, that it was "the earliest of that 



PEACE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE AND TREATY OF DOVER 31 

series of coalitions which ended by getting the better of the power 
of Lewis XIV, and is therefore a landmark in History." But, as he 
continues, its extension into a wider European alliance was out of 
the question, and the jealousy between the two mercantile Powers 
concluding it was not one to be removed by politicians. Thus, the 
advance of the French Power (which was fain to outrival both on 
their own ground) was checked, not ended. For the rest, Charles II 
never ceased to remain in touch with Lewis XIV, and took care to 
minimise to him the significance of the Alliance jubilantly received 
in England. Thus, after some hesitation, Lewis decided to give way, 
and play before Europe the game of moderation (the actual terms of 
the Treaty consisting, indeed, of conditions previously offered by 
himself), which for himself meant a willingness to wait. 

The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle which followed (May, 1668), and 
which ended the first stage of the advance of France under Lewis XIV, 
may, therefore, be said to begin the second, which had for its primary 
purpose the isolation, and for its ultimate goal the absorption, of the 
United Provinces. To effect this, an intimate connexion and coopera- 
tion between France and England became imperatively necessary; 
and to subserving the policy of which this was the cardinal principle, 
Charles, primarily intent on the interests of his monarchical power 
and of his purse, now wholly lent himself. 

The Secret Treaty of Dover, successfully negotiated by Henrietta 
Duchess of Orleans in 1670, was, therefore, merely a successful 
manoeuvre for binding down Charles to a line of action after his own 
heart, in the prosecution of which he had sought to engage from the 
very day of the conclusion of the Triple Alliance. The new feature 
added to it — the promised conversion, at his own time, of King Charles 
himself to Rome — was, on the above condition, most attractive to 
him, but hardly of supreme consequence to Lewis XIV, who, like his 
predecessors, had shown little repugnance to Protestant Alliances. 
It was not mentioned or reckoned as an item on either side of the 
money bargain in the version of the Treaty brought home from Paris 
by Buckingham, which alone was signed by the Protestant members 
of the Cabal (le Traite simule). For the rest, the Treaty, in both its 
versions, bound Charles to the policy of his Ally both in the immediate 
and in the remoter future — i.e. Lewis was to have the assistance of 
England both in making war upon the Dutch, and, eventually, in 
securing the whole of the Spanish inheritance. The partners in the 
Treaty were to endeavour to obtain the adherence to it of Sweden 



32 INTRODUCTION 

and Denmark, or of at least one of these States, and of the Elector of 
Brandenburg and other Princes. 

In the meantime, the Triple Alliance having, as a matter of course, 
fallen to pieces, though not till after its members had resolved on an 
agreement guaranteeing the subsequent Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
de Witt and Lisola drafted the hoped-for expansion of the Alliance 
into a wide European league. The proposal was inevitably rejected 
by Charles II, whose immediate efforts against the republican regime 
in the United Netherlands had been met by the nomination of Prince 
William III of Orange to the stadholderate of five of the Provinces, 
with the expectancy of that of Holland and Zeeland on the day of 
his coming of age. Before, however, that day arrived, the Secret 
Agreement with France had come into operation: the Declaration 
of Indulgence, into which the King's religious undertakings had for 
the present shrunk, had been proclaimed; and, a few days later 
(March, 1672), the English Declaration of War against the United 
Provinces appeared, outrunning, like a jackal, that of France. The 
foreign policy of Charles II, at once timid and treacherous, had at 
last come into the open. This and his home policy were not so much 
detached from each other as antithetically mixed. For he was anxious, 
above all things, for the retention of the Throne which, after so long 
an exile, he had secured ; and yet he was secretly averse from what was 
at bottom, though by no means consistently, the national policy to- 
wards foreign Powers whose motives he, unlike Cromwell, perfectly 
understood and whose action he was often personally disposed to 
support. 

Thus, in the War which from 1672 to 1674 they had to sustain 
against England as well as against France, the United Provinces were 
left without an Ally (except the Elector of Brandenburg, who soon 
found it necessary to secure himself by a separate Peace). Sweden, 
under its youthful King Charles XI, had been early detached from 
the Triple Alliance, and in April, 1673, when the French had already 
invaded the Free Netherlands, had concluded an Alliance with 
France, and another with England, promising her (in this strangely 
inverted triple compact) Swedish help in the case of any attack "for 
the sake of France." 

The French invasion of the United Provinces in 1672 had seemed 
to justify the self-confidence of Lewis XIV, till after the murder of 
the brothers de Witt, and the committal of the fortunes of the Pro- 
vinces to the guidance of their young Stadholder William III of 



THE DUAL POLICY OF CHARLES II 33 

Orange, the Dutch people had made a heroic stand behind their 
wall of waters. The bellicose English feeling against them, stimulated 
by factious invective such as Shaftesbury's, was dying out. Our share 
in the War had brought no laurels, and no East India fleet spoils, to 
our navy ; and public feeling was becoming strongly agitated against 
France. Meanwhile, the desire of the other European Powers to 
bring about the restoration of peace in Europe had led to the as- 
sembling of a Peace Congress at Cologne, from which England 
necessarily held aloof, and which came to nothing (1673). But diplo- 
matic activity continued; and, while France and England severally 
carried on their secret negotiations with the Dutch for a peace satis- 
factory to themselves, the Imperial agents were busily employed on 
the project of a wider combination against the aggression of France, 
whom it was hoped King Charles would, notwithstanding the in- 
fluences surrounding him and his own inclinations, be obliged to 
abandon. 

On the action of the English Government, hard pressed more 
especially by the Spanish (December, 1673), much depended; and 
Charles gave way so far as to indicate that he was prepared to treat 
as to peace with the Dutch on his own account, and without con- 
sulting his Ally. He threw himself on Parliament for the decision of 
a question which, by virtue of his prerogative, it really appertained 
to him to settle, and sought to conciliate parliamentary and popular 
feeling by denying the existence of any Treaty with France beyond 
the "simulated" one. (This suppression had seemed all the more 
desirable after the Test Act agitation and the Catholic marriage of 
the Duke of York, in the same year 1673.) Thus, he allowed himself 
to be detached from the obnoxious Alliance, and the result was the 
conclusion of the Peace of Westminster (February, 1674) between 
England and the United Provinces. 

The conditions of this Treaty were honourable to England as 
well as in other ways satisfactory, so far as her claims on the United 
Provinces were concerned ; but the Secret Article which prohibited 
either Power from allying itself with an adversary of the other bore 
ominously upon the events that were to follow. In the following 
August, the Coalition against France was formed, which included with 
the United Provinces, the Emperor, the King of Spain and the Duke 
of Lorraine, in the confident belief that, besides other Princes, 
England would soon come over to their side — and a new era in the 
history of Europe actually began. In this, England at first took only 



34 INTRODUCTION 

a tentative and, indeed, uncertain part. The Emperor Leopold now 
declared war upon Lewis ; and France (left with no support but that 
of Sweden, whose neighbour Brandenburg had joined the Coalition) 
resolved on evacuating the Low Countries and turning against 
Franche-Comte and the Palatinate. There, her arms were on the 
whole successful, and Charles II might feel that it was not the losing 
side from which he had been so strongly pressed to turn away. As 
a matter of fact, he had left auxiliary troops with the French army, 
who, by a strange irony of fate, took part in the devastation of the 
Palatinate; but neither this circumstance nor his known personal 
inclinations could incline the Emperor to accept the mediation 
proffered by Charles in the War against France. On the other hand, 
William of Orange, now Hereditary Stadholder and Captain- General 
of the United Provinces, would willingly have accepted such a media- 
tion, and suggested Nymegen for requisite negotiations. But, after 
a series of both parliamentary and diplomatic manoeuvres, the de- 
sign failed and with it, for the present, the attempt to establish a 
dynastic connexion between the English Throne and the Stadholder- 
ate by means of a marriage between William and the Princess 
Mary. But he could bide his time, and firmly stood out against 
Lewis XIV's endeavour to draw him over to the policy of a separate 
peace between France and the United Provinces. Meanwhile, in 
the same year (1676) Charles signed another Secret Treaty with 
Lewis, binding him by a yearly subsidy to adherence to the French 
alliance. 

Thus what has been well called the period of two foreign policies 
— marked by an impotence due to this duality more than to any one 
other cause — continued into the eventful year 1677 and the beginning 
of the following year. In spite — or partly in consequence — of the 
French successes in the field, the feeling against the Court and its in- 
clination towards France was stronger than ever; in the spring of 1677, 
notwithstanding the corruption of the members of the Opposition by 
Lewis XIV, the House of Commons unanimously voted an address 
explicitly hostile to France, Lord- Treasurer Danby being in favour 
of the policy urged by the House. It then refused to grant supplies 
for the defence of the country, unless the King concluded an offensive 
and defensive alliance with the States-General against France and 
for the preservation of the Spanish Netherlands. While Charles now 
began to haggle with his Ally, public feeling rose higher and higher; 
in the end, Parliament was adjourned, and an addition was made by 



ISOLATION OF ENGLISH POLICY 35 

Lewis to the price he had agreed to pay for the English adhesion to 
his Alliance. 

Charles II, in the pursuit of the policy on which he was bent, had 
many resources ; but they did not include those of an inflexible will and 
of a deeply meditated statesmanship. William of Orange, by whom the 
great change in the foreign policy of England was to be brought 
about, and who was in possession of both these qualities, was, in the 
first instance, called upon to use all the tact and circumspection at 
his command. The proposal was unpopular in the United Provinces 
and suspected in England ; but, with some difficulty, he gained over, 
first the King, and then his brother the Duke, to consent to his mar- 
riage with Princess Mary — a step which, as Charles calculated, would 
at least reassure the English people as to his own relations with 
France, without in any way subjecting him to the influence of the 
Prince. 

But the effect of the transaction was not long in showing itself. 
Lewis XIV had refused the terms of peace with the Coalition offered 
by Charles II as mediator and proffering the return of part of his 
conquests in the War, including Lorraine. Now, after the Orange 
marriage (November, 1677) the policy of Charles II took a turn — 
which, if carried to its logical consequences, would imply that the 
last link in the European Coalition against Lewis XIV was to be sup- 
plied by the accession of England. The English auxiliary contingent 
in the French army was now actually recalled, and (in January, 1678) 
a Treaty was concluded with the United Provinces, defining the 
French retrocessions on which the Powers must insist. But, when 
Parliament assembled, it went even further in the conditions to be 
imposed on France, demanding that the Peace of the Pyrenees should 
be made the basis of the intended settlement, and that, in the mean- 
time, all trade with France should cease. King Charles, though called 
upon by Parliament to inform it of the state of his Alliances, this 
time held to his view of his prerogative, and ventured to enter into 
a private negotiation with Lewis XIV, offering in return for yet 
another subsidy to modify in his favour the peace terms demanded. 
They were accordingly presented to the Powers at Nymegen (April, 
1678), but rejected by them; and England found herself in the 
unfortunate position of standing definitely on neither side in the 
contest. 

She had before her, on the other hand, the prospect of a new con- 
flict as to her foreign policy between Crown and Parliament, in which 



36 INTRODUCTION 

the latter went so far as to bid the King disband his army or break 
with France. He determined to settle the matter by promising 
Lewis XIV, in return for the consolidated subsidy, to preserve 
neutrality in case of the rejection by the Coalition of the French 
terms of peace. 

On August ioth, 1678, Lewis XIV having at last signified his 
unconditional assent to the territorial arrangements demanded of 
him, the Peace of Nymegen was signed between France, Spain and 
the United Provinces. But Charles II, who was, through Temple, 
acting as Mediator at the Conference, declined to append his signature, 
or to enter into any further understanding with the Emperor and 
Spain. Thus, largely by the inaction (or double-faced action) of the 
English policy, Lewis had in the Peace obtained Franche-Comte and 
sixteen fortified places in the Spanish Netherlands, and (since no 
compromise could be mooted on this head) kept Lorraine in his 
hands for the present. So far as English foreign policy was concerned, 
Lewis XIV replied to the congratulations of Sunderland on behalf 
of his master, and to his claim of a share in the result as due to the 
action of England, that he regarded himself no longer under any 
treaty obligation towards her. The great advance of France towards 
a complete predominance in the affairs of Europe, in which consists 
the real significance of the Treaties of Nymegen, had thus been 
effected neither against England nor through her aid. The ratification 
of the Treaties by the States-General and other Powers was long 
delayed, and (so strong was public feeling in England) Temple joined 
William of Orange in impeding it. But, in the end, the work of 
pacification was accomplished (1679); and, by a series of agreements 
with which no one concerned in them was content, Europe had 
secured a breathing- time. It was within this breathing- time that 
English foreign policy at last freed itself from the duplicity which 
had beset it through the personal designs — hesitating in the case of 
Charles II, but persistent in both him and his brother. A statesman 
had come to the front who viewed the course of European politics 
from an international as well as from a national point of view, yet 
who stood too near the Throne of England for his political future to 
admit of being dissociated from hers. 

The ink was hardly dry on the Nymegen Treaties when Lewis 
XIV's operations against the Empire began; and, in 1686, the Em- 
peror Leopold I, on behalf of the Empire, concluded with Spain and 
Sweden the League of Augsburg, countenanced by Pope Innocent XI. 



CHARLES IPs "SYSTEM" MAINTAINED TO THE LAST 37 

This League forms another landmark in this age of coalitions. But 
England, notwithstanding the Orange marriage (November, 1677) 
was still out of the reckoning. Charles II, after being harassed by 
the exploitation of the Popish Plot, was even more nearly touched 
by the Exclusion Bill agitation (1679-81). His increased estrange- 
ment from Lewis XIV, after an attempt at an understanding on the 
old lines, actually led to an Anglo-Spanish Alliance (1680). While 
the tortuous diplomacy of the French King aimed at rendering the 
breach between Charles and his subjects impassable, the States- 
General (without the interference of William of Orange), urged him 
to relinquish his opposition to the Exclusion Bill. But he was en- 
couraged by the conservative reaction in Church and State of his 
last years to go his own way, trusting, in the last instance, to the 
support of Lewis XIV. As the Continental policy of Lewis grew 
more and more aggressive, Charles gave repeated proofs of his reso- 
lution to persist in his non-intervention in European affairs, and 
turned a deaf ear to the appeal made to him to take part in the de- 
fence of Vienna against the Turk (1682). Thus, Charles II quitted 
the scene, without having changed the "system" of foreign policy 
— ultimate dependence upon France and refusal to enter into a 
European combination against her — to which, with the occasional 
semblance of divergences, he had adhered throughout his inglorious 
reign. 

Near its close (in February, 1684) Charles II supported new pro- 
posals for peace made by Lewis XIV to the States-General, which 
were denounced by William of Orange and rejected by a majority in 
favour of continuing to aid Spain in the defence of -the Spanish 
Netherlands. When, in the following August, the Truce of Ratisbon 
left France in possession for twenty years of her acquisitions (the 
so-called reunions) made up to 1681, and of Strassburg, as well as 
of Luxemburg, more recently captured, Charles II, in his desire for 
peace, promised the Imperial Ambassador to guarantee the agree- 
ment ; though Lewis XIV's intention of ultimately keeping what he 
had gained could be no secret to him. The importance of this double- 
faced course both for him and his successor is manifest. His own 
end, however, was close at hand (he died on February 16th, 1685). 
By receiving, at the last, the Sacraments of the Church of Rome, he 
had kept at least part of his bond with France. For the rest, he 
had, during the last ten years of his reign, preserved the peace of 
England, at the cost of refusing to throw such weight as she still 



38 INTRODUCTION 

possessed into the scale of the only policy by which tranquillity could 
be permanently restored to Europe. If his policy is viewed as a 
whole, it must be said to have found no other way of deferring the 
catastrophe of his dynasty, than that of depressing the English 
monarchy to the position of a vassal State. 

The event to which Lewis XIV had looked forward so hopefully 
— the accession of the Catholic James II to the English Throne — was 
to prove the final cause of the French ascendancy in Europe. At 
first, King James seemed not unwilling to come to an understanding 
with the Prince of Orange, and through him with the States- General. 
But the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which was judged very 
differently in different parts of the Catholic world, certainly had the 
effect of constituting the Prince, in the public eye, the representative 
of Protestant feeling against the King's Catholic sympathies and 
policy. Thus, though neither King James nor the nation paid much 
attention to the course of foreign affairs, the suspicions of an under- 
standing between him and the King of France soon spread, and 
William of Orange continued, to the best of his ability, to cement 
the defensive league of the other Powers. James IFs home policy — 
blind from the point of view of the preservation of his Throne — 
was, like his foreign policy, shortsighted, except on the supposition 
that he had made up his mind to follow France in any event. In 
April, 1687, he issued the fatal Declaration of Indulgence, and, in 
August of the same year, he declined the Emperor's request that he 
should guarantee the Truce of August, 1684. Yet, to make his iso- 
lation more complete, he incensed the States-General by attempting 
to recall his regiments in their service, while seeking to form a body 
of disbanded Catholic officers with the approval of Lewis XIV. The 
Dutch saw through the intrigue ; and William of Orange could thus 
lay before the States-General a plan for offensive operations against 
his father-in-law's Throne. 

Yet, while he was engaged in these manoeuvres, he had still dis- 
believed in war being made upon him by the United Provinces ; and 
had continued his course of government at home. The birth of the 
Prince of Wales (June 10th, 1688) had only served to heighten the 
public distrust in the King. On the day of the acquittal of the Seven 
Bishops (June 29th), the invitation to the Prince of Orange was issued, 
and the last stage in the catastrophe of the Stewart Throne began. 
From this moment till the assumption of the royal power by William 
and Mary, it is idle to speak of an English foreign policy. But though 



THE PURPOSE OF WILLIAM III 39 

by his declaration to the States- General, on September 9th, 1688, the 
French Ambassador formally identified his Sovereign with the pre- 
servation of the Throne of James II, the latter declined King Lewis' 
proposal of a joint war on the part of England and France against the 
United Provinces; nor is there any reference to it in the Prince of 
Orange's famous Declaration. 



Ill 

William of Orange, one of the most far-sighted of great statesmen, 
had, so far back as 1686, taken counsel with a contemporary Prince 
who, in this respect, most resembled him, the Elector Frederick 
William of Brandenburg (already the leading State of Protestant 
Germany), as to an invasion of England. In 1688, William had sent 
word to the Great Elector that the moment had come ; but Frederick 
William died in 1688, before the sailing of the expedition. His suc- 
cessor (afterwards King Frederick I in Prussia) undertook to cover 
the United Provinces on its departure; his brother-in-law, Land- 
grave Charles of Hesse-Cassel, followed suit; and, soon afterwards, 
the Luneburg Dukes (Duke Ernest Augustus only indirectly) took 
part in the enterprise. Prince George Frederick of Waldeck, whose 
masterly diplomacy had been invaluable to William of Orange in 
preparing the great stroke, was named by him his vicegerent in the 
Stadholderate during his absence. 

The object of William's invasion was the object of his life — the 
preservation of the independence of the United Provinces, which, as 
their Stadholder only, and in uncertain relations with England, it 
had been beyond his power to guard effectively, but which, when in 
assured control of both countries, he felt confident of securing. The 
final warrant of success in the accomplishment of his life's task would 
be the formation of the Grand Alliance against France, at which 
William had long been aiming, and which was now consummated in 
fact (though in name not till near the close of his reign). The Declara- 
tion of War by England against France was the work of William; for 
Lewis XIV, even after James II and his consort had found a refuge 
with him, preferred to avoid open war; and William's opportunity 
was the landing of James, with French support, in Ireland (April, 
1689). The Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance between the 
Emperor and the Dutch Republic was concluded (May), after King 
William had announced to the Emperor his accession to the English 



4 o INTRODUCTION 

Throne, and had declared his readiness to adhere to all the Treaties 
of Alliance in existence between the United Provinces and the Em- 
pire. Its object was stated to be the reestablishment of the Pacifica- 
tions of Westphalia and of the Pyrenees — i.e. the retrocession by 
France of all her subsequent territorial acquisitions. In a Secret 
Article, the Contracting Powers eventually promised their armed 
support of the Imperial claims for the whole of the Spanish inheri- 
tance. The Treaty, also, provided for the adhesion to it of England. 
Though Spain, Duke Victor Amadeus of Savoy, and the Princes of 
the Empire afterwards joined the Alliance, they neither signed the 
Treaty nor, so far as we know, were aware of this Secret Article. In- 
asmuch, however, as it provided for the mutual support of those who 
joined in it against the Crown of France and its adherents, it implied 
a guarantee of the existing tenure of the English Throne. In a word, 
the Alliance of 1689 amounted to an anticipation of the Grand Alli- 
ance of 1 70 1-2, and was by no means a mere repetition of the League 
of Augsburg of 1686. The critical importance of the 1689 Alliance in 
the history of European politics can, therefore, hardly be exaggerated 1 . 
When (on September 9th) King William, without submitting the 
Treaty of Alliance of May 12th to Parliament, without even re- 
quiring the signature of it by any Minister of State, signed his own 
Act of Adhesion to it, he, in effect, guaranteed the restoration and 
the preservation of the Peace of Europe, and once more placed England 
in the forefront of those who barred the way to the assailant Power. 

Although, in the ensuing conflicts, Lewis XIV kept no ally stedfast 
to the end but the Ottoman Turk, and although the only member of 
the League whom, quite at the last (1696), he succeeded in buying off 
was Savoy, the Peace of Ryswyk (1697) could not be regarded with 
satisfaction by his leagued adversaries. Yet, although, by this Peace, 
he lost nothing that he had held at the time of the commencement 
of the struggle organised against him by William, the French advance 
had at that point been decisively arrested, and the recognition by 
Lewis XIV at Ryswyk of William's tenure of the English Throne 
proved which Power had taken the lead among those opposed to the 
' Grand Monarch's ' aggression. 

In the actual Ryswyk negotiations, no reference had been made 
to any secret undertaking as to the eventual treatment of the Spanish 

1 Nor must the fact, though incidental only, be overlooked, that it finally 
abandoned the recognition of difference of religious confession as a determining 
element in international agreements; albeit appeal continued, from time to time, to 
be made on the one side or the other to confessional sympathies and antipathies. 



PROPOSED PARTITION OF THE SPANISH MONARCHY 41 

inheritance. But Lewis XIV — though historians differ as to whether 
he then had any serious design of adhering to the compact — had, so 
far back as January, 1668, concluded an actual Treaty of Partition 
of the Spanish monarchy with the Emperor. Thus, the idea of a 
Partition was no novelty; it could hardly fail to come to the front 
in a period of European politics during which neither side was pre- 
pared to contemplate the appropriation of the whole inheritance by 
a single claimant; and it became a question of practical politics, so 
soon as King William's statesmanship addressed itself to this solu- 
tion. He had to use great caution, for he knew how slow English 
politicians are in "taking up" questions of the future, more especi- 
ally in the field of foreign policy; and he was, also, aware that public 
opinion in his English kingdom was far less interested in the em- 
ployment of its forces in foreign offensive warfare than in the reduc- 
tion of the standing army at home. To William III, the idea of a 
partition of the Spanish monarchy, i.e. of an arrangement whereby, 
on the extinction of the Spanish Habsburgs in the male line, the 
distribution of their inheritance should not unsettle the Balance of 
Power in Europe, and above all not unsettle it in favour of France, 
was of the essence of the result to be aimed at. To Lewis XIV, it 
was nothing but a pis aller solution, when he found it impossible, at 
an earlier or later date, to secure the whole inheritance for France. 
The logical position, in view of the result contemplated by Lewis, 
was that of William ; but the policy which reckoned with arguments 
coming home to national feeling, and which, considering the possi- 
bility of unexpected incidents, had time on its side, was that of his 
adversary. This judgment seems borne out by the actual sequence 
of events, here only noticed in so far as they concern the history of 
English foreign policy in particular. 

What is usually called the First Partition Treaty — the first, i.e. 
of which William III shared the responsibility — was concluded by 
him with Lewis XIV in 1698. By it, the bulk of the Spanish in- 
heritance — viz. Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, and the West Indies 
—was, on the death of Charles II, to fall to his great-grand-nephew, 
the Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria; but the Two 
Sicilies, with Guipuscoa, were to pass to the Dauphin Lewis of France, 
and the Milanese to the Archduke Charles, son of the Emperor 
Leopold by his third wife. This arrangement, though seeming to go 
some way towards meeting the principle of the Balance of Power, 
was, as a matter of fact, more in the French than in the Austrian 



42 INTRODUCTION 

interest, and would hardly have been favoured by William III, but 
for the critical condition of his own affairs at home. It was, how- 
ever, frustrated by the death of the Electoral Prince in January, 1699 ; 
and, about a year later, a second scheme was devised by Lewis and 
William, in which the Austrian claims were necessarily treated after 
a different fashion, but still so as to indicate the desire of Lewis to 
show regard for the principle of European policy upheld by William 
III. The Archduke Charles was now to receive Spain, while the 
Netherlands and all the Spanish Colonies, together with the Two 
Sicilies and the Milanese (to be ultimately exchanged for Lorraine) 
were to be the share of France — not perhaps the lion's share, but 
something not altogether unlike it. The scheme was rejected by the 
Emperor — from what motives, it is not quite easy to decide — and 
was profoundly unpopular in Spain, where the indivisibility of the 
monarchy had become an article of popular faith. The ambition of 
Lewis XIV, hereupon, throwing over any further consideration of 
schemes of partition, exercised all possible pressure in the French 
interest on the Spanish Sovereign, now near the close of his days. 
He died (in November, 1700), shortly after signing a will, in which, 
in accordance with Spanish sentiment and with the approval of Rome, 
he left the whole Spanish monarchy to Philip Duke of Anjou, the 
second grandson of Lewis XIV. As such, he would not, in the 
ordinary course of events, succeed to the Throne of France ; should 
he, however, come to stand next in the French Succession, and accept 
that position, the Spanish monarchy was to pass to his younger 
brother, the Duke of Berry. To this testamentary disposition the 
King of France agreed in the teeth of the certain opposition of the 
House of Austria ; and there could be no doubt as to the action with 
regard to it of England and of the United Provinces — so long as 
they were under the joint guidance of William III. 

Although religious motives cooperated, it had been the com- 
mercial interests of his country which had induced Oliver Cromwell 
to challenge the still unrelinquished claims of Spain to oceanic rule. 
Still more definite was the conviction of the King-Stadholder that 
England and the United Netherlands were alike menaced in the very 
foundations of their future prosperity by the prospect of the Power of 
Spain falling under the control of that of France. The fact that French 
aggressive ambition was now rising to its height had led William III 
to adopt irrevocably the policy carried on by him consistently since 
the Alliance of 1689. It had entered into no new phase when the 



THE GRAND ALLIANCE TREATY 43 

Spanish Succession question came to the front. Public opinion in 
England had cared little for the Partition schemes, and might, as 
time went on, have rested content with a provision for the perpetual 
separation of the French and Spanish Crowns ; and in Amsterdam 
the funds rose on Philip of Anjou's acceptance of Charles II's in- 
heritance. But William's statesmanship was not to be checkmated 
in the midst of the game; and the action of Lewis XIV speedily 
justified the attitude maintained by him and Grand-pensionary 
Heinsius. While formally reserving the French rights of the Duke 
of Anjou, Lewis XIV ordered his troops to lay hands on the Barrier 
Towns and (1701) promised to the dying James II to recognise his 
son as his successor. 

The Emperor Leopold I, after at once protesting against the 
Will, entered into negotiations with William III, and began war in 
Italy on his own account in the summer of 170 1. Early in the same 
year, an Alliance was contracted with Denmark. And, though the 
Empire did not formally declare war until a year later, the Coalition 
of 1689, of the direction of whose operations the lead was from the 
first assumed by England and the United Provinces, was renewed 
on September 7th, 1701. The limits to which the stipulations of this 
Treaty, the Grand Alliance Treaty proper, were restricted should be 
carefully noticed, if the policy of William III is to be rightly judged. 
It did not, like the Secret Article of the Treaty of 1689, insist on 
the right of the Austrian claimant to the whole Spanish inheritance ; 
it merely demanded for him, as a due satisfaction, the Spanish pos- 
sessions in Italy. On the other hand, while France was in no cir- 
cumstances to acquire any Spanish Colonies in America, the question 
of the addition of any of these to the English or Dutch Colonies was 
left to depend on the course of the War. No express reference was 
made to the future occupancy of the Spanish Throne ; except that 
France and Spain were never to be under the same Sovereign. A 
clause was added to the effect that no peace should be concluded by 
the parties to the Alliance, till England had received satisfaction for 
the insulting recognition of the Stewart Pretender by the King of 
France. These conditions, to a large extent, coincide with those 
afterwards — at the end of the great War of the Spanish Succession — 
secured at the Peace of Utrecht. Thus, the statesmanship responsible 
for engaging England and the United Provinces in the great struggle 
was essentially of a piece with that of the Ministers who brought it 
to a conclusion. The "War of the Spanish Succession" was fought 



44 INTRODUCTION 

by the Maritime Powers, and by England in particular, for ends 
with which the actual satisfaction of the claims to that Succession 
was only in so far concerned, that France was to be prevented from 
succeeding to the Spanish dominions in the Netherlands, and be- 
coming the leading Mediterranean, and a great Colonial, Power. 
These latter were the interests ultimately at stake, and through its 
care for them the policy of William III itself takes its place within 
the general course of British foreign policy. 

The accession of Queen Anne was, in itself, favourable to the 
prospects of a War on the issues of which the whole foreign policy 
of her reign concentrated itself. The national support indispensable 
for its victorious prosecution was assured by her having inherited 
an ancestral Throne, and being both an Englishwoman by birth and 
(as now required by law) a Protestant. On the Act of Settlement 
(1701) rested, also, the nation's assurance against being involved with- 
out the consent of Parliament in any war on behalf of its sovereign's 
foreign possessions from which it desired to keep aloof. Thus, the 
conservatism of the nation rallied round her, and made legislation 
possible under her which her predecessor had in vain sought to bring 
about. It included the Act of Union with Scotland (1707), which, 
though it did not put an end to Jacobitism, was essential to the 
future of Great Britain as a European Power. And, at the very time 
when our national political life was definitively adopting the system 
of party government, a practical conjunction between the more 
moderate men of both the parties in the State enabled the Queen's 
Government, for a number of years, to carry on with extraordinary 
success the War actually in progress. 

A great war, extending over several years, almost inevitably be- 
comes an evolutionary process, testing, at each successive stage of it, 
the statesmanship which directs its course. The primary purpose of 
England and the United Provinces when, in 1701, setting on foot 
the Alliance, in which they had been successively joined by Denmark 
(1701), the Emperor (1701), the Empire (1702), Portugal (1703) and 
Savoy (1703), had been, as was seen, to prevent the union at any 
time of the French and Spanish monarchies, or the transfer of the 
kingdom of Spain itself, to the reigning House of France, without 
providing any suitable compensation for the House of Austria. In 
other words, the maintenance of Balance of Power had been the pri- 
mary object of the last great achievement of William Ill's foreign 
policy. But, so early as 1703, the Emperor Leopold I renounced 



BREAKDOWN OF PEACE OVERTURES 45 

with great solemnity his claims, and those of his elder son Joseph, to 
the Spanish inheritance, declaring that they scrupled to unite it with 
the hereditary dominions of their own line. The attempt, however, 
of the English Government, about the same time, to supplement the 
Grand Alliance Treaty by a declaration that no part of the Spanish 
monarchy should at any time come under the rule of any member of 
the House of Bourbon, failed, because of a difference on another point. 
Soon afterwards (1704), the Austrian claimant himself appeared on 
the scene, where he called himself Charles III ; but his progress was 
slow, though Gibraltar was soon taken by an English fleet. On the 
other hand, Marlborough's great victory of Blenheim, in the same 
year, ended a long period of unbroken French military ascendancy ; 
and in 1705, though the English Government, on good terms with 
Marlborough and Godolphin, was vigorously prosecuting the War, 
the idea of Peace was mooted. In August, 1706, Lewis XIV made his 
first serious overtures to the States- General, offering them a good 
Barrier and suggesting the recognition of Archduke Charles' tenure 
of Spain proper, if he would agree to Philip's sovereignty over all her 
Italian dominions. But Heinsius ascertained from Marlborough that 
the English Government would not now listen to the thought of a 
Partition, and that, if desirous of a satisfactory Barrier, the Dutch 
must act with the rest of the Allies. On the other hand, the party 
now in entire control of British foreign policy, in December, 1707, 
passed in the House of Lords an (amended) resolution, that no Peace 
would be honourable or safe that allowed the House of Bourbon to 
retain possession of any part of the Spanish monarchy 1 . Thus in 1709 
after Oudenarde (1708), Lewis felt forced to assent to the peace 
terms of the Allies, so far as the surrender of the entire Spanish 
monarchy ; but he could not bring himself to give the required pro- 
mise of joining hands with the Allies, should it prove necessary, in 
enforcing their demand upon his grandson. It is, assuredly, to the 
credit of Marlborough's good sense, that he regarded this condition 
as unreasonable ; but he allowed himself to be overruled by Heinsius 

1 Though they form a curious chapter in the history of our foreign policy in 
this period, it must suffice merely to refer to two among the diplomatic efforts 
made on both sides to extend the range of the War, so as to include Northern 
Europe in its complications. Marlborough was not successful in moving King 
Frederick I in Prussia out of his neutrality; but (at Altranstadt, in 1708) he per- 
suaded Charles XII of Sweden to abandon the idea of entering, with the aid of 
France, on the task of liberator of Protestant Germany, which had of old been 
taken upon himself by Gustavus Adolphus. (The Pretender's attempt, in the 
same year, at invading Scotland with a French force broke down.) 



46 INTRODUCTION 

and Prince Eugene; and, in the absence of any other guarantee of 
the Peace satisfactory to the Allies, the negotiations broke down. 
After Malplaquet (fought in September, 1709), they recommenced 
(March, 1710), at Gertruydenberg, between the States-General and 
France, Great Britain and the Emperor alike at first taking no part 
in them. But, when he did so, it was as adhering to the refusal of 
any cession to France (that of Sicily was, also, opposed by Savoy). 
Thus, though Lewis XIV actually declared himself ready to pay a 
subsidy towards the execution of coercive measures against his 
grandson, the Conferences of Gertruydenberg ended, under French 
protest, in July, 1710. Inasmuch as there can be little doubt 
that Marlborough and Townshend (our Ambassador at the Hague), 
shared the wish of the Dutch to go back to the policy of a Partition 
of the Spanish inheritance — to the policy, in other words, with which 
the War had been begun by this country — the failure of the Con- 
ferences casts a shadow on the part played in these transactions by 
Great Britain. With the aid of the Dutch, with whom it had concluded 
the First Barrier Treaty (1709), thereby securing them the protected 
frontier they desired, the British Government could probably have 
succeeded in moderating the policy of the Allies, and of the Em- 
peror in particular. The chief responsibility for the failure, therefore, 
must lie with Marlborough and Godolphin. Aware of their imminent 
political downfall, they shrank from the responsibility of bringing 
about a peace unacceptable to their party at home, and to the Allies 
abroad, with whom they had so successfully cooperated in the prose- 
cution of the War. 

Be this as it may, before the end of 1710, Archduke Charles 
(Charles III) had lost his hold over any part of Spain except Cata- 
lonia; and, even before the news reached England, Harley and 
St John, without communicating with any of the Allies, opened secret 
negotiations with Lewis XIV, on the lines of the retention of Spain 
by King Philip V. On the main theatre of the War, no important 
change had taken place ; but the prospect of its continued vigorous 
conduct had been gravely affected by the change of Ministry in Eng- 
land, when a new element was introduced into the European situation 
at large by the death of the Emperor Joseph I (April 17th, 171 1). 
The titular King Charles III of Spain had now become ruler of the 
whole of the dominions of the House of Austria. Should the entire 
Spanish monarchy be secured to him, the Balance of Power would 
be permanently unsettled by the union of all the possessions of the 



THE UTRECHT SETTLEMENT 47 

Emperor Charles V in the hands of his descendant and namesake. 
It is the great merit of the English Tory Government, of Harley 
(Oxford) and St John (Bolingbroke) the Lord Treasurer and the 
Secretary of State — and of the latter in particular — to have per- 
ceived at once, that the future of Europe must be protected against 
the new danger, as it had been from that of the union of France and 
Spain. Thus, Bolingbroke's name is, more than that of any other man, 
identified with the policy resulting in the Treaties which we call by 
the collective name of the Peace of Utrecht, and of which, whatever 
exceptions he may afterwards have taken to some of their provisions, 
he is known to have prided himself on being the real author. On 
this international settlement the Peace of Europe, for more than a 
generation — shall we say from 1714 to 1746? — virtually hinged; and, 
though within this period there are to be noted several Wars and several 
Congresses or Conferences by which they were successively brought 
to a conclusion — these led to no important unsettlement or resettle- 
ment of the Utrecht Treaties 1 . Thus, the Utrecht pacification, more 
especially, sufficed to put a stop to the aggressive policy favoured by 
France during nearly the whole of the reign of Lewis XIV and not 
resumed by her, at least with any measure of consistency, till the 
Revolutionary War. It will hardly be asserted, per contra, that the 
Peace of Europe would have been more effectually secured by a 
Treaty or Treaties securing to the House of Austria the full fruits 
expected from the victories of Eugene and Marlborough, and that, 
in this case, the "gratitude" of that House would have been itself 
more notable in the long run than was its wont. And a candid review 
of the processes for preventing a possible future union between the 
French and the Spanish Crowns which, in the eyes of the British 
Government at all events, formed the nodus pads, will hardly con- 
demn the conclusion reached as lame and impotent. Philip of Anjou 
solemnly renounced his eventual rights to the French Throne (No- 
vember, 1712); and this renunciation was supplemented by those of 
the Dukes of Berry and Orleans of their contingent rights to the 
Spanish, which were confirmed by the Cortes and assented to by 
Lewis XIV (in the form of an Amendment of the Reservation of 
December, 1700). No doubt, it was the unexpected survival of the 
Prince afterwards crowned as Lewis XV which actually prevented 
the agreement from coming into operation; and no doubt, at one 

1 The most notable exception, with which we have no direct concern here, was 
the complicated (so-called Third) Treaty of Vienna (1738). 



48 INTRODUCTION 

time, Lewis XIV had himself regarded such an event as undesirable 
in the interests of France, so that Bolingbroke had accordingly been 
induced to revive an alternative plan (in favour of Savoy). But, in 
itself, the policy ultimately approved and accepted by Great Britain 
was, in the circumstances, definite and moderate, as well as consistent 
with the principles to vindicate which she had entered into the 
War. 

We must, however, pass from the special question of the Spanish 
Succession to the general results of the War to which it gave its 
historic name, as affecting the political future of the world, and of 
Great Britain in particular. France came forth from the struggle, no 
longer the arbitress of the destinies of Europe — exhausted, though 
(as in later periods of seeming decline in her national life) not beyond 
recovery; but more closely connected than before with Spain, though 
not by a personal or institutional union. Spain herself was sinking 
into a European Power of the secondary order, though by no means 
without hopes of a partial recovery of her former external (Italian) 
possessions, as well as of a beneficial change in her administrative 
system. To the Empire, France would have to yield up some, but 
not all, of her spoils when the Emperor concluded his own Peace, 
which he preferred to postpone, and by which he would be left in 
possession of the now "Austrian" Netherlands — the least-desired by 
him of his reextended dominions (Sicily falling to Savoy). The 
United Provinces, who had played their game with characteristic 
persistency, by the so-called Third Barrier Treaty in 17 15 negotiated 
with the Imperial Government, and guaranteed by Great Britain, 
finally entered into possession of the full military security which had 
been their primary object in declaring and carrying on the War. 
Necessarily, their influence in the counsels of the Allies had sunk, 
in consequence of the change of Sovereign in England, and afterwards 
through the collapse of the Whig Government; but though they, 
afterwards, to some extent, recovered this influence, the time had 
passed for them to play a leading part in European politics; for, 
while their merchantmen still outnumbered those of any other 
country, they were certainly falling behind as a Naval Power. 

The inheritance of Charles II of Spain had included a Colonial 
dominion far more extensive than that which had, before the date of 
his decease, been acquired by the Dutch in India and by the English 
in the New World. Had France, unlimited as her aspirations were 
in this period, been allowed to annex this domain with the rest of the 



THE PEACE OF UTRECHT AND BRITISH INTERESTS 49 

Spanish possessions, and to consolidate it with her own Colonial 
settlements, she might have laid the foundations of an empire far 
exceeding, in extent, that afterwards under the sway of Napoleon. 
In this regard, the Treaty of the Grand Alliance (1702) had provided 
that France should never be allowed to take possession of the West 
Indies, or to enjoy any rights of commerce and navigation not granted 
in precisely the same measure to Great Britain and the United 
Provinces. In the Utrecht Treaty with Great Britain, the King 
of France undertook, in even more comprehensive terms, never to 
accept, in favour of his own subjects, any advantage in the 
way of trade or navigation with regard to Spain or her American 
Colonies which should not also be conceded to subjects of other 
Powers. 

As for specifically British questions, we remember how, before 
the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, British popular 
feeling had indignantly resented the French autocrat's arrogant inter- 
ference in the matter of the Succession to the Throne of these Islands. 
Thus it was significant as well as appropriate that the earliest article 
in the Anglo-French Treaty concluded at Utrecht should concern 
the difficult and delicate subject of this Succession. Much intrigue, 
more or less secret, in which "persons near the Queen" may or may 
not have had a hand, and of which the object no doubt was to di- 
minish the responsibility of Lewis XIV for the observance of the 
undertaking which he was about to accept, had preceded its inclusion 
in the Treaty. France recognised the order of Succession established 
by the Act of Settlement (1 701) in favour of the issue of Queen Anne, 
or, in default of such, of the House of Hanover. At the same time, 
King Lewis XIV promised that the son of King James II ("the Old 
Pretender ") should not at any time return within the realm of France, 
whence he had "voluntarily" taken his departure. 

Among the territorial acquisitions accruing to Great Britain from 
the Peace of Utrecht a significance of its own attached to the so-called 
" Dunkirk Clause " ; for the control of the Narrow Seas had long been 
treated as a cardinal principle of English foreign policy. After Dun- 
kirk had been taken from Spain in 1658 by France and England, and 
placed in the hands of the latter Power, the sale of it to France in 
1662 had aroused great resentment against Charles II's Government 
and more especially against Clarendon ; and additions to the fortifica- 
tions had, beyond doubt, made it a serious menace to the English 
command of the Narrow Seas. In the Treaty of Utrecht, it was 



50 INTRODUCTION 

stipulated that the King of France should, at his own cost, in per- 
petuum, rase the fortifications of Dunkirk, and fill up its harbour 
within six months. Lewis XIV subsequently showed a palpable 
want of good faith in his manipulation of this clause, and great agi- 
tation was provoked in England by the construction at Mardyke of 
a harbour connected with Dunkirk by a canal and intended to be of 
greater depth than the previous Dunkirk harbour. The Mardyke 
works had to be suspended, and finally when, under the Regency, 
amicable relations obtained between the two Governments, the 
dimensions of the scheme were so reduced as to render it harmless 
(17 17). The "Dunkirk Clause" continued to be regarded by British 
Governments as a security in need of careful watching, and the 
question of its observance caused trouble both in 1719 and later 1 . 
The clause reappears in the chief European Treaties till the 
Peace of Paris in 1783, when its abolition was, at last, obtained by 
France. 

Of far greater importance were the British acquisitions from 
France secured at Utrecht, although, from the nature of the case, 
this fact could only gradually come to be understood, more especially 
by the very Power about to enter on a half century's struggle for the 
preservation of her overseas dominion. After the temporary over- 
throw of French sovereignty in North America, the whole of the 
former province of Acadia was, in the Peace of St Germain (1632), 
restored to the French Crown, and the long contest between English 
and French enterprise (in Newfoundland and elsewhere) seemed to 
have come to an end. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, 
the Colonial ambition of France took a wider flight than it had pre- 
viously pursued, and she claimed, as her Colonial empire, the whole 
region from the mouth of the Mississippi to the Great Lakes and the 
St Lawrence. To this vast dominion was attached the familiar name 
of New France, though it was administered in full accordance with 
the political and ecclesiastical principles of the old country. 

It was, therefore, a notable step towards a transformation of the 
Colonial relations between the two Powers, when, in the Peace of 
Utrecht, Acadia (once more renamed Nova Scotia) was again trans- 
ferred to Great Britain. In a separate article of the Peace, France 
added the cession of Newfoundland and the adjacent islands (except 
Cape Breton and one or two others, which remained French and were 

1 See W. Michael, vol. 11. pp. 236-9. In 1720, an English engineer was residing 
at Dunkirk to invigilate. 



SETTLEMENTS WITH FRANCE AND SPAIN 51 

left in possession of certain rights of fishery 1 ). At the same time, 
Great Britain's possession was recognised of the whole island of 
St Christopher's (St Kitt's), where the Peace of Ryswyk had restored 
a bipartite occupation with France. 

On the same day as the Utrecht Treaty of Peace between Great 
Britain and France was signed a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce 
between the two Powers which (besides placing them eventually on 
the footing of the most favoured nation) seemed to promise a more 
momentous change than actually ensued in a most important sphere 
of international maritime law 2 . Inasmuch as a Treaty of the same 
purport was signed a few weeks later, between France and the States- 
General, these agreements would have greatly benefitted maritime 
(neutral) commerce, had they but been duly observed. Such, how- 
ever, in spirit, at least, was not the case, certainly not on the part of 
Great Britain, who concluded no similar compact at Utrecht with 
any Power besides France, and the principle of the Anglo-French 
agreement had to await revival, half a century later, when the aspect 
of things had altogether changed. 

The Peace between Great Britain and Spain, though not con- 
cluded till July 13th, 1713, formed an integral part of the resettle- 
ment of the relations between the Western Powers of Europe. Hence 
it is in this, quasi-supplementary, Treaty that is to be found the 
earliest mention of the fundamental provisions for the prevention of a 
future union on the same head of the Spanish and the French Crowns ; 
while, in further Articles, the King of Spain agrees to the prohibition 
of the transfer to France or any other Power by Spain of any land or 

1 By the exercise of these rights, the French fishermen were enabled to carry 
on their trade on a large scale, so much so that, at the time of the Peace of Aix- 
la-Chapelle, it greatly exceeded the British. Hence the long-lived fishery disputes, 
which continued to be a source of mutual vexation, until the Peace of 1763 excluded 
the French altogether from the Gulf of St Lawrence and the Newfoundland waters ; 
and even this proved no permanent settlement. 

2 In 1 68 1, when the French navy had risen to a condition of unprecedented 
strength, and the pride of Lewis XIV as its head to a corresponding height of arro- 
gance, a royal ordinance had declared any vessel a fair prize in which should be 
found goods belonging to enemies of France. This ordinance directly controverted 
the principle of "free ship, free goods," which was so prized by the Dutch, and 
which had been acknowledged by this country in several Treaties — including that 
with France of 1655, as well as by France herself in her Treaty with the Dutch of 
1646. To the practice which, accordingly, prevailed during the following period 
(including that of the War of the Spanish Succession), the Utrecht Treaty opposed, 
so far as Great Britain and France were concerned, the provision that all goods 
(except contraband of war) should be held, even in the case of a vessel proceeding 
to a port belonging to a belligerent, to be covered by the flag of the (neutral) State 
to which such vessels belonged. 



52 INTRODUCTION 

lordship owned by her in America. (He, also, expressly approves the 
Succession in Great Britain as settled by Act of Parliament.) 

Among the remaining articles in the Anglo-Spanish Treaty stands 
forth that which confirmed the cession by Spain to Great Britain of 
the town, citadel and port of Gibraltar. Of this famous possession 
the retention or abandonment was at different times in the history 
of our foreign policy differently viewed by successive Governments, 
but never in more than one way by public opinion in this country. 
In Spain, the loss and humiliation suffered by the capture (almost 
accidental) of the Lion's Rock in 1704, led to the investment of 
Gibraltar, in the following winter, by a strong Spanish force, and 
then by a French under Marshal de Tesse. But the resistance was 
successful, and the British hold on the fortress was confirmed by the 
Peace of Utrecht, on condition that, should the British Government 
ever propose to sell or otherwise alienate Gibraltar, the Spanish 
should always have the first refusal of it. By another article of the 
same Treaty, Spain ceded Minorca, which had been taken from her 
by British arms in 1708. But this island, though at first more highly 
prized, from a naval point of view, than Gibraltar, was not destined 
to hold the same continuous place among British conquests. In the 
meantime, while the simultaneous possession of Minorca and Gib- 
raltar satisfactorily secured the future of British trade with the Levant, 
where the French were by far the most dangerous competitors, to 
Spain, in the words of Philip V, a British Gibraltar was "a thorn in the 
flesh" ; and the question of its removal could not be a transient one 1 . 

1 See, for an account of the attempts made in this direction, Michael, vol. II. 
part 1. pp. 257-82. As the peaceable return of Gibraltar to Spain was not likely to 
be made without a quid pro quo (besides the saving of expense), it seems explicable 
why (apart from any personal reason) the thought for a time commended itself to 
the statesmanship of Stanhope — if it did not originate with George I himself. 
Leaving aside the questionable story of Louville's secret mission, we cannot doubt 
that in 1717, when Stanhope was seeking to obtain the adhesion of Spain to this 
European Alliance, he secretly communicated the idea to Dubois, and that he 
returned to it in 1719-20, before he had definitively convinced himself of the re- 
ception with which it would meet in Parliament. He then resolved to identify 
himself with what he had recognised to be an irresistible current of public opinion, 
and made the position clear to the Regent Orleans (who was still inclined to 
harp on the idea of the cession), through the new French Ambassador Senne- 
terre, and was encouraged, naturally enough, by the Imperial Resident Hoffmann 
in his new attitude of non possumus. There was no question of the suggestion being 
discussed at the expected Congress; and as for public opinion in England, any 
return to the policy of a cession would have been utterly scouted. No reference 
need be made here to Richard Cumberland's futile secret mission to Spain in 1780, 
when he was instructed to abstain from any mention of the idea of a cession, though 
the question was, notwithstanding, the real crux in the endeavour to bring about a 
separate Peace between Great Britain and Spain. After the failure of the great siege, 



THE PEACE AND THE EMPIRE 53 

No further provisions or omissions in the Anglo- Spanish Treaty need 
be dwelt upon in the present connexion. The Article securing to 
Great Britain (through the South Sea Company) the Asiento mono- 
poly formerly enjoyed by France, and henceforth by her chief rival 
till she and Spain were once more at war, belongs to a happily 
transient phase of international trade relations ; the British abandon- 
ment of the Catalans, whom under cover of an amnesty by King 
Philip the Utrecht settlement left to their fate, was a breach of good 
faith over which a veil must be cast. 

Manifestly, the chief shortcoming of the Utrecht Treaties as se- 
curities of the Peace of Europe lay in the fact that they had been con- 
cluded without the Emperor Charles VI, on behalf and in conjunction 
with whose House the great War had been waged. Perhaps, had the 
campaign of Prince Eugene in 17 12, continued by him after the 
Franco-British Armistice, not proved a failure, the Emperor might 
have, from the outset, refused to take any part in the Conferences. 
As it was, they duly opened in the presence of an Imperial Pleni- 
potentiary (Count Sinzendorf); but the capture of Denain further 
increased the confidence of the French negotiators ; and the interests 
of the Empire, notwithstanding the visit of Prince Eugene to London, 
became (as in some measure did the claims of the United Provinces) 
a matter of relative indifference to British statesmanship. On the 
evening of the very day of the signature of the Peace between France 
and Great Britain, the British Plenipotentiaries , the Earl of Strafford and 
the Bishop of Bristol (Robinson) handed to their Imperial colleagues 
the final offer of Lewis XIV, which proposed the Peace of Ryswyk as 
the basis of the present Treaty, and the Rhine as the frontier-line be- 
tween France and the Germanic Empire. These terms differed widely 
from what France might have proposed a very short time earlier; 
but, though British diplomacy contrived to bring about a few further 
conferences between the Imperial and the French Plenipotentiaries, 
by May, 1713, Sinzendorf and his colleague had quitted Utrecht. 
The bitterness of feeling which ensued might be illustrated from the 
party pamphlets published on both sides; but the Imperialist in- 
vective against the servile submissiveness of British public opinion 

the Peace of Versailles (1783), otherwise not unfavourable to the latter Power, left 
her face to face with an apparently unredeemable loss. Later proposals for making it 
good have been hardly more than speculation. Minorca was recaptured by the 
French in 1756, but restored to Great Britain in the Peace of Paris (1763). The 
island was again subjected to recapture and recovery, before, at Amiens (1802), it 
was definitively given up by Great Britain, to whom, in view of her continued 
occupation of Malta, it had come to be of secondary importance. 



54 INTRODUCTION 

to the wishes of the Crown missed fire. Continental statesmanship 
had been taught a lesson which it might, to its own advantage, have 
more readily remembered — that British foreign policy was not, as a 
matter of course, under the imperative control either of established 
historical tradition or of supposed commercial interests. 

When, however, before long, the Emperor Charles VI, finding 
himself hemmed in by successive calamities, began to go back upon 
his unwillingness to fall in with the British policy, British diplomacy 
brought about the communications between the French and Imperial 
Commanders-in-Chief which led to the opening of Peace Confer- 
ences at Rastatt (November, 171 3). The Peace of Baden (September, 
1 7 14), which finally wound up these negotiations, was concluded 
without the mediation of either Great Britain or Spain being accepted 
by France or the Emperor, whose frontiers were settled on a plan of 
mutual compromise, while the Spanish Netherlands were now de- 
finitively acknowledged to be a possession of the House of Austria. 
British interests had no direct concern with this Peace. On the other 
hand, they were not unaffected by the Supplementary Pacifications 
concluded at Utrecht, in February, 171 5, between Portugal and Spain. 
This Treaty had been long delayed by the unextinguishable hatred 
between the two neighbouring peoples, and, also, by the hopes of 
the Portuguese for better terms than Spain was willing to allow to 
them in requital of their faithful adherence to the Grand Alliance 
throughout the War (which the diplomatic skill of Sir Paul Methuen 
had induced them to join so early as 1703). Portugal, whose Alliance 
with England was but an extension of relations which had now lasted 
for half a century, had, apart from the subsidies paid to her during 
the War, owed much to this Alliance; in return, she had incurred 
considerable losses in its course, including the French capture of 
Rio, with much booty. Yet, as a matter of fact, she was in the Peace 
negotiations left very much to her own efforts, till, at a later stage of 
the negotiations, Great Britain's leverage was with some effect ap- 
plied on behalf of her faithful Ally. 

Finally, some reference must be made to the "Barrier Treaties," 
concluded in this period by the Power our Alliance with whom may 
be described as a fundamental part of our whole policy in the War 
and the Peace. Nature had done less than nothing for the Low Coun- 
tries in the way of Barrier; and the French invasion of 1672, which, 
but for the opening of the dykes, might have swept over Holland 
itself, was only stayed by the patriotic efforts of William of Orange, 



THE FIRST BARRIER TREATY 55 

assisted in the following year by Spanish and Imperial troops. The 
clause in the Grand Alliance Treaty giving the United Provinces 
assurance of a Barrier against France, without naming the places 
which should constitute it, had, therefore, led to protracted discus- 
sions between the States-General and the Court of Vienna; and, 
when the latter became aware of the possibility of offers of a separate 
peace being made by France to the States, Sinzendorf was sent to 
the Hague (1706) to open negotiations, under the mediation of Marl- 
borough, on the subject of a Barrier Treaty. The Austrian point of 
view was that, if the Spanish Netherlands were definitively secured 
to the Austrian claimant, there was no necessity for a Barrier at all ; 
while the Dutch had prepared a list of towns that were to form it, 
including Ostend, and at first even Antwerp. At this point, British 
interests came into play. A war between Great Britain and the 
United Netherlands could, as recent history showed, not be regarded 
as absolutely impossible ; how then, with such an event in view, could 
these places be permanently committed to Dutch custody? When, 
however, the peace negotiations of 1709 broke down, and cordial 
cooperation between the British and Dutch Governments became 
once more imperative, negotiations on the Barrier question were re- 
newed between the two Powers. In these Austria, though one of the 
Powers primarily interested, took no part; and the result was the 
First Barrier Treaty (1709), signed by Townshend. The British 
Government undertook to secure for the Dutch the right of garrisoning, 
at their own cost, nine strong places in the Spanish Netherlands, with 
two others if retaken from the enemy. This Barrier Treaty amounted, 
in point of fact, to a renewal, on conditions more favourable to the 
United Provinces, of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance between 
them and Great Britain. It was, accordingly, decried with much 
vehemence by the Tory party, soon to return to political power in 
England, where much jealousy and animosity against the Dutch still 
survived and were augmented by what seemed an undue morigeration 
to Dutch interests, so that, in the agitated period of British public life 
that followed, the First Barrier Treaty acted as a constant irritant. 
The Dutch, on their side, had little gratitude to spare for British 
promises; and when, in 171 1, Marlborough was dismissed from his 
offices, the States-General, instead of entrusting the command of 
their troops to his successor, the Duke of Ormond, made it over to 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial forces, Prince Eugene. 
Hereupon, in the course of the peace negotiations of 171 1 and 



56 INTRODUCTION 

171 2, in accordance with the general course of the relations between 
the Powers, the British Government was found prepared to revise 
its previous Barrier Treaty, after such a fashion as considerably to 
reduce its value for the States-General. Several of the Barrier-places 
enumerated in the First Treaty had now been marked out for cession 
to France; and it became necessary for Great Britain to conclude a 
Second Barrier Treaty with the States-General, which finally revoked 
the First. By this Second Treaty (January 30th, 1713) the United 
Provinces acquired the right of garrisoning eight places, four of 
those included in the First (Lille was one of them) being omitted in 
the Second. Military and naval contingents were promised on both 
sides for the maintenance of the Treaty; but the United Provinces 
lost Upper Gelders, which had now been disposed of to Prussia. 

At Utrecht, as well as afterwards at Rastatt and Baden, the House 
of Austria's possession of the once "Spanish" Netherlands was con- 
sistently treated as part of the settlement effected. Yet, in all these 
agreements, provision had been made that, until the States- General 
should have arrived at a satisfactory understanding with the Emperor 
in the matter of their Barrier, they should retain their hold over the 
Austrian Netherlands. To bring about such an understanding, an 
Austro-Dutch Conference was held at Antwerp, once more under 
British mediation. The task was no easy one, especially after the 
Dutch, whose influence among the Allies had been much depressed 
during the last four years of Queen Anne, found their position im- 
proved by her death (August 1st) and the consequent Governmental 
changes in England. The death of Lewis XIV (September 1st, 1715), 
and the accession to power of the Regent Orleans, who was consist- 
ently desirous of maintaining a good understanding with the United 
Provinces, likewise redounded to their advantage. 

The Third Barrier Treaty, concluded November 15th, 171 5, 
proved a settlement with which, when it had been with great diffi- 
culty brought to paper, the Dutch had every reason to be satisfied. 
British policy, genuinely interested in the security of the Belgic Pro- 
vinces, in view of the always possible contingency of hostilities with 
France, was naturally inclined to meet the wishes of the Dutch, if 
only because of their guarantee of the now imperilled Protestant 
Succession. But it had been a very far from easy task for British 
statesmanship to seek to reconcile the claims of the United Pro- 
vinces with those of the House of Austria, which had never welcomed 
with any warmth the acquisition of the Catholic Netherlands, though, 



THE THIRD BARRIER TREATY 57 

of course, unable to countenance the idea, soon afterwards started by 
France, of forming them into a neutral State. In November, 1714, 
Stanhope (whose personal influence already counted for much) had 
paid a visit to Vienna, but found no disposition there to yield; 
General (afterwards Earl) Cadogan, however, who followed, proved 
more successful, and, in the end, an arrangement was agreed upon to 
which the Emperor reluctantly gave his assent. The Barrier-places 
were now to number seven, including Namur.Tournay and Ypres (with 
a joint garrison at Dendermonde) ; and Venloo, with a small further 
addition of Flemish territory, was to be transferred to the United Pro- 
vinces. Great Britain (while obtaining for herself certain commercial 
advantages) undertook as Guarantor of the Treaty in all its parts to 
provide a considerable force for the defence of the Barrier by both land 
and sea, and if necessary to declare war against any aggressor. Thus, 
the Dutch had succeeded in securing a well-protected frontier against 
France; while at the same time a relation, which was in a measure 
one of dependence upon them, had been established with the "Aus- 
trian" Provinces. It is therefore not difficult to understand that the 
ratifications of the Treaty had to undergo considerable delays, on the 
particular causes of which we need not dwell. The Dutch declined, 
as will be seen, to join the Quadruple Alliance till the Third Barrier 
Treaty should be complete, and, as a matter of fact, till their joining 
had ceased to matter. Moreover, as was asserted by their neighbours, 
they had at the same time acquired a practical control of the Belgic 
waterways and (since the Scheldt could at any time be closed) of 
every port in the country, except Ostend. The delimitation of the 
Netherlands was finally accomplished by a Supplementary Conven- 
tion signed at the Hague (December, 171 8). As for the House of 
Austria, it had, for the sake (as will be seen) of British goodwill, 
consented that the fortresses of the territory acquired by it should 
be left, partly at its own cost, in the hands of another Power; so 
that, in course of time, it anxiously sought to exchange this for a less 
remote acquisition. 

The Treaties of Utrecht (to use the term, once more, in its widest 
sense) had thus, taken as a whole, carried out the policy of William 
III, as representing the interests of Great Britain, on the one hand, 
and those of the Netherlands on the other; but had not carried it 
out in full. France had acquired for a member of her royal House, 
though he was no longer included in the Succession to it, part only 
of the inheritance of Charles II ; but this part included what William 



58 INTRODUCTION 

III had sought to withhold from the French candidate, viz. Spain 
herself. Furthermore, France was deprived of the new vantage- 
ground which she had seized in the Spanish, as against the United 
Netherlands, and which was now, though not without certain in- 
convenient liens, in Austrian hands. Finally, France had formally 
renounced any pretension to interfere with the stability of the British 
Constitutional settlement. So much for the results of the Treaties 
which ended the War of the Spanish Succession. 

What may be called the moral results of that War were due, 
above all, to its actual course, and to its effect on the material resources 
of the Powers engaged in it and upon the relations between them and 
the political system of which they formed part. For the attainment 
of these results, the policy which had originated the War and that 
which directed the Peace were primarily and jointly responsible. 
And more than this : the Peace of Utrecht, though negotiated and 
concluded by a statesmanship in most important respects out of 
harmony with that of the author of the Grand Alliance, was, not less 
than the War itself, in the main Great Britain's work; and, if it 
failed to gather in fully what the War seemed to have laid at her 
and her Allies' feet, to her credit was to be placed what, within limits 
deliberately chosen by herself, it achieved for Europe and her de- 
pendencies. In this, as in all but the rarest instances of similar 
magnitude, history is called upon to judge by other standards than 
those of person or party. 



IV 

George I, wise in his generation with a wisdom recalling, in its 
degree, that of the great politician in whose school he had been bred, 
had fully learnt a modern ruler's primary obligation of moving 
with his times and acting in accordance with their exigencies. Yet, 
although, in his kingdom, he discreetly forbore from interfering with 
the existing system of government, the influence exercised by him on 
British foreign policy was unmistakable. To a considerable extent, 
it subserved Hanoverian interests, and was guided by Hanoverian 
advice, though these, in their turn, in a large measure, coincided with 
the traditions that had come down from the age of the Grand 
Alliance. Thus, while his reign as a whole justified the national 
preference — at first far from assured — of the continued acceptance 
of the Revolutionary settlement to a "Restoration" of the Stewart 



GEORGE I AS A PRINCE OF THE EMPIRE 59 

Pretender, the doubts and jealousies of foreign Governments were 
successfully met by a policy blending national (British) and dynastic 
(Hanoverian) purposes; and, although George I was neither an Eng- 
lishman nor a popular King, it was, on the whole, fortunate for Great 
Britain that he should have come from his well-beloved Hanover to 
ascend the Stewarts' uneasy Throne. 

It may be worth pointing out that the "Personal Union" brought 
about under George I is not quite correctly described as a union 
between a powerful monarchy and a small secondary State. The re- 
lations between England and the United Netherlands in the reign of 
William III, even after the death of his devoted Queen, furnished no 
sort of precedent, and had never come near to what had once been 
Cromwell's ideal; and the course of the War of the Spanish Suc- 
cession, and of the negotiations at its close, had shown how un- 
intermittently each of the two Maritime Powers kept its own par- 
ticular ends in view. Moreover, at the beginning of the Hanoverian 
period, the foundations of the British Empire were, after all, still in 
the laying ; and the Elector of Hanover, although hardly even among 
the foremost of the Princes of Germany, was entirely, in the words 
of a modern historian 1 , "a leading personage in Europe." The 
politics of the Brunswick- Wolfenbiittel branch of the Guelfs had* 
been Imperialist before the days of the Thirty Years' War ; and the 
Liineburg-Celle branch had, six years before the conclusion of the 
Peace of Westphalia, signed with the Emperor a separate pacification 
favourable to themselves. Thenceforward, the Brunswick-Liine- 
burgers had remained on the best of terms with the Court of Vienna. 
The Elector George Lewis, in especial, had borne an active part in 
several campaigns against the Turks, including the rescue of Vienna 
— a fact not forgotten when, at Carlo witz, in 1699, English mediation 
had secured to the Emperor Leopold the fruits of Austrian prowess 
against the Crescent, as, in substance, it again did, nineteen years 
later, at Passarowitz. In the West the Liineburg-Celle Princes had, 
in the main (though in the case of those ruling at Hanover, not from 
the first), supported the policy of William III and of the Grand 
Alliance, and had been rewarded by the Electoral investiture (1792) 
of the father of George Lewis, under whom the whole Liineburg- 
Celle dominions were reunited (1705). 

1 Mr J. F. Chance, in his most valuable monograph, George I and the Northern 
War (1909). As Mr Chance notes, " that George I might have succeeded Charles VI, 
on the Imperial Throne, was in 1714, a possibility not disregarded." 



6o INTRODUCTION 

The reign of George I, regarded from the point of view of its 
foreign policy, divides itself most conveniently into three periods, 
coinciding, more or less, with those of the ascendancy in this respect 
of Townshend (1714-7), of Stanhope (1717-21), and of Townshend 
and Walpole (not yet " Walpole and Townshend") (1721-7), respec- 
tively. In the earliest of these periods, the two statesmen chiefly 
concerned with the conduct of foreign affairs served side by side as 
First and Second Secretaries of State — Townshend, who held the 
former post, being regarded as Head of the Government, but the 
disposal of business between them being left to their own discretion. 
The arrangement proved itself inconvenient, especially since both 
these Ministers were high-minded as well as able men. Stanhope's 
views were, to a far greater extent than his colleague's, in accordance 
with their Sovereign's; and, on the split in the Whig party declaring 
itself and Townshend giving up the Seals, Sunderland was associated 
with Stanhope. Among the Secretaries of State in this reign were 
the excellent Addison (a steady party-man) and the younger Craggs 
(Pope's Pollio, of whose capacity in or out of Parliament there is 
abundant evidence) 1 . 

While the chief operations of British foreign policy during the 
larger half of George I's reign had the approval and were due to the 
suggestion of the King's Hanoverian advisers, it by no means follows 
that they should be held responsible for the conception, any more 
than for the execution, of that policy as a whole. Apart from the fact 
that few British Sovereigns have exercised so close and continuous a 
personal interest over the country's foreign affairs as George I, it 
should be remembered that the British statesmen entrusted with the 
management of these affairs in the earlier part of the reign and the 
Hanoverian advisers of the King were, from the nature of the case, 

1 The force and lucidity of Craggs' despatches might be illustrated without 
difficulty. Of Addison's, that to Count Gallas (the Imperial Ambassador at Rome) 
asking for his mediation with Pope Clement XI, who is required, in a conciliatory 
tone, to redress a series of British grievances of which the arrest of Peterborough 
at Bologna was the foremost (October, 17 17), is notable as showing the absence of 
direct diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the Court of St James. Cf. 
W. Michael, u. s. vol. 11. part 1. pp. 309 ff. Lord Stanhope (History of England, 
etc., 5th ed., 1858, vol. 1. p. 202), notices that the House of Commons remained 
without its due share in appointments to high administrative offices, and therefore 
in the direction of the administration of the country itself, till after the passing of 
the Septennial Act (171 6). The real change in the relative importance of the two 
Houses of Parliament in the public eye dates of course from the age of Walpole ; 
but the part taken by members of the House of Lords in the conduct of foreign 
affairs continued, for obvious reasons, to preponderate up to the days of the younger 
Pitt. 



\ 



THE HANOVERIAN "JUNTA" 61 

in substantial agreement. Townshend had been chosen as Principal 
Secretary of State with the approval, if not at the direct instance, of 
Bothmer (whose confidence, with that of the leading Dutch states- 
men, he had gained during his residence at the Hague); while the 
entire Whig Government with which George I began his reign had 
been recommended to him by Bernstorff (who accompanied him 
from Hanover to England on his journey for taking seisin). The 
approval of Bernstorff implied the assent of Robethon, the inevitable 
(and indispensable) Huguenot refugee, whose connexion with Eng- 
lish affairs dated from the days of his secretaryship to William III, 
at the end of his reign 1 . For the rest, we need say nothing further 
here as to Hanoverian influence on British political action, except in 
the instances adverted to below of the Bremen and Verden, and the 
Mecklenburg episodes. It may, however, be worth observing that 
the leading members of the "Junta" were by no means always at 
one with each other. Bothmer's star seems to have waned as Bern- 
storff 's rose to its height, which it reached while Stanhope's Govern- 
ment could still be, with any reason, popularly called the German 
Ministry. Of course, the Hanoverian influence was far more fully 
asserted in the affairs of Northern than in those of Southern Europe ; 
and Bernstorff 's political principles (as well as his personal interests) 
long obstructed these negotiations with Prussia, the success of which 
were, in 1720, followed by his downfall, the end of the Hanoverian 
era proper, and the reunion of the Whigs. 

At the time of the accession of -George I to the British Throne, 
the Peace recently concluded was still virtually Great Britain's peace. 
The Emperor would have none of it, even after he had, a few weeks 
later, concluded his own at Baden. The Dutch had only assented 
conditionally on a satisfactory Barrier being granted them by the 
Emperor. In France, the Peace was regarded with a sense of mingled 
relief and distrust. At home, it was loudly condemned by the great body 
of the Whigs; and, both here and across the water, the resumption 
of the War seemed for a time on the cards, even before King Lewis 
XIV's end had come (September 1st, 1715). To Great Britain the 
old Alliances were of more value than ever ; and, so early as November, 

1 He had then entered the Celle service and had (if one may so say) become 
the dme damnee of Bernstorff, having been appointed "Privy Councillor of Em- 
bassy" at Hanover, and continued to exercise the undefined functions of this office 
in England till his patron's fall. The personalities and history of the members of 
the "Hanoverian Junta" are briefly noticed in the Appendix to Lecture II of my 
Great Britain and Hanover (1899). 



6 2 INTRODUCTION 

1 7 14, Stanhope, when, at Vienna, he sought to bring about the 
acceptance of a Barrier Treaty which would satisfy the United 
Provinces, confidentially propounded, in the first instance, to Prince 
Eugene the conclusion of a defensive alliance, to be afterwards 
joined by the United Provinces — the germ of the later Triple Al- 
liance. But nothing came of the project so long as the Third Barrier 
Treaty remained unsigned. As has been seen, the jealousy between 
the Imperial and the Dutch Governments continued even after 
this; but, in the meantime, although the death of Lewis XIV had 
brought France under the rule of a Government favourable to Great 
Britain, the British Throne itself had been, though as it proved 
only transitorily, placed in a position of danger. Thus, while through 
the efforts of British diplomacy the Third Barrier Treaty had been 
brought to its conclusion under British guarantee (November, 1715), 
there remained behind the urgent expediency of securing to Great 
Britain the old Allies — more closely tied to her by their own interests, 
and, it may be said without prejudice, more trustworthy than the 
existing French Government. 

The relations between these Allies — the United Provinces and 
the Emperor — were, however, even after the signature of the Barrier 
Treaty, the reverse of easy, and their dissensions about the time of the 
years 171 5-6, owing to incidents connected with territorial transfers, 
rose to such a pitch that a joint alliance including both of them was for 
the present out of the question. The new Austrian Ambassador in 
London (no official of his rank had been accredited here since 1712), 
was a most unfortunate choice; and thus it came to pass that the 
first Treaty of Alliance signed by the British Government (February, 
1716) was with the States-General, and that a Treaty, of mutual terri- 
torial guarantee, with the Emperor was not formally signed at West- 
minster till the following May. To this second Treaty, though declared 
by the Emperor to be defensive only, the Dutch Government never 
formally signified their adhesion, though they gradually reconciled 
themselves to it, the more readily when it proved not to be incompat- 
ible with the Anglo-French undertaking that was, above all others, of 
value to their most important interests. It was concluded by George I, 
as King of Great Britain only, and therefore contained no guarantee 
of Hanoverian territories ; moreover, though his Hanoverian Ministers 
had taken part in the negotiations, their signatures were not added to 
the Treaty. But, though a joint alliance with both the Emperor and 
the United Provinces seemed for the moment impossible, there was 



ANGLO-SWEDISH RELATIONS 63 

no doubt of the friendly intentions of both her old Allies towards 
Great Britain. Of the two storm-points which, in the early years 
of the reign, seemed to threaten a continued disturbance of the Peace 
of Europe and a consequent interference with the Hanoverian Suc- 
cession included among its conditions at Utrecht, one had even now 
not yet reached its final stage. A considerable change had gradually 
come over Great Britain's relations with the Powers engaged in the 
still unfinished great Northern War, and in particular with the mili- 
tant Baltic Power to which she had long been drawn by strong re- 
ligious sympathies as well as by important commercial interests. 

So early in the reign of Charles XII as 1700, Sweden had con- 
cluded a Treaty of mutual defence with England for eighteen years ; 
and another immediately followed, in which the United Provinces of 
the Netherlands joined, and which, in a secret article, bound the 
Contracting Powers to use their best endeavours for preserving the 
endangered Peace of the North. By virtue of this compact, Sweden, 
in the same year, 1700, obliged Denmark to sign the Peace of Tra- 
vendal, which detached that Power from the league of the adver- 
saries of the young Swedish King. During the eventful years of his 
victorious advance that followed, Great Britain kept her hands free 
from engagements on either side, successfully foiling the efforts of 
Lewis XIV to gain over the Northern hero to the side of France in 
her own War. British trade with Sweden continued brisk, although 
its volume was probably not more than half that of the Dutch, the 
Swedish exports being, practically, confined to materials for ship- 
building. During the Northern War, Sweden treated neutral com- 
merce with a high hand, so that, on the plea that they had carried 
contraband of war into Russian ports — of which Sweden had de- 
clared a blockade — many British merchantmen were seized by 
Swedish men-of-war and privateers. On the other hand, it is notice- 
able as bearing upon the future, that the relations between Charles XII 
and the Elector George Lewis of Hanover had always been excellent, 
and had stood the Swedish King in good stead in the earlier part of 
his course. 

Accordingly, even after "Pultawa's day," when the counter- 
current of revanche gradually overflowed half Europe, Great Britain 
held her hand, and, in course of time, non-intervention in the North 
became part of her general policy of peace. Moreover, so long as the 
Spanish Succession War was still afoot, it was contrary to the interest 
of all the Allies, though of course to that of the Emperor and Empire 



64 INTRODUCTION 

in particular, to allow Germany to be set in a blaze with the aid of 
large forces still indispensable at the actual theatre of war. Accord- 
ingly, a Convention was signed at the Hague (March 31st, 1710) 
declaring the neutrality of the German Provinces of Sweden, so as 
to protect them, if necessary, against attack, and at the same time to 
prevent their serving as bases of counter-attack. 

One of the most wholehearted supporters of this Convention was 
the Elector of Hanover, whose dominions were bordered in part by 
Swedish annexations which, in the day of Sweden's dire distress, 
were certain to become so many coveted prizes. Among these were 
the "duchies" of Bremen and Verden. Apart from the fact that, 
when succeeding to the insecure grandeur of the British Throne, 
George I had excellent reason for "cultivating" what he left behind 
him, the ownership of these lands was a matter of considerable con- 
sequence, as well as historic interest, to the Elector of Hanover. The 
duchy, formerly belonging to the archbishopric, of Bremen had, 
after the Reformation, been held by cadets of neighbouring princely 
Houses, including that of Brunswick-Liineburg, but in the Peace of 
Westphalia had passed as a secular duchy into the possession of the 
Swedish Crown. The bishopric of Verden, of old part of the domin- 
ions of Henry the Lion, had likewise been assigned to the Swedish 
Crown as a secular principality. The duchy of Bremen and the prin- 
cipality of Verden, respectively, commanded the course of the Weser 
from Bremen to its mouth and that of the Elbe to the sea from 
the vicinity of Hamburg, Holstein lying to the north-west of the 
river; above Harburg, the Elbe formed the north-eastern boundary 
of the Brunswick-Liineburg territories. In the days of William III 
and Anne, the vigilance of the Elector of Hanover had been directed 
less against Sweden, the actual mistress of Bremen and Verden, than 
against her inveterate foe Denmark, who, should she possess herself 
of these territories, might, because of their immediate vicinity to 
Holstein, prove far more unwilling at any time to relinquish them. 

Thus, before the question of the future of the Swedish monarchy 
and of its provinces had to be faced by Great Britain as a European 
Power, a very direct Hanoverian interest had become mixed up with 
it. Tsar Peter I, against whom about this time (end of 1709) Charles 
XII was seeking to induce the Sultan to declare war — while he was, 
also, believed to be in communication with the French Government — 
was intent upon ousting Sweden from her control of the Baltic and from 
the territories still belonging to her in Germany. He was annoyed 



HANOVERIAN ACQUISITION OF BREMEN AND VERDEN 65 

by Prussia's hesitation about asserting her dynasty's claims on Stettin 
and its district ; and assiduously worked upon the Elector of Hanover, 
through his able representative there, Prince Boris Kurakin, to press 
his interest in Bremen and Verden. But the first actual step towards 
the acquisition of the " duchies" was not taken by George Lewis till 
the year before his accession to the British Throne. When Frederick IV 
of Denmark, notwithstanding his rout in Scania (171 o), made another 
attempt to carry out his part in the anti-Swedish league formed after 
Pultawa, and to this end, in 1713, after a severe struggle, occupied 
the duchy of Bremen, the fit conjuncture seemed to present itself 
for carrying out the long-harboured design. In the same year, 
George Lewis occupied Verden, with Ottersburg, just across the 
Bremen boundary and, though still at peace with the Swedish 
Government, announced his intention of continuing to hold the 
lesser territory, so long as the Danes held the larger. Though, even 
after the accession of George I and the arrival of Charles XII at 
Stralsund (November, 1714), cordial messages were exchanged be- 
tween them, there was no longer any mutual confidence; and, though 
the British ships sent in 17 15 took no actual part in the Dano- 
Prussian siege of Stralsund, the continuance of eight of them in the 
Baltic implied the approval by Great Britain of the Treaty between 
Denmark and Hanover, finally ratified in July of this year. By this 
compact, the duchy of Bremen was (in return for a payment variously 
reckoned, but over 600,000 dollars) to be given up to the Elector. 
The transfer was accomplished by October, and the Elector's de- 
ck-^ttion of war against Sweden immediately followed. On the other 
hand, Sir John Norris, while carrying out a demonstration on behalf 
of trade wrongs at the head of a fleet composed of British, Prussian 
and Danish ships, carefully kept out of the way of the transaction 
concerning the "duchies," and contributed only indirectly to the fall 
of Stralsund (December). As for the duchies, their Estates had at once 
done homage to their new ruler. The Danes, fearing that Charles XII 
might seek to purchase the friendship of the King of Great Britain 
by a voluntary cession of the duchies to the Elector of Hanover, had, 
without loss of time, safeguarded the transfer by means of Treaties 
with Hanover and Prussia; but the Hanoverian possession of them 
was not formally recognised by Sweden till 17 19 (in the Peace of 
Stockholm) when this complicated, and not altogether ingenuous, 
transaction was at last wound up. When the Hanoverian annexation 
of Bremen and Verden had actually been perpetrated, there could, of 
w.&g.i. 5 



66 INTRODUCTION 

course, no longer be any thought of friendly relations between 
George I and Charles XII. But this was not the time for the latter 
to think of a raid on any part of the British dominions on his own 
account, and the Jacobite insurrection of 171 5-6 collapsed without 
a serious hope or fear of any such incident 1 . 

Meanwhile, a great design (if this historic term should be applied to 
a vast, but largely shadowy, web of intrigues such as " Gortz's Plot") 
was in preparation, which, while imperilling the continuance of the 
existing British Government and dynasty, had in view a complete 
change in the relations between Sweden and her most formidable 
enemy, Russia. The ultimate object of Gortz, now in the service of 
Sweden and loyally devoted to her interests, was a peace between 
the two Baltic Powers, which would have extinguished the anti- 
Swedish league, now, as has been seen, virtually including Great 
Britain. The political relations between George I and the Tsar Peter 
had, indeed, become friendly, as British grievances and Hanoverian 
cupidity jointly increased the tension with Sweden; and, in October, 
171 5, a Treaty had been agreed upon between the Tsar and the 
Elector of Hanover at Greifswald mutually guaranteeing Bremen 
and Verden to the Elector of Hanover: and Esthonia, with Reval, 
to the Tsar. But to this Treaty the King of Great Britain could not 
give effect without the assent of his Parliament, and, since the British 
Ministers were not prepared for joint armed action against Sweden, 
Bernstorff informed Kurakin that the full purpose of the Treaty 
must be kept secret and only the commercial clauses made known 
at present. Meanwhile, Peter ruthlessly excited the violent wrath 1 of 
George I by his high-handed interference in German affairs, and 
more especially by taking advantage of the marriage of his niece 
Catharine to Duke Charles Leopold of Mecklenburg Schwerin, to 
quarter among the nobility there, traditionally impatient of their 
Sovereign's rule, a large body of Russian troops intended to take 
part in the Danish invasion of Scania agreed upon between Peter and 
Frederick IV at Altona. Prussia (who had just expelled the Swedes 
from Wismar) held her hand ; but Russia could depend on her good- 
will, while Hanover and Prussia were as a matter of course at odds. 
The invasion was postponed, though Sir John Norris was in the 

1 It is, by the way, illustrative of the entire relations between England and 
Scotland after the Union, that, there being at the time no Treaty of Alliance be- 
tween Great Eritain and Hanover, while a subsidiary treaty would no doubt have 
been deemed inadvisable, Stair's suggestion of shipping some Hanoverian bat- 
talions to Scotland at the time of the Insurrection was not carried out. 



DISCOVERY OF "GORTZ'S PLOT" 67 

Baltic, prepared to take part in it; and King George was with diffi- 
culty prevented from sending the Admiral orders to seize on the 
person of the Tsar in requital of his arbitrary ways. But although 
the British Ministry shared the desire to keep Peter and his designs 
in check, his violation of German territory could not be held to war- 
rant a coup de main by the British fleet against a Sovereign who was, 
virtually, an Ally 1 . 

Meanwhile, " Gortz's Plot," of which neither the genesis nor the 
ramifications can be traced here, had become known to British states- 
men, and at the end of January, 1717, was discussed in Council. In 
setting it in motion, the arch-intriguer Gortz had had the assistance 
of the Swedish envoys, Gyllenborg in London and Sparre at Paris, 
and had depended on the connivance of the scheming Alberoni at 
Madrid and of the Chevalier, still a disposition at Avignon. Nor .was 
he altogether out of touch either with the Regent of France (in the 
earlier stages of the affair), or with the Tsar. The discovery, though it 
rendered the plot as such hopeless, with the arrests, and the intern- 
ment of Gortz in Holland, caused a sensation almost unparalleled in 
modern diplomatic annals, but exercised no decisive influence upon 
British policy. Charles XII kept silence, and the Regent Orleans' 
disclaimer of any aggressive intentions against Great Britain found 
willing credence. As for George I and the more resolute among his 
Ministers, they had already made up their minds to a more vigorous and 
far-reaching "system" of action, which would place Great Britain in 
a firm position of her own among the European Powers, unassailable 
by machinations such as those of either Gortz or Alberoni. 

In the summer of 171 6, Stanhope had accompanied King George 
on the pathetic occasion of his first visit home. En route, the Minister 
contrived to manage the earliest of his celebrated "unbuttoned" 
conversations with the Abbe Dubois, the trusted intimate of the 
Regent Orleans, who was anxious to safeguard his personal future 
against the Spanish Bourbons and their (never wholly impossible) 
speculations as to the French Succession. With these speculations 
the designs of Alberoni, inspired, in the first instance, by the am- 
bition of Queen Elizabeth (Farnese) of Spain, were interwoven, and 
these naturally came to a head after the death of Lewis XIV. Their 

1 The Mecklenburg quarrel had an interesting sequel, which, however, had no 
direct connexion with British policy, though George I as Elector of Hanover was 
one of the Princes of the Empire charged with its execution against Duke Charles 
Leopold in 17 17, and though its results led to complications which engaged the 
attention of George II to so late a date as 1735. 



68 INTRODUCTION 

aim was, should it prove impossible to secure the French Throne for 
the Spanish Bourbons, at all events to revive in Elizabeth's line the 
Spanish dominion in Italy. While the resistance of the Emperor 
would of course be the obstacle-in-chief, Great Britain's attention 
must be distracted by the overthrow of her new dynasty. For the 
moment, however, since the working out of such a scheme required 
time, Alberoni was in no hurry to break with Great Britain, and was, 
indeed, desirous of cultivating her goodwill, especially since that of 
the French Government was no longer at the service of the Spanish. 
Hence the Anglo-Spanish Commercial Treaty of December, 171 5, 
highly favourable to British interests, negotiated by George Bubb 
(afterwards Lord Melcombe who, before entering on the later un- 
edifying part of his career had been Sir Paul Methuen's successor 
at Madrid) and Alberoni, though, on his part, neither sincere in 
conception nor effective in its results. Meanwhile, the British 
negotiations with France had been all but brought to a satisfactory 
conclusion. Instead of being conducted through the Earl of Stair 
at Paris (whose addiction to the pomps of diplomacy by no means 
rendered him averse from the use of its bye ways), the business was, 
in August, 1716, transferred to the management of Stanhope and 
the ambitious and intriguing Sunderland, with the cooperation of 
Bernstorff, in the still surroundings of Hanover. Here it was brought 
to a successful issue by the signing of an agreement between 
France and Great Britain confirmatory of those portions of the 
Peace of Utrecht which concerned their respective interests, more 
especially the order of Succession in the two monarchies, and 
guaranteeing their territorial possessions in a form including the 
new acquisitions of the House of Hanover. The Pretender was 
excluded from France, and the Mardyke question was, with some 
difficulty, satisfactorily settled. The complementary assent of the 
Dutch Government had been assumed, to the righteous indignation 
of the British Minister at the Hague, Horace Walpole (the elder); 
but it arrived on January 4th following, and the " Triple Alliance " was 
now complete. It was the work of Bernstorff and Stanhope (to write 
their names in the order of sequence proposed by the same critic at 
the Hague). Townshend, the absence of whose countersignature had 
been suspiciously noted by Dubois, had sent it in time; but there 
could be no doubt that he had looked askance upon the Alliance and 
the policy of warlike operations in the North to which it seemed to 
him to point. The King, moved in his turn by angry jealousy of 



STANHOPE AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 69 

Russia, was wholly against Townshend. Hence, a split among the 
Whigs, and a reconstruction of the British Ministry, which was com- 
pleted when, in April, 17 17, Stanhope became First Lord of the 
Treasury and Sunderland Secretary of State (1717), Townshend 
having, accepted the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland, but being sub- 
sequently dismissed from this office also. (Stanhope and Sunder- 
land exchanged offices in the following year, 1718.) Finally, whether 
or not the treatment of the Pretender in the Triple Alliance offended 
the chivalrous spirit of the Swedish King, the British Government 
more directly defied him, in the following March, by prohibiting all 
trade with Sweden, and, in the same year (171 8), sent another fleet 
into the Baltic. 

In the period of Stanhope's Ministerial ascendancy which ensued, 
the " Quadruple Alliance " (August, 1718) forms his most momentous 
achievement. It might, possibly, not have been carried through the 
difficulties besetting it, but for the active part played in the negotia- 
tions of the years 171 7 and 1718 by BernstorfT and Bothmer 1 , whose 
main purpose was to strengthen the authority of the Emperor in 
Germany and to promote the intimate relations between him and the 
House of Hanover. Yet, however sorely these efforts vexed the souls 
of Sir Robert Walpole and the section of the Whigs with which he 
acted, the plan courageously and circumspectly formed by Stanhope 
for settling the affairs of Europe was successful, in the face of reckless 
ambition abroad as well as of intelligible distrust at home. The Triple 
Alliance, well-omened as had been the fact of its conclusion, stood 
on no firm footing, and could not prove an enduring safeguard of the 
Peace of Europe, should Spanish policy, urged on by dynastic and 
Ministerial ambition, venture to revive the quarrel with the House 
of Austria, and should that House seize the opportunity of renewing 
its pretensions to the Spanish Throne. Cardinal Alberoni, the em- 
bodiment of the new Spanish aspirations, was, accordingly, the 
second stormpoint on the European horizon, which, even before 
the Northern War had become extinct, threatened to overwhelm the 
European order of things established by the Utrecht and supple- 
mentary Treaties, and including the settlement in Great Britain. 

The storm broke, in this quarter, before the plan of action de- 
vised by Stanhope and Dubois could be applied as a prophylactic. 

1 Of the importance attached to their counsels, more especially by the able 
Austrian negotiator Penterriedter, we have ample evidence from Bothmer's own 
hand, in his Memoir e on the Quadruple Alliance. 



7 o INTRODUCTION 

The Emperor was harassed by his Turkish War; and, influenced 
perhaps by this circumstance, Alberoni, though aware that the time 
was hardly ripe, yielded to his Sovereign's resentment of an accidental 
insult offered to Spain by Imperial officials, and seized Sardinia by a 
coup de main (August, 17 17). Emboldened by his rapid success, he 
was preparing to seize Sicily (now under Savoy rule) when Stanhope 
intervened. In March, 171 8, his kinsman Colonel William Stanhope 
(afterwards Earl of Harrington) appeared at Madrid to offer a pro- 
test, which was (not very strenuously) supported by France and the 
United Provinces. The British and the Spanish Governments were 
still on amicable terms, though Alberoni had already begun to dis- 
regard the recent Commercial Treaty with Great Britain, besides 
rejecting her offer of good offices with the Emperor. By July, how- 
ever, a British fleet was sent into the Mediterranean, to deal with 
Spanish naval operations which might conceivably have been fol- 
lowed up by a demonstration or a raid on the British shores. About 
this time, too, the Emperor's Turkish War was brought to a close, 
on terms satisfactory, so far as his interests in this quarter were con- 
cerned, by the Peace of Passarowitz (July, 171 8) — a Treaty to be 
placed mainly to the credit of British diplomacy, whose twofold 
object seems to have been to bring about an immediate close of 
hostilities between the Porte and the Emperor (so as to enable the 
latter to take part if necessary in the Western conflicts) and to 
make trouble between the Porte and the Tsar 1 . 

Thus, in the midst of this medley of East and West, the Anglo- 
French Convention, signed in July, 171 8, received the adhesion of 
the Emperor, and in the following month the Quadruple Alliance 
was concluded with him in London. Its name — to some extent a 
misnomer — was due to the adhesion of the United Provinces, which 
was, after some delay, unwillingly given (February, 1719). That of 
Savoy had preceded it, though, as will be surmised from the bargain 
proposed to her, it had not been much more readily accorded. Victor 

1 The policy of the Peace of Passarowitz, as noted above, repeated under equally 
critical circumstances, that of Carlowitz (1699), concluded under the mediation 
of Great Britain at a time when William III was anxious to put an end to a War 
diverting the military forces of the Empire from the Western theatre of action. 
In the midst of the Passarowitz negotiations, Prince Eugene took Belgrade; and 
the Peace marks an epoch in the history of the Eastern question and especially of 
Austria's Eastern policy, besides showing the interest taken in these matters by 
Great Britain at this time, largely under Hanoverian inspiration. The fruits of the 
Peace of Passarowitz were largely sacrificed by Austria in that of Belgrade (1739), 
which Russia (then her Ally), though victorious, had to follow up by a pacification 
of her own. 



SPAIN AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 71 

AmadeusII was suspected of playinga double game ; but the traditional 
friendship of Great Britain for the House of Savoy (which, however, 
failed to show the steadfastness of that of Braganza) prevailed over 
the wiles of the Cardinal at Madrid. The negotiations for the Alliance 
had been difficult and protracted; for both the French and the 
British-Hanoverian counsels lacked unity of purpose ; but, thanks to 
the energy of Stanhope, and the skill of his subordinates 1 , the scheme 
of which he was the primary author reached its consummation. 

The essential object of the Quadruple Alliance, which made a 
direct appeal to the principles of the Peace of Utrecht and the Grand 
Alliance, was to establish these agreements on an enduring basis, or, 
if the expression be preferred, to give to them their logical develop- 
ment. While the Emperor was to renounce definitively all pretensions 
to Spain and the Indies, Spain, in her turn, was to relinquish for 
the future any claim to any former Spanish province now under the 
rule of the Emperor. Sicily was to pass into his possession out of 
that of the House of Savoy, which was to receive, instead, the island 
of Sardinia, with the title of King. Finally, the Emperor was eventu- 
ally to invest Don Carlos (or another son of the Queen Elizabeth of 
Spain) with the duchies of Parma, Piacenza and the greater part of 
Tuscany, but on condition that none of these should in any case 
become part of the Spanish monarchy. 

Would Spain, under a guidance which wooed Fortune by teme- 
rity, now that her armada was at sea and the drift of her audacious 
designs becoming manifest to the world, dare to proceed, and to re- 
ject the compromise imposed upon her? Or would these designs, 
with the more or less vague hopes of support with which they were 
buoyed up, collapse in face of a mandate from the Powers united in 
the Quadruple Alliance? To decide this issue, Stanhope himself, 
immediately after the signature of that agreement, betook himself to 
Madrid, accompanied by Schaub. In one hand, he brought the offer 
of peace, with certain concessions, including (though with what ac- 
companying conditions, seems to remain unknown) a secret proposal 
for the cession of Gibraltar 2 — in the other, war. Alberoni refused 
to give way, even when (after Stanhope's departure) the startling 

1 One of these was St Saphorin, who had passed from the Hanoverian into the 
British service and was British Minister-resident at Vienna. He was by birth a 
Swiss, like Sir Luke Schaub, who, after varied services, became Ambassador at 
Paris in 172 1. The British diplomatic body, never more notably than in this period, 
recruited itself by the admission of natives of other countries. 

2 See Lord Stanhope, vol. 1. p. 310. 



72 INTRODUCTION 

news had arrived of the destruction of all the Spanish ships by the 
British fleet off Cape Passaro on the Sicilian coast (August, 171 8). 
But the die had been cast. Alberoni, more suo, now that his scheme 
of anticipating the Italian stipulations of the Quadruple Alliance had 
failed, and that it had been joined by Savoy, resorted to fresh offen- 
sive plans. In France, however, the discovery of the Cellamare plot 
against the Regent put an end to any elements of hesitation; and 
when, in December, 1718, the Government of Great Britain, of 
which Alberoni was planning both a Spanish and Swedish invasion, 
declared war against Spain, the French Government speedily fol- 
lowed suit (January, 1719). As will be seen, the Cardinal had also 
in mind a joint attack upon Hanover by Sweden and Russia, whose 
Governments were then discussing conditions of peace in the Aland 
Islands. The Spanish War — or the War against Alberoni — was un- 
popular in England, except for the losses in it of the Spanish navy; 
for no immediate British interests were involved in the Emperor's 
desire to make himself master of Sicily. 

Before, however, it began its course, the news had arrived of the 
death of Charles XII (December nth, 171 8); and, though his in- 
tentions had remained uncertain to the last, a sudden end had come 
to the designs of Gortz, and a severe blow had been dealt to those 
of Alberoni. In April, 1719, the Spanish expedition under Ormond 
was scattered off the Irish coast, and, in the same month, the French 
began their invasion of Northern Spain , seconded by a British raid by 
sea. On the other hand, the Cardinal was encouraged by a gleam of 
success which had attended the Spanish arms at Franca Villa against 
the Austrian reinforcements sent to Naples (June), to hold out a 
little longer. The persistency of the British and French Govern- 
ments, however, prevailed. In December, with the aid of a series 
of intrigues, in which the self-proffered diplomacy of Peterborough 
made itself conspicuous, the Spanish Prime-minister's career as such, 
at last came to an end. Yet, even so, the tenacity of Philip V — or, 
rather, that of his Consort — once more necessitated the personal 
intervention of Stanhope. In January, 1720, he, at Paris, joined in 
a declaration on behalf of Great Britain, France and the Emperor, 
firmly upholding the "system" of the Quadruple Alliance. A week 
later, King Philip accepted that agreement, subject (secretly) to cer- 
tain points left over for the decision of a Congress, to be held at 
Cambray in 1722. The Spanish adhesion to the Quadruple Alliance 
was followed by two Treaties, between Spain and Great Britain, and 



TENSION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SWEDEN 73 

between those Powers and France respectively (1721), intended, with 
a view to this Congress, as a sort of reinsurance against the under- 
standing by which France and Spain, distrustful of the intentions 
of the Emperor, had thought to safeguard themselves. But these 
Treaties were alike concluded after Stanhope's death. The political 
structure which he had raised into being cannot, in itself, be described 
as built on a rock ; but his courage and resolution, brought home alike 
to foe and friend, had successfully trodden down the embers which the 
efforts of Spain and the daring enterprise of her master-politician had 
begun to rekindle into flame in Western and Southern Europe. 

About the same time , the Northern War , which , as a matter of course , 
had considerably affected British trade, but with which Hanoverian 
political interests had latterly become inextricably mixed up, had, 
at last, been ended by the Peace of Nystad (1721). Before the death 
of Charles XII (December nth, 1718), while the effects of Gortz's 
now patent designs had not yet quite died out, and the Swedish 
negotiations with Russia in the Aland Islands were, under the in- 
fluence of these projects, still pursuing their tortuous course, the re- 
lations between Sweden and Great Britain were more strained than 
ever, involving most of the discomfort, with much of the cost, of 
regular warfare. In the spring of this year, Norris had again sailed 
into the Baltic, ostensibly in order to redress the continued grievances 
of British trade and navigation, in conjunction with the Danes (still 
at war with Sweden), and with the less certain support of the Dutch. 
He had instructions to present himself at Petrograd, where he might 
still be able to thwart the proposed combination between Russia and 
Sweden. The Tsar Peter had never swerved from his purpose of 
extending his dominions along the Baltic. To this end, he had first 
joined the League against Charles XII, and there now seemed an 
opportunity of compassing it by treaty. But the Mecklenburg trouble 
was not yet over; and there was nothing really satisfactory in the 
assurances of the Russian Court. Thus, a reconciliation might, not 
without some French encouragement 1 , have, after all, taken place 
between Sweden and Russia, which would have furthered neither 



1 The Treaty of Amsterdam of the previous year (17 17) was the work of the 
Regent's Government, anxious to play the part of Mediator ; Great Britain had no 
share in the Treaty, but Russia's proposed Concert against Sweden was counter- 
acted by the effects of Prince Eugene's victory at Belgrade and Stanhope's success 
in bringing about the Quadruple Alliance; and Prussia, whose policy was more 
suspect than before to Great Britain, had, for the moment, to fall back on a waiting 
game. 



74 INTRODUCTION 

British nor Hanoverian- Imperial interests — but for the catastrophe 
which happened near the end of the year. 

The death of Charles XII before Frederikshald (December nth, 
17 1 8) was one of those catastrophes which bring with them a sense 
of relief to half the world. The Swedish Crown descended to Charles's 
sister, Ulrica Eleanora, to the disappointment of his nephew, Duke 
Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp (afterwards son-in-law to the 
Tsar Peter) ; but its diminished authority was soon made over to her 
husband, King Frederick I (Prince Frederick of Hesse- Cassel), with 
whom George I was on the most friendly terms. After the death of 
Charles XII, Sweden had no policy left but one of peace. Among 
the many claims which that peace would have to meet, Hanover's 
were of the latest, Denmark's of the earliest, date; Prussia (intent on 
the acquisition of Stettin) stood firmly by her Russian ally. 

The Emperor Charles VI, whose Congress of neutral German 
Princes had sat long and uselessly at Brunswick, still continued as 
friendly to Hanover as he was adverse to Prussia. In this sense he had, 
not long before the death of Charles XII became known, concluded 
with Augustus II of Poland (Frederick Augustus I of Saxony) and the 
Elector of Hanover (King George I) an agreement for the defence of 
their German territories. The Hanoverian counsellors of King George 
were anxious to secure the support of the British fleet in the execu- 
tion of this Treaty; and this was secured by a diplomatic ruse, which, 
as the Treaty never came to be carried out, only threw discredit upon 
them and him 1 . Since the French Government was likewise inclined 
to favour Swedish rights and disregard Prussian claims in Germany, 
a general combination adverse to Russia and Prussia might have been 
formed, which would have prevented the Tsar from acquiring the 
supreme control of the Baltic, in return for Sweden's cession of all 
German territories belonging to her by Treaty. But George I and 
Bernstorff, with whose policy Stanhope's was in partial agreement, 
were not to carry through their scheme. British relations with 
Prussia became friendlier, and the policy of the Tsar in the end 
prevailed. 

Meanwhile, the efforts of British diplomacy at Stockholm had 

1 The story of these transactions has, for the first time, been clearly told by 
W. Michael (vol. 11. part 1. pp. 461 ff.). It turns on the omission, in the copy of 
the Treaty of January 5th, 1719, sent for ratification to London, of the declaration 
binding King George to send a British fleet to protect Danzig and Elbing in case 
of a Prussian attack. The daring policy was the King's; the peccant diplomatist was 
St Saphorin. 



CARTERET AND THE SWEDISH SETTLEMENT 75 

not been wanting in vigour. A leading part in them was taken by 
Lord Carteret in June, 171 9, at Stockholm, where he was actively 
assisted in the Hanoverian interest by the Mecklenburger Adolphus 
Frederick von Bassewitz. Carteret (afterwards Earl Granville and 
Secretary of State) was a statesman of extraordinary ability and per- 
sonal charm, and had, moreover, gained the personal confidence 
of his Sovereign by his knowledge of the German tongue — an ac- 
complishment then unique among British Ministers. He was, also, 
supposed to exercise a potent influence over the counsels of the Abbe 
Dubois in France. But at the root of his successes lay his self-trust ; 
for the opinion of others he had a contempt (by no means only in- 
spired by burgundy) which easily consoled him for his occasional 
failures. 

At Stockholm, Carteret, with Norris's squadron in the back- 
ground, lost no time in bringing about, with the assistance of his 
Hanoverian colleague, an understanding with the Swedish Govern- 
ment, which, in the form of a Preliminary Convention (July, 1719), 
settled the matters at issue, including the cession of Bremen and 
Verden, in return for the payment of a million crowns. By the time 
when the ratifications of the Treaty which carried out this agree- 
ment in a modified form, and provided for a renewal of the old 
friendship and Alliance, were exchanged (February, 1720), Carteret at 
Stockholm and Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Whitworth, a diplomatist 
of notable insight, at Berlin had succeeded in bringing about a Treaty 
between Sweden and Prussia, by which on payment of a large sum 
Stettin, with the Pomeranian region between Oder and Peene, was re- 
linquished by Sweden to Prussia. The network of Treaties was now 
nearly complete and the anti- Swedish League had been all but trans- 
formed into a protective combination against Russia. Of the former, 
there now only remained its earliest member — Denmark. In this 
quarter, the efforts of British-Hanoverian and French diplomacy at 
last (in July, 1720) prevailed upon King Frederick IV (afraid lest the 
claims of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp on parts of Schleswig should 
obtain the support of the Tsar) to agree on terms with Sweden, under 
a British and French guarantee of that duchy 1 . When, in this year, 
Sir John Norris arrived with instructions to notify to the Russian 
Government and its naval and military commanders Great Britain's 

1 In connexion with the Schleswig-Holstein question of later times, it is worth 
noting that this (Frederiksborg) guarantee in no wise affected the question of the 
Succession to the whole of Schleswig. 



76 INTRODUCTION 

willingness to initiate a peace with Sweden, but in any case to con- 
cert operations with the Swedish fleet, he found nothing in readiness 
at Stockholm. And, though there was a strong wish that Great 
Britain should exert her influence with the other Powers to bring 
about a Concert in opposition to Russia's Baltic policy, it proved 
impossible in face of the Emperor's non possumus, Prussia's caution, 
the religious difficulties in Germany which placed the Lutheran 
Elector of Hanover in a most unwelcome position between the two 
chief German Powers, and the uncertainty of the policy of France. 
Probably, the decisive element in the resolution ultimately taken 
— to abandon the naval offensive (August, 17 19) — is to be found in 
considerations which could only be usefully discussed in a Naval 
History. But a great political opportunity had been missed. 

Norris sailed home again, and the British design of an active 
intervention in the settlement of the North had come to naught. 
This barren result of a long episode of British foreign policy was not, 
however, wholly due either to the European complexities of the time, 
or to the naval difficulties of the situation. With the moment, the 
spirit needed for using it was not to return. The end of 1720, in 
May of which year Norris had reappeared in the Baltic, dates the 
Bursting of the South Sea Bubble, which, in more ways than one, 
shook the stability of the British Cabinet. In the midst of these 
troubles, Stanhope died (February, 1721), and, in April, Walpole, who 
had rescued the country from the consequences of the crisis, succeeded 
him as Head of the Government. Townshend, from whom no con- 
tinuation of Stanhope's actively anti-Russian policy was to be ex- 
pected, had, on his death, been appointed to his Secretaryship of State. 

But Sweden had, before this, ceased to reckon any longer on the 
direct support of Great Britain. The idea of a British League with 
Prussia, Denmark and Hesse- Cassel on behalf of Sweden speedily 
collapsed, and the Russian ships devastated the Swedish coasts. But, 
when Norris appeared for the last time in the familiar waters, in 
April, 1 72 1, it soon came to be understood that no aid, even in the 
form of further subsidies, was to be expected from his Government 
— at all events for the present. The advice of Great Britain to 
Sweden was now simply cedere malis. In the following month, the 
Nystad Peace Conference opened, and the Tsar's Plenipotentiary, 
Rumyantseff, made it clear that if his Sovereign's conditions were 
accepted, he would leave the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp's pretensions 
to the Swedish Throne to take care of themselves. In the Peace of 



RUSSIAN GAINS AT NYSTAD 77 

Nystad (May), the Tsar Peter was triumphant. Livonia, whose 
possession implied the virtual command of the Baltic trade 1 , was, 
with Esthonia and part of Carelia, yielded up by Sweden, on payment 
of a wholly inadequate money compensation. Finland was left to 
her, and a promise given that Russia would not interfere in her home 
(dynastic) affairs. Great Britain was not mentioned in the Treaty as 
mediator, guarantor or otherwise, except indirectly as an Ally of 
Sweden. The attempt to insert a clause for the protection of the 
Lower-Saxon Circle (of which Bremen and Verden formed part) had 
broken down; and the relations between the British and Austrian 
Courts and Governments had become so uneasy, that Bernstorff, 
who persistently adhered to the Emperor, lost his credit with his 
own Sovereign. The attempt to break the force of the Peace by a 
quadruple alliance or concert between the Contracting Powers 
(Russia and Sweden) and those who had not been accepted as 
Mediators (Great Britain and France), of course, remained a phan- 
tasm. The Tsar Peter, or as he now called himself, the Emperor of 
all the Russias, was master of a dominion comprising some of the 
fairest provinces of Sweden and clasping Poland in its deadly em- 
brace; and British policy, after coming into conflict with Russian, 
for the first time in the hitherto almost wholly secluded action of the 
latter, had undergone a most signal rebuff, which estranged the two 
Powers politically for the better part of a generation 2 . 

This signal discomfiture can, at least, not be imputed to want 
either of prescience or of activity. One of its causes was, no doubt, 
the coldness between the British and the Imperial Courts, due in 
part to the delays in the investiture of the Elector with Bremen and 
Verden, caused in its turn by the Emperor's jealous hesitation as to 
the parallel investiture of the King of Prussia with Stettin, and in 
part to the religious disputes in the Empire mentioned above. So 
strangely were political and religious difficulties still intertwined, that 
the blindness to its own future interests was in this instance on the 
side of the Empire. As for Great Britain, the Northern policy of 

1 Of this Riga, more and more distinctly, became the centre ; and it was Livonia 
which supplied the bulk of the war material exported from the Baltic to Great 
Britain. 

2 In 1742, during the Russo-Swedish War which ended with the Peace of Abo 
and the humiliation of Sweden, Great Britain concluded with Russia the Treaty 
of Moscow. This was the period of the ascendancy of Carteret and the so-called 
" Drunken Administration." Commercially, it may be noticed, the Baltic had 
become of less importance to Great Britain in the matter of naval materials, after 
these had begun to be imported in increasing quantities from America. 



78 INTRODUCTION 

George I and Stanhope, as it may be described without injustice 
being done to either, had failed, though not more conspicuously so 
than that of France. It would be futile to conjecture what use 
Cromwell, with the support of English Protestant feeling, would 
have made of the situation, the commercial aspects of which can 
hardly be said to be quite free from obscurity. In any case, the 
Emperor had not been induced by the authors of the Quadruple 
Alliance to play an effective part in it; but, though the Alliance 
had in so far proved a failure, the cause of its breakdown is not, 
in this case, to be sought in Hanoverian motives, which no longer 
dominated, though they had not ceased to influence, British foreign 
policy. 

After Stanhope's death, the conduct of British affairs inevitably 
passed into the hands of Walpole and Townshend, the former having, 
as was seen, been appointed First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, and the latter one of the Secretaries of State. 
Walpole, whose thoughts were as entirely English as his ways, and 
who made no secret either of his personal dislike of the King's 
Hanoverian counsellors, or of his distrust of the House of Austria, 
could not pretend to any diplomatic training and at first affected an 
indifference to foreign policy, in the narrower sense of the word. 
Townshend's experience was therefore indispensable to him, and 
they were at one in resisting the self-assertion of Carteret, who was ap- 
pointed to the other (Southern) Secretaryship, on the death, hastened 
no doubt by his being implicated in the South Sea disaster, of the 
younger Craggs. For a time, the influence of Carteret over the King 
seemed paramount; but, before long (April, 1724), a dispute between 
him and Townshend (at Hanover 1 ) brought about the transfer of the 
Southern Secretary to the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland. Carteret's 
successor, the Duke of Newcastle, was an adherent of the policy of 
Walpole, or at least preferred to support him as the leader of the 
most powerful party in Parliament. 

Walpole had, however, not yet taken to himself the chief direction 
of the foreign policy of Great Britain, when his Government was called 
upon to intervene in European affairs, which seemed to be experien- 
cing a strange metamorphosis. Early in 1720, on acceding to the Quad- 
ruple Alliance, Philip V of Spain had left over some of the perplexities 

1 The intrigue to which it had reference, and which involved both the French 
Court and the Hanoverian clique, led to the substitution at Paris of Horace Walpole 
the elder for Sir Luke Schaub. 



AUSTRO-SPANISH UNDERSTANDING 79 

confronting him (including the perennial question of Gibraltar) to be 
settled by the Congress of Cambray, which however did not actually 
meet till four years later, and, largely because of the matters here 
noted, broke up without result. Marriage contracts had been ar- 
ranged between the heir to the Spanish Throne and his brother 
Charles and two daughters of the Duke of Orleans, and the Infanta 
Maria Anna had, at a very early age, been betrothed to the young 
King Lewis XV of France. But the ex-Regent had died, and had been 
succeeded in the control of French affairs by the Duke of Bourbon- 
Conde, his deadly enemy. A few months later (March, 1725) the 
Duke of Bourbon, by sending back the Infanta, offered an unpardon- 
able insult to Spanish pride. When it was found that the British 
Government would not abandon the French Alliance, the Congress of 
Cambray was broken up by the Spanish Court, and Ripperda, the chief 
instrument of its policy, set to work for the conclusion of a league 
with the Emperor against the original members of the Triple Alliance, 
while waiving all the points that had remained in dispute between 
the Spanish and Imperial Governments. 

Not only had the Emperor Charles VI been with great difficulty 
induced by Great Britain to join in the Quadruple Alliance, seeming 
thus to shut the door against any future revision of the Utrecht 
Settlement; but he had come very near to a quarrel with Great 
Britain herself and the United Provinces, on account of his project 
for the development of the commerce of the Austrian Netherlands 
by the establishment of an East India Company at Ostend. More- 
over — and this was doubtless the main motive of his present line of 
action — he was most anxious to take advantage of the present isola- 
tion of Spain by obtaining from her a guarantee of the Pragmatic 
Sanction of his daughter Maria Theresa's succession in all his 
dominions. The ambition of the Spanish Prime-minister, the newly 
created Duke of Ripperda — an Alberoni of a very inferior type — 
met the Emperor's cherished desire halfway; and, by April, 1725, 
the two Governments had come to an understanding which found 
expression in an open and a secret Treaty signed at Vienna. In the 
former, which, while accepting the conditions of the Quadruple 
Alliance and a Spanish guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, also 
contained an Imperial promise of good offices for the recovery of 
Gibraltar and Minorca by Spain, there was nothing directly pro- 
vocative to Great Britain; but the secret Treaty was, besides pro- 
mising armed assistance for their recovery and continued action on 



80 INTRODUCTION 

behalf of the Stewart Pretender, understood to provide for the 
cementing of what was thus converted into an offensive Alliance, 
by arranging for the marriage of the Infante Don Carlos and his 
brother with two Austrian Archduchesses. It was further hoped 
that the Tsarina Catharine, who had in this year succeeded Peter I, 
and who had inherited his hatred of the British Government, would 
join in the Alliance. Alberoni's network was being patched up again, 
though by a far less able hand; and once more England was filled 
with alarm. Again, British interests, political and commercial, co- 
incided with the security of the Hanoverian dynasty, and prompt 
intervention seemed imperative. 

Thus the Alliance of Hanover, signed in September at Herren- 
hausen, though negotiated at the Hague, was a necessary and 
essentially defensive reply to the Alliance of Vienna; nor, though 
Parliament was not sitting at the time, could it be asserted, except by 
party spite, that this important transaction was under the control of 
Hanoverian influence ; indeed, the King looked upon it as dangerous. 
The main credit of it was due to the courage of Townshend ; France 
and Prussia were partners in the Treaty, though the accession of 
the latter (who in the same year concluded the wellknown Treaty of 
Wusterhausen) was secured with some difficulty and contained a 
reservation of Prussia's relations with Russia, who, in her turn, soon 
joined the Austro- Spanish Alliance. The United Provinces, after 
vainly attempting to secure by negotiation a stoppage of the Ostend 
Company, also acceded to the Austrian Alliance. 

A European war seemed, in the circumstances, inevitable; and, 
in accordance with the obligations undertaken in the event of a 
declaration of war by the Emperor against France, the British 
Government concluded a Subsidy Treaty with Hesse-Cassel. The 
Spanish Government began preparations for the siege of Gibraltar; 
but, in the meantime, there had been signs of a change in the general 
aspect of things in Europe. In 1726 Ripperda had been dismissed 
in disgrace, and in the same year Cardinal Fleury became Prime- 
minister in France, whose ascendancy in conjunction with that of 
Walpole brought peace in its train. The death of Catharine I, who 
had so faithfully adhered to her great Consort's principles of rule, 
followed in 1727. 

Thus it is not surprising that the Emperor Charles should have 
given way to the new current, and have agreed to the signing of 
Preliminaries of Peace with Great Britain, France and the United 



CONSISTENCY OF GEORGE I's FOREIGN POLICY 81 

Provinces at Paris (May 31st, 1727). While all Treaties concluded 
before 1725 were confirmed, any particular questions for discussion 
were referred to a General Congress ; but — and the exception shows, so 
far as Great Britain is concerned, what lay at the root of the so-called 
Alliance of Hanover — the charter of the Ostend East India Company 
was suspended for seven years. Spain still held aloof, but her 
acceptance of the Preliminaries must sooner or later follow. Little 
more than a week after the signing of these Preliminaries, King 
George I died on his return journey from Hanover. The foreign 
policy of his reign was, at the moment, in a critical phase, but not 
in one foreboding the collapse of the principles it had followed, and 
the interests it had served with, on the whole, indisputable con- 
sistency. After the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession, 
Great Britain could not renounce the leading part she was called upon 
to play in general European politics. The Triple and the Quadruple 
Alliance made the Peace of Utrecht a reality, and the ambition of 
Spain, not once but twice, both when opposed to and when tem- 
porarily reconciled with the dynastic purposes of the House of 
Austria, broke down in face of the Alliance between Great Britain 
and France. The Alliance had not sunk very deeply into the soil ; but 
it seemed more likely than before to hold out, as, in its general 
tendency, the conduct of affairs in both countries, united in resist- 
ance to a disturbance of the existing settlement, became more clearly 
pacific. In the North, new relations between the Baltic Powers, of 
which Great Britain had in vain resisted the establishment, had taken 
the place of the old ; but towards the problems certain to arise from 
these and other more nearly imminent changes, the attitude of Great 
Britain could not yet be determined. 

The first decade, roughly speaking, of the reign of George II 
(1727-37) is the period in which Walpole, the friend of peace, 
remained, virtually, undisturbed in his Ministerial sway. While the 
country at large saw in him its ablest financier, who had rescued it 
from the South Sea debacle, his action in the Spanish-Austrian crisis 
of 1726-7, although he was inclined to blame Townshend for pre- 
cipitancy, had materially contributed to check the policy of Spain, 
which had already begun to lay siege to Gibraltar. For , without Walpole , 
Parliament, when it met in January, 1727, would not have shown, by 
voting supplies, that the nation was prepared. Peace had been thus 
preserved, though the eleventh hour might seem to have passed; the 
Emperor had drawn back; and the Spanish question had been 



82 INTRODUCTION 

reduced to that of the time needed for soothing Spain's ruffled 
pride, and reconciling her to the Concert. 

The European position of Great Britain in these years was greatly 
strengthened by the cordial relations between her own and the French 
Government. Walpole's brother, the elder Horace, at that time 
British Ambassador in France, had, in ready deference to Fleury 'swish, 
crossed the Channel to second Queen Caroline in impressing upon 
George II the necessity of keeping the Minister in power. This was 
done, though no serious danger would probably have, at least for 
the present, threatened the security of the Hanoverian dynasty, or 
that of the British interests bound up with it, had the King followed 
his first inclinations. The Jacobites were, as usual, quite alive to the 
chances of the situation, but really unprepared to take advantage of 
them, should an opportunity present itself. The Pretender hurried 
from Bologna to Nancy, whence he was formally expelled by the 
French Government, and had to take refuge at Avignon, and then 
at Rome. The Jacobite faction in the new Parliament (1728) was 
impotent for action, and, when the arch-intriguer Bolingbroke ap- 
peared on the scene, it was in the character of an independent 
supporter of the Hanoverian Throne, merely desirous that it should 
change its counsellors. 

Meanwhile, the pacification of Europe which had seemed so near 
at the time of the death of George I had been, though but slowly, 
accomplished. The mock siege of Gibraltar was reluctantly given up ; 
nor was the conduct of the Emperor, bound as he was by his Treaty 
with Prussia, altogether loyal. It was only by very vigorous proceed- 
ings on the part of the British Government (which by means of the 
subsidy Treaty of Wolfenbiittel with Brunswick kept that duchy 
open for occupation by British troops) that he was made to under- 
stand the seriousness of the situation, and that Spain was obliged to 
relinquish her hope of a resumption of the Austro- Spanish Alliance. 
Philip V signified his acceptance of the Preliminaries of Paris in the 
Act of the Pardo (March, 1728), in which an ulterior settlement was 
referred to a Congress of the Powers. 

In this Congress, originally summoned to Aix-la-Chapelle, and 
thence transferred in the following June to Soissons, where it sat for 
several months, Great Britain's first Plenipotentiary was Colonel 
William Stanhope (subsequently Earl of Harrington, and after the 
dissolution of the Congress one of the Secretaries of State). The 
main question for settlement here was the satisfaction of Spain ; for 



THE "SECOND" TREATY OF VIENNA 83 

the Emperor, intent upon using the opportunity for as general as 
possible a recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction, had given up both 
his resistance to the establishment of a Spanish Prince in the North- 
Italian duchies, and the maintenance of the Ostend Company. But 
it was the Pragmatic Sanction which Fleury, in accordance with the 
traditions of French policy, steadily declined to recognise, and which 
the Congress left where it found it. The Spanish Government, here- 
upon, after in vain seeking to exact the cession of Gibraltar which 
British public opinion showed itself determined to resist, passed over 
to the other side, and concluded, with Great Britain and France, the 
Treaty of Seville, the United Provinces, as was their custom, acceding 
later. This Treaty (November, 1730) which patched up the trade 
relations in America between Spain and Great Britain, but passed 
over the subject of Gibraltar in silence, was Townshend's last achieve- 
ment. It was much approved in the City, whose interests had been 
jeopardised by the previous attempt of the Spanish Government to 
transfer to Austria the concessions enjoyed (since Utrecht) by British 
trade ; and gratified the Court, annoyed by the recent Austrian rap- 
prochement to Prussia (for securing whose friendship Queen Caroline 
had already formed projects of her own). While, however, the Em- 
peror seemed the loser, he contrived to possess himself of the Italian 
duchies which the Treaty had intended to secure to Spain; where- 
upon it was denounced by the Spanish Government itself. The 
British now once more returned to the Imperial alliance, and, in the 
so-called Second Treaty of Vienna (March, 173 1) guaranteed the 
Pragmatic Sanction, the Emperor in return abolishing the Ostend 
Company. When he further agreed to the succession of Don Carlos 
in the Italian duchies, Philip V of Spain, for his part, also acceded to 
the Treaty (July, 1731). Since it, also, received the adhesion of the 
Estates of the Empire and finally of the States-General (1732) a 
general Concert seemed to have been reached. In promoting this 
settlement, the conciliatory diplomacy of Earl Waldegrave, now 
British Ambassador at Paris, fully carried out Walpole's pacific 
policy. At the same time, Droysen, not without reason, regards the 
transaction as illustrating the " parliamentary " style of foreign policy 
characteristic of Walpole — a policy which provides for the day and the 
morrow, and leaves the day after to take care of itself. While by this 
Treaty the real gainer was the Emperor (as his concessions in return 
suffice to show), it was concluded without the assent of France; and, 
at a time when the relations between her and her Ally were by no 

6—2 



84 INTRODUCTION 

means altogether as easy as Fleury desired them to be, Great Britain 
had, in order that Europe should obtain peace for the present, yielded 
to the wishes of the House of Austria in a matter of vital importance 
for the European Balance in the future. France had taken no part in 
the Treaty. On the other side, it must be added that Great Britain 
and the United Provinces were afterwards accused of having failed 
to carry out the commercial concessions they had made to the Austrian 
Netherlands in return for the abandonment of the Ostend Company. 
With regard to the future, France, though under the genuinely pacific 
and conciliatory guidance of Fleury, had always been impatient of 
pacific Ministers, and to a generation not yet oblivious of the glories 
of Lewis XIV — even to Fleury himself — a realisation of the Pragmatic 
Sanction was intolerable. Thus, the disagreement on this head 
between France and Great Britain inevitably tended to bring about 
closer relations between the former Power and Spain, and to pro- 
mote the signing, so early as November, 1733, of the First Bourbon 
"Family Compact." On the other hand, the renewed good under- 
standing between Great Britain and the Emperor could, in the end, 
hardly fail to involve this country in the conflict between Austria 
and Prussia, which, although they had in 1729 concluded a Perpetual 
Alliance, could no longer be far distant. But, for the present, all 
seemed to promise well; and Walpole's method of advancing national 
prosperity by assuring the continuance of peace, and leaving over 
remoter difficulties, commended itself to public opinion. Great 
Britain required peace after the long strain of the active foreign policy 
of the first Hanoverian reign ; nor is it easy to see how, without the 
material resources accumulated by her during the Walpolean age, she 
could have taken upon her the mighty responsibilities awaiting her. 
Thus, we have reached a chapter of modern history marked by 
a European War in which Great Britain took no part. Notwith- 
standing the efforts of the Emperor to draw her (and the United 
Provinces) into the War of the Polish Succession (1733-8), she had 
contented herself with offering her mediation, after (in November, 
1733) the Government of Lewis XV had agreed to a Convention at 
the Hague, by which it undertook to refrain from invading the 
Austrian Netherlands. The War and the so-called Third Treaty of 
Vienna, which in 1738 definitively terminated it, exhibit the most 
turbid depths of eighteenth century diplomacy ; and it was only with 
the utmost difficulty that Walpole had succeeded in restraining King 
George II's dynastic and military aspirations from casting a line into 



BOURBON FAMILY COMPACT AND GREAT BRITAIN 85 

waters so troubled. Nor is it astonishing that the Courts of 
France and Spain which — the latter on acknowledging the Pragmatic 
Sanction — had been the territorial gainers in the issue, should have 
cherished the thought, developed in them by the course of the War, 
of turning their united strength against the Power whose neutrality 
had favoured an unprecedented growth of its commercial prosperity. 
They could not do so in secrecy ; for, as Seeley has pointed out, the 
Bourbon Family Compact of November, 1733, which showed that 
France was weary of a policy of peace, was known from the first to 
Walpole, whose own policy had seemed to be an element in its 
prospects of success. There can be no doubt that the purpose of this 
Compact, besides aiding in securing the position of Don Carlos in 
Italy, was to resist the advances of Great Britain by sea, and, while 
making joint war upon the Emperor, to keep Great Britain in check 
by naval armaments. At all events, the promise of French aid in the 
efforts of Spain to recover Gibraltar was included in the agreement. 
For the rest, the encroachments of British maritime trade offered a 
constant opportunity for Spanish grievances ; though it might better 
suit Walpole's parliamentary adversaries to find effective opportunities 
of attacking him in the Spanish treatment of British traders — oppor- 
tunities of which, in 1738, they availed themselves with relentless 
factiousness. If Walpole has been justly charged with moulding his 
foreign policy too closely upon the necessity of satisfying Parliament, 
it must be remembered that a bitter personal hostility to himself was 
the guiding motive of the whole Opposition against which he had 
long stood at bay. Carteret, after he had been replaced in his Secre- 
taryship by Newcastle, had returned to the Parliamentary arena in 
1730, and, an attempt at reconciliation with Walpole having failed, 
he, with the often invaluable aid of Chesterfield in the House of 
Lords, and that of Pulteney in the Commons, divided the conduct 
of the Opposition between them. The Jacobites under Wyndham, 
and the Boy Patriots clustered round Bolingbroke (William Pitt, 
from 1735, among them), treated foreign affairs as they treated 
domestic, from the same point of view— the baiting of Walpole. In 
the face of such an Opposition, no harder task ever fell to the lot of 
a British Minister. To his honour, Walpole was animated by a sincere 
desire for peace ; though the spirit of the nation had been effectually 
roused against Spain, while the Spanish Court, with the Family 
Compact to fall back upon, was never indisposed to war. In the nego- 
tiations which occupied the autumn and winter of 1738, Spain showed 



86 INTRODUCTION 

herself willing to give satisfaction for past transgressions, but not 
prepared to relinquish the right of search ; " No Search " had become 
the demand of the British mercantile interest, and, owing to the per- 
sistence of the Opposition, the cry of British public opinion 1 . 

Quite early in 1739, a Convention was signed at the Pardo by 
the Spanish Minister de la Quadra and Sir Benjamin Keene, a 
diplomatist who represented Great Britain at Madrid with much 
ability both before and after the War 2 which broke out later in this 
year. This preliminary agreement stipulated that, before the execu- 
tion of the final Treaty, Spain should pay to Great Britain the amount 
by which the British claims exceeded the Spanish counter-claims. 
Into the accompanying reservations and protests it is the less requisite 
to enter here, since public opinion in England, led by the Opposition, 
would in no case have been satisfied with the Convention, which 
Walpole, in one of his Pyrrhic victories, only carried by small 
majorities (March, 1739). The Opposition hereupon seceded, thus 
enabling the Government to carry a Danish Subsidy Bill. Whether 
the object of this measure was to patch up a Hanoverian quarrel or 
to prevent a Danish alliance with Sweden and France and thus leave 
Great Britain without an ally in the imminent War, the incident at 
all events illustrated the inconvenience of mingling questions of 
foreign policy with party manoeuvres. Before long, it became evident 
that, though the Opposition was unable to oust Walpole from office by 
their onslaughts, they had created a situation involving the country 
in the War to the avoidance of which his policy had, above all, been 
directed. When the Spanish Government declared that negotiations 
could proceed on no other basis than one repudiated by British 
public opinion, and that, till a particular Spanish demand (the claim on 
the South Sea Company) had been satisfied, Spain would suspend 
the Asiento, the chances of peace had been reduced to nothing. The 
usual votes followed in Supply ; but Carteret's advice to conclude an 
alliance with Prussia was not followed. Keene 's ultimatum was 
declined by Spain, and war was declared (November, 1739). France 
protested her pacific intentions, but began to arm. 

The outbreak of the War found Great Britain without an ally 
(except Denmark). The Emperor Charles VI was sick to death. He 
had consented to the humiliating Peace of Belgrade, and was not to 

1 Pitt was, in course of time, to come to see the Spanish side of the argument. 

2 He was also commissioned at Madrid as South Sea Agent. It was Keene, 
who, in 1757, reluctantly obeyed Pitt's instructions to offer Spain the restoration 
of Gibraltar, if she would join Great Britain against France. 



GREAT BRITAIN IN THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR 87 

be tempted by British suggestions as to the recovery of Naples and 
Sicily; the United Provinces, this time, stood altogether aloof; 
Frederick William I (whose death, like the Emperor's, followed in 
1740) would give no encouragement to British overtures, being, 
above all, anxious to preserve the goodwill of France. As for France, 
she would no doubt join Spain in the War at the moment most con- 
venient to herself; and, though it began with Admiral Vernon's naval 
exploit (celebrated at home as a party triumph), this was not success- 
fully followed up, and Anson's brilliant circuit had no influence on 
the course of the War: the conflict between two European Great 
Powers could not be decided in the Pacific. Thus the spirit of the 
Opposition was by no means quelled. In 1741, what Lord Stanhope 
hardly exaggerates in calling the "cry for the blood of Walpole" 
went up louder than ever. He successfully resisted a drastic censure 
on his entire foreign policy moved in the Lords by Carteret and in 
the Commons by Samuel (afterwards Lord) Sandys ; but, immediately 
before the dissolution of Parliament, he had felt obliged to follow 
public opinion, with which part of the Opposition identified itself, 
in carrying the grant of a subsidy to the Queen of Hungary (April). 
By this grant, Great Britain became a participant in the War of 
the Austrian Succession, for which Frederick II's invasion of Silesia 
in December, 1740, gave the signal, and which was destined to 
dominate the next epoch of European politics. Although Carteret, 
a consistent friend of the House of Austria, hoped from the first that 
Maria Theresa would come to terms with her determined assailant, 
the subsidy granted sufficed to make her believe that Great Britain 
would support her to the end ; and Walpole's plans for the preserva- 
tion of peace fell to the ground. Thus, the battle of Chotusitz (1742), 
which ended the First Silesian War, lost two provinces to her, and, 
while the Alliance of Great Britain had only helped her to conclude 
a humiliating peace, the result had still further increased the 
unpopularity of Walpole at home. Upon him too fell a share of the 
indignation aroused by the Treaty by which, in September, 1741, 
the Elector of Hanover agreed to remain neutral in the War, and even 
to abstain from voting for Maria Theresa's Consort in the approach- 
ing election to the Imperial Throne. The Prime-minister's position 
had become untenable 1 , as was shown by Newcastle's averted 

1 His desperate, or at least paradoxical, notions of recovering popularity by 
a separation of Hanover from Great Britain on the King's death, and of obtaining 
Jacobite support by overtures to the Pretender, had, practically, no connexion with 
his foreign policy. 



88 INTRODUCTION 

attitude ; and though his was not the last instance of a peace Minister 
drifting into war, Walpole's sagacity failed him more signally in 
1741 if less ignobly, than it had in 1739. Carteret, as Secretary of 
State, guided the foreign policy of the new Administration; but it 
was only at sea (by forcing Don Carlos at Naples to remain neutral) 
that Great Britain interfered effectively in the European conflict. 

The Peace of Breslau (June, 1742), in which both Russia and 
Great Britain were included (the former continuing for the present 
to hold aloof from the struggle), was "mediated" by Lord Hyndford, 
as representing Great Britain. Although in truth there was little to 
effect by mediation, the friendly spirit of Carteret's policy had found 
occasion for manifesting itself; and, in the same year, an enlarged 
subsidy and a large vote in Supply testified to the nation's warlike 
enthusiasm, though as yet Great Britain and France, a direct contest 
between whom could not be far distant, were only in arms against 
each other on behalf, respectively, of the Queen of Hungary and of 
the Nymphenburg Alliance against her. At the beginning of 1743, 
a brighter prospect seemed opening for the Queen and her British 
sympathisers; and Carteret's spirited foreign policy steadily (the 
adverb is perhaps ill-chosen) advanced in its course. Prussia was 
satisfied, so long as she was left in possession of Silesia. The Tsarina 
Elizabeth had entered into an Alliance with Great Britain, though 
this was not to extend to any Russian action against Turkey, or to 
any British intervention against Spain in Italy, where the House of 
Savoy had come to an understanding with that of Austria. Thus, the 
time seemed to have arrived at last when the British nation, weary 
of a condition of things which was neither peace nor war, might take a 
leading part in a struggle which was now a far from hopeless one, 
and when King George II might satisfy both his political wishes and 
his military impulses by leading into battle a " Pragmatic " army, com- 
posed of both Englishmen and Germans, in British as well as (to do 
him justice) in Hanoverian pay. In the face of vehement opposition 
the vote was carried (December, 1742). The battle of Dettingen was 
fought (June, 1743), and, while the Nymphenburg Alliance was 
virtually dissolved, the Treaty of Worms (September) united, as the 
Allies of Maria Theresa, Great Britain, the United Provinces, Sar- 
dinia and Saxony, and promised an annual British subsidy "so long 
as the necessity of her affairs should require." But the Treaty was 
never ratified, and, though kept secret, confirmed the decision at 
which, though against his own wish, George II had arrived, to pass 



THE SECOND SILESIAN WAR 89 

over Carteret in the choice of a new Prime-minister (August) ; for 
the unpopularity of the Crown and of the Hanoverian interest had 
reached its height, and Pitt's thunder already filled the sky. A term 
was thus set to a line of policy which was easily held up to scorn as 
subservient to Hanoverian ends or motives, but in truth signified a 
resumption of the Whig policy in Queen Anne's reign as opposed to 
the vague peace policy of Walpole, and exhibited, curiously enough, 
points cf resemblance to the ideas of Bolingbroke. Yet, as a matter 
of fact, Carteret's "system" would not fit in with the existing rela- 
tions between the European Powers chiefly concerned. On the one 
hand, the two principal German Powers were too much absorbed in 
their own quarrels to care for a close cooperation with Great Britain ; 
and her political action was more and more concentrating itself upon 
the protection of her own trade, whether lawful or illicit. She was, 
in fact, a Maritime Power before everything else, and, as such, 
unable to combine with any one other Power in an alliance like the 
Family Compact, which France and Spain were (still quite secretly) 
renewing on terms of the closest intimacy. 

The outbreak of the Second Silesian War (1744-5), m which 
George II encouraged Maria Theresa to engage (" ce qui est bon a 
prendre est bon a rendre"), found Great Britain firm in her support. 
Though Henry Pelham,the younger brother of the Duke of Newcastle, 
and himself a more timid statesman of Walpole's school, was now at 
the Head of the Government, Carteret continued to conduct foreign 
affairs till the King was obliged to dismiss him (November, 1744), 
when the Earl of Harrington was appointed in his place 1 . Before 
this, France, no longer ruled by Fleury, had declared war against 
Great Britain, though not till after a vain attempt had been made to 
throw an army on her shores, promptly answered by a British block- 
ade of the French and Spanish ships at Toulon. There was no longer 
any pacifist opposition in England, while the open outbreak of war 
between Great Britain and France seemed once more, as in the greater 
days of the past, to promise that the consent of all loyal parties would 
enable the Crown to carry out its policy to the full. But the case was 
altered. Perhaps, had Maria Theresa's only Ally encouraged her to 
persevere, instead of concluding the Peace of Dresden (December, 
1745) she might have successfully prolonged her struggle; but public 
opinion in England, because it was now less under the influence 
of sentiment, had taken a turn less favourable to her cause and was 

1 Carteret (Granville) 's return to office in 1746 lasted only four days. 



9 o INTRODUCTION 

certainly much preoccupied with the course of events nearer 
home. 

Maria Theresa's prospect of recovering Silesia depended, as a 
matter of fact, on the continuance of British subsidies ; and in the 
end, she had, therefore, to content herself with the advice of George II 
— if it was actually proffered — to wait for a better day. In Italy, 
Austria was, notwithstanding the assistance of a British fleet, unable 
to establish her claims. But, for Great Britain, the significance of 
the War, into which a generous impulse had mainly caused her to 
enter, soon concentrated itself upon what came to be more and more 
clearly recognised as the beginning of a struggle with France for 
maritime, Colonial and East Indian supremacy. The ultimate break- 
down of the last and most formidable Jacobite Insurrection (1745-6) 
reacted but slightly on the conduct of the War (only in so far as 
British troops had to be transferred from Flanders). On the other 
hand, the British capture of Cape Breton, the "Dunkirk of the 
West" (1745), was a serious blow to France; and found no com- 
pensation in the surrender, in the following year, of Madras and its 
British settlement, which after a long and gallant contest was re- 
covered by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. In 1747, two great British 
victories — off Cape Finisterre and near the Isle of Aix — placed the 
superiority of the British navy to the French beyond all doubt; and, 
in the following winter, peace negotiations began. The previous 
French attempt, in the Breda Conferences (1746), to cow the United 
Provinces, who had little stomach for joining in the aggressive policy 
of Great Britain, had failed; but the consequent French invasion 
having (notwithstanding the French victory of Lauffeldt) led to no 
decisive result, the British and Dutch Governments now entered 
jointly into these negotiations. 

In June, 1747, Great Britain had concluded a subsidy Treaty with 
Russia (who in the previous year had concluded a defensive Treaty 
with Austria, and whose troops were already on their march), and to 
this the United Provinces had acceded. With the view, no doubt, of 
putting a final pressure on France, the two Maritime Powers, at the 
beginning of 1748, signed a Convention at the Hague, in which 
Sardinia was included, declaring their alliance with Austria. Yet, by 
now negotiating for peace, in spite of the martial ardour of George II 
and the Duke of Cumberland, the British Ministry attested the fact, 
to which they could no longer shut their eyes, of the uselessness of 
the War, as undertaken in support of Maria Theresa. The essential 



THE PEACE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 91 

condition of the Preliminaries insisted on by Great Britain and the 
United Provinces was the status quo ante helium — the restitution, in 
other words, of the conquests made during the War, including the 
Barrier Towns recently taken by the French, and Madras. 

The Peace Conferences of Aix-la-Chapelle began in April, 1748, 
and, Maestricht having been taken early in their course, were pro- 
longed during the summer. On October 18th, the Peace was signed, 
its terms being virtually those of the Preliminaries and not more 
favourable either to Maria Theresa or to her Ally Great Britain than 
they would have been, had the winding-up of the peace negotiations 
with France, Spain and their Allies not been delayed, in deference to 
the personal wishes of George II, till public opinion in England had 
rendered it imperative. While the House of Austria was now assured 
of the European recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction, and Prussia 
(which had kept out of the Treaty, leaving the care of her interests 
to France) of the guaranteed possession of Silesia, Maria Theresa 
had, besides losing that Province, made definite cessions in Italy, 
and had been grievously disappointed by the War in which Great 
Britain had chivalrously undertaken to support her. Great Britain 
herself issued forth from the War with little clear gain. But she 
had well sustained her military repute, and stood before the world 
as the all but undisputed mistress of the seas. Thus, she had proved 
equal to staying the revived ambition of France, even when that 
Power commanded the allegiance of Spain — and had in so far justified 
the fears of Fleury. 

The foreign policy of the Pelham Administration (1744-54) 
had, up to the conclusion of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, lacked 
the strength of which the true foundations lie in definite political 
principle, and not in a "broad bottom" of caution and craft, such as 
respectively marked the Prime-minister and his brother, the Duke of 
Newcastle. Neither of them had proved high-spirited enough to 
withstand the King's tenacious adherence to a policy of war, which 
Walpole had so long succeeded in restraining; and Chesterfield, the 
only member of the Government possessed of the required courage, 
had, in 1745, after the retirement in the previous year of Granville, to 
whom he was bitterly opposed, been, after a successful diplomatic 
mission to the Hague, transferred to Ireland. 

The Peace concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle had nearly been broken 
in the following year by the refusal of Spain to carry out a com- 
pensation clause for war losses contained in it, and to renew the 



92 INTRODUCTION 

Asiento; but Great Britain proved conciliatory, and the trade between 
the two countries was restored to the conditions which had pre- 
vailed in the reign of Charles II of Spain. In other respects, the 
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, far from glorious as it was, had not been 
concluded too soon for British interests, considering the incom- 
petence of either the Government 1 or the utterly factious Opposition 
to rise to a policy alike definite and reasonable. The German question 
seemed to slumber ; though Hanoverian influence was at the bottom 
of the protracted manoeuvres for gaining the votes of the Electors 
for Archduke Joseph as Roman King 2 , and for obtaining grants of 
subsidies to them with that object from the British Parliament. 
French diplomacy, on the other hand, was still hampered by the 
reserve maintained by King Frederick II of Prussia in his relations 
with France. 

The Peace of Europe had now been restored ; but the question of 
its endurance was full of uncertainty. However much the soul of 
Maria Theresa had been vexed by the behaviour of Great Britain in 
the Aix-la-Chapelle negotiations, she found it necessary to follow the 
advice of the majority of her counsellors, and to adhere to the British 
(and Dutch) Alliance, with the additional security (such as it was) of 
the Defensive Treaty with Russia of 1746. But, already before the 
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was actually signed, Kaunitz, the Austrian 
Plenipotentiary there, had, at a Secret Council held by the Empress, 
declared his view that the King of Prussia was her most dangerous foe ; 
but that, since the Maritime Powers would no longer come to her 
aid against him, the only policy left open to her was to invoke the 
assistance of France. In this counsel we have the germ of the Seven 
Years' War; but though, so early as 1750, Kaunitz went as Am- 
bassador to Paris, it was not till three years later that he was actually 
called to the conduct of Austria's foreign policy ; and even then no 
change was as yet made in its system. Thus, the idea of seeking to 
recover Silesia was not resumed as a practical political purpose till 
complications between Great Britain and France obliged the former 
Power to consider her attitude towards what might still be called the 
German question 3 . 

Although the most important issues decided at Aix-la-Chapelle 

1 Granville, after his return to office as President of the Council in 1751, no 
longer influenced the course of affairs, foreign or domestic. 

2 The election, however, did not actually take place till after the close of the 
Seven Years' War. 

8 Cf. A. von Arneth, Geschichte Maria Theresia's, vol. iv. (Vienna, 1870). 



CONTINUED FRANCO-BRITISH RIVALRY 93 

had been those bearing upon the contention between France and 
Great Britain for the mastery of a great part of the known world, the 
settlement on this head reached in the Treaty could not possibly be 
regarded as definitive. Great Britain had deemed it so important to 
remove the French garrisons from the Dutch Barrier-fortresses that, 
by way of compensation, she had allowed the French to recover their 
possessions in North America — a withdrawal which seemed in- 
tolerable to the British Colonists. In the East Indies, the warfare be- 
tween the Companies continued; while, on the West Coast of Africa 
and in the Levant, British trade was outstripped by that of its rival. 
In Russia, while the Baltic trade was chiefly in British hands, in the 
Black Sea region France consistently kept up intimate relations with 
her old friend the Turk, and her rivalry was, again, dangerous. In 
both directions, French diplomacy — never more imaginatively active 
than at this season of internal decline— sought to provide for the pos- 
sibilities of the future, keeping the Porte in hand as a check upon 
European operations of the Eastern Powers, and intriguing with the 
dominant party in Sweden (the ' Caps ') for a defensive alliance against 
Great Britain 1 . In Poland, British and French influence were at 
issue on the burning question of the next Succession to the Throne. 
In Denmark, French, in Portugal, British influence predominated, 
and even in the United Provinces, where, after the death of the 
Stadholder William IV (175 1) his widow, the British Princess Anne, 
carried on the functions of his office on behalf of her son, a French 
faction asserted itself, which here, of course, was in favour of peace. 
On the other hand — as if to meet paradox by paradox — in Spain, 
where internal prosperity was the chief care of King Ferdinand VI 
and his Minister Carvajal, there was now evident friendliness to 
Great Britain, partly due to a dispute as to the succession in the Two 
Sicilies between the Bourbon lines, which had in its turn led to a 
combination between Spain and Austria. 

It was thus inevitable that the conflict of interests between the 
two Powers which thus divided between them the good- and the ill- 
will of the rest of Europe should declare itself with peculiar strength 
in the affairs of the Germanic Empire, where the Sovereign of Great 
Britain had a legitimate standing as Elector of Hanover, while the 
intervention of France in them had — for a century past at all events — 

1 The British relations with the opposite party, the 'Hats,' were so close that a 
rumour actually attributed to George II the intention of bringing about the eleva- 
tion to the Swedish Throne of the Duke of Cumberland. 



94 INTRODUCTION 

been a regular element in her political action. Great Britain's sub- 
sidies had, as noted, continued, so late as 1752, to flow into the 
Austrian exchequer, and into the pockets of the Electors to the 
Roman Kingship, and, though disliked by Pelham, were defended 
in Parliament by his brother, who, at the close of the previous year, 
had succeeded in ousting from the other Secretaryship of State the 
Duke of Bedford and putting in his place the Earl of Holderness, a 
diplomatist not possessed of the Duke's parliamentary influence. 

But it was not in Europe, or in connexion with European dis- 
putes, that the rivalry which constitutes the chief political interest of 
the years following on the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle most signally 
declared itself. That Peace had failed sufficiently to define the 
boundaries between the Colonial dominions of France and Great 
Britain; more especially, the limits of the Colony of Nova Scotia 
(Acadia) were disputed, and the frontier between Canada and New 
England. On the peninsula connecting Nova Scotia with the main- 
land, both Powers had constructed forts against one another, while 
Virginia was up in arms to recover a fort on the Ohio captured by 
the French (1754). The War between the two Governments did not 
actually break out on this occasion ; for neither side was eager for a 
precipitate rupture. But there were other Colonial quarrels, and it 
was felt throughout the British dominions that the unbroken main- 
tenance of them along the whole line must be very soon definitively 
settled. At such seasons, the most competent diplomacy may find 
itself incapable of doing more than delay for a time or hasten, 
according as it may suit the purpose of its Government, the first 
unretraceable step. But Great Britain seems at this time to have 
been singularly ill-served in the most important quarter. The British 
Ambassador at Paris, as Lord Stanhope reminds us, was the Earl of 
Albemarle, whom Chesterfield held up to his son as an encouraging 
example of how to succeed without a single recommendation except 
good manners ; and his political secrets were carried from his embassy 
to the French Government. In 1754, the year in which this diplo- 
matist was removed by death, Newcastle succeeded his brother as 
Prime-minister, and entered upon the last decade of nearly half a 
century of public service. On his personality satire has, not always 
quite fairly, exhausted itself; though a consistent time-server, he 
was also loyal to the dynasty on the Throne, and, while he corrupted 
others, he, at least, took no thought of personal gains. 

In choosing a Leader of the House of Commons, Newcastle had 



IMMINENCE OF (THE SEVEN YEARS') WAR 95 

been virtually reduced to the choice between Henry Fox and William 
Pitt, of whom the latter had entered that House in 1735. Since, 
however, neither of these politicians would submit to give up that 
side of the conduct of affairs which he most prized, Newcastle offered 
the Leadership, together with a Secretaryship of State, to Sir Thomas 
Robinson, who possessed diplomatic experience without parliament- 
ary ability, and who was welcome to the King because of his familiarity 
with German politics. For a time, Pitt (whom the King detested) 
and Fox hereupon joined hands against the new Leader and his 
master; Robinson retired to the Mastership of the Great Wardrobe, 
and Henry Fox, without Pitt, allied himself with Newcastle 1 . But 
even this makeshift was not to hold out for long. Already the storms 
were lowering, and the nation was looking towards its destined pilot. 
When Parliament met at the close of 1754, the King's wishes were 
met by an Address from the Commons undertaking to support him 
in defending his rights and dominions against all encroachments; a 
credit of a million was at once granted; and, had he not, with his 
customary want of tact, hereupon immediately set out for Hanover, 
this might have proved the season of his greatest popularity since he 
had ascended the Throne. On the following day, Admiral Boscawen 
sailed for Newfoundland, and soon afterwards came the news of 
General Braddock's catastrophe on the Ohio, which was speedily 
avenged. The brink of war had been reached 2 . 

Few wars, as statesmanship knows to its cost, are easily localised; 
but the difficulties besetting the process were nothing short of in- 
superable in the case of the present struggle between Great Britain 
and France. Apart from all questions of Treaties and Alliances, the 
Netherlands could not but be involved in a struggle with which they 
must be brought into contact by both sea and land; and, if so, 
Germany could not remain outside it. But there were of course now, 
as there have so often been, special considerations which would 
implicate severally or collectively the German States in a conflict 
between the Western Powers; and who, at the close of the year 1754 
could have reckoned otherwise than that in the War now imminent 
Prussia would take the side of France, and Austria that of Great 
Britain ? 

And yet, as indicated above, the Austro-British Alliance was, 

1 For these transactions cf. Earl of Ilchester, Henry Fox (2 vols. 1920) and the 
Earl of Rosebery, Chatham: His Early Life and Correspondence, 1910. 

2 As to what follows, cf. Ranke, Der Ursprung des Siebenjahrigen Krieges (Leipzig, 
1871). 



96 INTRODUCTION 

notwithstanding, on the eve of dissolution. Apart from lesser grounds 
of complaint, which British diplomacy was certainly not disposed to 
minimise, a difference of great historical significance seriously dis- 
turbed the relations between the United and the Austrian Nether- 
lands. Much importance attached to the view taken of these relations 
by Austria, which had grown weary of the conditions on which she 
held the Provinces now called by her name, while the British concep- 
tion of the proper function of the Low Countries in the political 
system of Europe necessitated as close as possible a connexion be- 
tween the Austrian and the United Provinces. Although the British, 
which was necessarily also the Dutch, view had prevailed at Aix-la- 
Chapelle, the Vienna Government had administered the Austrian 
Netherlands as possessing interests of their own and free from the 
control of their neighbours, who occupied the Barrier fortresses, and 
had actively promoted Belgic prosperity on these lines. When, in 
August, 1754, a provisional Treaty was proposed for the adjustment 
of these differences, it was rejected through the influence of Kaunitz 
against the strenuous efforts of the British Ambassador, Keith. A 
grievance of a different description is interesting, inasmuch as it illus- 
trates the part still occasionally played by the old religious disputes in 
the philosophical "eighteenth century," and the importance attached 
to them by the Hanoverian dynasty, whose tenure of the Throne, after 
all, depended primarily upon its Protestantism. In the complicated 
quarrel at the Germanic Diet in 1754 as to the guarantee demanded 
on behalf of the Hereditary Prince Frederick of Hesse-Cassel (whose 
Consort was the British Princess Mary), George II and the King of 
Prussia were alike opposed to the House of Austria. But these and 
other lesser quarrels apart, Austria would certainly not adhere to 
Great Britain, unless the latter would aid in the recovery of Silesia 
and could, even as an Ally, be of no assistance to her except by making 
war on Prussia, from whom Great Britain, in her turn, had nothing, 
and even Hanover, at this time, had not very much, to fear. In other 
words, the interests of the two Allied Powers were quite divergent, 
and while certainly much British treasure had been spent and not a 
little English blood spilt, purely for Austria's sake, Kaunitz might, 
on the other hand, speciously argue that the Alliance had only been 
carried on by Great Britain so long as it served her own purpose. 

Undeniably, the motives for maintaining the Austro- British Alli- 
ance had long prevailed, and Great Britain's differences with France 
continued to be regarded as the beginnings of a quarrel in which 



BRITISH POLICY AFTER AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 97 

Austria's own part was marked out for her beforehand; while, should 
France attack Great Britain by way of Hanover, Austria was doubly 
bound to contribute to the defence of the Electorate. No exception 
was taken in England, so late as 1755, either to the Subsidy Treaty 
with Hesse-Cassel (where there was an easy market for soldiers) or 
to a Russian Subsidy Treaty, in which the Austrian Government 
had interested itself. If Austria and Russia remained friendly, there 
seemed no reason why the present situation should not be prolonged, 
provided always that, as in the last year of the War of the Austrian 
Succession, Prussia remained neutral. Great Britain would not suffer, 
and, so far as the game of Alliances went, France would have gained 
nothing. 

But this calculation was absolutely intolerable to Kaunitz and to 
his Mistress, who had made up their minds that, after despoiling her 
monarchy, Prussia must not be suffered to hold by its side the position 
which she had acquired among the European Powers. Thus, the more 
surely that the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain 
announced itself, the more resolute was Kaunitz, in the first instance, 
to turn the force of the Austro- British Alliance against the "new 
Power," as he called Prussia, as well as against France. 



The British Government, for its part, had no intention of re- 
versing the general policy it had pursued up to Aix-la-Chapelle, or, 
on the other hand, of abandoning the guarantee of the tenure of 
Silesia by Prussia, in which it had joined. According to the view 
duly placed before the Austrian Government, the present task of 
Great Britain was to aid in the defence of the United Provinces and 
the Hanoverian Electorate; and Kaunitz promised to augment the 
Austrian forces in the Netherlands and to assume the offensive 
against Prussia, should her troops march against Hanover. But 
Great Britain had no reason for apprehending any Prussian attack 
of the kind upon the Electoral frontier. And, as the words of Holder- 
ness (whose intelligence has perhaps been underrated) show, the 
British Government was beginning to understand, that Kaunitz and 
the Empress meant to utilise for the recovery of Silesia the Alliance 
desired by the British Government for the purpose of its contest 
with France. When it became clear that Great Britain was not dis- 
posed to fall in with an extension of her plan of action, and that 

w.&g.i. 7 



98 INTRODUCTION 

Austria would therefore not find her account in joining in such a war, 
there remained for her only the choice between neutrality (hardly 
possible, in view of the situation of the Austrian Netherlands) and 
the radical change of policy long and explicitly recommended by 
Kaunitz 1 . An alliance with France would be the foundation of the 
new policy; the cooperation of Russia, and probably of Sweden, 
Saxony and the Palatinate, might be secured; and the division of the 
spoils after the overthrow of Prussia was already prospectively planned. 
France might have to be attracted to the projected alliance by a terri- 
torial cession either in Italy or in Flanders (the complicated details 
of which illustrate the imaginative force of the projector's diplomacy) 
and by the promise of Austrian support of the candidature of Prince 
Conti for the Polish Throne 2 . Such was (of course in barest outline) 
the great design of Kaunitz ; and the first move in the game was the 
audience vouchsafed to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Count 
Starhemberg, with Mme de Pompadour (September, 1755). At the 
present moment, when France was on the point of entering into an 
all-important war with Great Britain, there could be no question of 
the simple rejection, by Lewis XV's Government, of such a proposal 
on the part of Great Britain's historic Ally — the House of Austria. 
The only difficulty in the way of its acceptance by the French 
Government — but this, at first, seemed insuperable — was the im- 
probability of the renunciation, by Frederick II, of the French in 
favour of a British Alliance ; for Austria could not carry on negotia- 
tions with France on any basis but that of the severance of her 
Alliance with Prussia. 

It was about this time (summer of 1755) that the American news 
already referred to arrived in France, where the remainder of the 
year was mainly consumed in armaments and taxation. An invasion 
of England was at least talked of; the hopes of the Jacobites simmered 
up, and the French Government resolved to fight out the struggle 
against Great Britain by every means in its power. True, it had other 
support in view; but it continued to think, as it had thought in 1741, 
friendly relations with Prussia, to whom, in her turn, the French Alli- 
ance must be indispensable, the basis of its system. Frederick II, on 
the contrary, even apart from any secret evidence he might possess on 
the subject, felt his position insecure, so long as Austria had the support 

1 See, for what follows, R. Waddington, Louis XV, et le Renversement des 
Alliances (Paris, 1896). 

2 On this head, the wishes of Lewis XV soon began to cool. 



CHANGE IN PRUSSO-BRITISH RELATIONS 99 

of her present Continental Allies, and so long as France was weakened 
by the maritime and colonial rivalry of Great Britain, as well as by the 
unsoundness of her own condition at home. Thus, for Frederick II 
of Prussia there was during these busy years (1748 to middle of 1755) 
but one way of staving off war — namely, that of holding himself pre- 
pared for it. There seems, however, no reason for concluding that, 
at any time in this period, he intended either to renew the War with 
Austria, or to become implicated in that imminent between Great 
Britain and France. But, as we know, and as the French Govern- 
ment was not slow to point out to Frederick II, this latter War might 
bring with it a French attack upon Hanover, in which the cooperation 
of Prussia would be of very direct value to the French. Frederick II, 
though he kept his own counsel, could not close his eyes to the part, 
at once difficult and inglorious, which he might thus find himself 
called upon to play. 

British statesmanship, while loth to accept Kaunitz's view that a 
real concert with Austria required Great Britain to join in an attack 
upon Prussia, also perceived that Prussia could have no wish, for the 
sake of her friendship with France, to cooperate in an attack upon 
Hanover. The situation was critical; and George II's visit to his 
electoral dominions in the summer of 1755, with Holderness in 
attendance, accordingly proved the first step towards a change in 
the relations between Great Britain and Prussia of the utmost im- 
portance in its bearing on the impending European War. Taking 
advantage of the friendly relations between the Prussian Court and 
Duke Charles of Brunswick- Wolf enbiittel, Holderness contrived to 
elicit from Frederick II, in reply to the question whether he would 
refuse to prevent the defence of Hanover against a French invasion, 
the reply that he saw no objection to treaties concluded by Hanover 
with her neighbours for this purpose, but that the time had not yet 
arrived for a declaration on the subject. For some time Frederick II 
(whose present Defensive Alliance with France would naturally ter- 
minate in 1756) would go no further; but he finally made up his 
mind that, while he had not guaranteed to France her overseas pos- 
sessions, the relative smallness of his own military forces would not 
justify him in going to war against an Alliance which might bring the 
Russians into Germany. Hence, the only course open to him seemed 
to be to enter into the Treaty of Neutrality as to Hanover suggested to 
him by Great Britain, without on that account breaking with France. 

Thus it came to pass that, in the Treaty of Neutrality concluded 

7—2 



ioo INTRODUCTION 

between Great Britain and Prussia in January, 1756, and sometimes 
called the Treaty of Westminster, Frederick II and the British 
Government, directly instigated this time by the Hanoverian interests 
of King George II, met halfway. Henry Fox devised the expedient 
of adding this Prussian Treaty to a Russian (and a Hessian) Subsidy 
Treaty, which he carried in one of the most famous debates of the 
age ; Pitt, who had accepted the Paymastership of the Forces in the 
Government, being foremost among the opponents of the proposal. 
One object of the Anglo-Prussian Treaty was declared to be the preser- 
vation of the Peace of the Continent, and that of Germany in especial. 
Holderness introduced into it a concise guarantee of the Prussian 
tenure of Silesia; and the Prime-minister, Newcastle, proclaimed 
King George IPs personal anxiety to place himself on an amicable 
footing with King Frederick II. Henry Fox was, on the following day 
(November 25th, 1755), appointed Secretary of State, while Pitt was 
dismissed from office with other opponents of the Russian Subsidy 
Treaty, which the Prussian Neutrality deprived of its force. 

For the "Treaty of Westminster," drafted as proposed by 
Frederick II, went further than George II, and his Ministers could 
have at first anticipated. By it, Great Britain agreed not to permit 
the entry of a Russian army, or Prussia that of a French, into Ger- 
many 1 . Even so, the Treaty appears to have been generally approved 
in England, where it was regarded as preventive of any fear of trouble 
ensuing on account of Hanover, and the funds are stated to have 
risen on its conclusion. Whatever the history of its origin, its effect 
on the Court of Vienna was to leave no doubt that British aid in any 
attempt to recover Silesia was now altogether out of the question. 
But could Prussia, after arriving at this friendly understanding with 
Great Britain, remain on good terms with France? The Due de 
Nivernais, sent to Berlin to find out whether French interests were 
in any way prejudiced by the guarantees contained in the Anglo- 
Prussian Treaty (from which Gibraltar and Minorca were expressly 
excepted), made it clear to King Frederick, who had actually thought 
of patching up the quarrel between France and Great Britain, that 
this was now impossible. And, in fact, the French Government, 
while seeking (by way of justification or pretext) to multiply causes 

1 This term was substituted by Frederick II for 'The Germanic Empire,' after 
Podewils had pointed out that the wider term might have been interpreted by 
Great Britain to comprise the Austrian Netherlands, which the King of Prussia 
had certainly no wish to see included in it. 



THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE AT AN END 101 

of quarrel with Great Britain, declared itself unable to assent to the 
principle of a permanent neutrality for Hanover. Thus, at the be- 
ginning of 1756, it had, so far as Frederick IPs relations with France 
and Great Britain were concerned, become more than doubtful 
whether he could adhere to the policy, hitherto followed by him, of 
remaining on a friendly footing with both Powers. At Vienna, the 
Anglo-Prussian Treaty was at first received with tranquillity ; for an 
Imperial attack in conjunction with France upon Hanover seemed 
wholly out of the question, and Russia's only complaint against Great 
Britain was that she should have entered into such an agreement with- 
out informing her Allies. But so rooted were the jealousy of Prussia 
and the suspicion of the advantageous position secured by her, as 
between France and Great Britain, entertained by Kaunitz and his 
Sovereign, that they resolved on an effective counter-move to the 
Neutrality Treaty; and their overtures fell on receptive and well- 
prepared ground. France was unwilling, while carrying on a Naval 
War with Great Britain, to lay aside what had long been a primary 
part of her policy — intervention in the internal affairs of Germany. 
The negotiations between the Austrian and French Governments 
(represented by Starhemberg and Bernis) at Versailles now (Febru- 
ary, 1756) treated the Prusso-French Alliance of 1741 as at an end, 
and passed on to the question whether, if France allowed her 
Alliance with Prussia to drop altogether, Austria would in turn 
consent to drop hers with Great Britain. 

Thus the advisers of Lewis XV, Bernis in particular, may be said 
to have inspired in him the idea of avenging upon George II his 
Treaty of Neutrality with Prussia ; while to the arguments by which 
Kaunitz persuaded Maria Theresa to put an end to the long-lived 
Alliance with Great Britain, was added the hope that the example of 
Austria would be followed by Russia. Austria, the Power so long 
identified with the guardianship of the Empire, allowed Prussia, of 
whose aggressiveness it stood in dread, to assume this time-honoured 
function, while, at this very time, itself entering into an Alliance with 
France. The Franco-Prussian Alliance was at an end; the relations 
between Austria and Russia had, on the other hand, become friendlier, 
and though on BestuchefFs advice, the Tsarina Elizabeth had reluc- 
tantly agreed to the British Subsidy Treaty of September, 1755, tnev 
were, by April, 1756, shaping towards a closer Alliance. But the effects 
of such an Alliance, more especially for Great Britain, must depend on 
the decision of France as to her own action. One by one, the obstacles 



102 INTRODUCTION 

in the way of the actual conclusion of an Alliance between France, 
on the one hand, and Austria, with Russia, on the other, disappeared. 
The French negotiators would have been ready to conclude the busi- 
ness, on the twofold basis that Austria might make war upon Prussia, 
and France upon Great Britain, as they chose, without calling upon 
each other for offensive cooperation. But the Austrian Government 
wanted more than this — viz., the offensive cooperation itself (more 
especially when there would be no more British subsidies forth- 
coming), and, in the event of success, a territorial repartition which 
would avenge the shameless league which, on the death of Maria 
Theresa's father, had proposed to divide among its members her 
inheritance. 

The Austro-French negotiations were resumed in April, 1756; 
and, after a Ministerial Council had been held at Versailles, and on 
the ground chiefly that the Austrian Alliance was the only way by 
which the King of France could use his right of attacking Great 
Britain through the Hanoverian Electorate, the Ministry approved 
the conclusion of that Alliance. The Two Treaties, known as that 
of Versailles, were hereupon signed, on May 1st, 1756. The first of 
these consisted of a Convention of Neutrality, whereby the Court of 
Vienna bound itself to take no part in the War with Great Britain ; 
i.e., the Imperial Power would not be used against a Sovereign who 
was Prince of the Empire ; while France promised not to attack either 
the Austrian Netherlands or any other part of the Austrian do- 
minions. This, then, was the Austro-French answer to the Anglo- 
Prussian Treaty of Westminster, which had been the motive cause 
of the Austro-French negotiations. Its effect would be to let the 
French into Germany, from which the Westminster Treaty had ex- 
cluded them, without any resistance on the part of the Head of the 
Empire. But the first of these Versailles Treaties was not in itself 
a Treaty of Alliance, and even the second, which purported to be a 
Treaty of Mutual Defence between the Contracting Powers, declared 
that it was not directed against any other Power ; and the number of 
troops to be furnished on both sides, if the casus foederis should arise, 
was very moderate accordingly. This second Treaty contained, how- 
ever, in addition, Secret Articles corresponding more closely to the 
motives with which the compact had been concluded. If, during the 
Anglo-French War, France or Austria was attacked by any other 
Power, the Contracting Power so attacked should be entitled to the 
support of the other Contracting Power. And, further, a revision of 



BRITISH DECLARATION OF WAR WITH FRANCE 103 

the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was taken into contemplation ; so that, 
though the Treaties by no means amounted to an offensive alliance 
for the recovery of Silesia or any other purpose, they contained this 
ominous reference to the more remote future. The Treaties, more 
especially since Russia would assuredly be invited to adhere to them, 
could not but be looked upon without apprehension in England, 
though they by no means implied an offensive alliance against this 
country; and there can be no doubt but that the religious, or con- 
fessional, aspect of the combination exercised its effect now, as it did 
when Great Britain had made her choice, and when a large part of 
her population regarded Frederick the Great as "the Protestant 
Hero." 

It was not till May, 1756, that Maria Theresa, in giving audience 
to Sir Robert Keith, the British Minister at Vienna, who had been 
instructed to demand explanations of the Versailles Treaty or Treaties, 
threw the blame of her Alliance with France upon the combination 
between Great Britain and Prussia — her only enemy in the world, as 
the Empress afterwards confidentially told him, besides the Turk. 
Undoubtedly, this attitude on the part of the Empress Maria Theresa, 
formerly the subject of so much admiring sympathy in England, 
taken together with the ratification which speedily followed of the 
Versailles Treaties (the drift of whose Secret Clauses was sufficiently 
suspected), roused deep indignation against a Power, now the Ally, 
under whatever conditions, of our mortal foe — after, for the sake of 
that Power, we had shown so much forbearance at Aix-la-Chapelle, 
and when it had been the recipient of a long series of our Subsidies. 
Popular feeling in England had, throughout the winter 1755-6, been 
in so excited a state as to take the almost inevitable form of a con- 
viction that we had been betrayed. Apprehensions had actually arisen 
of a French invasion; and when, at last, in the spring of 1756, the 
immediate designs of France had declared themselves, Newcastle's 
Government had been found ill-informed. Byng had failed to pro- 
tect Minorca, and, though Newcastle, after sailing with the blast of 
popular fury against the Admiral was by a change of Ministry to 
escape from the responsibility of carrying out the sentence against 
him, this very change had shown that a vigorous foreign policy was 
now imperatively demanded. On May 18th, 1756, Great Britain 
declared War against France. Before the end of June, Port Mahon 
surrendered, a few weeks before Frederick II began his War against 
Austria by crossing the Saxon frontier (August). 



104 INTRODUCTION 

Thus, Great Britain had been driven into open hostilities with France 
at a time when her ancient Ally, Austria, had entered into relations 
of mutual amity with that Power, and when an estrangement of her 
from Great Britain inevitably followed. There remained the question 
whether this estrangement necessarily implied a corresponding change 
of relations between Great Britain and Russia. Such had not been 
the design of the Tsarina Elizabeth. The negotiations concerning the 
still-born Russian Subsidy Treaty had not been allowed to drop ; and 
the brilliant British Ambassador at Petrograd, Sir Charles Hanbury 
Williams, who had consistently promoted (in every way) the Russian 
Subsidy Treaty and the Austrian Alliance, and of whose diplomatic 
career this humiliating episode was to be the end, had been kept in 
the dark as to the transactions in progress between Austria, Russia 
and France. The Russian intentions at this time are surrounded by 
some obscurity ; but it must be remembered that the Franco- Austrian 
negotiations had not come to an end with the Versailles Treaties. 
While Kaunitz and Starhemberg hoped for the support of France in 
the reconquest of Silesia, it was to be recompensed by the transfer 
to France of the Austrian Netherlands, or the main part of them, in- 
cluding, in view of the struggle between France and Great Britain, 
at least the temporary occupation of Ostend and Nieuport. The 
Naval War between the two Powers was already in progress, and at 
no time could an opportunity of establishing her ascendancy in 
Flanders have been more welcome to France than at present. The 
French "ideas" for a "new Europe" suggested in 1756 did not stop 
short with this. As for the North, Bremen and Verden might be cut 
out of Hanover for the benefit of Denmark; and, as for the Mediter- 
ranean, Gibraltar might be taken from Great Britain, as Minorca 
had been ; and she might be confined to the possessions of her own 
chalk-cliffs, just as Prussia would again be reduced to the dimensions 
of a meagre Brandenburg Electorate. 

But it was not till May, 1757, that the spirit of these notions was 
compressed within the limits of a Secret Treaty; and, on the part of 
Russia, upon whose military cooperation the execution of much of the 
airy design depended, the Tsarina Elizabeth and Bestucheff were at 
this time unprepared with the armaments which their share in the 
process would have required. At Potsdam, on the other hand, 
Frederick II reckoned with realities ; and he had by his side the British 
Envoy, Sir Andrew Mitchell, a Scotsman so full of commonsense 
as to be without any trace of Jacobitism, and yet endowed with a 



OPENING OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 105 

power of sympathy which on occasion induced the King to reveal 
his inmost feelings to him 1 . Frederick II had, from the first, sus- 
pected that at the bottom of the Versailles Treaties lay the thought 
of an attack on Hanover; but of this, he considered, neither Great 
Britain nor Prussia need be afraid if they were united and prepared. 
For this end he was ready to make any sacrifice. But when reports 
reached him of a triple alliance between France, Austria and Russia, 
when they were corroborated by further intelligence derived by him 
partly from stolen papers in the Austrian and Saxon Chanceries 2 , 
partly from other communications to himself and Mitchell, and when 
Austrian troops began to be massed in Bohemia and Moravia, he 
began to recognise that he was sure of no Alliance but the British, 
whether or not the British Government still succeeded in avoiding 
a quarrel with Russia 3 . He, therefore, resolved to explode the com- 
bination against him before it was ripe for action, arguing to himself 
that, besides France and Austria, Russia might, in a year's time, be 
prepared to draw the sword. Sir Andrew Mitchell, anxious that 
Frederick II should do nothing to affront British public opinion, 
professed himself contented with Maria Theresa's assurance that the 
interests of the other Power — Great Britain being of course the only 
Power in question — would not suffer from the measures which she 
had commanded. Frederick II, on the other hand, after his question, 
whether Austria would promise not to attack him in the current or 
following year, had remained without a reply from Vienna, started 
at the head of his troops (August 28th) from Potsdam for the Saxon 
frontier. 

The Seven Years' War (1756-63) which had now opened in Old 
World and New, was essentially a double war, the two parts or sides 
of which had each a different origin and were fought (as the com- 
batants recognised) with distinct objects. Yet the successes of their 
Ally, in the face of difficulties altogether unprecedented, came home 
so closely to the British nation, that to popular feeling here this War 
seemed throughout a single War, and that, while our own flag waved 
victorious over every sea, and our arms prospered in Asia as well as 
in America, the glory of the conflict seemed a glory earned in common. 
On whomsoever may rest the responsibility of its actual opening, the 

1 Cf. Carlyle's Frederick the Great, Bk xviil. c. 5. 

2 These are the so-called "Menzel Documents" which began so far back as 

3 Saxony-Poland, it seems necessary to add, had so far, notwithstanding French 
overtures, adhered to its neutral attitude. 



106 INTRODUCTION 

Seven Years' War as a whole may be regarded as an endeavour, on 
the part of France, to arrest, and if possible put an end to, the grow- 
ing maritime and colonial ascendancy of Great Britain, and, on the 
part of Austria, to deprive Frederick II of the prize which, at the end 
of the previous two Silesian Wars, she had been obliged to leave in 
his hands. The diplomacy of Kaunitz had succeeded in blending 
these two purposes into one. This purpose was compassed before 
long ; but the interests for which France contended beyond the seas 
were not thereby rendered identical with those for which her armies 
fought in Germany. Thus it came to pass, that the year (1759), which 
may be regarded as the climax of Austria's attempt to lay low the 
power and the ambition of Frederick II, was also that in which 
Great Britain gained her most momentous success over the French 
in Canada. And, when the Seven Years' War came to an end — in 
Great Britain's case by a Peace thoroughly unpopular at home and, 
in that of her solitary Ally, as a gift of good fortune as well as the 
reward of heroic perseverance — the cup of national glory was full in 
each case, and the names of Frederick the Great and the elder Pitt 
were linked together for ever as emblematic of victory. 

We are here only concerned with the policy which directed the 
action of Great Britain in the successive stages of the conflict. The 
gradual unfolding of the prospect of a great European War, and the 
general want of confidence, deepened by the course of the miserable 
Byng episode, in the competence of the Newcastle Government 
proved fatal to it. Newcastle's success in securing Henry Fox as 
Secretary of State was as ineffectual as it was transitory, and a 
series of overtures and manoeuvres ended in his being left without 
a supporter fit to cope with the opposition of Pitt, while the Duke 
still retained power — or a share of power — himself. The ensuing 
attempt at a combination between Fox and Pitt, having, thereupon, 
broken down, the Duke of Devonshire formed his Administration 
(December, 1756 to April, 1757), of which Pitt, at the King's per- 
sonal request, formed part as one of the Secretaries of State 1 . New- 
castle's influence being still predominant, and the King dissatisfied 
at having had to include Pitt, whose personal following was limited to 
the Grenvilles, the Ministry was not so strong as it might have been. 

But a new spirit had begun to reign and to animate the foreign 
and colonial policy, which under Pitt were from the first blended. 

1 Pitt's tenure of the Southern, and Holderness's of the Northern Department, 
were reversed in June, 1757. 



PITT'S FIRST MINISTRY 107 

And after the King, who had in vain negotiated on his own account 
for the assistance of other German Princes in maintaining the neu- 
trality of his Electorate, had spent all his Hanoverian income on 
behalf of its defence, a bolder course was taken. While, with the aid 
of Mitchell, Frederick concluded a Treaty with Brunswick and other 
smaller States for the defence of northern Germany, Pitt proposed 
a substantial Parliamentary grant for the defence of Hanover, and 
early in 1757 the Duke of Cumberland was appointed to the com- 
mand of the British troops sent out to take part in the operations. 
Thus the defence of Hanover had by a strange fortune become the 
corner-stone of Pitt's policy in the European part of the War. Yet, 
even at the last, it was not without great difficulty that George II 
had been persuaded by Frederick II's Envoy Schmettau to abandon 
the neutrality of Hanover. Before Pitt's hand was laid on the helm, 
there had been some hesitation and some ill-success — the latter in 
the operations to prevent the French seizure of Corsica and in the 
fighting in Canada in the region of the Great Lakes ; while the dismal 
tidings from India (the massacre of the Black Hole) were soon over- 
taken by the news of Clive's great victory of Plassey (June, 1757). 

By the beginning of this year the cards were at last all on the 
table. The French Government was so much impressed by the de- 
termined action of the British Government as to signify, by way of 
the Hague, its willingness to conclude peace on terms proposed. The 
answer (February 8th), made at a time when affairs in Canada were 
in a doubtful position, was worthy of Great Britain, and sufficiently 
verified Frederick's saying that she had at last found a man. Great 
Britain, the King was assured, would never assent to terms of peace 
in which he was not included. The overture was evanescent, and the 
war proceeded, on the British side with unprecedented vigour, after 
the personal intrigue directed by Newcastle against the control of 
foreign affairs by Pitt had brought about an interregnum which was 
almost an anarchy, and after, early in July, 1757, Pitt had formed 
what is rightly called his First Ministry. It was, in a word, the most 
powerful Administration the country had, or has, ever known. 
Parliamentary opposition was at a standstill; and when, little more 
than four years later, Pitt went out of office it was as if the glory of 
Great Britain, of which he had consummated the reestablishment, 
departed with him. 

The unexampled popularity enjoyed by Pitt from the time on- 
wards in which the conduct of the country's affairs, foreign, colonial 



108 INTRODUCTION 

and commercial, blended together, at last came under his immediate 
control, cannot be analysed in a few sentences. That popularity itself 
was the cause as well as a consequence of the consummation not pre- 
pared in a day. So far back as 1736, The Craftsman had commented 
on his close study of foreign affairs; and though he had to cast to 
the winds much on which he had insisted during his long years of 
Opposition, partly (as he afterwards confessed) for Opposition's sake, 
partly from ignorance, he had come into power with a mind made 
up, an initial plan formed, and a knowledge of British as well as 
foreign commercial conditions accumulated and well arranged in his 
mind. His wonderful power, not only of influencing others as an 
orator, but inspiring the agents of his policy to end in action, did 
the rest, in the days of his personal supremacy — for no word short 
of this would be appropriate. He had at his command the devoted 
services on which his conduct of British foreign policy depended — 
the Foreign Office and its agents, diplomatic and consular, who 
suddenly found their instructions clear and precise, instead of being 
left like servants in doubt as to the intention of their masters, the 
Admiralty and the Board of Trade. The City was devoted to him 
throughout almost the whole of his career. The American Colonists 
regarded him as one of the few British statesmen who understood 
colonial affairs 1 , although it is only just to the memory of the Duke of 
Bedford, whose qualities as a statesman deserve higher recognition 
than they have always received, to remember that a memorial of his 
to Newcastle, a decade before Pitt fully described his American 
policy, foreshadowed it in its comprehensiveness. 

During the Ministerial interregnum which, in the spring of 1757, 
had preceded Pitt's assumption of full power, Frederick II had sent 
to him assurances of his unchanged regard ; but the British Govern- 
ment had not ventured to press on George II, who had still hoped to 

1 See the admirable summary in Miss Kate Hotblack's Chatham s Colonial 
Policy (Routledge and Sons, 1917) which treats the several parts of the subject 
with a rare combination of fulness and point. Of particular value in the present 
connexion is her demonstration of the economic implications of Pitt's foreign 
policy — and of his efforts, from this point of view, to frustrate the union of France 
and Spain, to strengthen the Portuguese Alliance, to stir up Italian distrust of France, 
and even to induce the Porte to embarrass Austria by an attack upon Hungary. His 
continuous purpose was that of enabling Great Britain, without self-exhaustion, to 
outlast France ; his conquests beyond sea were designed to pay for the War ; and 
the union of the great variety of measures which he crowded into action — from the 
Senegal expedition of 1757 onwards — was essential to the total of success. His 
carefully managed dealings with the Barbary States (from 1757) were of high 
importance for the British Mediterranean trade as well as for his Spanish policy. 



THE FRANCO-AUSTRIAN TREATY OF VERSAILLES 109 

play a mediating part between the two chief German Powers, the 
plan of Frederick II, against whom Imperial Execution had been 
declared by the Diet, for uniting the dissenting Estates in resistance 
against it. Of much greater importance for the progress of the War 
was the question of an active Alliance between Russia and Austria, 
which after some delay (owing to differences of opinion at Petrograd 
and the suggestion, rejected as insufficient, of the exclusion of British 
trade from Russian ports) was actually concluded (January, 1757). 
By it, the two Empresses bound themselves not to lay down arms till 
Silesia and Glatz should have been restored to Maria Theresa. In 
March, a Franco- Swedish Alliance against Prussia followed, and in 
the same month the French troops crossed the German frontier. 
The British Government, under the influence of the wishes of King 
George II, was still haggling about Hanoverian neutrality with the 
Austrian, when, in May, the Secret Treaty of Alliance between France 
and Austria — the Partition Treaty of Versailles — was signed, the 
final hesitation of King Lewis XV having been overcome by his 
being shown a forged Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and 
Prussia. The Franco-Austrian compact, while providing for Austria's 
recovery of Silesia and for the transfer to Duke Philip of Parma of the 
whole of the Austrian Netherlands, except Ostend, Nieuport and 
Mons, ceded to France, further promised the Empress's cooperation 
in securing Minorca to that Power 1 . The accession to the Treaty 
of Russia and other Powers was to be asked in due course. 

The House of Austria, which in this Treaty had in fact gained all 
it desired, had by it completely detached itself from the time-honoured 
Alliance of Great Britain, but had neither undertaken to enter into any 
active operations against her, nor precluded a reconciliation with her 
at some future date. The contents of this Secret Compact remained 
for some time unknown. But, inasmuch as its designs, when they 
came to light, showed that they affected the future of nearly the whole 
of Europe (it is noteworthy that the Treaty itself contained no men- 
tion of the Ottoman Power), and inasmuch as there existed between the 
Contracting Powers no international bond of union unless the Roman 
Catholic religion be regarded as such, the War which it converted 
into a European War was surrounded with that general uncertainty 
which challenges the use of all the resources of statesmanship. And 
it was in the face of a Europe engaged or involved in such a War as this 

1 As already noted, the Utrecht stipulations as to Dunkirk now came to an 
end. 



no INTRODUCTION 

that Great Britain and France carried on, through its most momentous 
stage, their own struggle for empire beyond seas. 

Two months before the formation of Pitt's first Ministry Frederick 
the Great's dearly bought victory at Prague had not failed to exercise 
its effects in England, and George II had met the attempts of the 
Austrian Ambassador still resident at his Court (Colloredo) with con- 
temptuous rudeness. The Austrian victory of Kolin (June 8th, 1757) 
had been followed by a French invasion of Germany and a successful 
conflict with a British army; Russia and Sweden had followed suit. 
But, by this time, all hesitation was at an end in the counsels of 
Great Britain, though the season had advanced too far for any 
material effect to be exercised by British intervention on the progress 
of the Continental War. Great Britain had no ships to spare for the 
protection of the Prussian coasts against Russia and Sweden; and 
the States-General had, after the shedding of some tears by the 
Regent, the British Princess Anne, allowed the transit by way of 
Maestricht of French troops, who, besides garrisoning Ostend and 
Nieuport, occupied the chief towns of Westphalia. The Duke of 
Cumberland arrived in time to be defeated, though not decisively, 
at Hastenbeck and to sign the notorious Convention of Kloster- 
Zeven (September) which was, in reality, a capitulation. Even now, 
George II would have gladly concluded a Treaty of Neutrality for 
Hanover with France and Austria, and confidence was rising at 
Vienna and Versailles; but Pitt, who had his own plans for British 
cooperation in the Continental War, would not hear of the acceptance 
of the Convention. The ultimate refusal of George II to ratify it, 
accordingly, signified the final and complete adoption by the British 
Government of the policy of active cooperation with Prussia, instead 
of attempting to carry out a Hanoverian, side by side with its own 
(British), policy. Before the year 1757 was over, the most brilliant 
of Frederick's victories, Rossbach (November), sealed the compact of 
mutual confidence and relegated into political oblivion the Capitulation 
of Kloster-Zeven. The Duke of Cumberland was superseded in his 
military command by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick; the Hano- 
verian army was taken into British pay; and success crowned the 
recasting, as it might almost be called, of the lines of the Personal 
Union 1 . 

1 Not, however, so as to cause this aspect of it to be recognised in the Peace 
which ended Great Britain's participation in the War, and which, while abandoning 
Frederick II, ignored Hanover. 



PITT AND THE BRITISH WAR SPIRIT in 

In December, 1757, there followed Frederick IPs second great 
victory gained in this wonderful year of military history — the battle of 
Leuthen. The moral, as well as the financial, support of Great Britain 
had been of high value to the victor, and the question now became : in 
what measure was his Ally prepared to help him to carry the Conti- 
nental War to the successful end which his military genius had made 
possible. For the British enterprises of the latter part of the year had 
by no means proved successful; the Rochefort expedition had been 
a costly failure ; and in America and elsewhere the British Navy had 
not asserted its superiority over the French. But the great battles 
won by Frederick, with the news of our victorious progress in India, 
enabled the high spirit of Pitt to carry Parliament with him in his 
forward policy, and he was sanguine endugh to conceive, and to em- 
body in a famous despatch composed at this time (end of 1757), the 
idea of an alliance with Spain, which should subsequently be extended 
to Naples and Sardinia. Gibraltar was once more to be the price paid. 
But the scheme was as inopportune as it was unsound, and the good- 
will towards it of the Spanish Minister, Wall, proved a broken reed. 

Yet, when Parliament met in the last month of 1757, the German 
news had, together with the Indian, raised popular enthusiasm to the 
highest pitch in favour of the War and Pitt, though neither of the 
early policy of Clive, nor of the victory which crowned it in Bengal, 
can the credit be claimed for the British statesman. In 1758-9, how- 
ever, his plans against France were in organic cooperation with the 
action of the East India Company, though his design upon Mauritius 
was diverted. (The capture of Manilla was not carried out till after 
his resignation.) Nor should it be overlooked that the material pros- 
perity of Great Britain had not suffered from her warlike exertions 
and preparations; her credit stood high, and British trade, the in- 
terests of which were from the first at the bottom of Pitt's foreign 
policy, prospered under his care. The British fleet were masters of 
the Mediterranean, French trade with the Levant was checked, and 
Dutch trade in the West Indies, at the risk of a serious collision with 
the States-General, was subjected to a strict application of the right 
of search 1 . Pitt's vigilance was unsleeping; nor could any notion be 

1 The difficulties as to the Dutch trade with the French West Indies by way of 
the Dutch West Indian Islands gave rise to a prolonged dispute, which really 
defied settlement, so long as there was no agreement as to the principles of inter- 
national maritime law. There were similar disputes with the Danish Government, 
which, however, was less pertinacious. (Sweden's attitude towards Great Britain 
was hostile.) 



ii2 INTRODUCTION 

more futile than that of his eloquence having been his main contri- 
bution to the progress of the War. 

For the campaign of 1758 Pitt was ready to furnish Frederick II 
with the promised subsidies ; and the demand for military and naval 
support, pressed by him after the Russians had occupied Konigsberg, 
was (after acrimonious discussion with Fox) met by the Subsidy 
Treaty and the accompanying Declaration (April), which made the 
aid of troops and ships conditional upon the requirements of British 
action in America. This carefully drawn ' Declaration of London ' is of 
the highest importance as marking the progress of the Anglo-Prussian 
Alliance from its first to its second stage ; but it shows, at the same time, 
beyond what length Pitt was unprepared to go, well aware as he was 
of the outcry to be eventually expected against the employment of 
men and ships needed for home and colonial defence on the expulsion 
of the French from Hanover and the sweeping the Baltic clear of 
Russian vessels. This latter service, therefore, except in the interests 
of both the Allies, the Declaration expressly declined on the part of 
Great Britain. 

The year 1758, marked by British successes beyond the seas (the 
reduction of Cape Breton and the capture of Duquesne, now re- 
named Pittsburg), brought no decisive results to Frederick II; for 
the occupation of Prussian provinces by his adversaries was, in a 
manner, balanced by his continued tenure of Saxony. The presence 
and successes of the Hanoverian army under Ferdinand of Bruns- 
wick, however, freed him from the obligation of keeping watch and 
ward against the French and their German mercenaries, and materi- 
ally contributed to strengthen the Alliance. The Austrian Nether- 
lands were in serious danger; and, if the British Government had 
chosen to support Prince Ferdinand by a naval descent upon the 
Belgian coast, a momentous effect might have been exercised upon 
the progress of the War. But the resources at hand were expended 
upon two of those lesser expeditions (St Malo and Cherbourg), which 
must be reckoned among the mistakes in Pitt's conduct of the War. 
On the other hand — for his sway was absolute in all directions, both 
before and after he and Holderness exchanged Departments— his 
Russian policy at this time aimed at inducing the Tsarina Elizabeth, 
whose forces had occupied the Prussian North-East, to conclude 
peace with Frederick II 5 and the instructions of Sir Robert Keith 
(who remained British Ambassador at Petrograd till the crisis of 
1762) were so intended. But, though he had consulted King Frederick, 



THE AUSTRO-FRENCH ALLIANCE CONFIRMED 113 

he found the political situation unmanageable. He had, therefore, to 
turn to the secondary purpose of his mission, the conclusion of a 
Commercial Treaty with Russia, whose trade had suffered grievously 
from British privateers, and who in her turn was suspected of designs 
in which she would command the support of Sweden and Denmark 
(with both of whom France had signed Subsidy Treaties) and might 
thus ultimately acquire the control of the navigation of the Baltic. It 
was not till after much manoeuvring, nor until after the accession of 
Catharine II, that the Commercial Treaty was signed. But between 
Sweden and Great Britain a rupture of diplomatic relations had taken 
place in 1758 (March), and it was only the prudence of Pitt which, in 
this instance, avoided serious complications for British policy. 

Thus, in 1758, while on the whole the British arms had made 
progress both in Canada and in Bengal, the course of the campaigns 
in Germany had (notwithstanding Hochkirch) been such as to afford 
a kind of negative encouragement to Frederick II, and to raise serious 
doubts in influential quarters in France — even in Cardinal de Bernis, 
formerly one of the chief promoters of the Austrian Alliance — as to the 
expediency of seeking peace. But the hesitation was overcome ; the 
Tsarina Elizabeth stood firm by the Partition Treaty ; after making 
some pacific overtures to Great Britain through Denmark, Bernis 
was banished (December), and in the last days of the year a new Treaty 
was concluded between Austria and France. This compact upheld 
the promise of France as to the recovery of Silesia, and made the 
conclusion of a French Peace with Great Britain conditional on re- 
gard for Austrian interests ; but it otherwise considerably diminished 
her obligations under the Partition Treaty of 1757, to which a Secret 
Agreement now put an end. This "diplomatic masterpiece" of 
Choiseul — for he was now in entire control of the foreign policy of 
France — amounted to no very considerable improvement of the position 
to which that Power had been reduced by Madame de Pompadour's 
friends; and it left unchanged the essence of the situation. In other 
words, the Austro-French Alliance continued, while, so long as Pitt 
was in power, there was no fear of the bond between Great Britain 
and Prussia being broken. On the contrary : though Frederick II could 
not but long for as early as possible a peace through victory, Pitt, as 
the triumph of British arms by land and sea assumed wider dimen- 
sions, perceived that fullest advantage must be taken of the oppor- 
tunity for utterly overthrowing the naval and colonial power of France ; 
and George II was, after his wont, speculating on an enlargement of 



n 4 INTRODUCTION 

his Electorate in the direction of Westphalia. But, for the present, 
a new Subsidy Treaty passed the House of Commons (December), 
Pitt taking occasion to defy the Austrians, as if they were treacherous 
conspirators against the honour of the British nation. 

The year which followed (1759) splendidly vindicated his con- 
fidence. For it was the year of the capture of Quebec — a heroic 
memory— though it was not till the following year (1760) that, by 
the capitulation of Montreal, the whole of Canada fell into British 
hands, and the possessions of France in America were reduced to 
Louisiana alone. The fall of Quebec was only one of a long series of 
British victories at a stage in the War intended by Choiseul to have 
been marked by the invasion of England — in lieu of which the French 
coasts were subjected to a complete blockade. Later in the year 
(November), Hawke's great exploit at Quiberon Bay followed; and, 
after this victory, Pitt's foresight in ignoring the hopes placed by 
France on the cooperation of the Italian States was justified, and the 
gallant Thurot's invasion of Ireland ended in death and disaster 
(February, 1760). So far as Great Britain was concerned, the main 
result of the War, the establishment of her naval supremacy, had 
been already achieved, though part of Pitt's American design was in 
his eyes still unaccomplished, so long as the fishing monopoly which 
he wished to establish for Great Britain in the Gulf of Newfoundland 
was not in her possession. 

Meanwhile, the year 1759 had seemed to bring Great Britain's 
Ally to the verge of ruin ; his resources were all but reduced to his 
requisitions in Saxony and some petty Saxon States, and to the 
British subsidies. The moral advantage of Great Britain's maritime 
and American successes contributed to sustain him in resisting what 
seemed his doom ; and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, though the 
effects of his victory of Minden (August) fell short of what they should 
have been, much more than held his own against the Western foe. 
It is not surprising that the vicissitudes of the German campaigns 
in this year should have overshadowed other aspects in the history 
of the Alliance; but the projects, independently conceived by both 
Frederick II and Pitt, directed to the permanent exclusion of Austrian 
dominion and influence from Italy, should not be overlooked. The 
death of Ferdinand VI had brought to the Spanish Throne his brother 
Charles III, whose goodwill was of so much importance that France 
and Austria were alike willing to promote a drastic revision in his 
favour (or in that of his third son, Ferdinand) of the settlement of Italy 



FAILURE OF PITT'S ITALIAN SCHEME 115 

agreed upon at Aix-la-Chapelle. The House of Savoy (with its wonted 
vigilance) declined to fall in with the arrangement ; and this suggested 
to Pitt a scheme which should at the same time satisfy that House and 
the Spanish dynasty, and involve Austria in a war on behalf of her 
Italian interests. While the Spanish infante Don Philip of Parma was 
to be indemnified by Tuscany, Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia was to 
acquire Milan, and the North-Italian duchies, with the title of King 
of Lombardy 1 . But Charles III, who (not inexplicably) hated Great 
Britain in his heart, had no intention of allying himself with her and 
entering into a war, of which the chief Italian gain would accrue to his 
Sardinian rival, whose desire for territory equalled his own. He was 
secretly longing for the day when, by the side of Great Britain's present 
chief adversary, he might take revenge upon her and her dictatorial 
policy towards his monarchy and himself. The British proposals were 
refused at Naples, where, according to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
Philip of Parma was to have succeeded Charles III on his mounting 
the Spanish Throne; and, when subsequently repeated by Frederick 
II, they met with a similar rebuff. But the new King of Spain 
thought it well at present to conceal his enmity to Great Britain, 
although he made no secret of it to the French Government, whose 
plans of an invasion of England in this year (1759) he warmly ap- 
proved. He was, indeed, intending to proceed to his new Throne at 
Madrid by way of France, in response to an invitation from Lewis XV, 
and with a view to confirming or renewing the Bourbon Family Com- 
pact 2 , when he was restrained, partly by the fear of offending Spanish 
pride, partly by the tidings of recent brilliant successes. At Madrid, 
he found feeling very strong against Great Britain, more especially 
on account of offences against Spanish neutrality imputed to British 
vessels. The Spanish Government, which, at the close of 1759, had 
offered its mediation between Great Britain and France, in the follow- 
ing year sent a memorial to London reciting all the Spanish grievances. 
Pitt received it with surprise, as he had the offer made by Don 
Ricardo Wall with indignation — for he was well aware of the real aim of 
Spanish policy. He had, before this, judiciously declined the suggestion 
of Frederick II, that the former Jacobite Earl Marischal, now Prussian 
Ambassador at Madrid, should proffer his mediatory services. 

On the other hand, Great Britain and Prussia had agreed, towards 

1 See R. Waddington, La Guerre de Sept Am, vol. ill. p. 451. 

2 This was effected in August, 1761, when the most important of the three 
agreements known under the name of the Family Compact was signed at Paris. 



n6 INTRODUCTION 

the end of 1759, on the expediency of proposing to the Powers at 
war with them the assembling, in regular form, of a Peace Congress. 
This they did by handing to the Envoy of these Powers at the Hague 
through Duke Lewis Ernest of Brunswick-Bevern (guardian of the 
Hereditary Stadholder William V), the so-called Declaration of Rys- 
wyk (November). But it remained ineffective, and was in truth de- 
signed to conciliate public opinion in England by taking advantage 
of the popular craving for peace in France, which Choiseul, like 
Bernis before him, could no longer gainsay, and which (March, 1760) 
actually induced him to carry on at the Hague secret negotiations 
with the British Government for a separate peace. But, while France 
was negotiating without her Allies — Austria having declared it neces- 
sary to arrive, in the first instance, at an understanding with Russia, 
and the Tsarina Elizabeth having sent a point-blank refusal to discuss 
the subject — Great Britain, from the first, loyally declared that her 
Ally should be apprised of every step in the negotiation. And Pitt 
held to his promise, while Frederick II, also, kept himself in- 
formed through a secret channel — no other than his friend Voltaire — 
and then directly through a Prussian agent, and, in the stress under 
which he was placed, showed himself not averse from the proposal 
of a separate peace between France and Great Britain. But Pitt 
judged more correctly (as his Ally was afterwards fain to acknowledge) 
and insisted on the inclusion of Prussia in the peace as indispensable. 
The negotiations, hereupon, broke down, and (April, 1760) the three 
Allies, once more united, presented to the Regent of the United Pro- 
vinces the " Counter-declaration of Ryswyk," which, while stating that 
the King of France was prepared to negotiate with the King of Great 
Britain through the King of Spain, accepted a Congress on Peace 
with Prussia only on condition of the admission of the representa- 
tives of the other Powers at war with her (Poland and Sweden). All 
hopes of peace were now at an end ; and the proverbial tenacity of the 
House of Habsburg had succeeded in keeping its Allies under arms 
together. 

But, though Austria had thus been enabled to resume the design, 
with which she had entered into the War, of crushing her archfoe, 
and though bankrupt France had to continue her twofold struggle, 
Russia's adhesion to her Allies, albeit assured, for the period of her 
reign, by the Tsarina's determination, was not accorded without 
promises of future gains in the event of common victory. In March, 
1760, these were secured to her by the so-called Schouvaloff Treaties 



RUSSIAN ACTION IN THE WAR 117 

with Austria (ratified in July), which, while signifying Russia's 
accession to the Versailles Treaty between Austria and France of 
December, 1758, in a Secret Article laid down the obligations under- 
taken by the two Powers for their respective satisfaction at the end 
of the War. In the event of Austria's recovery of Silesia — but not 
otherwise — Austria bound herself to secure the acquisition by Russia 
of "Prussia," i.e. Ducal Prussia, with the addition of Danzig ; Poland, 
helpless as usual, notwithstanding the friendship of France, being 
compensated by some lesser cessions. When it is remembered that in 
the previous year (March, 1759) Russia had concluded a Treaty with 
Sweden for the effective maintenance, for trade purposes, of Baltic 
neutrality, and that Denmark was obliged to adhere to this agree- 
ment in the following year, it will be seen how, in the event of a 
victorious issue of the War, the power of Russia would have been 
rendered irresistible in the Baltic. 

It was against an Alliance thus extended in its aims as well as 
strengthened in its cohesion that Pitt and Great Britain prepared to 
take part in the progress of the struggle, when it reopened in the 
spring of 1760. Pitt's Government, in order not to interfere with the 
British trade in the Baltic, declined to send a fleet into those waters, 
where it would have been welcomed by the Danes ; so that the Rus- 
sians and Swedes had their hands free for operating there against 
Prussia, while her Allied enemies could, with the exception of France, 
address themselves with renewed energy to the German War. Maria 
Theresa had made up her mind to carry it to a decisive issue. But 
there were differences of plan between Austria and Russia; and in 
the end Laudon had to raise the siege of Breslau (August) though 
the Russians for a few days (October) occupied Berlin. The con- 
fidence of Maria Theresa was severely shaken by the Austrian defeat 
(at first reported a victory) at Torgau (November); and, while 
Frederick II remained in his headquarters at Dresden, no important 
result had been reached by his adversaries' campaign against him in 
eastern and central Germany. In the west, Prince Ferdinand had, 
partly in consequence of the numerical inferiority of his forces, been 
unable to deal any effective blow; but, at least from the British point 
of view, he had not carried on the fight in vain, having kept the 
French forces out of Hanover and done his best to exhaust the re- 
sources of the enemy. Thus, Great Britain was the better able to 
continue her efforts against the same foe beyond sea, where the French 
siege of Quebec was raised and Montreal capitulated. 



u8 INTRODUCTION 

The indecisive character of the German campaigns of 1760, and 
the extensive losses of the French Power in the East Indies and the 
New World, rendered Choiseul anxious to bring about negotiations 
in the direction of peace with the Prussian and British Governments. 
But, afraid of challenging Austrian (and Jesuit) influences at Court, 
he once more had resort to King Charles III of Spain. The latter at 
this time gave much of his confidence to Marquis Grimaldi, who had 
convinced himself that, instead of continuing to mix herself up in 
the German War, France ought, in close alliance with Spain, to 
apply all her energies to the War with Great Britain. Spain, of whose 
grievances mention has been already made, actually began to arm, 
and a diplomatic contention followed between the Spanish Ambas- 
sador at the Court of St James' and Pitt. Though France still hesi- 
tated about changing her policy and concluding peace with Prussia, 
it seemed as if the year 1760 was not to end without the outbreak of 
hostilities between Spain and Great Britain. But the death of the 
bellicose Spanish Queen (Maria Amalia) and, far more signally, a 
month afterwards, that of King George II of Great Britain, led to 
a change — the latter event to an all-important one — in the situation. 

King George II died — on October 27th, 1760 — as the Ally of a 
Prince whom he detested almost more than any other, and counselled 
by a Minister from whom he shrank with unconquerable aversion. 
But it was the nation which had sustained Walpole so long as its 
mind was bent on peace; and the nation, not King George II, had 
brought Pitt into favour and kept him there, so long as its mind was 
set on war. The change in the system of government which began 
with the accession of George III was, in the first instance, fatal to 
the complete ascendancy of Pitt, and could not but become so to the 
continuation of the foreign policy with which he was identified. At the 
very time when the War was extending itself towards the participa- 
tion in it of Spain, Pitt was on the eve of having to resign power into 
the hands of a royal favourite, who was prepared to conclude a peace 
short of the measure of aggrandisement which Great Britain had 
actually achieved, and which would have satisfied the nation. On the 
very first day of his reign, George III proposed to appoint Bute 
one of the Secretaries of State, though it was not till six months 
afterwards that, Holderness having made way for the favourite, the 
offer was reluctantly accepted by him. (Bute had been at once ad- 
mitted by the new Sovereign into the Privy Council.) On opening 
his first Parliament (November 2nd) George III announced his inten- 



PROPOSED PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE 119 

tion of steadily pressing on the victorious War, and Frederick II was 
so sure of the bona fides of the British Government, so long as Pitt was 
at its head, that he even declared his readiness to acquiesce in a separate 
peace between Great Britain and France, provided that limits were set 
to French assistance to Austria. Moreover, he remained in control of 
the greater part of the army of Prince Ferdinand. Thus, the proposed 
revision of the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of Alliance came to nothing, and 
the old Subsidy Treaty was renewed. But some of Pitt's followers, 
as well as "the King's Friends," were inclining to the view that the 
War had accomplished enough ;and Bute's acceptance of the Secretary- 
ship, with certain other Governmental changes, no doubt weakened 
Pitt's position. He was ready to make peace with France, though he 
still pressed on British conquests in order to command what were, in 
his judgment, reasonable terms, and, being aware of the intimate rela- 
tions between France and Spain, he was anxious to take advantage of 
Choiseul's increased anxiety to conclude a tolerable peace. Influenced, 
among other pacific symptoms, by the Swedish popular dislike of the 
War, Choiseul pressed his views in favour of peace on Maria Theresa, 
who for the first time in the course of the War, showed signs of dis- 
couragement; but Kaunitz and Russian influence prevailed, and his 
notion of a Congress was in the end accepted by Choiseul, in lieu of 
the plan of a separate negotiation between France and Great Britain. 
Thus, the campaigns of 1761 began without any actual movement in 
favour of peace, and, though Pitt's willingness to entertain the notion 
of concluding it with France on his terms had been in vain, his 
alternative of pressing on the War till these terms should have 
become possible remained and justified itself. 

For, while, in 1761, the struggle of Prussia against Austria and 
Russia remained undecided, want of money, though not of men, having 
delayed an agreement between the Allies on a joint plan of action, 
and Laudon's brilliant surprise of Schweidnitz (October) having then 
reduced Frederick II to the defensive in Lower Silesia, things had gone 
badly for the French in the west. Here the French armies had been 
unable either to drive Prince Ferdinand out of Westphalia or to en- 
croach further on Hanoverian territory. These failures had increased 
the longing for peace in France, and, though the ill-judged Belle-Isle 
expedition, a lesser effort of the sort on which Pitt at times set his 
heart, and intended to secure an eventual equivalent for Minorca, was 
allowed by him to delay the assembling of the proposed Peace Con- 
gress at Augsburg, he saw no objection to secret communications 



120 INTRODUCTION 

with France in the same direction in Paris (through Hans Stanley) 
and in London (through de Bussy). In these negotiations, Pitt let 
it be known that no separate peace with France would be allowed by 
Great Britain to prevent her from continuing effective aid to her 
Prussian Ally. But the Austrian Government succeeded in stiffening 
Choiseul's attitude, and even in insisting on a guarantee to Spain 
being attached to any Treaty with Great Britain. Thus, through the 
efforts of Grimaldi, Choiseul, in his Memorial of July 15th, formu- 
lated the Spanish claims against Great Britain and implicitly adopted 
them. Pitt's Government on the other hand, declared their inclusion 
in any Peace Treaty with France wholly inadmissible. The temper of 
the nation, encouraged by the news from the Indies both East and 
West, was still high; and peace with France was still out of the 
question, so long at least as Pitt was at the helm. 

On July 25th the British Government forwarded its own con- 
ditions to the French; they proposed that Great Britain should be 
allowed to assist her Prussian Ally in accordance with her Treaty 
obligations ; but the real difficulty lay in Choiseul's mind being now 
obsessed by the idea of the Spanish Alliance. The Third Family 
Compact between France and Spain, in whose mutual guarantee the 
Bourbon Princes in Italy took part, was signed on August 15th. It 
contained a Secret Article, of even greater moment than the public 
agreement, binding Spain to declare war against Great Britain on 
May 1st, 1762, should that Power then still be at war with France, 
and, in this event, promising the restoration of Minorca to Spain. 
The point of the Compact was obviously directed against Great 
Britain ; but by concluding it France violated the Versailles Treaty 
of May 1st, 1756 with Austria, who had been left without so much 
as cognisance of it. As for the British peace negotiations with France, 
they were broken off, though not till October, and the Congress of 
Augsburg, for which the Plenipotentiaries had already been named, 
collapsed in its birth. 

But, on finding the preservation of peace with Spain impossible, 
Pitt, as if desirous of taking a leaf out of the book of his Ally, and 
(if it may be so put) anticipating the inevitable, gained an advantage 
over the now accomplished Alliance at the outset. Reckoning that 
the seizure of Spanish ships could, if rapidly effected, be carried 
out without any augmentation of the British navy, and at the same 
time lead to the seizure of Spanish Colonies, he, so early as September 
18th, 1761, proposed to the Cabinet to declare war against Spain. 



RESIGNATION OF PITT.— WAR WITH SPAIN 121 

But the proposal appalled the whole Ministry, except Temple, and 
was resisted by Bute, who thought that the opportunity had at last 
arrived for overthrowing the Ministry's master. The question was 
debated in three Cabinet meetings, and on October 2nd was finally 
decided against Pitt. On December 5th, he resigned, Temple fol- 
lowing him out of office. 

Bute had now the leading voice in the Government, though 
Newcastle remained its nominal head till 1762. Lord Egremont, 
who had been designated as Plenipotentiary at Augsburg, and who 
was regarded as wholly under Bute's influence, took Pitt's place as 
Secretary of State. He perceived at once that, popular as the great 
war Minister had been, there was no other way of ending that popu- 
larity than the conclusion of that Peace which Pitt had declined to 
seek to bring about prematurely, but which was favoured by the 
majority of the new Parliament (November), whether through the 
influence of the Court or through the manipulation of Newcastle, 
or both. The Speech from the Throne made no mention of Spain; 
but the Spanish Government vindicated the insight of Pitt by throw- 
ing off the mask. Its military preparations were hurried on, and Wall 
now propounded a long series of grievances against Great Britain, 
accompanied by an indignant message of sympathy with France. 
The request for information of the Earl of Bristol, the British Am- 
bassador at Madrid, as to the Family Compact was received with 
cynical boldness, and, when a formal reply was made five weeks 
later, its tone was unaltered. Immediately afterwards, the Spanish 
reply to the British ultimatum, enquiring whether or not King 
Charles III designed to ally himself with the foes of Great Britain, 
arrived in London; and on January 4th, 1762, there followed the 
British Declaration of War against Spain. In March, a peremptory 
joint Spanish and French Note was despatched to the King of 
Portugal, desiring him to put an end to all correspondence and com- 
merce with Great Britain, and, on the demand being refused, a 
Spanish army entered Portugal (April). 

But while, in this quarter, the British Government had done 
what seemed indispensable, it had taken the momentous negative 
step of leaving the Subsidy Treaty with Prussia unrenewed. This, 
indeed, did not amount to her abandoning Prussia to her foes, and 
was not so regarded by Frederick II, who at this late stage was 
formulating proposals as to the terms on which, as he hoped, Great 
Britain would insist on his behalf in the event of her concluding a 



122 INTRODUCTION 

separate Treaty with France. Nothing, however, came of this 
negotiation; and there can be little doubt that Frederick's recent 
ill-success had, about the turn of the years 176 1-2, inclined Bute 
and those who thought with him, or who, like Bedford, went even 
further in their desire for peace than he, to place very little store on 
the continuation of the Prussian Alliance, or to favour its abandon- 
ment. At the beginning of 1762, Frederick II was, though with a 
much reduced army, still holding out, and his best chance of recover- 
ing himself lay in the growing French weariness of the burden of 
the Austrian Alliance. But, of a sudden, the whole situation changed 
by the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth (January 5th, 1762) which 
abruptly transferred Russia's support of the Austrian Alliance to 
Frederick II. In the next month (February), the new Tsar Peter III 
issued a formal Declaration in favour of peace throughout Europe 
(February). To Bute and the friends of peace in England this utter 
change in Russian policy came at a most inopportune moment ; and 
he revealed his ulterior intention of leaving Prussia out of account 
in the impending peace negotiations by proposing to her that an 
annual grant should take the place of the renewal of the Subsidy 
Treaty. Before Frederick's answer arrived, the changed attitude of 
the British Government had been made clear to him by the resigna- 
tion of Newcastle (May), who had objected to the insufficiency of 
the grant asked for the expenses of the War (including that to 
Prussia), while Bute insisted that the perilous position of Portugal, 
which in this month declared war against France and Spain, was 
now the matter of chief moment to Great Britain. In vain, Pitt had 
protested that even Portugal could be best protected by upholding 
the Prussian Alliance. The " King's Friends " now had the ball under 
their feet, and prospectively, there was no doubt of Prussia being 
left by Great Britain to her new friendship. About the same time, 
Russia entered into an Alliance with Prussia, and Sweden concluded 
Peace with her. The complications which ensued with Denmark 
need not occupy us. On the deposition and assassination of Tsar 
Peter III (July), his Consort and successor, Catharine II, did not 
renew the alliance with Prussia. But, in substance, the relations 
between the two Powers remained unchanged till the close of the 
War, when, in circumstances of altered significance for Great Britain, 
they were reformulated as an actual Alliance (1764) 1 . 

1 Treaty of St Petersburg, April, 1764. With this Treaty, accompanied by a 
Secret Convention concerning Poland, the British Government had no concern. 



BRITISH MARITIME AND COLONIAL SUCCESSES 123 

The Prussian campaigns of the year 1762 had ended successfully 
for Frederick II at Schweidnitz and Freiberg (October), and in the 
west Prince Ferdinand had by the capture of Cassel (November) 
victoriously closed his brilliant military career. Bute, who lacked 
courage rather than insight, had not as yet dared to interfere openly 
with the prosecution of the War ; but, while Prince Ferdinand was 
still about to push his advance, the news arrived that, as will be seen 
immediately, the British negotiations with France and Spain had 
resulted in the conclusion of Preliminaries of Peace. Choiseul's 
policy of prolonging the War in Germany, in order, at the last 
moment, to carry on effectively the War against Great Britain with 
the aid of Spain had rapidly broken down, even after this joint effort 
had been practically restricted to an attack on Portugal — a failure in 
the end, thanks partly to British supplementation of the national 
resources. The British supremacy by sea had in this year been every- 
where maintained. In the West Indies, where, with the solitary 
exception of the capture of San Domingo (1761), warlike operations 
had for some time been suspended, in order to spare Spanish sus- 
ceptibilities, there was, of course, no reason for showing considera- 
tion for an open enemy. Martinique was taken (February, 1762), 
and in accordance with a design of Pitt's, the whole of the Windward 
Islands were now under British rule. Havana was captured (August), 
and before long (October) the Philippines in the Eastern Seas were 
added to the Western gains — or rather, would have been added, had 
not the British Government already placed both these acquisitions on 
the list of those of which it was prepared to make a present to Spain. 

The War was virtually over, so far as Great Britain was concerned. 
She had been victorious in almost every quarter of the globe; but 
her Sovereign and his Minister had made up their minds for peace 
with France and Spain, and almost dreaded successes which might 
seem to oblige them to raise their terms as towards these Powers. 
About April (1762), diplomatic correspondence on the subject had 
been resumed with France, Spain being taken into confidence. The 
negotiation was kept carefully secret from Prussia, though Shelburne, 
who had boldly demanded the withdrawal of our troops from Ger- 
many 1 , was informed that the Government had no intention of further 
carrying on the German, in addition to the Spanish War. But, as 
the business proceeded, Choiseul thought it desirable (May) con- 
fidentially to apprise the Austrian Government, which was pressing 

1 Cf. Lord Fitzmaurice's Life of Shelburne, vol. I (1875), p. 124. 



124 INTRODUCTION 

Great Britain for aid, of the design of a separate Peace between the 
Western Powers ; when it was found that, though the assembling of 
a Congress might have seemed more favourable to her interests, Maria 
Theresa and her counsellors were prepared to transact directly, and 
to seek to obtain fair conditions for herself (the retention of Glatz) 
and her Saxo-Polish ally. The persistence of her foe, the desertion of 
her by Russia, and the coolness of France, had at last overcome her 
resistance. It now only remained to inform Frederick II of the con- 
ditions under which she was prepared to make peace with him, if 
the Army of the West were withdrawn from Germany during the pre- 
sent War. Frederick II, still professing his disbelief in the willing- 
ness of his Ally Great Britain to safeguard his interests, asked for a 
direct communication from the Austrian Government as to its in- 
tentions. The opening of official negotiations between France and 
Great Britain, hereupon, followed (September), Frederick's old 
acquaintance the Due de Nivernais being sent to London, and the 
Duke of Bedford, a firm friend of peace, to Paris. 

The Cabinet, on which the final settlement of one of the most 
momentous questions that a British Ministry has ever been called 
upon to determine, had recently undergone certain changes. Bute, 
who, on the resignation of Newcastle, had, as a matter of course, 
become First Lord of the Treasury, had appointed George Grenville, 
in whose valuable support he placed great trust, one of the Secre- 
taries of State in his place ; and it now appeared that both he and his 
fellow Secretary, the Earl of Egremont, insisted that, before signing 
the Preliminaries, Bedford, who had a strong will of his own, should 
submit them to the Cabinet. The news of the British success at 
Martinique added to the arguments in favour of this view, and Bute 
had to bow to it, though he took his revenge by transferring the 
seals from Egremont to Halifax and shifting Grenville to the Ad- 
miralty. The transaction of the Preliminaries was accordingly pushed 
on, and, on November 3rd, the Preliminaries of Peace between Great 
Britain, France and Spain were signed at Fontainebleau. Six days 
later they were approved by Parliament, after Pitt had liberated his 
soul in a speech of three hours and a half, a majority of 319 to 65 
supporting an address of thanks to the Crown. On February icth, 
1763, the Peace of Paris, based on these Preliminaries, was signed. 

This Peace replaced Great Britain in possession of Minorca, and 
left in British hands the whole of Canada, with Cape Breton and 
the other islands (except two) in the Gulf of St Lawrence ; certain 



THE PEACE OF PARIS 125 

religious rights were reserved for the Roman Catholics of Canada, and 
certain rights of fishery in the Bay of Newfoundland (the nursery, 
as it has been called, of the French navy) were left to the French. 
On the Gulf of Mexico, Florida and Louisiana, except New Orleans 
and its district, became British — partly as an equivalent for Havana. 
In the West Indies there was a partition, and in Africa, Great Britain 
obtained Senegal, but gave up Goree. In the East Indies, France 
recovered possession of certain factories and settlements in Bengal, 
but only on the undertaking to keep no troops and raise no fortifica- 
tions there. In general, it was agreed that all conquests "not yet 
known" should be restored without compensation, so that Havana 
and the Philippines were alike surrendered. On the other hand, 
Spain waived all the claims on which her participation in the War 
had been founded. 

Notwithstanding the signal moderation shown by the British 
Government in agreeing to these terms, King George III must be 
allowed to have had, in more ways than one, reason for declaring 
that Great Britain had never before concluded such a peace, and that 
perhaps no other European Power had ever concluded another like 
it. It established British maritime supremacy in both hemispheres ; 
it placed Great Britain in the position of the foremost Colonial Power 
in the world; and it opened for British commerce an incomparable 
prospect of expansion. But this Peace, at the same time, wore a more 
dubious aspect, with regard to its provisions connected with Great 
Britain's participation in the recent European War. Whether, even 
so, it contained in it the germs of national animosities for whose out- 
break the course of time could not fail to provide opportunities, was 
a question which history would be called upon to solve; but, most 
assuredly, an insistence upon the policy of Pitt — the policy of abso- 
lute commercial monopoly — would not have been accepted by France 
except at a stage which the late War had not reached— that of her 
absolute prostration. 

It is impossible, from this point of view, not to compare the 
Peace of Paris with the Peace of Utrecht, or to gainsay that, in both 
instances, the motives impelling the British Government to press a 
pacific conclusion were those of political partisanship, and jealousy 
on the part of the Crown and its followers of one great man pre- 
eminently fitted to carry on the War and associated by public opinion 
with its continuance 1 . Nevertheless, Great Britain cannot justly be 

1 In a powerful passage in Lecky's History of England in the Eighteenth Century, 
vol. in. (ed. of 1882), pp. 44 ff. 



i 2 6 INTRODUCTION 

said to have at Paris, as she had at Utrecht, purchased for herself 
whatever advantages accrued to her from the Peace at the cost of 
her Allies. Portugal recovered all that she had lost by the War, and 
— which is, of course, the main question at issue — Great Britain's 
conduct to Prussia, though inevitably resented by Frederick II (in 
whatever measure he may have expected it) cannot fairly be described 
as desertion. By a strange coincidence, the Article of the Treaty pro- 
viding for the restoration by France of the territory and strong places 
in her occupation omitted to specify the Powers to whom they were 
to be given up; and, but for Frederick's vigilance, Austria might 
have taken advantage of this lapse. But the real defence of Great 
Britain's action towards Prussia consists neither in this omission, 
nor even in the fact that Great Britain was under no formal obliga- 
tion (as Frederick had been made aware) to continue indefinitely her 
Annual Subsidy to him. It lay in the complete change of the cir- 
cumstances from those in which her Alliance with him had been 
concluded. Austria and Saxony apart, he was now on the friendliest 
of terms with Russia; Sweden was following suit, the great league 
against him was dissolved, and France alone, from whom he had 
little or nothing to fear, and who in the Peace undertook to give 
no fresh assistance to her Allies still involved in the German War, 
remained unreconciled 1 . 

We leave aside the disentanglement of the relations between 
France and her Allies in Germany. The British Government had 
devised a scheme of its own for solving the difficulties which attended 
the process by proclaiming — with a resolution savouring of Pitt 
rather than his successor — the neutrality of the Prussian Rhinelands 
during the remainder of the War, when the news of the conclusion 
of the Peace of Hubertusburg rendered the acceptance of the scheme 
superfluous (February 15th, 1763). The Prussian and Austrian 
Governments had rapidly reached the conclusion that the time had 
come for them to settle their differences directly, while keeping in 
good humour the new Tsarina in her own right, who was anxious to 
assume the part of Mediatrix. The Peace of Hubertusburg, which 
left the Austrian, Prussian and Saxon dominions precisely the same 
in extent as they had been before the War, while Prussia made certain 
concessions of no primary significance to the Houses of Austria and 

1 Frederick put faith in the report that Bute had held out hopes of British 
support of demands from Prussia of territorial compensation for Austria ; but this 
gravamen rests on the uncorroborated evidence of Prince Galitzin, Russian Am- 
bassador in London, and need hardly be taken into account. 



RECEPTION OF THE PEACE IN ENGLAND 127 

Saxony, was regarded by Frederick IPs contemporaries as a masterly 
close to a masterly War, and he and Kaunitz were at one in their 
satisfaction at its having been reached without actual foreign {i.e. 
Russian) intervention. George III was included in it among the 
Allies of Prussia both as King of Great Britain and as Elector of 
Hanover. No warmer congratulations on this Peace attended 
Frederick II than those of Mitchell, who during the most critical 
part of the War had adhered to him and upheld his action with un- 
flagging energy; and when, after nightfall on March 30th, the great 
King entered Berlin, there rode by his side Prince Ferdinand, whose 
prowess had lifted from his shoulders a great part of the burden. 
And though there was truth in his boast, "I made the War" — for 
in his self-reliance at the supreme crises of his course lay the final 
cause of his victory — there were also on his side the forces by which 
history works, and of which the greatest of warriors and statesmen 
are but the agents. 

In England, if the Peace of Paris had been carried through in a 
different spirit, and by other statesmen, it might have been welcomed 
with acclamations. As it was, the hopes of the Court party that the 
assurance implied in the Peace of the young King's having, in the 
conclusion of it, been moved by no German sympathies would cover 
him with popularity were to be speedily disappointed As for his 
chosen Minister, though the charge of having been induced to make 
the Peace by a French bribe was momentarily bruited abroad, he was 
severely handled in the Lords, and, with an insight into the situation 
creditable to his loyalty as well as to his good sense, unexpectedly 
resigned his office as early as April. It is significant that, in the most 
notorious effort of the demagogues who virulently attacked him and 
his regime — in No. 45 of Wilkes's North Briton, published a few days 
after Bute's resignation — the abandonment of Frederick II and the 
inadequate conditions of the Peace are among the charges urged 
against the fallen, but even now by no means powerless, Minister. 



VI 

The intrigues which followed scarcely concern us here. Bute was 
succeeded by George Grenville, the conduct of foreign affairs being 
left to Egremont (whose influence among the Tories was consider- 
able) and to Halifax, personally popular, but not a statesman of high 
mark. After Egremont's death, the King was forced to have recourse 



i 2 8 INTRODUCTION 

to the counsel of Pitt, who, while advocating the exclusion from office 
of all who had taken part in the Peace negotiations, dwelt on the 
necessity of giving the great Whig families their share in the ad- 
ministration of public affairs. The illogical result was the inclusion 
in the Ministry of the Duke of Bedford (September), and, after further 
difficulties, which the King had made yet another effort to overcome 
with Pitt's aid. Grenville and Bedford were superseded in office by 
the Marquis of Rockingham, the leader, respectable according to any 
use of the word, of the main body of the Whigs (1765). 

Within the closing months of Grenville 's Government falls the 
event — the passing of the Stamp Act — with which a new period 
begins in the history of British foreign policy. For, as was soon to 
become manifest, it was henceforth constantly affected, and for many 
a long day dominated, by the relations between the Colonies and the 
mother-country. Hitherto, the North American Colonies, which are 
primarily in question, had in times of peace been virtually left to 
themselves ; and Grenville's Stamp Act, by which half North America 
was lost to Great Britain, was an almost incidental result of his en- 
deavour to utilise discreetly for the defence of Great Britain what he 
looked upon as her resources beyond seas. In the process legalised 
by this Act there is nothing altogether new; but the application of 
its principles — which of old Walpole had said he would "leave to a 
braver man" — proved the supreme test of Pitt's colonial statesman- 
ship 1 . During the earlier stages of the Anglo-French warfare in 
North America, the British Colonists had fought bravely with little 
help from home. The formation of a central authority to direct their 
efforts had, accordingly, been felt so strongly that, on the eve of the 
Seven Years' War, a Congress had been summoned to Albany (1754) 
by the Colonial Governor, to discuss a common organisation of defence 
and a central fund for supplying the necessary means. But the War, 
while it preserved the Colonies from French dominion, almost ruined 
them by putting an end to their unlawful trade with their French and 
other foreign neighbours, as well as by the exhaustion of their own 
resources; and Grenville's proposal to raise by parliamentary tax- 
ation of them part at least of the money necessary for the permanent 
establishment of a force in North America was as inopportune as it was 
offensive, while it might very possibly prove inadequate to its purpose. 

The history of the Stamp Act, which, while passing with very 
little notice in England, at once aroused the most violent opposition 

1 See Miss Hotblack, u.s., in the chapter "Stamp Act." 



REPEAL OF THE STAMP ACT. THE TEA DUTY 129 

in the Colonies, and that of its Repeal, supported by Burke and 
opposed by Pitt (February, 1766), must not detain us. The Repeal 
was accompanied by a Declaratory Act, asserting that the taxing 
power of the British Parliament extended to the Colonies. Pitt, 
though seeking to maintain a distinction between legislation and 
taxing powers, declined to bind the Colonies by an absolute declara- 
tion of right. The Repeal, however, was accepted in America as a 
binding measure, though the wound still smarted. On every ground, 
the remembrance of it should have been left to die out as speedily 
as possible. 

In the following July (1766), the King dismissed Rockingham and 
recalled Pitt, now created Earl of Chatham, into office as Lord Privy 
Seal. The Duke of Grafton, who had resigned the Secretaryship 
of State under Rockingham, had been persuaded to accept the 
nominal headship of the Government, while Shelburne and Conway, 
both strong adversaries of the Stamp Act, were appointed Secretaries 1 . 
But, though Chatham remained a member of the Government till 
1768, he was such in name only; and his life had already lapsed into 
that of an invalid in retirement, with fitful emergings into the light 
of public day — its normal condition in his later years. His Colonial 
policy, which he clearly expounded to the House of Commons on 
the eve of the War of Independence (February, 1775), underwent 
no fundamental change; and he held fast to the principle that the 
legislative authority of Great Britain must remain supreme, with the 
rider that no tax should be imposed on a Colony without the assent 
of an assembly duly convened there to vote supply for imperial uses. 
Grafton's Government, to which Chatham had for a time given the 
support of his name, had, in the meantime, carried out the policy 
of the (repealed) Stamp Act through Charles Townshend's im- 
position on the Colonies of a port duty on tea — the occasion, as it 
proved, of the outbreak which led to the War of Independence. After 
Townshend's death, his successor as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Lord North, who in 1770 became First Lord and virtual Prime- 
Minister, continued the same policy, of which the primary inspi- 
ration was the will of the King. 

1 It is worth noticing, as showing the increased importance attached to British 
North America, that, in 1768, the Earl of Hillsborough (afterwards Marquis of 
Downshire), who had served under Grenville as President of the Board of Trade, 
but whose sympathies were Tory, was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
But the office was abolished in 1782 — a proof of the difficulty, in this period, of 
distinguishing Colonial from Foreign Affairs. 



i 3 o INTRODUCTION 

It would serve no purpose to touch here on the personal incidents 
and influences more or less affecting British Colonial and foreign policy 
in this period of rampant faction, and of the prostration of the powers 
of guidance to which Parliament and nation had, during four glorious 
years, accustomed themselves to look. "The late frequent changes in 
England," wrote, about the end of 1767, Sir Andrew Mitchell, whom 
experience had taught what his country could achieve under a great 
leader, "have created a degree of diffidence in foreign Powers which 
renders all negotiation with them difficult and disagreeable." While 
in America discontent and disaffection were becoming more and more 
formidable, and while at home the attention of the public was con- 
centrated upon domestic agitation, the regard paid to Great Britain 
by the European Powers was rapidly sinking 1 . Significant of this 
decline, though, of course, its importance was much exaggerated by 
Burke when he represented it as changing the Balance of Power in 
the Mediterranean, was the ignoring by France of the protest of the 
British Government against her purchase of Corsica and enforcement 
of it, after the heroic struggle of the islanders under Paoli against their 
Genoese oppressors 2 . Much about the same time, an essentially 
Colonial question, that of the Falkland Islands, brought Great Britain 
to the verge of war with Spain. The first British design of a settle- 
ment on these barren islands (valuable because of their nearness to 
Chili) had been formed in 1748, but abandoned in consequence of a 
protest by Wall. In 1766, a formal attempt was made to take possession 
of one of them (now called Port Egmont) 3 for Great Britain ; but, in 
1770, a strong Spanish expedition captured the British garrison, 
detained a British frigate, and for a moment assumed the mastery 
of the South Seas. Since Spain, also, refused to pay the money due for 
Manilla, war seemed unavoidable, but was averted by the skilful 
diplomacy at Madrid of the British Charge d'affaires, James Harris 
(afterwards Earl of Malmesbury) and the apprehension of Grimaldi 
that war with Great Britain, on which Choiseul had determined, could 
not be carried to a successful issue. But it was an untoward incident 
for the British Government, and seems to have led to the resignation 

1 The only step of importance taken at this time by Great Britain with regard to 
India was the enquiry into the affairs of the East India Company, instituted before 
Chatham was wholly disabled by illness. 

2 Corsica was actually annexed to France in 1769. 

3 France had effected a settlement on another (Port Louis). For a full account 
of the Falkland Islands affair, see Winstanley, Lord Chatham and the Whig Ministry 
(Cambridge, 191 2). 



THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 131 

of Lord Weymouth (who had succeeded Conway as one of the Secre- 
taries of State). On the other hand, it likewise led to the dismissal 
by Lewis XV of Choiseul. Chatham's laments over the decadence 
of Great Britain, when he found strength to make them, resounded 
in vain, and with the recovery of his bodily powers he had only 
partially recovered his personal authority ; so that, although he could 
help for a time to weaken Lord North's Ministry, he was unable 
either to prevent the American War or to agree with Burke as to the 
conditions of maintaining the union with the American Colonies, 
which they were both unprepared to sacrifice. 

In 1775, without any wish on the American side for separation 
from Great Britain, and with very little belief in the British of the 
power of the Colonists to carry through the resistance on which they 
had determined, the War of Independence broke out. There existed, 
at the time, no kind of understanding between the Americans, or the 
majority of them resolved on resistance, and any of the European 
Powers ; but there was a cooperation, unseen and unnoticed, between 
the historic forces at work in very different regions of the world. As 
has been well said, Europe was strewn with the wrecks of the liberties 
of the past, and all the great or leading States were under the sway 
of despotisms, benevolent or other. In the United Provinces, where 
the House of Orange had recovered a quasi-royal position, corruption 
and decadence were visible on all sides. Poland was already in the 
throes of anarchy, and in 1772 underwent her First Partition 1 , of 
which the Powers that had perpetrated it obtained a formal recogni- 
tion from the Republic itself. The prospects of Constitutional liberty 
were almost universally enshrouded in gloom ; and during the Ameri- 
can War not a few Whig politicians were haunted by the belief — 
though this fear acted in different ways on different minds — that 
the defeat of the American Colonists would be followed by a sub- 
version of the foundations of the British Constitution. 

It was after the British Government had resolved to bargain with 
certain German Princes, in order to raise the King's forces to what 
seemed the requisite minimum, but before, in July, 1776, the Declaration 
of Independence had been voted by Congress, that the advanced party 
among the leaders of American opinion took into serious considera- 
tion the question of foreign assistance. In the first instance, at all 
events, this could be no other than that of France 2 . Hitherto, France 

1 " England," Frederick II, had in the previous year written to his Envoy in 
London, "need not worry herself about Poland." 

2 See for a full exposition of the situation, in this respect, Lecky, iv. 

9—2 



i 3 2 INTRODUCTION 

had been regarded as the natural enemy in the American Colonies even 
more distinctly than in England itself; but the early course of the War, 
and the manifest fact that the Colonists were far from united in their 
resistance, or, outside New England, had made so much as an approach 
to unanimity, soon placed it beyond doubt that the action of France 
must determine the result of the struggle. That intervention was by 
no means a mere question of revanche ; for it was the evident interest 
of France to obtain for herself a share of the commerce from which 
she had been excluded since the time of the Navigation Act, to re- 
cover the losses which she had suffered through the deliberate policy 
of Pitt, and to gain comparative security for her West India Islands. 
French political opinion, which had of late become very active, 
anxiously noted the alteration in the conditions of the European 
equilibrium — more especially the augmentation of Russian, and of 
Prussian, power and influence by such a process as the First Par- 
tition of Poland. So early as 1776, Vergennes in his Memorial on 
American affairs, while affecting to deprecate war with Great Britain, 
urged the adoption by both France and Spain of a policy which would 
secretly encourage and assist the Americans in their struggle; and, 
though Turgot, when called upon to report on this Memorial, in- 
sisted on the maintenance of peace as the immediate and pressing 
necessity for France, the more active policy prevailed, and the 
Government of Lewis XVI, while duping the British Ministry, sub- 
sidised the American Revolt. 

Spain, partly under the influence of France, partly on her own 
account — for she could not have entertained any real desire to foster 
Colonial independence — supplied the American Colonies with money 
and gunpowder, and allowed their ships ampler trade privileges than 
she granted to those of any other country. Grand-duke Leopold II 
of Tuscany secretly did away with all duties impeding American com- 
merce with his dominions, besides giving open expression of his 
goodwill to the American cause. And a still more ' intelligent ' despot, 
Frederick the Great, who had never forgotten Great Britain's con- 
duct towards him at the close of the Seven Years' War, without com- 
mitting himself publicly, or even consenting to receive an American 
diplomatic representative, threw every obstacle in the way of British 
enlistments in Germany, and took pains to assure France that, if she 
went to war with Great Britain, he proposed to remain neutral. The 
Emperor Joseph II (Co-regent with his mother since 1765), hostile 
to Frederick II on all other points, agreed with him as to discouraging 



RESTRICTED BRITISH PROPOSALS TO AMERICANS 133 

the British enlistment of German recruits for the American War. 
Finally, the United Provinces found a single-minded satisfaction in 
obtaining a new market in America, and organising the little Dutch 
West Indian island of St Eustatius as a station for supplying the 
needs of the insurgents. Thus, French sympathies were the reverse 
of isolated in their varied manifestations on behalf of the War — one 
of them being a flow of French officers into the American army. 
For a time, the resolution of the French Government wavered, and 
the counsels of Spain (who was engaged in a brief War with Portu- 
gal) were against opening hostilities with Great Britain. But, at 
the close of the year 1777, after the British disaster at Saratoga, the 
American Commissioners at Paris were informed that France was 
prepared to enter into a Commercial Treaty with the American 
Government, and to acknowledge and support its Independence, on 
the sole condition that the Americans would conclude no peace with 
Great Britain, which did not include the actual recognition of that 
Independence. No advantage was asked for France in the Treaties 
formally signed at Paris in February, 1778 ; France was to have her 
place in the sun — her due share in American commerce — and Great 
Britain's monopoly of it was to be ended by the severance of the 
political tie between her and the Colonies now in revolt. 

The recognition of their independence was precisely the basis on 
which George III had made up his mind not to treat with the Ameri- 
cans. In deference to a unanimous vote of the Cabinet, he at last 
consented that new proposals should be made to the American Com- 
missioners, and in February, 1778, North moved and passed Bills of 
Conciliation, which yielded all the points originally in dispute, but 
maintained the political union between the Colonies and the mother- 
country. The final oratorical effort of Chatham, true to his point of 
view, and true to his policy of resistance to France, was in support 
of this principle 1 . But when the British Commissioners, recently ap- 
pointed 2 , reached America in May, they found all doors closed against 
them, and, after they had appealed to the nation from Congress, 
returned home. For, in the same month, the French Treaties of 
Commerce and Alliance, signed in February at Paris, but kept secret 

1 April 7th, 1778, against the Duke of Richmond's notice of an Address. See, 
as to the extreme probability that had he survived, he must have been called to 
office, Stanhope's History of England, chap, lvii, where the historian defends 
Chatham's policy against Croker and Macaulay. 

2 The Earl of Carlisle, William Eden (afterwards Lord Auckland), George 
Johnstone. 



i 3 4 INTRODUCTION 

for some time, had become known in America; and, by June, France 
and Great Britain were at war. Great Britain had entered into the 
last phase of the struggle without an ally ; but it can neither be denied 
that the challenge of France for a time strengthened the Govern- 
ment by arousing the national indignation, nor that Chatham's death 
gave unity to the Opposition led by Rockingham, who were now 
unanimous in advocating the concession of complete American 
Independence. 

At first, the clouds seemed to gather more and more darkly, and 
the foreign policy of Great Britain to be reduced to an anxious de- 
fensive, though in America the fortunes of war were in her favour. 
French naval enterprise appeared to be reviving: in 1779, a French 
squadron seized the British possessions in Senegal, and in the same 
year a combined French and Spanish fleet sailed up the Channel, as 
the Dutch had, rather more than a century before. For the Bourbon 
Family Compact, and the irritation, old and new, provoked by British 
self-assertion at sea, with the hope of recovering losses of which that 
of Gibraltar transcended all others, had once more prevailed A 
proposal made by the Government of Charles III, who, with his 
Minister Florida Blanca, had shown pacific tendencies, to mediate 
between Great Britain and France having fallen through, a Conven- 
tion between France and Spain, in which each Power stated the ob- 
jects it desired to secure, and the Spanish Government stipulated that 
no peace should be signed till Gibraltar had been restored, was signed 
in April, 1779 ; and, in June, Spain declared war against Great Britain. 
The combined fleets, as noted, appeared in the Channel; but, ere 
the day of peace had dawned once more, Rodney had brilliantly re- 
asserted British naval supremacy in both hemispheres, and, before his 
final victory over de Grasse in the West Indies (April, 1782), the last 
assault upon Gibraltar had, after being prolonged for three years, 
hopelessly broken down. 

While North's Ministry still held out, British diplomacy had been 
much occupied with the relations between Great Britain and the 
Powers not involved in the momentous conflict into which she had been 
drawn. It was not unnatural that, in the earlier days of the American 
War, the great Continental monarchies and Russia in particular, 
should have leant to Great Britain ; but that at the same time jealousy 
should have been provoked, in northern as well as in western Europe, 
by the continuous growth of her naval ascendancy. The ambition of 
Catharine II, accordingly, might be depended upon to lend a willing 



"ARMED NEUTRALITY" DECLARATION OF 1780 135 

ear to grievances on this head. So early as 1778, both the vigilant 
Vergennes and several of the minor Maritime Powers of Europe had 
invited the Tsarina to place herself at the head of a combined move- 
ment towards restricting the British pretensions to interfere in times 
of war with the commerce of neutral nations — but without much 
success. At her Court, Panin's party carried on the recent tradition 
of serving the interests of Frederick II of Prussia, and was conse- 
quently, in view more especially of his bitterness towards Great 
Britain, ill-disposed towards that Power. Her imperious favourite, 
Potemkin, on the other hand, leaned towards a British alliance, 
though his aims were essentially selfish. Catharine, who was not at 
heart hostile to Great Britain, and who distinguished the British 
Ambassador Harris by her special favour, was prepared, in these 
matters, to pursue a line of policy highly inconvenient to Great 
Britain. The British Government had given orders that Russian 
ships should be left unmolested; but the Spaniards searched and 
made prizes of two which they erroneously thought to be trading 
with Great Britain. The Tsarina, henceforth, angrily gave instruc- 
tions that a number of Russian vessels should be equipped for the 
protection of Russian commerce, evidently with the intention of 
at least making an effective naval demonstration against Spain. 
Frederick IPs counsel, however, induced her to restore the ships, 
and Panin took advantage of the occasion to persuade the Tsarina 
to summon a Congress under her presidency for defining the rights 
of neutrals by sea, so as to prevent a recurrence of the incident. In 
March, 1780, she issued a Declaration to the effect that in times of 
war neutral vessels may navigate freely along the coasts of belliger- 
ents, carrying any such goods of belligerents as are not contraband ; 
that contraband articles are such only when expressly enumerated in 
a Treaty concluded between the British and Russian Governments, 
and that blockade must be really effective. This Declaration, amount- 
ing to acceptance by Russia of principles first put forward by the 
Prussian Government in 1752, laid claim to an almost universal au- 
thority. The British Government, without directly disputing the doc- 
trine set forth by this "Armed Neutrality" Declaration, contented 
itself with answering it in general terms. But it was extremely un- 
favourable to the interests of Great Britain, as arraying the greater 
part of northern Europe in diplomatic hostility against her, while 
increasing the probability of an extended War, in which she would 
have no chance of assistance from Russia. Catharine II, however. 



136 INTRODUCTION 

had no wish to engage in hostilities, and promulgated the ' Declaration 
of Armed Neutrality,' which, as she told Harris, ought rather to be 
called an Armed Nullity, chiefly to satisfy her self-consciousness. 

A further difficulty connected with the commercial relations of 
Great Britain, about the same time, led to actual warfare. This was 
primarily due to the use made of their island of Eustatius, mentioned 
above, by the Dutch during the War between Great Britain and 
France. The latter Power permitted the City of Amsterdam, and 
finally the whole Province of Holland, to trade with her Colonies 
duty-free through this channel, and came to depend most largely 
on Dutch supply for materials needed in the equipment of her ships. 
The consequent animosity gradually deepened between Great Britain 
and the United Provinces, where the party of Amsterdam and the 
Pensionary van Berkel had, from the first, strongly opposed that of the 
Stadholder and the British interest ; and where the ambition of ulti- 
mately securing a large share of the American trade had never before 
risen so high. The Dutch traders, with contraband and other articles 
on board, swarmed in the Western seas, and American privateers freely 
ran their prizes into Dutch harbours. In return, British ships freely 
applied the right of search and captured Dutch vessels which refused 
to allow it. In September, 1780, a secret Treaty between Amster- 
dam and the "United States of America" (drafted for approval by 
the States- General) was brought to light by a daring capture, and, 
when it was only met by a dilatory and evasive disavowal, Great 
Britain declared war against the United Provinces. 

Thus, at the close of 1780, Great Britain's isolation was complete. 
She was confronted by the united hostility of the American Colonies, 
France, Spain — against which she was defending Gibraltar — and the 
United Provinces, while Northern Europe was threatening her with 
the loss of her best weapon of offence. Meanwhile, in Hindustan, 
Hyder Ali was desolating the Carnatic and menacing Madras. In 
Ireland and at home in England — in the capital itself — the founda- 
tions of the monarchy seemed to be trembling. The recovery in 
America (1779-80) had temporarily strengthened North's Govern- 
ment and the national resolution of resistance ; but with the surrender 
of Yorktown (October, 1781), followed by the Spanish capture of 
Minorca, and the complete establishment of French naval supremacy 
in the West Indian seas, that resistance came to an end, and the 
Ministry resigned (March, 1782). Its place was, after attempts at 
reconstruction by Lord Shelburne and Lord Gower, taken by 



RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENCE OFFERED 137 

the (second) Rockingham Ministry, in which Shelburne (who 
represented the followers of Chatham) and Charles Fox held the 
Secretaryships of State. After the death of Lord Rockingham, and 
the succession of Shelburne to the headship of the Ministry (July, 
1782), the Secretaryship of State for Foreign Affairs held by Fox was 
transferred to Lord Grantham 1 . 

When, just before the resignation of North, and before King 
George III had reluctantly committed the conduct of affairs to the 
Whigs, with the avowed task of terminating the War and recognising 
the Independence of America, the question of Peace had virtually 
become only a question of time, Benjamin Franklin, American Com- 
missioner in Paris, had transmitted to Shelburne certain conditions 
of Peace, privately suggested by Vergennes to a Scottish intermediary 
named Oswald. They included the cession, by way of reparation, to 
France of Canada and Nova Scotia. In April, 1782, the British 
Cabinet decided to suggest, through the same channel, peace con- 
ditions of which the essence was the grant of Independence to the 
Americans and the restoration of Great Britain to the position in 
which she had been left by the Peace of 1763. In May, Fox com- 
missioned Thomas Grenville (son of George Grenville) to write a 
similar communication to Vergennes; and the Cabinet authorised 
him (after Rodney's great victory) to propose, in the first instance, 
the recognition of the Independence of America by Great Britain. A 
most untoward difference of opinion, hereupon, arose between Fox 
and Shelburne as to the meaning of this offer — whether or not it 
was, as the latter contended, to be conditional on the conclusion of 
a general peace, instead of preceding it? Fox's motion that Inde- 
pendence should be unconditional was lost by a narrow majority; 
and, on Shelburne's appointment as successor to Rockingham, Fox, 
as stated, resigned, with certain other members of the Cabinet. 

The result was a hitch in the informal peace negotiations at Paris ; 
but, inasmuch as the American War — largely because of want of 
money — languished, though the Dutch as well as the French Govern- 

1 In 1782, the system of three Secretaries of State had ceased (the third or 
American Secretaryship being abolished); and there was instituted for it that of 
two Secretaries, one for Foreign and the other for Home and Colonial Affairs. 
But this arrangement did not prevent an anomalous state of things under Rocking- 
ham, when the two Secretaries of State, Fox and Shelburne, were at daggers drawn ; 
so that, in Lord Rosebery's words (Pitt (1892), p. 22) it "is not matter for surprise 
that, within a month of their assuming office, Shelburne and Fox, the two Secre- 
taries of State, had each their separate plenipotentiary at Paris negotiating for 
peace." 



138 INTRODUCTION 

ment had now recognised American Independence, it was felt on all 
sides that the advent of peace could no longer be delayed. King 
George Ill's resistance had now been overcome, and France and 
Spain before long perceived the futility of the hope that Rodney might 
still be crushed and Gibraltar and Jamaica captured, or that, though 
their united navies, even without Dutch aid, still outnumbered the 
British, this condition of things would outlast America's remaining in 
the conflict, and their own solvency would continue. The negotiations 
for the Preliminaries of Peace were, accordingly, carried on at Paris 
with renewed assiduity in the later months of 1782; Vergennes, of 
course, representing France, d' Aranda Spain, and Franklin, John 
Adams and Jay America, while the British Government had com- 
missioned, together with Oswald, its original agent in the proceedings, 
Alleyne Fitzherbert (afterwards Lord St Helens). The Preliminary 
Articles with the United States were signed on November 30th, and 
those with France and Spain on January 20th following. (The notion 
of giving up Gibraltar for an equivalent had approved itself to the 
King and Shelburne, but had been successfully resisted — among 
others by Pitt.) The definitive Treaties were signed, at Paris and 
Versailles respectively, on September 3rd, 1783 ; the Duke of Man- 
chester and David Hartley having taken the place of the negotiators 
of the Preliminaries, and the Tsarina and the Emperor Joseph II 
being, by way of compliment, named as Mediators in the Treaties 
with the two European Powers. The Pacification with the United 
Provinces was characteristically delayed till 1784, when freedom of 
commerce was secured to Great Britain in the Indian Seas. 

Compared with the Peace of Paris of 1763, which France and 
Spain had resolved to undo, the new Peace wears a depressing aspect 
on any British page of history, and reflects the balance of losses ex- 
perienced by her in the War. Yet it should not be overlooked that 
almost everything now relinquished by her to her European adver- 
saries had been taken from them by her in previous Wars, and that 
a great part of her acquisitions in the Peace of 1763 was still retained 
by her. The gains of France were, in substance, restricted to those in 
Africa and India ; to the abrogation of the Utrecht Clause providing 
for the demolition of the fortified port of Dunkirk, and to the ac- 
knowledgment of the French right of fishery on the Newfoundland 
coast. Spain recovered Minorca and Eastern Florida, while agreeing 
to the British rights in Honduras and restoring the Bahamas. 

The American settlement turned on that recognition of Indepen- 



THE AMERICAN SETTLEMENT 139 

dence with which the negotiation virtually began — the promise of a 
compensation to the Loyalists, in lieu of the restoration of their 
estates, was a matter of secondary, though of considerable moral, 
consequence. On the whole, the American negotiations had been 
the most successful part of the entire transaction ; and it should be 
noted that there had been considerable differences, at the end, between 
French and American diplomacy as to how far the latter had ful- 
filled its pledge of communicating, before signing, all preliminary 
agreements. Nor was Vergennes free from doubts whether, if Fox 
came into power in the place of Shelburne, he might not be disposed 
to conclude a separate peace with the United States. Yet there was 
no rupture, and the new loan which France had promised to the 
Americans was not refused to them. Spain detested the notion of 
American Independence, and cherished to the last the hope of an 
exchange with Great Britain of Guadaloupe for Gibraltar. 

It will not be necessary, in the ensuing survey of British Foreign 
Policy from the Peace of 1783, to advert, except incidentally, to the 
Ministerial changes which occurred in the interval between the down- 
fall of Shelburne 's shortlived Administration, and the advent of the 
younger Pitt, who had held office in it as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
to full power as Prime-Minister. Until the right solution was found 
in the appointment of the Minister who enjoyed the confidence of the 
nation in the first instance, and that of the Sovereign in the next, 
these changes turned on men rather than on measures; though of 
Shelburne, whose public conduct it is perhaps more difficult to judge 
with fairness than that of any contemporary British political leader, 
it was said, with some point, by his colleague, Lord Grantham, that 
he always trusted too much to measures rather than to men 1 . 

Indeed, his chief defect in his public career was, perhaps, his 
neglect of the Machiavellian maxim, that in politics everything depends 
on making and keeping friends — our enemies will take care of them- 
selves. Yet it should not be forgotten that it was Shelburne 2 who, 
after his own resignation, suggested Pitt as the new Prime-Minister to 
the King, who was more than ready to act on the suggestion, in order 
to escape the hateful alternative — to which he after all had to submit — 
of the Fox and North Coalition. It lasted for little beyond eight 
months, under what is not very happily described as the " ornamental " 
headship of the Duke of Portland, the two reconciled adversaries 

1 See Lord Fitzmaurice's Life of William Earl Shelburne, m, p. 410 (1876). 

2 See J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and National Revival (1911), p. 125. 



Ho INTRODUCTION 

holding, Fox the Foreign, and North the Home and Colonial, Sec- 
retaryship of State. This was the Ministry — mistrusted by the nation, 
and looked upon with bitter resentment by the King — during whose 
tenure of office the Peace Treaties with the United States, and with 
France and Spain, were definitively signed, without any modification 
being introduced into them by the Whigs, who in Opposition had taken 
exception to them so strongly. 

When, through the unconstitutional action of King George III, 
encouraged by the unscrupulous violence of Lord Thurlow and aided 
by the selfish ambition of Earl Temple, the Coalition had been, in 
December 1783, brought to a fall over Fox's East India Bill, Pitt was 
appointed Prime-Minister by the Sovereign, in the face of a hostile 
majority in the House of Commons. From Pitt's Cabinet, the Earl of 
Shelburne, long the leader of the party— or fraction — to which 
the new Prime-Minister had belonged, was left out, and William 
(afterwards Lord) Grenville, though a member of the Government, 
was admitted into the Cabinet till 1791 ; the Marquis of Carmarthen 
(eldest son of the Duke of Leeds) being, however, included in it as 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Defeated again and again in the 
Commons, but rendered confident by the gradual dwindling of the 
Opposition members, Pitt resolved — in the full sense of the phrase — 
to appeal to the nation. Early in March, 1784, Parliament was dis- 
solved, and in May he met the new House of Commons at the head 
of an overwhelming majority. It was thus that he became the most 
powerful Minister ever known in our history. The foreign policy 
of the younger Pitt presents almost as many points of contrast with 
that of his father as could have coexisted with the personal qualities 
characteristic of both. But the task of the one was conditioned 
by the achievements of the other, and, though their rates of resolution 
differed, they alike proved equal to the unexampled responsibilities 
laid upon them by a nation whose self- trust they inspired and shared. 



BOOK I 

FROM THE PEACE OF VERSAILLES 

TO THE SECOND PEACE OF PARIS 

1783-1815 



SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

1783 TO 1815. 

Marquis of Carmarthen (Duke of Leeds). 

Lord Grenville. 

Lord Hawkesbury (Earl of Liverpool). 

Lord (Earl of) Harrowby. 

Lord (Earl of) Mulgrave. 

Charles James Fox. 

Lord Howick (Earl Grey). 

George Canning. 

Earl Bathurst. 

Marquis Wellesley. 

Viscount Castlereagh (Marquis of Londonderry). 



December, 


1783; 


June, 


1791 


February, 


1801 


May, 


1804: 


January, 


1805 


February, 


1806 


September 


, — 


March, 


1807 


October, 


1809 


December, 


— 


March, 


1812 



UNDER-SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

1783 TO 1815. 



August, 

February, 

October, 

January, 

April, 

September, 

February, 

November, 

June, 

January, 

February, 

March, 

March, 

August, 

October, 

December, 

February, 



1783: 
1789: 

1790: 
1795: 
1796 
1799 
1800: 
1801 
1803 
1804 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1807 

1809 

1812 



George Aust {Permanent). 

James Bland Burges (Sir J. B. Burges Lamb). 

Hon. Dudley Ryder (Earl of Harrowby). 

George Aust (Permanent). 

George Hammond (Permanent). 

George Canning. 

John Hookham Frere. 

Edward Fisher. 

Lord Hervey (Marquis of Bristol). 

Charles Arbuthnot. 

Hon. William Eliot (Earl of St Germans). 

Robert Ward. 

Hon. George Walpole. 

George Hammond (Permanent). 

Viscount FitzHarris (Earl of Malmesbury). 

Hon. Charles Bagot. 

William Richard Hamilton (Permanent). 

Culling Charles Smith. 

Edward Cooke. 



{Later titles in brackets.) 



CHAPTER I 

PITT'S FIRST DECADE. 
1783-1792 

ELEVEN months before he died, that is to say in September, 1785, 
Frederick the Great of Prussia, with the Duke of Brunswick in 
attendance, gave to a Special Envoy from Great Britain 1 a survey of 
the state of Europe as he saw it, or affected to see it, and of England's 
position among the Powers since the Peace of 1783. Frederick was 
gloomy — gloomy with intent, as Englishmen thought ; but his view was 
a possible one and no statesman in Europe had better opportunities 
for gaining information than "old Fritz who knew everything that 
he wanted to know." The Balance of Power in Europe, he said, was 
lost. France, Spain, Austria and Russia "were in alliance," and 
Holland was dragged in their wake. England and Prussia were iso- 
lated. Even united, they would hardly be a match for "that mass 
which he had described." A struggle between such unequal forces 
might be attempted; but it "was not a game to play often." He very 
much doubted whether England could tackle the combined fleets of 
France, Spain, the United Provinces and Russia. The position of the 
United Provinces, he said, was particularly unfortunate. The power 
of the Stadholderate and of the House of Orange which held it was 
undermined : France wanted to destroy it and to govern the Provinces 
through her Ambassador. How could he — although the wife of 
William V of Orange was his niece — how could he prevent the Franco- 
Dutch alliance, which was at that moment in the making ? Did England 
suggest an Anglo-Prussian alliance? — There had been talk of this. 
Well: he did not care to alarm the opposing "mass" by a treaty, but 
he would always be well disposed towards England. He had no doubt, 
he concluded with malicious courtesy, that Pitt would restore her "to 
the importance which she had formerly held in the scale of Europe," 
and render her "as great and respectable as his father had done 2 ." 
It is likely that he had grave doubts. A few years earlier he had written 
to Brunswick, who stood at his elbow while he spoke to Lord Corn- 

1 Lord Cornwallis, the Special Envoy, to Carmarthen, September 20th, 1785. 

2 Salomon (Pitt, p. 316) takes this to be a considered judgment of Frederick 
on Pitt. To me it reads differently. 



i 4 4 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

wallis, that "wealth,... luxury, the spirit of corruption, had all helped 
to rot that formerly so respectable Government." He was probably 
too cautious, in his sceptical old age, to hold, with Joseph II of 
Habsburg, that England had fallen "for ever,." or that she had "gone 
down to the rank of a second rate Power like Sweden and Denmark 1 ; " 
but combined with an old grudge againsV her for deserting him in 
1763, which made him unable altogether to conceal his Schadenfreude, 
was a real doubt as to her present efficiency, a doubt which he shared 
with all the chanceries of Europe. That British statesmen felt the 
need to silence this doubt is shown by the pains which Cornwallis 
took to convince him that we had not suffered in pocket by our recent 
disasters more than our rivals had suffered in defeating us, and that 
we were in a position "to support our weight and dignity with the 
other Powers of Europe 2 ." 

Lord Cornwallis had not been sent to Berlin on this occasion 
precisely to seek Frederick's alliance, though he was instructed to 
make it clear that England would prefer Prussia "to all possible 
allies." He went at Frederick's request, or rather at the request of 
Frederick's Ambassador in London. He had been warned to put no 
trust in the King and to be infinitely circumspect 3 . But his mission 
falls in a period during which the British Cabinet, conscious of its 
isolation, had put out feelers among the Northern Courts and at 
Vienna. These feelers had all b*een cautious ; for,. as r Pitt wrote to 
Carmarthen in June, 1784, it was necessary "to lay the foundation 
of such connections, keeping clear at the sam§ time of being too soon 
involved in the quarrels of any Continental Power 4 ." If England 
could secure the support of Catharine of Russia, Frederick told Corn- 
wallis, he would enter into a triple alliance "as soon as she pleased." 
He knew that Catharine disliked and despised the British Govern- 
ment more than he did himself; that advances had been made to 
her from London: and that these advances had been very coldly 
entertained. Having no intention of committing himself, and being 
anxious not to risk an open breach, either with France, who for the 
moment dominated western, or with Catharine, who seemed to rule 
eastern Europe, he could afford to speak warmly of his own readiness 
to enter this unlikely combination. 

1 Sorel, UEurope et la revolution frangaise, I. 346. 

2 Joseph Ewart to Carmarthen, September 10th, 1785 reporting an earlier 
interview of Cornwallis with Frederick. 

3 Draft of instructions for Cornwallis, September 2nd, 1785. 

4 Salomon, Pitt, p. 300 n. Salomon gives a full account of the feelers of 1784. 



THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, 1783-1785 145 

His reference to "an alliance" between Spain, France, Austria 
and Russia was, strictly speaking, incorrect, and he knew very well 
that these Powers did not form a compact "mass." But they were 
linked together; and it was at least conceivable that, should the loose 
and selfish Alliances of Europe be consolidated by the threat of war, 
should the "General War/' whose chances of outbreak the eighteenth 
century statesmen were always calculating, begin again, they would be 
found operating together. The Family Compact between France and 
Spain was a reality. It had worked already and would probably work 
again. The Alliance between France and Austria, the second link in 
the loose chain, seemed to have been tightened since an Austrian 
Princess had shared the Throne of France. Frederick knew how 
strong the anti- Austrian party in France was. The Alliance of 1756 
had, from the first, been regarded as unnatural by the best Frenchmen. 
It was believed to have been unprofitable in a high degree. French 
politicians were always anticipating that Austria would again exploit 
it to their disadvantage. If France became engaged in " a complicated 
unsuccessful war," wrote a member of the French Council of State 
in 1785, who could promise that the Emperor 1 "would not claim 
Alsace and perhaps other provinces?" On the other side, also, the 
Alliance was not popular. At the end of 1784, the coolest head in the 
House of Habsburg, Xeopold of Tuscany, Joseph's brother, called 
the French "our natural, enemies, disguised as allies, who do us more 
harm than if they were open enemies 2 ." Yet, uneasy as the Alliance 
was, the directors of policy on both sides found it for the present 
worth maintaining. Frederick told Viscount Dalrymple in December, 
1 785, that he knew there was no love lost between France and Austria ; 
but that an Anglo-Prussian alliance would drive them together, and 
then he would have to face the nightmare risks of the Seven Years' 
War. So, he concluded, he must humour France 3 . It was a reasonable 
calculation. 

The link in the chain of understandings most dangerous to Prussia 
was the recent agreement between Joseph and Catharine of Russia. 
At their first meeting, in Mohilev on June 4th, 1780, Joseph had replied 
to the Tsarina's mocking and calculated enquiry, why it was that he, 
a Roman Emperor, did not fix his capital at Rome, that there were 
difficulties in the way which he could not at present overcome, but 

1 Memoires lus au Cornell du Rol en 1784 et 1785 : quoted by Sorel, 1. 295 n. 

2 Sorel, I. 441 n. 

3 Dalrymple to Carmarthen, December 3rd, 1785. 



146 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

that there would be no great difficulty in her case. Her Rome was 
not out of reach. By thus flattering her dearest ambition, he had won 
her favour once for all 1 . Frederick's agents lost ground at Petrograd ; 
and the world knew, during the next five years, that the Imperial 
Courts were revolving schemes for the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire and the establishment of Russian rule at Constantinople. 

In 1785 Catharine was not " in alliance " with France, as Frederick 
asserted to Cornwallis. But there was a very good understanding 
between Petrograd and Versailles. Catharine appreciated and admired 
the conduct of French policy under Vergennes. Relations were so 
confidential that, in 1784, she had received from one of Vergennes' 
subordinates a detailed account of the inner organisation of that 
French Foreign Office which had accomplished so much 2 . The 
traditional friendship between France and Sweden was a permanent 
obstacle to a Franco-Russian alliance. Yet it was not insuperable. 
Frederick's insight into the realities of European diplomacy was 
proved, rather more than a year after his death, when England and 
Prussia had actually drawn together; for, in the autumn of 1787, 
Segur, the very popular and accomplished French Ambassador to 
Catharine's Court, an old friend of England's enemies, transmitted 
to his Government a Russian project for precisely that Quadruple 
Alliance of France, Spain, the Tsarina and the Holy Roman Emperor 
which Frederick had feared 3 . The proposal came to nothing; but it 
was actually made. 

Pitt's desire not to be "too soon involved in the quarrels of any 
Continental Power " was most natural. He was nursing British finance 
and the British navy, which depended on finance. This he was doing 
with no definite intention of revenge either on France or on America. 
He had probably less natural animosity against France than any of 
his colleagues; and certainly less than any of the leading British 
diplomatists of his day. When, in 1786, he protested in a famous 
apostrophe that "to suppose that any nation can be unalterably the 
enemy of another is weak and childish," he was expressing a con- 
viction, not making a point in debate. But if he did not desire for his 
country revenge, he desired honour, weight in the counsels of Europe, 

1 Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte, I. 37. 

2 Doniol, Le Comte de Vergennes et P. M. Hennin, p. 47. Hennin was the sub- 
ordinate who drafted the report. M. Doniol shows that it was Vergennes who " or- 
ganisa ce qui parait ne I 'avoir guere etejusqu'd lui: le ministhe des affaires etrangeres," 
p. 44. 

3 Sorel, 1. 522, 532. 



BRITISH RESOURCES 147 

" respectability," as theword was understood in the eighteenth century. 
These were things which money, well used, could buy. Hence, in 
part, those great financial measures which filled the early years of 
his Ministry. 

When Cornwallis assured Frederick that Great Britain had not 
suffered in power more than her foes, he made an understatement, 
either discreet or unconscious. Much as Englishmen groaned about the 
cost of the late War, many as were the prophecies of national collapse 
under the burden of the Funded Debt, the British finances, even 
before Pitt's reforms, were in a far better condition than the French; 
and the British financial system was probably the best in Europe. 
In a few years, Pitt made it incomparably the best. He was aided 
by the beginnings of those economic changes which were to fashion 
modern England. Canal building was now in full swing. The roads 
had become good enough to permit Palmer to start his swift mail 
coaches in 1784. Steam was first used to drive the air through a blast 
furnace in 1790. Between 1788 and 1796, the output of pig iron in 
Great Britain doubled. Those who directed European foreign policy 
were either completely ignorant of these things or did not reckon them 
at their full value. British statesmen had better opportunities of 
knowing the truth; and the least economic among them could see 
and appreciate the amazing expansion of the public revenue which 
set in, when a competent and upright financier handled freely the 
expanding resources of the nation. 

From the first, Pitt had seen to it that a full share of his takings 
should go to the Navy. He maintained a larger personnel than had 
ever been maintained in time of peace. He insisted on receiving at 
regular intervals reports on the state and progress of the Fleet. In 
1784 he set aside £2,400,000, a sum about equal to the total income 
of Frederick of Prussia, to build ships of war. By 1790, twenty-four 
new line-of-battle ships had been turned out from the private ship- 
yards. By 1787, he was prepared to risk war. In 1790, when, for a 
time, war seemed certain, he had ninety-three sail of the line ready 1 . 
At sea he would not have feared to meet France, Spain, Russia and 
the Habsburg Empire. By that time, he had not to face the possibility 
of meeting the Dutch also. 

Some critical aspects of Great Britain's international position not 
referred to in Frederick's survey were very present to the minds of 
Pitt's Cabinet and of Continental diplomatists. And, first, the Irish 
1 Rose, Pitt, 1. 210-1. 



148 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

aspect. The establishment of Ireland's legislative independence in 
1782 had seemed, to outside observers, a final proof of British de- 
cadence. Clearly perceiving the dangers of a semi-independent 
Ireland, Pitt put forward, in 1785, his generous scheme for Anglo- 
Irish Free Trade, to bind the two countries together; but English 
political and commercial prejudice ruined it 1 . So natural did it seem 
to our Ministers to find the enemies of England fishing in the 
troubled Irish waters, that they were always on the look out for French 
intrigues. A careful watch was kept on the letter-post ; and among the 
papers of the Duke of Rutland, Lord Lieutenant, for the year 1784, is 
a copy of a private letter from Sir Edward Newenham of Belcamp, 
Co. Dublin, to Lafayette, inviting him to a friendly visit, and pro- 
mising him a warm welcome 2 . The French knew well that Ireland 
was a source of weakness to England ; but, as a matter of fact, French 
Ministers were not at this time, nor for several years later, engaged in 
intrigues there 3 . 

If Ireland was a source of weakness, India was on the way to 
become a source of strength, though also of sustained anxiety, to 
British Ministers. British influence there had been steadily extended 
throughout the century. The Peace of 1783 had secured Negapatam 
from the Dutch. The need for some regular Constitutional link 
between the growing Eastern empire and the British Crown had led 
to Pitt's India Bill of 1784. When Cornwallis went to Berlin, he was 
already, in the mind of the Prime-Minister, the first parliamentary 
Governor-general designate. At first, Cornwallis had demurred, 
raising objections to the scope of his powers. These powers were 
extended by the Amending Act of 1786. The Governor-general could 
now override the views of his Council at Calcutta, and thus was in no 
danger of factious opposition from colleagues such as Warren Hastings 
had been obliged to face. Under Cornwallis (1786-93) what might 
be called the nineteenth century era of British rule in India began, 
with the power in the hands of a series of men of high ability, who 
enjoyed the full confidence of the Home Government. 

Consolidation of British power in India had two main consequences 
in the sphere of international politics. First, France was forced to 

1 For the Irish propositions see, inter alia, Murray, Commercial relations betioeen 
England and Ireland; O'Brien, The economic history of Ireland in the eighteenth 
century; Rose, Pitt, I. 

2 H.M.C. Rutland MSS. HI. 119. Newenham happens to mention "my agent 
for my landed estates," Napper Tandy. 

3 The evidence is in Lecky, vi. 369 sqq. 



IRELAND; INDIA; AMERICA 149 

grope about, at times in India itself, at times elsewhere in the nearer 
or further East, for some equivalent — as the statesmen of the eighteenth 
century put it — in trade or dominion. Secondly, there began to emerge 
out of Asia the first true conflict of interests between Russia and 
Great Britain. Catharine was mastering the northern coasts of the Black 
Sea. Her orders were executed on the shores of the Caspian and on 
the banks of the Oxus. Her designs in the nearer East were frankly 
advertised. Henceforward, Russian policy became a matter of concern 
to every Asiatic Power — and Great Britain was now such. Moreover 
— though how far this was understood in England is doubtful — that 
policy might conceivably work in with France's gropings for an equi- 
valent. In 1782, Joseph II had suggested to Catharine that perhaps 
France, a traditional ally of the Turk, might be induced to acquiesce 
in his destruction by the offer of Egypt. The case was debated at the 
French Council of State, with special reference to the effect of a 
French occupation of Egypt on Indian trade and politics 1 . France 
had no wish to see Turkey dismembered ; but she had to prepare for 
all the chances of a shifting world. The world did not shift so far at 
that time; so the hypothetical situations never arose. But the first 
of those clashes of British, French and Russian interests in the East 
which the occasion foreshadowed was not long postponed ; nor was 
their termination to be the matter of a day. 

Contrary to the expectations of the average diplomatist, apt to 
identify prestige and power, dominion and wealth, and not holding 
with Adam Smith that Britain's American empire had been "not 
a gold mine, but the project of a gold mine," the loss of the Thirteen 
Colonies had made singularly little difference to British prosperity. 
Independent, they traded with the United Kingdom very much as 
they had traded when dependent. Had it been possible to make a 
clean and satisfactory settlement in 1783, it is probable that the empire 
might have seemed to gain greatly by disruption ; and it is certain that 
such a settlement would have contributed enormously to the world's 
peace during the succeeding century. But such a settlement was not 
made. Throughout the ten years 1784-94, the Treaty of Versailles 
remained imperfectly executed, and Anglo-American relations in the 
unwholesome condition of standing water. Since America had no part 
in the ever shifting "systems" of Continental Europe, to which Great 
Britain had to adjust her policy from year to year, their mutual relations 
in those ten years may be described here without reference to any of 
1 Sorel, 1. 328-9. 



150 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

these. Not until the French Declaration of War in 1793 were they 
really affected by the course of European affairs. 

The final Treaty with the United States had been signed at 
Versailles three months and a half before Pitt took office ; but, owing 
to distance and the inevitably slow working of the new American 
Constitution, the ratifications were not exchanged until May, 1784. 
After the exchange, David Hartley, the British representative, re- 
ported the anxiety of Adams, Franklin and Jay to proceed at once 
to the negotiation of an Anglo-American Commercial Treaty 1 . The 
project was not new. It had been put forward at the time of the Pre- 
liminary Treaty, and had been pressed on Hartley by his American 
colleagues during his whole negotiation, from April to September, 
1783. They wanted, as he reported to Fox, reciprocity "upon any 
terms whatsoever, from the narrowest limits to the utmost extent of 
mutual intercourse and participation." For himself, he had dreams of 
perfectly free intercourse, leading to a "family compact between our 
two nations 2 ." But the letter in which he expressed this hope crossed 
his final instructions from Fox, to complete the political arrangements 
separately from the commercial. The British Cabinet was not ready 
to open the whole question of commercial policy and commercial law, 
and to define its attitude by treaty; though it was ready to make 
important concessions to the United States by Order in Council 3 . 
In any case, it was not prepared to show its hand at Paris. The Anglo- 
French and Anglo-American Treaties were to be signed simul- 
taneously; and Fox held that commercial arrangements "ought not 
to come under the eye of the French Minister, much less to make 
part of a Treaty the completion of which he insists upon previous 
to the signing of his own, and which consequently he may be said 
in some degree to take under his protection 4 ." This point of diplo- 
matic procedure was a good one ; but the unreadiness of London was 
the deciding factor. 

David Hartley, a friend of Benjamin Franklin and of America, 
no ordinary diplomatist, an advanced Whig, a fellow of Merton 
College and, like Franklin, something of an inventor, was recalled 

1 Hartley to Carmarthen, May 13th, 1784. 

2 Hartley to Fox, May 20th and August 2nd, 1783. 

3 Fox to Hartley, June 10th, 1783. He expresses his wish to put off "for a time 
the decision of that important question which you think at last must come to an 
issue, i.e., how far the principles of our Navigation Act ought to be sacrificed to 
commercial considerations drawn from the peculiar circumstances of the present 
crisis." 

4 Fox to Hartley, August 4th, 1783. 



AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS 151 

by Carmarthen without thanks or compliments on May 25th, 1784. 
He refused to understand a perfectly clear phrase of this letter — that 
commercial matters would "require a considerable degree of delibera- 
tion" — and lingered in Paris until September, in spite of further recall 
orders. At last he was brought back by the cutting off of his appoint- 
ments at a week's notice 1 . In June, Franklin was still hopeful that 
a commercial negotiation might be started ; but by the end of July 
he had " begun to suspect that no instructions were intended 2 ." Hartley 
should have perceived this earlier. Pitt's Cabinet was no more ready 
to begin negotiations than Fox's had been. 

As, however, the American deputation remained in Europe, 
negotiating on economic questions with other Powers; and as a 
subordinate diplomatic agent reported them to be "very inquisitive" 
about the prospects of an Anglo-American treaty 3 , they were 
encouraged to come to London at the end of the year. "Your people 
are ready to listen to us," wrote Franklin to Hartley, who was at Bath, 
occupied in drafting the final report of his mission for the un- 
sympathetic Carmarthen; "but they thought it more for the honour 
of both that the treaty should not be in a third place 4 ." There is 
no evidence that the British Minister had written so definitely of 
"the treaty." 

John Adams, the first American accredited to the Court of 
St James', was presented to King George on the afternoon of June 1st, 
1785. Two months later he transmitted to Carmarthen a draft treaty, 
hinting in his covering letter that the results of inaction would be most 
serious for Anglo-American commercial and political relations 5 . The 
draft was not merely commercial ; there were included in its twenty-six 
clauses important proposals of a political kind. Relations between the 
two countries were to be based on "the most perfect equality and 
reciprocity." Subjects of either were to reside and pay duties in the 
other as if they had been citizens of it. They were to be free to send 
any kind of goods, wherever produced or manufactured, in ships of 
any description, with any class of crew, to all points in one another's 
territory or elsewhere, subject to the right of either Power to prohibit, 

1 Carmarthen to Hartley, May 25th ; August 20th ; September 5th ; September 
17th. 

2 To B. Vaughan, July 26th. Memoirs of Franklin, ill. 154. 

3 Ed. Bancroft to Carmarthen, Paris, December 8th, 1784. 

4 Franklin to Hartley, January 3rd, 1785. Memoirs, iv. 423. Hartley's report 
to Carmarthen, dated from Bath, is of January 9th. 

5 Adams to Carmarthen, July 29th, 1785. The Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
United States, 1783-1789, iv. 257 sqq. 



152 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

for reasons of State, particular imports and exports. This clause 
(No. 4) was a direct challenge to the sections of the British Navigation 
Code which reserved inter-imperial trade to ships built and owned 
in the British empire, and manned by crews predominantly British, 
while excluding foreign ships from most of the carrying trade between 
British ports and ports outside their own territory. By subsequent 
clauses, each country was to guarantee the other most favoured nation 
treatment in the matter of customs, and to give every facility for the 
establishment of consular offices. 

So much for pure commerce. In time of war between either 
country and a third Power, the legal principles of "free ships, free 
goods" and "enemy ships, enemy goods" were to be recognised: 
contraband, if found on the vessels of one of the Contracting Parties, 
was not to be confiscated, but deposited in a port of the capturing 
country and paid for ; no embargo was to be placed on the shipping 
of the Party not engaged in the war "for any military expedition " or 
similar purpose; the subjects of neither Party should take from any 
third Power letters of marque for preying on the commerce of the 
other. In case of war between the Contracting Parties themselves, 
merchants were to have nine months' grace in which to wind up their 
affairs, and prisoners were not to be sent into distant and inclement 
countries, but to be housed in barracks such as were used for the 
captor's own troops. 

Such were the main points of this remarkable draft. Apparently 
it fell dead. There survives a record of a conversation between Car- 
marthen and Adams in October, at which Carmarthen confined himself 
to generalities about Great Britain's desire for reciprocity 1 . Four 
months later, an explanation of his reserve is suggested by a very stiff 
note to Adams, complaining of the failure of the United States to 
carry out the Treaty of 1783 2 . Then, on April 4th, 1786, Adams, now 
in conjunction with Jefferson, sends him, "as requested in conversa- 
tion," another draft treaty. It contains the commercial clauses of the 
previous draft, almost verbatim, but nothing else. Probably, Adams 
had pressed the matter and Carmarthen had responded pro forma. 
A month later again (May 8th) a confidential agent reports Adams as 
being "highly dissatisfied with his situation and the supposed dis- 
positions of H.M. Minister towards the United States," and his 
correspondence as being "calculated to excite them" to commercial 

1 Minute of a conversation with Adams, October 20th. 

2 Carmarthen to Adams, February 28th, 1786. 



ADAMS'S DRAFT TREATY 153 

and political hostility. At this point, the negotiation, if so it maybe 
called, was broken off, and no more is heard of it in Great Britain for 
another four years. 

There is no reason to think that, at any time between 1783 and 
1 793 , Pitt's Cabinet was ready to throw overboard the Navigation Code ; 
though Pitt acquiesced in those administrative relaxations which 
alone rendered Anglo-American trade possible. American produce, 
coming to the United Kingdom in American or in British ships, was 
treated just as if America were still a colony. Facilities were given, as 
in the old days, for the reexport of American tobacco and rice; and 
so on. But the strong American wish to trade freely with the Canadian 
and West Indian Colonies, and to carry between those Colonies and 
the Mother-country, was never frankly gratified. In 1783, Fox had 
explained to Hartley that the notion of admitting West Indian produce 
in United States bottoms must be ruled out: "the prejudice (if that 
be the name these opinions deserve) " was, he said 1 , far too strong. 
So it remained. But this and other prohibitions were freely evaded. 
The West Indies, in particular, required food and lumber from the 
United States; and their merchants had pressed for a commercial 
treaty in 1783 2 . Failing the treaty, they had to help themselves. 
A common device, as our early Consuls reported, was for a ship to 
be owned jointly by British and American traders and to utilise its 
double nationality 3 . Such evasion, though it might help traders, did 
nothing to promote an Anglo-American "family compact." 

There is no need to assume, as Franklin did in 1784, that Great 
Britain had "still at times some flattering hopes of recovering ". . ."the 
loss of its dominion " over the United States 4 . The difficulties as to 
the Treaty of 1783 are sufficient to explain a great measure of reluct- 
ance to enter into further obligations. " By the fourth, fifth and sixth 
articles of the Treaty no impediments were to be put in the way of 
the recovery of debts [by British subjects] ; the States were to be 
recommended to repeal their Confiscation Acts [directed against 
Loyalists] ; and there were to be no future confiscations nor prose- 
cutions of any sort against any person because of the part taken by 
him in the late war. But the States gave no heed whatever to these 
articles. The Confiscation Acts were not repealed ; impediments were 
placed in the way of the recovery of debts ; and thousands of Loyalists 

1 Fox to Hartley, June ioth, 1783. 

2 Resolutions of the West Indian Merchants, November 26th, 1783. 

* E.g., Bond (Consul at Philadelphia) to Carmarthen, May 14th, 1787. 
4 Memoirs, III. 154. 



154 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

were driven from the country 1 ." By way of retaliation, the United 
Kingdom refused to evacuate an important line of frontier posts on 
United States territory, from Lake Michigan to Lake Champlain. 
The diplomatic and consular correspondence of the years 1783-94 is 
full of the resulting difficulties and mutual grievances. Franklin had 
recognised in 1783 that the ill-treatment of the "Tories," which he 
deplored, gravely impeded the commercial negotiation 2 : the question 
remained an impediment for years. In view of this unfortunate 
experience, the British Government might well doubt to what extent 
a commercial treaty, assuming it to be desirable, would become 
operative. True, under the Articles of Confederation of 1781, no 
single State might enter into treaties or levy import duties in conflict 
with the stipulations of treaties entered into by the United States; 
but, if particular States defied one Treaty, they might defy another, 
and it was wellknown that Congress could not collect its own taxes. 
Meanwhile, several States were passing Navigation Acts and levying 
extra duties on goods imported in British bottoms. 

John Adams returned home in 1788. Before the arrival of his 
successor, Morris, early in 1790, the Foreign Office had learnt that, 
under the new Constitution of the United States, Congress alone 
could levy duties affecting foreigners ; that Congress had not adopted 
any commercial policy discriminating against Great Britain ; and that 
everything contrary to the definitive Treaty of 1783 was repealed. It 
was now the law of the land 3 . This settlement paved the way for 
easier relations between the United States representative and the 
British Foreign Secretary. Morris had to explain the absolute inability 
of his Government to carry out the Treaty to the letter, at this late 
date. The debts were in many cases irrecoverable; the Loyalists had 
suffered persecution and had long since fled. Leeds replied that His 
Britannic Majesty could not evacuate the frontier posts until the 
position was regularised. He suggested some "fair and just com- 
pensation" for the parties who had suffered. As to the treaty of 
commerce, of which Morris had spoken, he was profuse in expressions 
of goodwill, but made no definite proposal 4 . 

In the course of the year, however, Pitt's new Committee of 
Council on Trade was instructed to report on the question of com- 

1 Professor McMaster, of Pennsylvania University, in The Cambridge Modern 
History, vn. 307. 

2 Report of Franklin's article in The Salem Gazette, F.O. November, 1783. 

3 Consul-general Sir John Temple to the Duke of Leeds, September 23rd, 1789. 

4 Leeds to Morris, April 28th, 1790. 



BRITISH COMMERCIAL POLICY 155 

mercial negotiations with America. The report, transmitted to Leeds 
on March 3rd, 1791 ,was generally favourable to the opening of negotia- 
tions "especially as Congress appears inclined to this measure; but," 
it went on to say, "it will be right, in an early stage... explicitly to 
declare that Great Britain can never submit even to treat on what 
appears to be the favourite object of the people of the United States, 
that is, the admission of the ships of the United States into the Ports 
of Your Majesty's Colonies and Islands 1 ." The Committee inclined 
to the view that America stood to lose more than Great Britain in 
a trade war and suggested measures of retaliation, should Congress 
make "further Distinctions to the detriment of our trade." 

In the autumn of 1791, Grenville now being in charge of the 
Foreign Office (see p. 207, below), George Hammond, who had been 
Hartley's secretary at Paris in 1783, was sent as the first British 
Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States 2 . His main business 
was the settlement of the question of the frontier posts and the British 
claims for compensation. There were also American counterclaims 
arising out of the carrying off of American property, in the shape of 
negroes, at the evacuation of New York by the British forces in 1783. 
If the American Government was anxious to proceed to commercial 
negotiations, Hammond was instructed to aim at securing most 
favoured nation treatment for British goods and, if possible, a promise 
that the existing duties on them would not be raised. Similar treat- 
ment for American goods was to be offered in exchange. For his 
guidance on the wider questions of navigation policy, he was given 
the report of the Committee of Council, with its clearly expressed 
intention to retain the British monopoly of imperial trade. But he 
found at an early date that what the United States, speaking through 
Alexander Hamilton, most wanted was the right of trade with the 
West Indies, if only in small craft 3 . A regular commercial negotiation 
was, however, never started during 1792, Hammond's time being 
entirely occupied with the interminable questions of debts and 
compensations, alleged failures of individual States to accept the 
Treaty of 1783 as the law of the land, and the British garrisons in the 
frontier posts. Then came the French Declaration of War against the 
United Kingdom. The outstanding legacies from the Treaty of 1783 
remained unliquidated. No treaty of commerce existed, and all the 

1 The report is a very elaborate one, extending to about 150 MS. pp. 

2 His special instructions are of September 1st, 1791. 

3 Hammond to Grenville, January, 1792. 



156 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

problems of neutrality, contraband, and the exercise of sea power, 
which John Adams's draft had attempted to provide against in advance, 
were revived in aggravated forms. 

American sympathy was overwhelmingly on the French side, and 
Washington's Declaration of Neutrality, of April 22nd, 1793, was re- 
ceived with a storm of abuse 1 . Great Britain's refusal to admit the right 
of American shipping to enjoy the trade of the French West Indies, 
now thrown open to it as a war measure ; an Order to British cruisers 
to bring into port neutral cargoes of corn and flour destined for France ; 
and the beginnings of the search of American ships for British seamen 
— all played into the hands of the Anglophobe party in America. These 
events, and those that followed, lie outside the chronological scope of 
the present chapter; but their outline, in their relation to the abortive 
negotiations of the ten years of peace, may be most conveniently 
sketched here. Pitt's Government had been sincerely anxious for 
a settlement when Hammond was despatched. The dangers of war 
stung it into decisive action. The initiative, however, came from 
Washington. With the approval of the Senate, he sent John Jay to 
England to arrange a treaty. His task was eased by an Order in Council 
of January, 1794, instructing naval commanders and privateers to stop 
only such neutral ships as were engaged in the direct trade between the 
French West Indies and France. By October 7th, 1794, Jay had signed 
with Grenville the Treaty which is usually called by his name. It was 
approved by President and Senate nine months later. "Jay was burned 
in effigy, guillotined in effigy, hanged in effigy, from Maine to 
Georgia 2 "; but ratifications were exchanged next year. 

The Treaty reflects very imperfectly some of the principles of 
international intercourse which American negotiators had put forward 
in the previous decade ; but it was in the main concerned with specific 
cases and grievances. The United Kingdom agreed to withdraw all 
troops from United States territory on or before June 1st, 1796. Inter- 
course across the continental frontier was not to be impeded by either 
Power. The navigation of American rivers in the territory of either 
was to be free up to the highest point to which seagoing vessels could 
proceed. A Commission was to be set up in America to provide "full 
and complete compensation" for the British creditors, who had 
waited nearly a dozen years. Per contra, Great Britain offered com- 

1 On the American situation see McMaster in The Cambridge Modern History, 
vil. 318 seq. 

2 The Cambridge Modern History, vil. 320. 



THE JAY TREATY 157 

pensation for damage done to American shipping under the harsh 
Orders in Council of 1793. United States vessels were authorised 
to carry on direct trade with British ports in the East Indies (they had 
done so to a considerable extent already without authorisation) and 
with British possessions in Europe. The trade between the United 
States and the West Indies was opened, as Hamilton had urged on 
Hammond, to small vessels, up to 70 tons burden. The most favoured 
nation principle was mutually adopted in matters of customs, tonnage 
and harbour dues. Neither Contracting Party was to entertain in its 
ports pirates or privateers with letters of marque from an enemy of the 
other, or to allow its subjects to accept from foreign Princes in time of 
war letters of marque which might authorise them to prey on the 
commerce of the other Party. Contraband was more closely defined. 
It was agreed that enemy property, but enemy property only, might 
be taken from neutral ships in time of war ; the United States hereby 
abandoning the principle of "free ships, free goods." There were 
other more detailed clauses dealing with the problems of neutrality, 
capture, and the exercise of sea power. Finally, in the event of war 
between the Contracting Parties, the property of individuals was not 
tc be confiscated — a reminiscence of the American Confiscation Acts ; 
merchants might remain and carry on trade in spite of the existence 
of a state of war ; and no reprisals for alleged illegal acts were to be 
initiated by either Party without notice. It should be added that all 
the clauses of a general character dealing with the problems of warfare 
were accepted for twelve years only, except the clause which forbade 
the confiscation of private property. It may, also, be noted, in the 
words of an American historian and in anticipation of the war of 1812, 
that "nothing was said about search, or impressment, or paper 
blockades, or indemnity for the negroes whom Carleton took away 
in 1783 1 ." The British Navigation Code was rendered less water- 
tight by the clauses relating to the West Indies and India ; but it was 
not wrecked. The Treaty, in short, was a piece de cir Constance, and 
as such something of a triumph for British foreign policy : it had few 
of the elements of a "family compact" broad-based on principle. 

Had it been possible for the United Kingdom to have, from the 
first, an Ambassador to the United States in touch with Washington 
and his colleagues, as the Ambassadors to the Great Powers were with 
the Courts to which they were accredited, Anglo-American relations 
in this critical decade might have worked out differently. For the 

1 The Cambridge Modern History, VII. 320. 



158 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

Ambassadors and other diplomatic agents played a great part in the 
development of British policy. In the last resort the policy was Pitt's. 
Early in Carmarthen's tenure of the Foreign Secretaryship (1783-91), 
Pitt gave advice on all delicate matters ; and later, as Great Britain be- 
came more closely involved in the politics of Europe, he assumed the 
control at every crisis, often preparing the drafts of decisive despatches 
himself 1 . When Grenville succeeded Carmarthen (Leeds), these 
personal incursions become less frequent, but only because of the 
complete identity of views between the Prime- Minister and the Foreign 
Secretary. Owing to Grenville's great industry — a trait less conspicuous 
in the character of the Duke of Leeds — Pitt could be certain that their 
common policy would receive prompt expression and execution. But, 
in contributing to form his own opinion, in preparing the diplomatic 
situation for his decision, and in determining the attitude of foreign 
Courts towards Great Britain, the greater diplomatic agents were 
all-important. In quiet times, they were little interfered with and 
rarely instructed. This was specially so while Carmarthen was at 
the Foreign Office. At an out-of-the-way Court a Minister might 
receive no despatches at all: none went to Warsaw in 1782-4. 
Sir Robert Keith, Ambassador at Vienna from 1772 to 1792, said that 
on the average he received one answer to every forty official letters. 
Once, in times far from quiet, he received no line of instructions for 
five months 2 . The ablest and most independent of all the Ambassadors, 
Sir James Harris (Malmesbury), did not regret this neglect, because, 
as he once said, he "never received an instruction which was worth 
reading 3 ." He served at Madrid, Berlin, Petrograd (1777-82) and 
the Hague. He knew how to play a lone hand, and preferred it. He 
could impress an Empress, plan a revolution, or bribe a royal valet 
to deny the presence to an anti-British Minister 4 . Centrally placed 
at the Hague from 1784 to 1788, he saw most of the northern corre- 
spondence, which passed through the Hague under flying seal; he 
was within easy reach of Paris news ; and through Messrs Hope, the 
Scotch-Dutch bankers of Amsterdam, he knew how the world's gold 
was moving. No one could write more brilliant or more persuasive 
despatches. His career helps to explain Burke's opinion, expressed 
in 1 79 1 , that ' ' those in power here , instead of governing their Ministers 

1 For the evidence, see Rose, Pitt, I. and Salomon, Pitt, passim. It is summarised 
in Rose, i. 618. 

2 Memoirs of Sir R. M. Keith, II. 219, 221, 224. 

3 To Joseph Ewart, Malmesbury Diaries, II. 112. 

4 He did this at Loo (see p. 180, post). Harris to Carmarthen, June 15th, 1788. 



THE CONDUCT OF BRITISH POLICY 159 

in foreign Courts, are entirely swayed by them 1 ." This was not true; 
but there was truth in it. 

Permanent "combinations" were even more foreign to English 
than to Continental diplomacy in the eighteenth century. But there 
were traditions of friendship and of hostility which affected, in 
varying degrees, the atmosphere of diplomatic life. That France was 
suspected, and that French and British diplomatists worked, steadily 
and courteously, against one another with mine and countermine, 
goes without saying. They had done so for a century. A tradition, 
now rather remote, of friendship with the House of Habsburg had not 
been completely effaced by nearly thirty years of Austro-French 
alliance. So long as Austria remained the Ally of France, Prussia was 
obviously a possible friend. But friendship with her had been inter- 
mittent, and as a first-class Power she was very young ; so that there 
was no weight of tradition behind this relation. Her Protestantism 
still had some little weight at home ; but the word does not occur in 
the diplomatic correspondence. Russia, until recently, had seemed 
a natural friend, by virtue of old commercial connexions and the 
apparent impossibility of any real conflict of interests. But, of all 
friendships, the most natural and obvious was that with the Dutch. 
Nothing seemed more shocking to British diplomatic opinion than 
the decline of British influence at Amsterdam and the Hague during 
the War of American Independence. For four years (1783-7), the 
struggle to recover that influence is the master-thread of British policy 
in Europe. For rather less than four years more (1787-91), the re- 
covery of it is the keystone in the rather ill-cemented structure of 
the Triple Alliance of Great Britain, Holland and Prussia. Two years 
later, Britain had accepted without hesitation a war with France, 
which she had not sought, in order to retain that influence and to 
uphold threatened Dutch interests. 

The United Provinces had not lightly gone to war against the 
United Kingdom in 1780. There were material reasons why they should 
not, apart from all considerations of friendship : " England is I believe 
the only Power that can ever literally annihilate Holland," Carmarthen 
wrote a few years later 2 ; and the point of this remark was always 
appreciated at Amsterdam. Three out of the seven Provinces had 
opposed the War with Great Britain. The influence of the Stadholder, 
William V of Orange, the unworthy bearer of a great name, was always 

1 Ed. Burke to Rd. Burke, August 16, 1791, Correspondence, in. 268. 

2 To Harris, November 8th, 1785. 



i6o PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

used on the British side — so much so that he was accused of treachery, 
whereby the old aristocratic Opposition, with its headquarters in the 
States of Holland, was greatly strengthened. Under the cumbrous 
and intricate federal system of the Provinces, the main utility of the 
office of Stadholder was in time of war. If it did not serve as a rallying 
point for the people then, there was some presumption that it was 
of no use. Certainly, it had not so served in 1780-3. William V was 
dilatory in business. He was neither able nor courageous. He was 
known to be much influenced by his Prussian wife. He was supposed 
to have acquired alien sympathies from his English mother. All 
those who disliked Great Britain or favoured France, and the still 
larger number who valued above all things the pure Dutch traditions 
of their Province or their town, were turning against him. 

Great Britain was on her guard, even before Peace was signed with 
the Dutch. "His Majesty," wrote Fox to Sir John Stepney, Ambas- 
sador at Berlin, on September 19th, 1783, "is much alarmed at the 
accounts we receive every day of the state of affairs in Holland. The 
remaining authority of the House of Orange seems to be in the most 
dangerous state." In a manner hardly worthy of his position, Fox 
had asked the advice of Frederick as to "what steps, if any, could with 
propriety be taken by this Court in the present juncture." Frederick 
replied that this was a matter on which he could not pretend to give 
advice. "No notice whatever was taken of the two Courts acting in 
concert 1 ." It was a palpable snub. However, in April, 1784, Count 
Finkenstein, speaking as was assumed for his master, suggested 
that England should send to the Hague a Minister " who would employ 
quiet and conciliatory measures 2 ." This was, certainly, not a close 
description of Harris, whom Pitt sent over seven months later. But 
Harris was not sent merely to please Berlin. 

The situation in the United Provinces required skilled handling. 
While the "Patriots" were working against the Orange interest, the 
whole country became engaged in a quarrel with the Emperor Joseph, 
about treaty rights to which Great Britain was a party. Joseph's passion 
for what was rational and absolute was stirred by the irrational checks 
and balances of Low Country politics. "His" Netherlands had been 
protected against France, his Ally, by Dutch garrisons in the Barrier 
fortresses. Of these he had got rid during the late War, Great Britain 
not being in a position to uphold the Barrier Treaty. Now (1784), he 

1 Stepney to Fox, October nth, 1753. 

2 Stepney to Carmarthen, April 6th, 1784. 



THE DUTCH QUESTION 161 

repudiated the "unnatural" arrangement by which the Scheldt was 
shut, and Antwerp's trade ruined, for the benefit of the Dutch. Also, 
he revived an old claim to an outlying bit of Dutch territory about 
Maastricht, which lay conveniently adjacent to lands of his in Lim- 
burg. He seized some Dutch forts and set an army in motion late 
in the year. 

It could not be supposed that any Dutch party, least of all the 
"Patriots," the commercial aristocracy of Holland, would yield to 
such demands without a fight. As this party was in close relation 
with France, Carmarthen hoped to see France involved, to her dis- 
advantage, in the quarrel between her friends and her Ally 1 . The 
strain increased throughout the early months of 1785; but in the 
summer it began to appear that the prospect for France was promising. 
She would mediate, bring the disputants to terms, and thereby in- 
crease both her own prestige and, if the terms were satisfactory to 
the Dutch, that of the "Patriots" also. That France should stand 
as protector of Dutch interests in the Scheldt was intolerable to 
Harris ; but this was what he saw coming. Carmarthen's attempts to 
provoke Austria against France proved futile. Frederick of Prussia 
could not be induced to come forward as an open supporter of the 
Dutch, even though he might have been expected to welcome a chance 
of checkmating Austria. He was waiting on France 2 . Carmarthen 
tried in vain to move Berlin, as he saw France and Austria coming 
together again during 1785. " Interested as Great Britain and Prussia 
must be to watch every move of their respective rivals, so formidably 
connected," he wrote to Ewart on May 14th, why should they not 
cooperate "to emancipate the Republic from the shackles of her 
slavish dependency on France " ? Frederick was absorbed in the con- 
templation of another Habsburg scheme, the proposed exchange of 
the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria. When this finally collapsed 
(June, 1785), he was busy building up his German League of Princes 
to hold the Imperial Court in check. He was on the whole in favour 
of the British policy towards the United Provinces ; but he was cir- 
cumspect, timid, rather malicious, and, as has been seen, doubtful of 
England's resolution and competence. In return for active support 
in the Dutch matter, not necessarily military, he might have won 
British assistance for his League of Princes. King George joined it in 

1 See Salomon, Pitt, p. 304. 

2 Joseph Ewart (Charge - d'affaires at Berlin) to Carmarthen, September 18th; 
November 9th, 1784; April 2nd, 1785. 



1 62 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

his Hanoverian capacity, but, as usual with him in such cases, without 
consulting or informing his British Ministers. Harris and Ewart 
were anxious to use the League as a steppingstone to an Anglo-Prussian 
alliance. The Cabinet was less eager. Both the desire not to commit 
Great Britain too far prematurely, and a justifiable suspicion of 
Frederick's interest and sincerity, held them back, as the September 
Instructions for Cornwallis show. But had Frederick responded, 
something might have been accomplished. He contented himself 
with his discouraging survey of Europe and his double-edged com- 
pliments to Pitt. 

Harris worked desperately. He interviewed the Stadholder — and 
would have felt happier if he " would act one half as well as he spoke " 
— as well as the Princess — and got the impression of his having warned 
Berlin that open intervention might hurt the Orange cause ; and he 
interviewed every accessible person of importance. The Prince lacked 
all "firmness and conduct." Some months before, he had talked of 
selling his estates and retiring to Germany — "a resolution," said 
Harris, "which, if ever he carries it into execution, will compleat his 
character." As with other nervous Princes, King Charles's head entered 
into his conversation. Harris thought that "the more temperate 
members of the aristocratical party," though hostile to Orange, 
disliked dependence on France. So he had long discussions with the 
Directors of the Dutch East India Company, as a result of which he 
suggested that Great Britain might guarantee all their Eastern pos- 
sessions, and so prevent them from becoming centres of French 
influence 1 . But to no purpose. Preliminaries of an agreement between 
the United Provinces, France and the Emperor were signed in Sep- 
tember. They showed, said Harris, "the low and abject situation to 
which this Republic is reduced." He worked on, nevertheless, to 
block the completion of the Treaty, through friends in Zealand, the 
most Anglophil of the Provinces. Correspondence with Ewart con- 
vinced him that "the King of Prussia was acting a hollow and insidious 
part," but that his heir, Frederick William Prince of Prussia, took a 
more lively interest in his sister's fate 2 . Yet nothing but words came 
from Berlin. The States-General rated them at their true value, and 
proceeded to consider proposals for removing the arms of the House 
of Orange from regimental colours, postwaggons and public pro- 
clamations. 

1 Harris to Carmarthen, August 2nd, 9th, 16th; September 2nd, 9th, 13th, 1785. 
Also, a private letter of March nth, quoted in Rose, Pitt, 1. 309. 

3 To Carmarthen, September 27th (two despatches of the same date). 



HARRIS AT THE HAGUE 163 

On November 8th and 10th, 1785, two Treaties signed at Fon- 
tainebleau registered Harris's failure. Joseph withdrew. He recog- 
nised the absolute rights of the United Provinces over the lower 
Scheldt, which was all that mattered, and agreed to abandon his 
claims on Maastricht in return for a money payment. To win the 
Dutch, France undertook to pay almost half the sum herself. In 
return, the Dutch Envoys signed the second Treaty, a political and 
commercial Alliance with France. The two Powers were to aid one 
another, if either were attacked, by land and sea; neither was to carry 
on negotiations to the detriment of the other ; and in matters of trade 
a "most favoured nation" system was established between them. 

On the day on which the first Treaty was signed, Carmarthen 
wrote to Harris the threatening despatch already quoted. The Dutch 
were, he said, running a fearful risk, Britain "could destroy their 
credit or annihilate their very soil. Desperate and distasteful as such 
a step would be, it sure would be justifiable and I trust be effected 
(and the attempt I think could scarcely fail) without remorse or 
hesitation 1 ." He approved a proposal of Harris's for the presentation 
of a memorial of protest by the British Ambassador to the States- 
General, a most unusual proceeding as between independent Powers. 
And he authorised Harris to do what that active Minister had done 
already — impress the risks they were running on the Dutch traders, 
who "would be the first to suffer and the last to be recompensed" in 
case of war 2 . Nevertheless, the Treaty of Alliance with France was 
ratified at Christmas, 1785. 

The months from January to August, 1786, were the blackest of 
Harris's mission to the Hague. " It is not on the cards at this moment 
to reclaim this country. Every thing... concurs to throw it into the 
arms of France" (March 31st). Yet hope must not be abandoned. At 
all costs, by combinations somehow to be devised, England must 
manage "to disentangle the Republic from her present connexion 
with France and to restore her to her former treaties with England " 
(June 13th). From Prussia there was no hope. "His Prussian Majesty 
is only a friend to the Stadtholder by affinity — and not politically so 
— and... providing his Niece enjoy the honours usually attached to 
the Office, he is very indifferent as to the preservation of its privileges " 
(August 1 st). This was so. The King had told Viscount Dalrymple, 
British Ambassador at Berlin, in the previous December, that he 

1 Carmarthen to Harris, November 8th. 

2 To Harris, November 17th. 



164 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

hoped to see the title of Stadholder secured to his Niece's husband, 
"but not a shadow of power, nor did he expect it." It could not be 
helped, he said. France must not be provoked 1 . 

Harris was troubled, also, by the silences and apparent indifference 
of Pitt. He wished him to write and encourage the rump of the 
"English" party among the merchants of the United Provinces. " Is 
it impossible to move him who speaks so well, to write one poor line 
to these sound shillings and pence men ? " Such was his postscript to a 
letter for Carmarthen in July 2 . Pitt's silence and apparent indifference 
were due, in part, to preoccupation and overwork ; in part, to a certain 
insularity, natural to a very young man with no first-hand knowledge 
of Continental problems ; in part, to his lack of Harris's flaming hatred 
of France ; and in part, it may confidently be assumed, to his wish at 
that moment to avoid any appearance of hostility towards her. If Car- 
marthen ever asked him to write a " poor line," there was an excellent 
reason for refusal. The French secret service was well organised. 
A letter to be communicated even to reputed friends was unlikely 
to remain hidden. And Pitt was just concluding with France a 
Commercial Treaty most advantageous to British interests. The 
signatures were attached to it by William Eden, whose name it 
generally bears, and Gerard de Rayneval on September 26th, 1786. 

In the eighteenth article of the Treaty of 1783, France and England 
had agreed to nominate, without delay, Commissioners to draw up 
a commercial treaty, "on the basis of reciprocity and mutual con- 
venience," this treaty to be completed not later than January 1st, 1786. 
The initiative had come from Vergennes. Vergennes, it has been said, 
had no trace of genius 3 . He had, however, immense diplomatic 
experience and an enlightened commonsense. He had served for 
nearly ten years in Portugal ; for five in Germany ; for nearly fifteen 
at Constantinople. He had created the modern French Foreign 
Office 4 . All his experience had failed to assimilate him fully to the 
ordinary diplomatic type of his day. True, he could play the diplo- 
matic game with any man. He had led France into the American War, 
and had won back for her from Great Britain, by a timely use of force, 
the position among the Powers — but not the territory, which in the 
Seven Years' War Great Britain had by force taken from her. He 
had advised Lewis XVI against a policy of mere spatial aggrandise- 

1 Dalrymple to Carmarthen, December 3rd, 1785. 

2 B.M. Add. MSS. 28061. Quoted in Rose, Pitt, 1. 275. 

3 Sorel, 1. 297 : " Turgot avait du genie, Vergennes n'en avait point." 
* Above, p. 146 m. 2. 



VERGENNES 165 

ment. In memoirs presented to his master, he had protested with 
passion against the partitions, exchanges and mechanical roundings- 
off of territory, which occupied most of the time of the German 
chanceries. France, he said , had ' ' in herself everything that constitutes 
real power {la puissance re'elle) 1 ." Of course, he desired that she should 
influence — his enemies would have said dominate — her lesser neigh- 
bours; but the notion of annexing them was abhorrent to him. 
Between France and Great Britain, he desired mutual respect and 
free intercourse, not the alternations of actual with commercial war 
which had marked the last century. He once told a colleague that, 
if he could annihilate England, he would not do it. But there was 
nothing that he would not do "to bring about a change in her jealous 
policy, which damages both us and her, and which, if well examined, 
proves to be folly." And he added, with a wonderful insight: "for 
a century and a half we have been ruining one another to enrich 
Europe, to strengthen Powers from whom we have nothing to fear 
or to create brandnew Powers. As a consequence, we lose weight in 
proportion as the others grow, and we shall end by making them our 
equals 2 ." In 1783, he had been determined to begin an era of more 
neighbourly relations ; and he had been delighted to find in Shelburne 
a statesman who needed no compulsion 3 . Each had a strain of the 
cosmopolitan idealism of the century and a contempt for some of the 
idols of the marketplace. 

Vergennes was far too good a diplomatist to miss such opportunities 
for extending the moral dominion of France as Dutch and other 
affairs offered him. His agents throughout the world played the 
game for influence as Harris played it, each side calling the play of 
the other " intrigue." In 1785 he approved the recreation of a French 
East India Company. British statesmen suspected that this Company 
would exploit the new connexion with Holland, and possibly amal- 
gamate with the Dutch Company 4 . Therefore, Harris paid special 
attention to the Dutch Directors. These intrigues, suspicions and 
counter-intrigues did not improve the prospects of the commercial 
treaty. Further, Pitt was no doubt anxious that fiscal union between 

1 Sorel, 1. 313-5. This was in 1777. 

2 These sayings were credited to him by Hennin after his death. (Doniol, 
Le Comte de Vergennes et P.M. Hennin, pp. 103-4.) Theymaynot be verbally correct, 
but they are in accordance with his conduct. 

3 Pitt was Shelburne's Chancellor of the Exchequer; but Rose (Pitt, 1. 325) has 
"found no sign of his opinions on the subject" of Vergennes' proposals and Shel- 
burne's reception of them. 

4 Harris's correspondence contains many references to this suspicion. 



1 66 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

England and Ireland should precede changes in Great Britain's 
external economic relations 1 . His Irish attempt and failure were not 
complete until June, 1785. By that time; Vergennes was putting pres- 
sure on Great Britain to carry out Article 18. Early in 1784, a British 
Commissioner had been sent to Paris ; but he had been kept waiting 
months for Instructions. In March, 1785, he was still without a reply 
to letters written in the previous September and November. But he 
had been advised to reject the French proposal for negotiations on 
the basis of mutual most favoured nation treatment, since the British 
Government was not prepared to abandon the specially favoured 
treatment of Portuguese wines stipulated for in the Methuen Treaty 
of 1703. Vergennes retaliated by arguing that if the new treaty was 
not completed, as agreed, by January 1st, 1786, the existing commer- 
cial arrangements between the two countries arising out of the Treaty 
of Utrecht must lapse. He next instigated a series of edicts inter- 
fering with British exports to France, of which the most serious was 
one of July 10th, 1785, forbidding the import of foreign linens, 
cottons and muslins. This was suspended, in consequence of a protest 
from London ; but it showed what England might expect if her delays 
continued. Vergennes was well within his rights; for French silks 
had been prohibited in England since 1765. With considerable for- 
bearance, however, he agreed to waive the claim to negotiate on a 
basis of complete reciprocity and most favoured nation treatment, 
on condition that negotiations were really opened. This was in 
October, 1785 2 . Two days before, he had prohibited the import of 
iron, steel and cutlery. 

Pitt was already preparing to send over a highly qualified agent 
to treat with France; but he showed himself strangely dilatory in 
the whole business. While he delayed, Vergennes secured his Treaty, 
and most favoured nation terms, from the United Provinces. At 
Pitt's request, he now agreed to extend the "period of grace" for the 
British Treaty by six months, and eventually by twelve. Having 
gained time for consideration, Pitt instituted elaborate enquiries, 
partly by his new Committee of Council on Trade, partly by the 
agent whom he selected : William Eden, the future Lord Auckland. 
Eden, now in his forty-second year, had a varied political experience, 
no excessive tenacity of political friendship or principle, but great 

1 This is Rose's suggestion {Pitt, I. 328). It lacks documentary evidence, but 
is inherently probable. 

2 Vergennes to Barthelemy (the French representative in London), October 13th. 
Salomon, Pitt, p. 212. 



EDEN'S COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATION 167 

knowledge of economic affairs . Since 1 772 , he had been , in succession , 
Under-secretary of State, First Lord of the old Board of Trade, 
and Vice-treasurer of Ireland. In Ireland, he had helped to establish 
the National Bank. His economic horizon had been widened by 
intercourse with Adam Smith; but his conduct of the negotiation 
shows little trace of that desire to introduce a freer trade between 
nations, with a view to the future and in defiance of accompanying 
drawbacks, which can be discerned among the French negotiators. 
He was sent to make the best bargain possible, and excellently he 
succeeded. It is not suggested that concern for the far future was the 
deciding motive with the French. Their statesmen wished British 
goods to be imported, in order that Frenchmen might learn to imitate 
them; they wished them to be imported legally, in order that the 
King's revenue might benefit by the cessation of smuggling; they 
desired a freer market for French wines, for obvious reasons; and 
they wished to draw the teeth of England's jealous commercial 
system, both because it did France harm and because so difficult an 
operation would add to her prestige. But Vergennes' final despatch 
to Barthelemy, when all was over, seems sincere and takes higher 
ground. "It is not," he wrote, "a question as to which nation gains 
most in the early years, or of whether the balance of gain will ever 
be exact. We desire to give trade and industry a great stimulus, to 
procure an outlet for our wines, and still more to establish a per- 
manent community of interests between many individuals of both 
nations, which in time of need may serve as a corrective to the warlike 
passions of our neighbours 1 ." 

Not till late in March, 1786, did Eden cross to France. He had 
worked hard in England since December. His appointment was 
popular among English manufacturers, whose right to protection 
against the competition of Ireland he had championed against Pitt 
in the previous May. Josiah Wedgwood, who had organised the 
manufacturers' opposition to the Irish proposals, wrote to congratu- 
late him and placed his extensive knowledge at his service. Daily 
interviews with the interested parties had given Eden exact informa- 
tion, with regard to every important trade, as to whether reciprocity 
with France was desired ; what level of duties would be most suitable ; 
what was the highest level at which the trade could still manage to 
export to France; whether it was greatly in need of new markets; 

1 To Barthelemy, November 26th, 1786. (Paraphrased from the German version 
of the French MS. original in Salomon, Pitt, p. 235.) 



168 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

whether it could bear French competition at all; and so on 1 . The 
representatives of most British industries were confident in their own 
competitive efficiency, Wedgwood in particular ; but the silk manufac- 
turers, although they boasted of giving employment to nearly 200,000 
people, maintained that, for them, the choice was merely between con- 
tinued prohibition of French silks and ruin. Arrived in Paris with all 
his material, Eden was surprised to find that the French Ministers were 
not equally well prepared. He suspected that, in consequence, they 
would aim at a vague sweeping kind of treaty, avoiding, so far as 
possible, the dangers which might result from pitting their relative 
ignorance against his carefully acquired knowledge. He intended to 
make that knowledge tell; and no doubt he succeeded. Vergennes' 
final disclaimer of all interest in the exact amount of immediate gain 
or loss from the Treaty seems sincere ; but, in view of its unpopularity 
among French manufacturers and its unquestionably painful opera- 
tion on French industry, the disclaimer might be interpreted as a 
veiled admission of failure, a half-apology for his agents' inability 
to beat Eden on his own ground. There had been no elaborate enquiry 
among experts. A single official, the Inspector-general of Manu- 
facturers, appears to have furnished all the technical information on 
the industrial side. 

This apparent neglect was, however, mainly the result, not of 
oversight, but of principle. Vergennes, with no parliamentary criti- 
cism to fear, could take risks and incur unpopularities such as Pitt 
became every year more reluctant to face. His right-hand man, G. de 
Rayneval, strongly influenced by physiocratic thought, stated dog- 
matically that the most useful and solid trade was that in agricultural 
produce ; that the interests of industry were secondary ; that it was an 
economic blunder for a nation to aim at complete industrial self- 
sufficiency ; that an industry which could not maintain itself without 
high tariffs was not worth maintaining; and that prohibition was in 
all circumstances vicious. If he could widen the market for French 
agricultural produce — that is, for French wines — he was relatively 
indifferent as to Eden's successful bargaining about woollens and 
porcelain and silk and hardware and Birmingham "toys" He was 
aware that the years immediately following the Treaty upon which 
he was engaged might be difficult years for French industry. He was 
planning means for obviating these difficulties, including the intro- 

1 "Evidence for commercial treaty with France," B.M., Add. MSS. 34462 
(Auckland Papers). 



THE COMMERCIAL TREATY OF 1786 169 

duction of English methods. He had hopes at this time that no less 
a firm than Boulton and Watt might be induced to transfer their 
business across the Channel. 

The French negotiators were, also, fully conscious of the shattered 
state of the French finances. This was what Vergennes had in mind 
when he spoke of commercial relations "serving as a corrective to 
the warlike passions of our neighbours." He believed that England 
desired revenge for Yorktown and the Treaty of 1783. He wished to 
divert her interests from war to commerce, because he thought that 
France could not afford another war for some considerable time. In 
the last War he had saved her honour, and at its conclusion had shown 
moderation. To postpone or avert a fresh war, he was again prepared 
to give something away. If the English valued above all things what 
his physiocratic advisers considered relatively worthless, he naturally 
made no objection. 

Before the end of April, Eden was reporting that, in his opinion, 
France would gain nothing essential through the Treaty beyond a re- 
duced duty on her wines, whereas Great Britain would get rid of all old 
and new prohibitions and other obstacles to her export trade. He had 
still difficulties to surmount ; and at times he found the very exacting 
Instructions from home, inspired by Jenkinson at the Council of 
Trade, difficult of execution. In August, he became nervous because, 
the French manufacturers having had wind of the course of the 
negotiations, letters of protest against their ruinous character were 
pouring in to Calonne, now Controller-general of Finance. Eden 
saw risk of a fall at the last fence and regretted that it had not been 
possible to make the pace hotter. Having avoided the fall, he wrote 
home on the day before signature (September 25th), that he hoped the 
English manufacturers would, for a time at any rate, moderate their 
expressions of joy. Fortunately for him, when the news arrived, 
although the King had "never been seen in such spirits," " the prin- 
cipal merchants in the City did not choose to give an opinion about it," 
because — so Dorset, Eden's correspondent, held — "anything, if 
novel, is apt to stupify merchants 1 ." And as no such agreement ever 
completely satisfies commercial men, there were some complaints 
and talk of a sacrificing of British interests. It was Pitt who, in 
defending the Treaty in the House during February, 1787, against the 
usual factious Whig opposition, was indiscreet enough to argue that, 
while advantageous to France, it was still more so to Great Britain. 

1 Dorset to Eden, Auckland Journals , I. 392. 



170 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

Eden's anticipation of the provisions of his Treaty had been sub- 
stantially accurate. Its earlier clauses provided for general freedom 
of intercourse and free exercise of religion in time of peace, and for 
civilised treatment of domiciled enemy subjects in the event of war 1 . 
Its later clauses dealt at length with privateering, contraband, piracy 
and the legal relations of shipmasters of either nation to the local 
authorities of the other when in its seaports. The chief central clauses, 
first, reduced the duty on French wines to the level of that on the 
wines of Portugal, and adjusted, favourably to France, duties on 
vinegar, brandy and oil ; secondly, fixed a maximum duty of ioper cent. 
ad valorem, in either country, on hardware, cutlery, and miscellaneous 
metal wares; thirdly, fixed a similar maximum duty of 12 per cent, 
on cottons, woollens, porcelain, earthenware and glass. Silk and all 
goods mixed with silk remained mutually prohibited. This was 
regarded as Eden's great coup ; for England had small hope of export- 
ing silks to France. 

Although, during the debates on the Commercial Treaty, Pitt 
denounced the belief in unalterable hostility between any two nations 
as "weak and childish," during the negotiations he had told Eden 
that, while counting the French sincere on the economic side, he was 
suspicious of their assurances of political friendship 2 . Thorough- 
going haters of France, like Carmarthen and Harris, were convinced 
that there was no sincerity anywhere: economic compliance was a 
mere political subterfuge. The success of France in the United Pro- 
vinces during 1785, followed by an energetic development of her 
defensive and naval works at Cherbourg, and by an Eastern policy 
which kept England constantly on the alert, served to nourish Pitt's 
suspicions and Harris's conviction. While Eden was working in Paris 
during the summer of 1786, Harris — as has been seen — was as near 
despair as was possible with his vigorous and sanguine temper. Two 
deaths and a crisis in French internal affairs happened opportunely 
for his policy. On August 17th, 1786, Frederick of Prussia died. Six 
months later (February 13th, 1787), Vergennes died. Within a fort- 
night of Vergennes' death, Calonne was explaining to the First 
Assembly of Notables the desperate condition of the French finances. 

The British representatives at Berlin had long hoped that the new 
King, Frederick William, brother of the Princess of Orange, might 

1 In case of war, Englishmen domiciled in France, and vice versa, might stay 
and trade; if their conduct made it necessary to remove them, they were to have 
twelve months in which to wind up their affairs (Art. II). 

2 To Eden, June ioth, 1786. Auckland Correspondence, 1. 127. 



GREAT BRITAIN AND PRUSSIA 171 

introduce into Prussia's Dutch policy a change favourable to British 
interests. Frederick the Great was hardly buried, before the Princess 
told Harris that " the only means of saving " the House of Orange was 
"a united support in its behalf from England and Prussia." She read 
to him letters from her brother expressing determination 1 . She 
(naturally) did not explain, if indeed she knew, that her brother's 
determination was intermittent, liable to be suspended at almost any 
moment by the influence of what an English Ambassador once called 
the "female appendices 2 " of Potsdam. A fortnight later, a Prussian 
Envoy, Gortz, was explaining to Harris that, though his master would 
prefer above all things to " conciliate matters " in the United Provinces 
through France, yet there were lengths of conciliation to which he 
would not go, and that, in certain contingencies, he would break with 
France, unless, indeed, he were faced by the superior might of 
"Austria and Russia siding avowedly with France on this occasion." 
Since France would have carried Spain with her, it is clear that opinion 
in Berlin was still much influenced by fear of that quadruple entente. 
As a protection against such a combination, Gortz urged " the necessity 
of a Continental System being formed between England and Prussia." 
Harris listened ; but he had no instructions to take the matter up 3 . 

"So long as M. le Comte de Vergennes lived," wrote the French 
Foreign Office official who was responsible for correspondence with 
the United Provinces, "all the measures adopted by England to 
regain preeminence in Holland were fruitless 4 ." During the last 
months of Vergennes' life it seemed probable that Dutch affairs 
would be "conciliated" by way of Paris. Late in the year, definite 
proposals, drafted by Rayneval,for a settlement between the Stadholder 
and the Patriots — proposals which Prussia was believed to favour — 
were brought by Rayneval himself from Paris. Harris was, no doubt, 
glad to be able to report that both the Prince, whom Rayneval de- 
scribed as "a complete fool 5 ," and the Princess regarded them as 
"absolutely inadmissible 6 ." He added that the English party was 
growing, led by van de Spiegel, Pensionary of Zealand. Early in 1787, 
he could report that the Prince was still firm and that, since France, he 

1 Harris to Carmarthen, September ist, 1786. 

2 Morton Eden to Lord Auckland, November 23rd, 1792. Dropmore (Grenville) 
Papers, II. 347. 

3 Harris to Carmarthen, September 19th, 1786. 

4 Doniol, Vergennes et Hennin, p. 95. Hennin was the official in question. 

5 In a despatch of January 3rd, 1787. P. de Witt, Une invasion Prussienne en 1787, 
p. 142; quoted in Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte, 1. 136. 

6 To Carmarthen, December 12th, 1786. 



172 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

assumed, would try to force her solution, " civil war. ..might be a very 
near event 1 ." In February, Vergennes was succeeded by Montmorin, 
a much inferior statesman, and the mess of the French treasury was 
disclosed by Calonne. Harris continued to work hard at propaganda, 
organising meetings, subsidising journals and pamphleteers, and 
evidently making progress 2 . 

By May, civil war in Holland had practically begun. The "Pat- 
riotic" party, by its origin that of the commercial aristocracy, was 
acquiring a revolutionary and democratic tinge by intercourse with 
France. Hitherto, the permanent limitation of the powers of the 
Stadholderate, and perhaps the removal of the undeniably incom- 
petent and universally unpopular Stadholder in favour of his son, 
had been the measures contemplated. Now, the total abolition of 
the office was certainly being discussed. This enabled the English 
party to appeal to old deep-rooted popular sentiment in favour of 
the House of Orange. Even in the Province of Holland itself, the 
stronghold of the Patriots, there were Orange elements. The dockers 
of Amsterdam, for instance, preferred a remote Prince to the local 
Mynheers — capitalistic Patriots — and were accessible to Harris's 
propaganda. The French Ambassador Verac was working, also with 
success, on the other side. Such external interference in domestic 
affairs was singularly easy in a state "built up in the most amazing 
fashion out of Federation, Republic, Monarchy, Crown Property 
and heritable Privileges," as Clausewitz described the United Pro- 
vinces at this time 3 . 

The crisis came in June. Both sides had armed. The Prince had 
about 4000 men; the Patriots a larger, but less compact, body of 
Free Companies (militia). Some months earlier, the Prince and 
Princess had left the Hague and the Province of Holland for a safer 
residence at Nymwegen. But recent changes of opinion encouraged 
Princess Wilhelmina to think that, by a personal appeal at the Hague, 
she might yet win a majority of the States -General for the Orange 
cause. She set out, with a very small following, early on June 28th — 
spent the night in a peasant's house, a prisoner of the Free Companies 
of the province of Holland, and returned next day to Nymwegen. 

Thereupon, her brother, who had heard an exaggerated report of the 
insults offered her, sent a threatening despatch to the States of Holland 

1 To Carmarthen, January 2nd, 1787. 

2 See his correspondence, February- April, passim. 

8 Der Feldzug des Herzogs von Braunschweig von 1787, p. 259 ; quoted in Heigel, 
I. 133- 



THE DUTCH CRISIS OF 1787 173 

and ordered his nearest troops to hold themselves in readiness. He 
was careful to treat the issue as personal, not political, and to explain 
that he was far from contemplating war. "She wants to drag me into 
a war," he told one of her confidential servants, "but I will soon show 
her that I am not to be led by her 1 ." Yet war might come; and, if 
it came, he knew he must look to England. For some years, Hertz- 
berg had been advocating an Anglo-Prussian-Dutch "system" at 
Berlin. The growth of the English party in the Provinces, and the 
fear of a Dutch democratic republic subservient to France, had roused 
Pitt and the Cabinet, hitherto not very responsive to Harris's des- 
patches. Harris had been in consultation with Ministers at Whitehall 
in May. The Cabinet, most certainly, did not want war; but in view 
of the financial embarrassments of France it was prepared to adopt 
a course which might conceivably lead to war. Harris went back 
with a promise of £20,000 for the Orange cause 2 . Next month, he 
obtained £70,000 more. In July, Carmarthen assumed, almost as 
a matter of course, the armed intervention of the King of Prussia 3 ; 
and Pitt sent for the Prussian Ambassador, with whom hitherto he 
had had few dealings, to tell him that the insult to Princess Wilhelmina 
concerned her brother only and that France had no right to intervene 
in any way. It is evident that, if he could get the famous Prussian 
army in motion, he was prepared to risk war. On August 2nd, he wrote 
instructing Cornwallis to seize Trincomalee from the Dutch, so soon 
as hostilities began, in order that the French might not use it as a base, 
and that the English might — possibly for an attack on the Cape of 
Good Hope 4 . 

Rather better diplomacy on the part of France, a diplomacy such 
as Vergennes could, almost certainly, have commanded, or a different 
course of events in Eastern Europe, might have shattered Carmarthen's 
assumption ; for in July Frederick William was trimming. He wanted 
a settlement without war; and it should have been easy for France 
to make the Patriots offer satisfactory, but not to them humiliating, 
terms. This she failed to do, thus giving the impression that she meant 
to support them through thick and thin; yet, at the end of August, 
Verac, her Ambassador at the Hague, their party's patron and faiseur, 
was recalled and succeeded by St Priest, a representative who was not 

1 Luckwaldt, Die englisch-preussische Allianz von 1788, p. 67. 

2 Malmesbury Correspondence, 11. 306. Pitt himself was not in favour of a policy 
which might lead to war: but he agreed to the financial assistance. Rose, 1. 360. 

3 Malmesbury Correspondence, II. 329, July 3rd. 

4 Cornwallis Correspondence, I. 321. 



i 7 4 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

committed. Meanwhile, Frederick William was relieved of anxiety 
towards the east, by the growing internal difficulties of the Habsburg 
dominions, where Joseph's reforms were bearing their fruit of dis- 
affection, and still more, in August, by the sudden decision of the Porte, 
weary of Catharine's insolence, to declare war on Russia. Sir Robert 
Ainslie, our Ambassador at Constantinople, had warned the Foreign 
Office of the impending Declaration. It was issued so opportunely as an 
embarrassment to the Imperial Courts, that contemporaries credited 
it to Ainslie or his Prussian colleague. The suggestion is unproved 
and, in view of the dates of the various relevant decisions, unlikely. 
Certainly, Ainslie had no Instructions in this sense. 

News of Turkey's decision reached Berlin in the first days of 
September. Verac's recall from the Hague had taken place at the end 
of a month during which French diplomacy had seemed definitely 
provocative. The recall suggested a weakening of purpose. Great 
Britain had already sent a General to Germany to hire Hessians, and 
had put ammunition at the disposal of the Orange party. The King 
of Prussia had failed to secure any apology or satisfaction from the 
States of Holland. He had just decided to send an ultimatum to the 
Hague and to close with English offers of cooperation. The news that 
his imperial neighbours would now probably have their hands full 
greatly eased his mind 1 . 

On September 13th, Ferdinand of Brunswick, all his plans having 
been mathematically drawn out and the risks of cutting the dykes care- 
fully weighed 2 , crossed the Dutch frontier with 20,000 men, to attack 
the Province of Holland only. Brunswick's preparations were super- 
fluous. The Hollanders, unsupported by France, collapsed. Opinion 
swung round at the Hague. By the 20th, the mob was tearing a Patriots' 
flag in pieces in front of the British Embassy, with cries of Oranje 
boven ; and Harris's eyes were moistening as he met again the Prince 
of Orange, of whom he had so exceedingly low an opinion. Next day, 
he induced the States of Holland to rescind a decision, which they 
had taken on the 9th, appealing to France for aid. Amsterdam showed 
fight, but capitulated on October 10th. In Berlin, Hertzberg quoted 
vent, vidi, vici; and in Europe the conviction was confirmed that 
Prussian troops, led by Ferdinand of Brunswick, were invincible. 

1 It was not until November that Austria's participation in the Russo-Turkish 
War was definitively known. 

2 He started at the new moon, so as to secure the minimum variation of the 
tides. Clausewitz, who was with him, thought the campaign reckless and its success 
due almost entirely to Dutch incompetence, Heigel, I. 143-4. 



THE PRUSSIANS IN HOLLAND 175 

Montmorin was bewildered at the speed of events. Before the 
States of Holland had rescinded their appeal, he had issued a declara- 
tion that France could not reject it (September 16th). Two days 
earlier, Pitt had written to William Eden, who was still clearing 
up the aftermath of the commercial negotiation in Paris, that, if 
France wished to maintain predominance in Holland she would have 
to fight 1 . Carmarthen had already told Harris that France was not 
ready and, in his opinion, was unlikely to fight 2 . Harris, who heard 
no news of French military action down to September 22nd, con- 
curred 3 . 

On September 21st, a despatch, drawn up by Pitt himself, went 
to all British Embassies, notifying them that, since France had 
declared her intention of assisting that party in the Province of 
Holland which resisted the King of Prussia's just demands, and since 
her intervention had not been called for by a majority in the States- 
General, and thus there was no casus foederis , His Britannic Majesty 
was arming a fleet and augmenting his land forces. Very soon, forty 
ships of the line, from the fleet which Pitt had been nursing, were 
ready for sea. Once more, events moved too quickly for Montmorin. 
Late in September, Amsterdam was still holding out in the expectation 
that he would act ; but he was already telling Eden in confidence that, 
if the French party in the Provinces proved utterly weak, action 
would be folly 4 . Before the end of the month, he was interviewing 
William Grenville, sent over as a Special Envoy to smooth matters 
down if possible, but was protesting that he could discuss nothing 
until the Prussian troops were withdrawn, and meanwhile was pro- 
ceeding with belated military preparations 5 . The fall of Amsterdam, 
apart from all other circumstances, made French intervention hopeless ; 
and on October 27th Montmorin exchanged with Eden and Dorset, the 
ornamental British Ambassador to the Court of Versailles, a Declara- 
tion and Counter-Declaration of Disarmament, the French Declaration 
stating that France had never intended to intervene in Holland and 
retained no hostile views towards any party involved in the affair — 
that is to say, towards Prussia. After the signature, Dorset reported 

1 Auckland Correspondence, I. 192. 

2 Carmarthen to Harris, September 8th. 

3 To Carmarthen, September 22nd. Harris's despatch of September iSth, 
written in the full rush of events, is a most brilliant document. At 11.30 p.m. he 
wrote "and I think I can now venture to congratulate your Lordships that the 
revolution in this country is as complete as it was in 1747." 

4 Eden to Carmarthen, September 25th. 

5 Grenville to Carmarthen, September 28th. 



176 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

that "there did not seem to remain any degree of ill-humour, tho' 
there was visible a little awkwardness on occasion of the humiliating 
terms to which this Court had been obliged to subscribe 1 ." 

But Montmorin told Eden that war had been nearer than might 
have been supposed. For " exclusive of all objects of internal interest, 
there had been some opinion of weight that a war was the best mode 
of finishing the internal troubles which had prevailed at the time of 
the King of Prussia's march 2 ." The suggestion recurred again and 
again in France during the next five years; for foreign war, it has 
been said, was the classical cure for internal troubles 3 . 

Even before Amsterdam had fallen, Harris was pressing the Dutch 
for an alliance. But with so complex a polity as the United Provinces 
negotiations were exceptionally slow. In November, while the 
Prussian troops were beginning to withdraw, the Orange party was 
consolidating its power by the dismissal of "Patriotic" functionaries. 
In December, Harris's friend van de Spiegel became Grand Pen- 
sionary of the United Provinces. Though a friend, he did not wish 
to sell his friendship too cheap ; and, since in any Anglo-Dutch discus- 
sion colonial questions at once came to the front, the Dutch states- 
man suggested that Great Britain should give backNegapatam 4 . Harris 
managed to put this suggestion aside. By the end of March, 1788, 
his draft had passed the States of Holland, and on April 15th, the 
Defensive Alliance between His Britannic Majesty and Their High 
Mightinesses the States-General of the United Provinces was signed 5 . 
A Prusso-Dutch Treaty was signed the same day. 

Great Britain and the Provinces promised one another friendship 
and armed assistance if involved in war, specifying the amount of 
that assistance. A clause, to which England attached great importance, 
provided for military and naval cooperation in such an event between 
the Dutch and British authorities in the East. In case of war with 
a common enemy, neither was to disarm or make peace without the 
consent of the other. Great Britain guaranteed to the Prince of Orange 
the Hereditary Stadholderate of the United Provinces, and the office 
of Hereditary Governor in every Province, "engaging to maintain 
that form of Government against all attacks and enterprises, direct 
or indirect, of whatsoever nature they might be." The contracting 

1 To Carmarthen, November ist. 

2 Eden to Carmarthen, November ist. 

3 The point is repeatedly referred to by Sorel. 

4 Harris's despatches, December and January, passim. 

5 Harris to Carmarthen, April 15th, 1788, enclosing the treaty. 



TOWARDS THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 177 

parties agreed to negotiate further about Negapatam. On May 8th, 
1788, the Treaty was ratified, and the Dutch skiff appeared to be once 
more in tow behind the British ship of the line. This, however, was 
the year in which Mirabeau, in his pamphlet Aux Bataves sur le 
Stathouderat, told the Dutch that England was working through the 
House of Orange " to turn them into European Indians." In the long 
run, the reimposition of a personally unpopular and incompetent 
Stadholder by foreign arms worked as Mirabeau hoped it might — to 
increase the existing dislike of the office and of the Powers who 
propped it. It did so the more surely, because Great Britain in fact 
never opened the promised negotiations about Negapatam. 

Brunswick's military promenade to Amsterdam and its brilliant 
results proved a curse to Prussia. They set her statesmen planning 
other and greater coups, to be brought about by an opportune waving 
of the Prussian sword, and confirmed her King in his natural inclina- 
tions. "When once prevailed upon to exert himself," wrote Joseph 
Ewart from Berlin about this time 1 , "he is by no means deficient 
in judgement and penetration ; but he requires to be roused from his 
dissipation and inactivity." It might well seem to him, now, that an 
occasional rousing was enough. Frederick William emerged from 
the Dutch crisis pledged to Great Britain, by a secret agreement of 
October 20th, 1787, to maintain the Dutch Constitution. Beyond that 
point he was not committed ; nor was Great Britain. Throughout the 
winter, both Governments worked at the Dutch Treaties, which in 
themselves constituted a political consortium of the three Powers, if 
not exactly a Triple Alliance. 

For a time, Great Britain had not been anxious to go further. There 
were once more rumours of a Quadruple Alliance of the Imperial 
and Bourbon Courts, and Pitt wished to learn what they were worth. 
The scheme came from Catharine, who during 1787 had partly 
shown her hand by refusing to renew her Commercial Treaty with 
Great Britain, while including one with France. She now (late in 
1787) sounded Montmorin through Segur, the French Ambassador at 
Petrogad. But an alliance with Russia meant for France the sacrifice 
of three of her oldest diplomatic friendships — those with Sweden, 
Poland, and the Porte. Montmorin could not bring himself to make 
such sacrifices: the Quadruple Alliance remained a scheme 2 , and Pitt 
was for the moment free of that risk. 

Intimate relations between Great Britain and Prussia were first post- 

1 To Carmarthen, January 9th, 1785. 2 Sorel, 1. 322, 323. 

W.&G.i. 12 



178 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

poned and always imperilled by the working of the anti-British party 
at Berlin and by the fantastic programmes of European rearrangement 
which, at this time, were being put forward by Hertzberg. Hertzberg, 
as a Prussian, was not greatly interested in the United Provinces, where 
Prussian interests were dynastic rather than territorial, except in so 
far as Dutch affairs might promote that closer cooperation with Great 
Britain which he had always favoured, in opposition to his colleague, 
Fink von Finkenstein, who inclined to a French connexion. While Pitt 
regarded Anglo-Prussian cooperation via the Netherlands as a safe- 
guard for the peace of Europe, and for those colonial and maritime 
interests which the Dutch Alliance was especially intended to promote, 
Hertzberg saw in it a means of promoting the territorial consolidation 
and expansion of Prussia in the east, for which the state of affairs in 
Austria, Russia and Turkey seemed to present opportunities. Before 
the end of the year 1787, he had outlined a gigantic system of re- 
arrangements and "compensations," which Joseph Ewart, the British 
Secretary of Legation at Berlin, described in January, 1788, as " equally 
extravagant and impracticable in the present circumstances 1 ." 

In Prussia, no Ministerial plan had the weight and influence 
belonging to plans agreed on by a British Cabinet, since it was always 
uncertain to the last moment whether any such plan would receive 
the royal sanction. So, British diplomatic representatives at Berlin 
had to keep in constant and unwelcome touch with what Morton 
Eden, in 1791, called "the wretched and dirty intrigues that pervade 
this Court." Eden, in a fit of disgust, actually went so far as to say, 
in a very private letter, that the Prussian Ministers "knew about as 
much and had as much influence in public affairs as his boy" — an 
overstatement, but significant 2 . 

Hertzberg's plans during 1787 and the early part of 1788 were 
based on the assumption that Russia and Austria would profit by 
the Turkish War. Russia was known to covet the Black Sea port of 
Oczakoff and the province of Bessarabia, Austria the provinces of 
Moldavia and Wallachia. Assuming that they secured these or other 
important territories, Prussia must put forward a claim for compen- 
sation backed by force and British influence. The compensation was 
to be secured by a reshuffle of Polish territory. In the First Partition, 
Prussia had linked her detached province of East Prussia to the mass 

1 To Carmarthen, January 9th, 1788. 

2 Eden to Grenville, December 31st, 1791 ; Morton Eden to Lord Auckland, 
November 23rd, 1792. Dropmore Papers, II. 245 and 347. 



HERTZBERG'S PLANS 179 

of her territory by securing West Prussia from the Poles ; but she had 
not acquired Danzig. The core of the schemes was that she should 
obtain Danzig and the palatinates of Posen and Kalisch (Great 
Poland), the Poles being in their turn compensated by the retrocession 
of Galicia, Austria's acquisition in the First Partition. Ewart was 
"informed, in private confidence," at the beginning of 1788, "that 
the King of Prussia would have no objection to Russia's obtaining 
Oczakoff and Bessarabia, but that he was more averse than ever to 
the Emperor's making any acquisitions, without his having the equi- 
valent, on the side of Poland 1 ." Thus, in broad outline, the King and 
his Minister were in agreement. 

Great Britain can hardly be said to have had any Polish policy at 
that time. Her Embassy at Warsaw was regarded mainly as an outpost 
for securing information about the plans of Poland's neighbours — a 
function which it fulfilled imperfectly, owing to "the extreme dearth 
of news at this place," as Charles Whitworth wrote in 1786. His 
Instructions, when sent there in January of that year, had been simply 
to watch all designs for the dismemberment of Turkey or Poland, 
and to safeguard British commercial interests 2 . It was not the habit 
of the British Foreign Office to embody political "systems" or hypo- 
thetical policies in the initial Instructions for Ambassadors. The 
British Instructions would make a very meagre collection, if placed 
side by side with the great French series of ambassadorial Instructions ; 
but the almost complete absence of subsequent despatches from 
London to Whitworth shows that the bald Instructions in this case 
correctly outlined the Polish interests of his Government. 

Although schemes for rearrangements of Polish territory, certainly, 
did not greatly concern the Cabinet of St James', it was necessary, 
when drawing closer to Prussia , to weigh the resulting commitments. It 
was therefore important to keep abreast of Hertzberg's plans and his 
master's impulses, and to move with some caution. The history of 
the Triple Alliance, which dominated British foreign policy from 
1788 to 1 79 1, proves that, in his desire to terminate a period of isola- 
tion and secure continental support for his general policy, Pitt showed 
too little rather than too much caution when dealing with his principal 

1 To Carmarthen, January 15th, 1788. 

2 Whitworth to Carmarthen, April 8th, 1786 and his Instructions, January, 1786. 
The Foreign Office only showed interest in Warsaw when it instructed Whitworth 
to attend, on some pretext, the meeting of Catharine and the King of Poland at 
Kieff, in April, 1787. He was sent to collect news, but failed to make Catharine 
talk politics. To Carmarthen, April 24th and May 7th, 1787. Whitworth was 
promoted to Petrograd in October, 1788. 



1S0 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

Ally. Not because Prussia was abnormally lacking in scruple, if 
judged by the diplomatic standards of the day ; but because her real 
interests and those of Great Britain lay in such different fields, 
sustained and active cooperation between the two Powers was always 
difficult. 

Just before the Treaties with the United Provinces were signed, 
i.e. early in April, 1788, Pitt had written down his notion of the form 
which an Anglo-Prussian alliance might take 1 . Putting on one side 
a definite proposal which had come through Ewart from Hertzberg 
for joint action in the east, he suggested that a treaty guaranteeing 
the Dutch settlement should include also a general defensive alliance 
and guarantee of territories between the two Powers, which might be 
kept secret so long as the Quadruple Alliance of the Imperial and 
Bourbon Courts remained incomplete. The Cabinet was more cautious, 
and decided against the suggested mutual guarantee of territory. It 
fully agreed that Great Britain ought not to be in any way committed 
to Hertzberg's territorial speculations. Hertzberg tried again. Again, 
the British Cabinet raised difficulties and refused to commit itself 
too deeply 2 , unless Prussia would make very general promises of 
military assistance. This angered King Frederick William. He told 
his Minister that he was determined not to employ his troops outside 
Germany and the Netherlands, and thanked God that he had no need 
to snatch at alliances 3 . Within a fortnight he had accepted the Alliance, 
though not quite on the terms which had provoked this outburst. 

His acceptance was the work of Sir James Harris. The Prussian 
King had an appointment to visit his sister, the Princess of Orange, at 
her chateau of the Loo, in the second week of June. Just before he 
started, Ewart at Berlin was not very confident. The French party 
in Prussia was active, and Ewart could only express the hope that 
the King would be "undeceived at Loo 4 ." To accomplish this, the 
full apparatus of diplomacy was brought to bear. King George wrote 
an appropriate autograph letter to the Princess, which Harris deli- 
vered 5 . During the critical day (June 12th), Harris concentrated the 
whole strength of his trained and impressive personality on the King 
— and bribed the King's valet to block the access of a hostile personality. 

1 April 2nd, 1788. Pitt MSS. In Salomon, p. 342. 

2 Carmarthen to Ewart, May 14th, 1788. Hertzberg's proposal to Ewart was 
dated April 19th. Luckwaldt, pp. 105-6. 

3 In a note of May 30th. Salomon, p. 345. 

4 To Carmarthen, May 31st. 

6 Malmesbury Correspondence, II. 420. 



PITT'S PLANS. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 181 

Matters were settled between King and Ambassador after midnight 
during a walk in the gardens, away from the music of the State ball. 
The King returned to the music, while Harris, with the Minister 
Alvensleben, spent the small hours of the morning drawing up the 
Treaty on the basis of one of Hertzberg's drafts. The King looked 
through the draft at 9 a.m., and signed the Treaty at 2 p.m. on the 
13th. Harris despatched his courier to Helvoetsluys, and spent the 
afternoon going over the European situation with England's new Ally. 
On the 14th, he must have begun the series of despatches in which 
he told his Cabinet how it had all been done 1 . His rewards were 
a peerage and the right to bear the Prussian Eagle in his coat of Arms. 
Meanwhile, from Berlin, Ewart was able to report that "the French 
emissaries were discarded" and that the Countess Ingelheim — the 
reigning Mistress — "warmly applauded" the King's conduct 2 . 

The Treaty was officially described as provisional. The definitive 
Treaty was signed by Hertzberg and Ewart, exactly four months 
later; but not many changes were made in Harris's work. The final 
Treaty was a Defensive Alliance, the United Kingdom and Prussia 
pledging themselves to support one another, if attacked, with a force 
of at least 20,000 men or an equivalent in cash, and to uphold the 
Dutch Settlement of 1787. As a concession to Frederick William's 
known prejudice, Prussian auxiliaries were not to be used by Great 
Britain outside Europe or be shipped to Gibraltar. Secret articles 
stipulated that the promised contingents should not be furnished, unless 
the Party attacked had set 44,000 men of its own in motion; and that 
Prussia might count on the help of a British fleet, should she require it. 

Hertzberg acted on the principle that Prussia's policy was to have 
no policy — she ought to be always adjusting her programmes to a 
changing world, in order to extract from it the maximum of land and 
of power. He held to the main objects of his great scheme ; but he 
was prepared to put in operation any lesser, or greater, scheme which 
circumstances might favour. Now the early course of the War of 
Russia and Austria against Turkey suggested that the vast conquests 
of the Imperial Courts, in return for which Prussia was to press for 
compensations equally vast, might never be achieved. Wars got 
under way slowly in eastern Europe, and nothing considerable was 
attempted during 1787. In 1788 disease ravaged the ill-organised 
Russian armies and the Act of God at sea crippled the fleet of 

1 They are dated June 15th and have been fully utilised by Salomon and Rose. 

2 To Carmarthen, June 28th. 



182 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

Sebastopol. It was only at the very end of the year (December 17th) 
that Oczakoff was carried in a last desperate assault and its population 
massacred. Austria, by an immense effort, had put 180,000 men into 
the field, but in scattered and ill-coordinated armies. Disease broke 
out in them. Their Generals were incompetent, but so, too, was 
the Emperor, who insisted on retaining the supreme command. So 
unsuccessful were the early months of the War that in August, when 
news of the Anglo-Prussian Treaty came, Joseph was writing to 
Kaunitz that, if Prussia and England joined in, "then the monarchy 
was lost," and there was nothing to prevent the King of Prussia 
from " occupying all Bohemia and Moravia and marching on Vienna 1 ." 
By September, the Austrians were retreating, leaving the Banat of 
Temesvar to be ravaged by the Turks and in fear for Transylvania. 
The Emperor's letters were more despairing than ever. Very natur- 
ally, the thought arose in Berlin that Prussia by an opportune show 
of force — she had already troops massed on the Austrian frontier — 
might get compensation, though Austria got nothing from her Turkish 
war but disgrace. Hertzberg began to see the most brilliant prospects 
opening out for Prussian policy 2 . 

For a time, in the summer, Catharine had seemed in even greater 
danger than Joseph. The chivalrous, autocratic and inconsequent 
Gustavus III of Sweden had suddenly declared war, come to an 
understanding with the Turks, and marched on Petrograd through 
Finland. In the north, Catharine had only a small force and her 
Cronstadt fleet. The fleet fought an indecisive action and the Empress 
had horses ready for the journey to Moscow. Then, partly as a result 
of Russian manipulation, the powerful party among the Swedish 
nobility and gentry which detested Gustavus, on account of his 
autocratic home policy, connived at revolts among the troops and 
desertions of officers. At the same time, the Danes, secretly bound to 
Russia in case of a Russo-Swedish war, prepared to invade Sweden 
from Norway and beset Gothenburg. On September 2nd, Carmarthen 
wrote to Joseph Ewart: "The last accounts which we have received 
of the situation of the King of Sweden represent his difficulties as 
much increased, and state the probability of his applying to this Court 
and that of Berlin, as well as to France, for good offices and mediation." 
It was most desirable, he added, that England and Prussia should 
"prevent France having a share in the event," and hinder Russia 

1 August 26th. Quoted in Sorel, i. 526. 

2 Krauel, Hertzberg, p. 43 ; quoted in Salomon, p. 488. 



THE WAR IN THE EAST AND THE NORTH 183 

from becoming supreme in the Baltic 1 . Pitt and his colleagues began 
to see their new Triple Alliance not only preserving for Great Britain 
that peace which they sincerely prized, but also acting as the great 
and honoured European peace-maker, the preventer of France, the 
curb of Russia, the saviour of Sweden and, should she need saving, 
of Turkey. At Constantinople, Sir Robert Ainslie and his Prussian 
colleague Dietz were influencing Turkish policy and preparing the 
way for mediation by the Triple Alliance, when the time for peace- 
making should come. In the struggle for prestige among the Great 
Powers mediations had long played an important part. Could Great 
Britain mediate, so as to save two old dependants of France, Sweden 
and the Porte, nothing would more clearly demonstrate that to her was 
already passing that moral leadership of Europe which in 1783 the 
French seemed to have recovered. 

That the Alliance should strike in upon the weakness of its neigh- 
bours and thus upset existing territorial arrangements, did not enter 
into the British conception. The British point of view was expressed 
clearly, if not concisely, a year later by Leeds (Carmarthen), when 
Hertzberg's scheme, in a fresh form, had again been put forward. 
The scheme, he said, went much beyond "the spirit of our Treaty 
of Alliance, which is purely of a defensive nature and by which, of 
course, we cannot be considered as in any degree bound to support 
a system of an offensive nature, the great end of which appears to be 
aggrandisement rather than security, and which, from its very nature, 
is liable to provoke fresh hostilities, instead of contributing to the 
restoration of general tranquillity 2 ." 

In the autumn of 1788, Catharine was not in a mood to accept 
British or any other mediation. She supposed, wrongly 3 , that Great 
Britain and Prussia had some hand in the King of Sweden's adventure, 
and wished to punish him and them. She had saved herself by her 
own energy and did not intend to be beholden to that " grandissime 
politique fr. Ge." (frere George), as she called Pitt's master in her 
private correspondence 4 . But, if Catharine was inaccessible, the Court 
of Copenhagen was not ; and there Great Britain was strongly repre- 
sented, by Hugh Elliot. He was instructed to call off the Danes. 

1 See also Pitt to Grenville, September ist, 1788: "Our intervention may pre- 
vent his (Gustavus') becoming totally insignificant, a dependent upon Russia, and 
it seems to me an essential point." Dropn\ore Papers, 1. 353. 

2 Leeds to Ewart, June 24th, 1789. 

3 The evidence is in Rose, Pitt, 1. 494-5. 

4 To Grimm, quoted in Sorel, 1. 528. 



184 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

Mediation between Denmark and Sweden had been offered in a 
despatch from Carmarthen to Elliot, dated August 15th. The great 
Minister Bernstorff had seemed well disposed ; but the young Prince 
Royal repeated what Elliot had been told before, that Denmark was 
bound by treaty to Russia and must stand to her word. This brought 
Pitt forward in person. A despatch to Elliot drafted by him left this 
country on September 9th. It criticised Danish policy on the ground 
that it was certain "to extend the mischiefs of the present war in 
a manner which cannot fail to excite the most serious attention, and 
to have a great effect on the conduct, of all those Courts who are 
interested in the relative situation of the different Powers of the 
Baltic." Before he received this rather obscurely veiled threat, 
learning from Ewart that Prussia was in agreement with Great Britain 
and was contemplating an invasion of Holstein, also that there was 
imminent risk of Gustavus' accepting French mediation, Elliot crossed 
to Sweden, to come into personal contact with the King, who, in spite 
of his high spirit, was almost overwhelmed by external danger and 
domestic treachery. Abandoning his natural inclination to trust in 
Sweden's ancient ally France, Gustavus, who knew that time was 
short, accepted Elliot's magniloquently worded offer without reserve: 
" Sire, give me your Crown ; I will return it to you with added lustre." 
The return of the Crown was not entirely Elliot's work. He went 
at once to the Danish camp, for the Danes were now advancing on 
Gothenburg; but, at first, he failed to impose mediation upon the 
Prince Royal. The siege of Gothenburg was prepared; but so was 
the defence — by Gustavus himself, with the assistance of English 
sailors from ships then in the port. As the prospect of carrying the 
town by a coup de main seemed over, the Danes accepted a short 
Armistice, on October 9th. During the period of the Armistice, news 
of Prussia's threat to Holstein arrived. This strengthened Elliot's 
hand. In the middle of November, the Armistice was extended for 
six months and the immediate danger to Sweden was over 1 . There 
was nc peace : the state of war continued between Sweden and Russia : 
Denmark's good faith was doubted; yet, at the close of the year, the 
Triple Alliance was looking forward with confidence to a general 
pacification and a satisfactory settlement during 1 789 . But its members 
were not agreed as to what constituted a satisfactory settlement. The 
fall of Oczakoff, following on Sweden's breakdown, closed the year 
not unsatisfactorily, if not brilliantly, for Catharine. She had the 
1 This account is based on Rose, Pitt, 1. 495. 



DENMARK AND POLAND 185 

patience and the long views of her adopted country. If not Con- 
stantinople or Bessarabia in this War, then in the next or in some yet 
remote war. Only for a moment, during Gustavus' Finland raid, 
had she ever feared attack — and even then not for Russia proper. 
Without bitterness or any recrimination, she acquiesced in the change 
of plan which circumstances seemed to force on her Ally. She wrote 
to him just before Christmas, and before she can have had the news 
from Oczakoff, that she would raise no objection at all to his making 
peace with the Porte, if he so desired. But she would have nothing 
to do with mediation from any quarter. The view now prevalent at 
Vienna was put by Kaunitz thus : " so long as Prussia's power has not 
been curtailed, all the intentions, plans and enterprises of the two 
Imperial Courts will always be hindered and destroyed by her 1 ." It 
was therefore necessary, if in any way possible, to settle accounts 
with Prussia. On New Year's Day 1789, the chances of doing so in 
the near future would have appeared, to any cool observer, scanty. 

The relations between Berlin and the Imperial Courts had just 
been complicated by events in Poland. For years diplomatists had 
anticipated dissolution for this country, "precluded from every 
exterior commerce by its neighbours and deprived of every interior 
improvement by its Constitution 2 ." Now, the Poles, hoping to be 
relieved of Russian pressure by the withdrawal cf Catharine's armies 
for use elsewhere, initiated a constitutional reform. The Diet met 
on October 6th, 1788, and prepared for action by "confederating" 
itself. By "confederation" it acquired the power to make decisions 
by an ordinary majority vote, instead of by that unanimity, the need 
for which, under the old Polish Constitution, had done more than 
anything else to ruin the country 3 . Catharine, who was in fact com- 
pelled to remove her troops from Polish soil, called to Poland over her 
shoulder, so to speak, that she would regard the least change in the 
Constitution as a breach of treaty (November, 1788). Prussia egged 
the Poles on to defy her, and the work of the Diet went forward. 
Early in December, the Diet decided to enter into negotiations with 
a view to a Prussian alliance, and to send missions to the European 
Courts to explain the contemplated reforms in the Polish Constitution. 
Thereupon, the Prussian representative at Warsaw, Lucchesini, let 
it be known, about Christmastime, that his master would guarantee 

1 Martens, Traites de la Russie avec VAutriche, II. 188-9, quoted in Sorel, I. 528. 

2 Viscount Dalrymple (from Warsaw), October 1st, 1782. 

3 There is an excellent series of despatches on the work of the Great Diet from 
David Hailes who took over the embassy from Whitworth in November, 1788. 



1 86 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

the independence of the Republic without interfering in its internal 
affairs. Prussia at once became popular among the patriots of Warsaw. 
They began, also, to approach the British representative and ask 
whether, if they made an alliance with Prussia, England would accede. 
The British representative was civil ; but, not seeing what commercial 
advantage England could derive from a Polish alliance, with Prussia 
astride the trade route down the Vistula, and inclining to the view that 
Great Britain could only get any such advantage by working through 
Berlin, he advised his Polish friends to lean on Prussia, or else "they 
would never be able to effect any purpose, either commercial or 
political 1 ." Approached again, rather later (March, 1789), he advised 
his Government that to step into Polish affairs might endanger rela- 
tions with Prussia; that it would mean for England "taking the 
Republic under her protection " ; that this was "undoubtedly the wish 
of the Poles and their chief design in proposing their commerce to us " ; 
but that he was very doubtful how far we ought, "to engage for their 
independence" or incur "the danger arising from the protection of 
a sort of new Colonies 2 ." The despatch, though not that of a Cabinet 
Minister, reflects perfectly the Polish problem, as seen from London 3 . 

In these opening months of the great year of Revolution, Prussia 
was encouraging revolutions wherever she could in the Habsburg 
dominions, which contained hardly one contented province, while 
blessing officially what Catharine called revolution in Poland. Prussian 
agents in Hungary were working on the pride and dissatisfaction of 
the Magyar leaders. In Galicia, they were explaining the benefits 
of reunion with a reformed Poland. In the Austrian Netherlands, they 
were blowing the fires of that revolution of Brabant which preceded 
the revolution of France, and gave half its title to Camille Desmoulins' 
first revolutionary journal 4 . Hertzberg, so a French agent reported 
from Berlin, wanted to push his master into action and glory, but 
was opposed by the courtiers and favourites: "all that lot are most 
anxious that the King of Prussia should not escape them, which 
would happen inevitably if that monarch went to lead his armies. So 
these people and the mistress are all for the maintenance of peace — 
and England still more so 5 ." To Great Britain, at least, he did justice. 

Among all the revolutions, actual or projected, that which touched 

1 Hailes to Carmarthen, February 8th, 1789. 

2 Hailes to Carmarthen, March 27th, 1789. The English Alliance was a favourite 
scheme of the Prince Sapieha of those days. Hailes to Carmarthen, July 13th, 1789. 

3 See below, p. 188. * Les Revolutions de France et de Brabant. 
6 Report of the Comte d'Esterno, April 21st, 1789, in Sorel, 1. 531. 



REVOLUTION IN THE HABSBURG DOMINIONS 187 

Great Britain most nearly was the revolution of Brabant. Brabant, like 
all the other duchies and counties which formed the Austrian Nether- 
lands, had inherited its own customs and constitution; and, until 
Joseph's day, the Habsburgs had respected this inheritance. No new 
taxes could be levied without the consent of the Provincial Estates, 
and the established taxes were voted from year to year. The country, 
as a whole, was passionately Catholic, though French philosophy had 
made headway in educated circles. The combination of autocratic 
tendencies, a striving after governmental uniformity, and a definitely 
anti-clerical strain in the Josephine system, had provoked all sections 
of Belgian society. The crisis began when Joseph attempted, by edicts 
dated January 1st, 1787, to introduce a centralised bureaucratic 
system for the whole country. Within four months, the Estates of 
Brabant had declined to vote the taxes, and the Council of Brabant 
had refused to accept dissolution. A lawyer demagogue, Henri van 
der Noot, called the men of Brussels to arms. On May 30th, the 
ancient militia of the gilds, swollen by peasants from the neighbouring 
villages, overawed the Regent and her husband — Marie Christine, 
Joseph's sister, and Duke Albert of Saxe-Teschen. The Government 
on the spot gave way; but, in the autumn, Joseph sent a soldier to 
enforce discipline. In January, 1788, the first blood was shed by 
the troops, while dispersing a mob in the streets of Brussels. 

Joseph supposed that he had won and went forward with his 
reforms, especially the educational and ecclesiastical. In the course 
of 1788, opposition and refusals to vote taxes came from the Estates 
of Flanders and Hainault also. This opposition Joseph once more set 
himself to crush. By June, 1789, just before the fall of the Bastille, he 
supposed that he had succeeded. "At last we have won our game in 
Brabant," he wrote to his sister on the 26th 1 . In truth, the losing game 
for the Habsburg rule in the Low Countries had just entered on its 
final stage. 

The English view of the Belgian situation was stated very clearly 
by King George, in a letter to the Duke of Leeds, later in the year. 
It would never, he said, be in the interests of Great Britain, "either 
that the Emperor should become absolute, or that a Democracy should 
be established there, as either must probably unite that country more 
with France 2 ." During August, Pitt had drawn up a remarkable 

1 Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte, I. 199. 

2 George III to Leeds, December 1st, 1789. Leeds Papers, quoted in Salomon, 
p. 461. 



1 88 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

memoir on the whole position, as a basis for replies to suggestions 
from Prussia that Great Britain should encourage revolution in 
Belgium and Galicia, with a view to their ultimate separation from 
Austria 1 . Galicia, as it touched English interests, he put on one side 
in few and significant words. " The object of increasing Poland with 
a view to the extension of our commerce " he wrote, was " too remote 
and contingent to be relied upon." But the Belgian question was of 
another order. The prevention of a union of Belgium with France 
was an object "worth the risk, or even the certainty," of a war. But 
the mere creation of an independent Belgian State — one of the 
possible results of supporting the Belgian patriots — was not a British 
interest. Our sole direct interest was to keep Belgium in dependence 
on Holland and ourselves. The status quo ante, a. half-independent 
Belgium, not too docile under Austrian rule, suited us perfectly; but 
he recognised the difficulties in the way of its maintenance, and so 
came to a rather lame conclusion. He might have mentioned that 
the main cause why Great Britain, a few years earlier, had not looked 
favourably on Joseph's scheme for exchanging the Low Countries 
against Bavaria was the reasonable belief that a small independent 
Belgian State was far more likely to fall permanently under French 
influence than a group of Belgian Provinces, laxly ruled by a remote 
but powerful Prince, who could make his voice heard in the counsels 
of Europe. An alternative to independence or the maintenance of 
the status quo was the union of Belgium with Holland. This suggestion 
came from the Belgian leader van der Noot. Noot was not a democrat 
of the '89 type — the leader of the growing democratic party was his 
rival, Vonck — but a clerical and an upholder of the old Provincial 
privileges. Driven from home by Joseph's temporary success in 1789, 
he visited van de Spiegel, the Pensionary of the United Provinces, went 
later to Berlin, and sent an agent to London. How sincere his pro- 
posal was, or what weight should be assigned to such schemings of 
a party leader in exile, may be left undecided. He undoubtedly 
made the suggestion to van de Spiegel that a son of the Prince of 
Orange should be nominated Regent of Belgium 2 . The proposal was 

1 It is in the Leeds Papers, B.M. Add. MSS. 28068, and is dated August 27th. 
A German translation is in Salomon, p. 453 sqq. 

2 Resume des Negotiations qui accompagnerent la revolution des Pays-Bas Au- 
trichiens, by L. B. J. van de Spiegel, 1841, quoted in Heigel, op. tit. I. 199. Van der 
Noot's agent in England was a certain van Roode. Van de Spiegel mentioned the 
scheme for Belgian independence, but apparently not the Regency scheme, to the 
British Minister, Alleyne Fitzherbert. Fitzherbert was "not a little surprised that... 
he could condescend to listen for a single instant, to a scheme which to my mind 



THE BELGIAN PROBLEM 189 

weighed in London and known in Paris. A French agent in England 
reported it, in what seems a distorted form, in the course of September. 
England, he said, had for a time played with the idea of uniting the 
two countries and attaching the new composite State to the German 
Empire, as an additional electorate 1 . In his August memorandum, 
Pitt had in fact considered the scheme, and had dismissed it. It 
appeared to him, he wrote, that "the difference of religion and the 
clashing interests of commerce, particularly with respect to the navi- 
gation of the Scheldt, seemed to make that project difficult, if not 
impracticable." Nothing more was heard of it for years. 

Discussing the possibility of an ultimate war with France on 
some Low Countries' issue, Pitt stated that he would rather become 
involved in such a war, "having the Emperor and Holland with us, 
and Prussia not against us," than run the risk of forcing it on now, 
and so driving France and Austria into a joint war with England, 
the United Provinces and Prussia . He had not yet come to understand 
the new France, nor foreseen that henceforward Franco- Austrian 
cooperation would be an impossibility. His conclusion of the whole 
matter was to wait, but to assure the Belgian insurgents that Great 
Britain would not allow the Emperor to destroy their Constitution. 

Pitt did not anticipate any immediate complications with the 
French over the Belgian question; but he thought that, if "either the 
rashness of their councils, or the enthusiasm of the present spirit 
which prevails among them should lead them to measures of this 
nature, a war would be in any case inevitable." The sentence contains 
one of the earliest hints by a European statesman of a possible French 
war of democratic propaganda. That France might be plunged into 
war by the partisans of the Old Order, with a view to distracting 
attention from internal trouble, was a commonplace of diplomatic 
speculation 2 . Pitt's representatives and agents in the Belgian Provinces 
kept the Foreign Office well informed as to every move of the French 
and democratic parties there 3 ; but so late as August, 1789, at least, 
and, in the minds of most statesmen, down to a much later date, the 

appears wild and chimerical in the extreme" (to Leeds, July ioth, 1789). Nor does 
van der Noot appear to have broached the Regency scheme at Berlin (see Ewart to 
Carmarthen, September 5th, 1789, reporting his proposals there). Pitt's serious 
discussions of it suggest that his agent pressed it in London. 

1 Report of La Luzerne, September 29th, 1789, quoted in Sorel, II. 60. 

2 There are many such suggestions: for example, the discussion between the 
British representative and the Spanish Minister Florida Blanca reported by the 
former. Wm. Eden to Carmarthen, March 30th, 1789. 

3 See the F.O. Correspondence, Flanders, 1789, passim. 



i 9 o PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

possibility of French democratic propaganda being conducted by the 
sword seemed remote and in no way dangerous. What might be 
called the correct diplomatic opinion during 1789 undoubtedly was 
that for years France, whatever she might do, would involve no real 
danger to anyone. William Eden, for example, writing to his brother on 
September 29th, said it was "beyond any speculation that in our time 
France should again make the same appearance among nations that 
she has made... I fairly and sincerely wish to see order restored: — she 
is no longer an object of alarm; and her prosperity would now be 
very compatible with ours, which certainly is at this hour far beyond 
what the nation has ever experienced." He added, a month later: 
" The troubles of France have increased, so as to render that unhappy 
country very interesting as to its interior, but probably for a long 
period of little importance with regard to its external, politics 1 ." Eden 
was a representative observer, cool, experienced and intimately 
acquainted with French affairs 2 . Other cool heads were of the same 
opinion. "The situation of France," Ewart reported from Berlin 3 , 
"seems to have made the Empress of Russia fairly sensible that no 
reliance whatever can be placed on the power or influence of that 
country at least for many years." The Court of Berlin, also, was 
persuaded that — "the great popular revolution in France will prevent 
that country effectually from interfering in any shape in favour of 
the Imperial Courts 4 ." 

Hertzberg no longer felt any fear of that Quadruple Alliance 
which had haunted his first and great master. He could go forward, 
if Great Britain would. Throughout the latter part of 1788 and the 
whole of 1789, Anglo-Prussian diplomacy is one long struggle between 
Prussia's forward policy and the British conception of the Triple 
Alliance. Hertzberg's plans evolve and shift. His master's military 
enthusiasm flares up, and dies down, and flares up again. The British 
Foreign Office reiterates that "it is impossible to pledge this country 
beforehand to the consequences of measures which go beyond the 
limits of a Defensive Alliance 5 ." By May, 1789, Frederick William 

1 Wm. Eden to Morton Eden, September 29th and October 20th, 1789, Auckland 
MSS., B.M. Add. 34429. 

2 By April, 1790, however, Eden had become alarmed at what he called the 
French " enthusiasm of giving what they called liberty to all nations." To Sir R. M. 
Keith, printed in Memoir of Sir R. M. Keith, II. 270. 

3 To Leeds, October 20th, 1789. 

4 Ewart to Leeds, July 28th, 1789. 

6 Leeds to Ewart, September 14th, 1789, following the lines of Pitt's August 
Memorandum. 



THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE POWERS 191 

was writing to his Ambassador in London that he was losing all 
patience and did not know what to think of this indifference of the 
British Cabinet, which he had not deserved. "There was no such 
delay and indifference shown on my side, when the Dutch affairs 
were under consideration 1 ." When the Bastille had fallen, Prussia 
tried to scare England into activity; not by suggesting that France 
might begin a war of democratic propaganda, but by suggesting 
a Franco-Prussian alliance — the French, free from autocracy, might 
cast off the Austrian connexion, and return to their true interests 
and to their old relations with Prussia 2 . England was not fright- 
ened. Her Minister had just stated once more that "she could not 
be considered as in any degree bound to support a system of an 
offensive nature 3 ." 

Prussia then tried the argument that she need not support it very 
actively. The King himself told Ewart, in October, that in "case of 
his being committed with Austria, either separately or in conjunction 
with Russia, relative to the affairs either of Poland or of Turkey, he 
did not pretend that England should become a party in the War; 
mats qu'elle voulut seulement lui tenir le dos libre, du cote de la France, 
and continue to cooperate in maintaining the neutrality of Denmark 4 ." 

At this time, Frederick William was desirous of war, Hertzberg 
eager for a diplomatic triumph, but apparently not for war. The 
King was in high spirits at the successes of the Belgian insurgents, 
successes which culminated in the return of van der Noot with 
triumph to Brussels, a joint repudiation of the Habsburgs by the 
Estates of Flanders and Brabant, and the junction of the other 
Provinces with them at the end of the year. "He is so over-elated 
that he thinks of nothing less than depriving the House of Austria 
both of the Netherlands and Galicia," Ewart wrote on November 28th. 
His Minister at Constantinople was working for a Turkish Treaty, 
a Treaty which was signed hurriedly and, as Hertzberg thought, with 
an amazing lack of foresight in the drafting, on January 31st, 1790. 
During December the Polish Diet approved the preliminary arrange- 
ments with Prussia which ripened next year into the traite d'amitie 
et d' union of March, 1790. These two negotiations explain Frederick 
William's reference to "the affairs of Poland and of Turkey." The 
Polish Treaty was the starting-point for the series of events which 

1 To Alvensleben, May 4th. Salomon, p. 450. 

2 To Alvensleben, July 31st. Salomon, p. 450. 

3 Leeds to Ewart, June 24th. The despatch quoted above, p. 183. 

4 Ewart to Leeds, October 17th. 



i92 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

led up to the Second Partition ; but, at the time of its signature, Prussia 
was not planning partition. All her statesmen were determined to 
secure, by any means, at least the key-towns of Thorn and Danzig; 
but the ruling design in 1789-90 was that for compensating Poland at 
Austria's expense by the gift of Galicia. In gratitude, Poland was to 
pass from the Russian sphere of influence into that of Prussia. This 
plan did not allow sufficiently for the strength and resource of 
Catharine, or for the storms which were blowing up from the west. 

At the close of 1788 Catharine had hoped that George Ill's 
insanity and the Regency of the Prince of Wales might bring Fox back 
to power. She approached Fox through Woronzow, her Ambassador 
in London, and expressed the conviction that he and the Prince would 
not allow themselves to be dragged at the heels of Prussia 1 . But King 
George's recovery (February) left Pitt stronger than ever; so that 
door was closed. However, the succession of a weak Sultan, Selim II, 
in April, 1789, raised hopes in Petrograd for the campaigns of that 
year. They proved, in fact, most successful. Joseph's armies recovered. 
The Danubian Provinces — Bessarabia, Moldavia and Wallachia — 
were invaded, and by the end of 1789 the original postulate for Hertz- 
berg's compensation schemes, that the Imperial Courts would be in 
a position to claim much Turkish territory at the end of the War, 
seemed to have become valid. Hence, Frederick William's desire to 
utilise the Belgian revolt to the utmost, and to blood his fine army on 
Austria while the mass of Joseph's troops were on the Danube. 
British troops he neither needed nor expected, but he required the 
British fleet, for Denmark was not to be trusted. She had not yet 
made peace and, thanks to her passive assistance, Russia was in control 
of the Baltic. Prussia, therefore, hoped that Great Britain's firm wish 
to reestablish the status quo in the Baltic, and to keep France in check, 
would suffice to ensure her cooperation at least long enough for the 
Prussian sword, or the threat of the Prussian sword, to do its work. 

Great Britain was exceedingly cautious, but correct. At the end 
of 1789, she was given an opportunity by the Imperial Courts of 
throwing over Prussia altogether. They sounded her as to the terms 
on which she would agree to an eastern peace 2 . This offer she put 
aside: she must act with her Allies, she said. But as the offer indi- 
cated a desire for peace, it confirmed the British Cabinet in its policy 
of using the Triple Alliance as a peace-making and conservative 
combination. All that Frederick William, to his annoyance, was able 
1 Rose, Pitt, 1. 509. 2 Details in Salomon, p. 463. 



POSITION IN THE EAST. DEATH OF JOSEPH II 193 

to secure in relation to the Netherlands was a Convention, signed at 
Berlin on January 9th, 1790, by which the three Powers declared their 
joint interest in the Belgian Provinces ; their resolve to uphold Belgian 
liberties; and their willingness to recognise Independence, should 
Independence become quite evident 1 . In spite of its annoyance, the 
Court of Berlin made a swift calculation and fell into line. This was 
the calculation: that the Triple Alliance, taking its cue from Great 
Britain would come forward with a proposal for a general peace on 
status quo ante terms : that the Imperial Courts would be too proud 
to accept : and that Prussia would thus secure her war, her com- 
pensations, and her Ally 2 . 

Early in the morning of February 20th, 1790, Joseph II died at 
Vienna. He had worked to the end at the task of government which 
had now broken him — signing documents that same night. His wiser, 
cooler, more diplomatic brother Leopold, the liberal-minded Grand- 
duke of Tuscany, was his heir. Two days after the news of Joseph's 
death reached Florence, Leopold summoned the British Resident, 
Hervey, to a private interview in the evening. He told his visitor that 
he wanted peace, and that Hervey was to state this emphatically to 
his own Court. He referred to the unhappy Alliance with Russia and 
the sacrifice of the natural Austrian friendship with England. Let 
England mediate and save him from a breach with Prussia. He would 
dearly like a defensive alliance with England. He praised her correct 
and reserved handling of the Belgian revolution, and said — with 
seeming sincerity — that no nation in Europe was now so highly 
esteemed. France, he added, was laid aside for years. For himself, 
he cared for no conquests. He would make peace tomorrow. Russia 
and the Porte were war-weary, and would no doubt concur. To the 
Belgians he had made offers which they could not refuse: if desired, 
he would accept England and Prussia as guarantors of the Belgian 
liberties. To the Magyars, also, he would restore their ancient customs 
and liberties. As for Poland — he would give back his share of it 
tomorrow, if the other Partitioning Powers would do the same. 
Hervey left the presence late at night, with Leopold's parting pro- 
testations of friendship in his ears 3 . 

1 Ewart to Leeds, January 9th, 1790. For the King's annoyance, Ewart to Leeds, 
February 22nd. 

2 Minute au Rot, March 5th, 1790, and the King's reply (Salomon, p. 465), 
Compare the unexpectedly cordial reception given to a despatch from Leeds of 
February 26th, as reported by Ewart to Leeds, March 8th. 

8 The report is in the Leeds MSS., dated February 28th. A full summary in 
Salomon, pp. 467-9. 

w.&G.i. 13 



i 9 4 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

Nothing could have been more welcome to the English Cabinet 
than Hervey's report. "It seems highly expedient," Leeds wrote at 
once to Ewart, "to communicate to his Prussian Majesty in the 
strictest confidence some very interesting information we have re- 
ceived respecting the general views of the King of Hungary 1 ." The 
information followed, with hopeful estimates of the new Sovereign, 
and of his sincerity. These estimates were shortly confirmed by the 
shrewd and humorous British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Robert 
Murray Keith. " I have every reason to be persuaded of the sincerity 
of his pacific professions, and it appears to me that he uses his best 
endeavours to restore the general tranquillity." But as a Scotsman and 
a soldier, Keith added: "It may not however be amiss to remark 
that with a brave army of above three hundred thousand effective 
men... and with a population as well as money sufficient to keep it up 
to that strength, he may be supposed to be able to maintain. . .a vigorous 
war against Prussia... particularly if that war shall be made (as every 
appearance seems to prognosticate) on a plan merely defensive 2 ." 

Campaigning had now begun, and what Keith anticipated is 
clear. Leeds had followed up his letter to Berlin of March 16th by 
another, in which he stated categorically that "it would be impossible 
for this country to give any expectation of supporting Prussia in a 
contest" waged to tear Galicia from Austria 3 . The Prussian Court 
was for a moment dismayed. Should Leopold act as reasonably as 
he spoke, and accept the status quo, there would be neither war nor 
compensations 4 . ^There was talk of British treachery at Berlin. But 
having secured his Turkish and Polish treaties, considering that Russia 
was far away, the King, after much vacillation, decided to risk 
Great Britain's defection and stand by Hertzberg's Galician plans, 
on the ground that either he would get something by them , or they 
would provoke Austria to war. He arranged "to have his whole army 
on the war establishment about the middle of next month," as Ewart 
wrote in April. " This has been judged necessary on every account and 
particularly as very considerable corps of Austrian troops are already 
assembled in Bohemia and Moravia and are daily receiving rein- 
forcements 5 ." 

1 Leeds to Ewart, March 16th, 1790. 

2 Keith to Leeds, April 5th, 1790. Prince Henry of Prussia, a constant enemy 
of Hertzberg, also thought that Austria would fight a successful defensive war. 
Heigel, op. cit. p. 255. 3 Leeds to Ewart, March 30th. 

4 For details of Prussian opinion see Salomon, pp. 470-1. See also Lecky, 
vi. 127 sqq. 6 Ewart to Leeds, April 19th, 1790. 



THE POLICY OF LEOPOLD II 195 

Leopold wanted peace; but, as Keith had hinted, he was not pre- 
pared for humiliation. Perhaps his resolution was stiffened by the 
maritime quarrel about Nootka Sound which had suddenly broken 
out between Great Britain and Spain. It might give the former occu- 
pation. But, as he already knew that she would not support Prussia in 
a war for Galicia, this must have been a secondary consideration. He 
continued warlike preparations ; but he wrote most reasonable letters 
to Berlin 1 . In June, Frederick William moved to Schonwalde on the 
Silesian frontier, whither Ewart followed him, so as to keep in touch 2 . 
The King was growing impatient. "It is ridiculous to lose so much 
time, when you have an army like mine," he wrote to Hertzberg: 
matters must be settled within three weeks, or he would fight 3 . 

From Vienna, the British Ambassador did not vary his estimate 
of Leopold's good intentions and sincerity. But conflicts of royal 
with Ministerial policy, very typical of the State systems of the day, 
puzzled Keith. It is possible that Leopold utilised them to throw dust 
in his eyes. The old Chancellor Kaunitz, with his "haughty inflexi- 
bility," became so impracticable that another Minister, Count Philip 
Cobenzl, was authorised by Leopold to explain away the Chan- 
cellor's communications. Keith was asked to show them to Cobenzl, 
who would bring back his master's glosses. " It is at best (rejoined I) but 
an awkward method of doing business, and the sooner an end is put 
to it the better. But I subscribe to it for the present.... Here, My 
Lord," Keith concluded, "ends the history of Prince Kaunitz's 
political career : Heaven forbid that I should ever hereafter insult his 
ashes 4 ." Kaunitz was not so easily buried; but, by June, the King of 
Hungary — Leopold was not yet Emperor — was in effective control 
of his own policy, and seemed ready to accept British mediation of 
a peace on the basis of the status quo 5 . 

Pitt and his Cabinet, fully occupied at that time with the Spanish 
problem, could not bring their full weight to bear either on Leopold 
or on Prussia. Leeds had written, on May 21st, that Great Britain 
would acquiesce in minor territorial rearrangements, should an 

1 Copies were regularly sent by Ewart to Leeds. 

2 He writes from Breslauon June 16th. On June 21st, he moved to Reichenbach. 

3 June nth. Heigel, op. cit. p. 257. Hertzberg must have told Ewart, who wrote 
to Leeds on the 16th in these very words. 

4 To Leeds, April 24th, 1790. 

5 Keith's June despatches, passim. It may be worth noting that the Dutch 
Ambassador in Vienna reported at this time that there were three policies there — 
Kaunitz's, Cobenzl's, and Leopold's, "often totally distinct and separate from them 
both." Auckland [from the Hague] to Leeds, July 16th, 1790. 

13—2 



196 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

armistice and, eventually, peace be attainable on no other terms. A few 
weeks later, Leopold, in one of his friendly letters to Frederick William, 
had made it clear that he could not go beyond some such minor adjust- 
ments without sacrifice of honour 1 . At the same time he sent Envoys, 
Baron Spielmann and Prince Reuss, to treat with Hertzberg, who was 
now established within twenty-five miles of the Bohemian frontier, 
at Reichenbach. 

Here, the formal Conference opened on June 27th. On the first 
day, Prussians and Austrians discussed compensations, exchanges and 
the status quo. On the 29th, Ewart and his Dutch colleague van Rheede 
were invited to attend. Ewart found that the negotiators were con- 
templating much more extensive "arrangements " than England could 
possibly approve. The Austrians were standing out for heavy com- 
pensation at the cost of the Porte — which looked ugly after their 
master's professions. Leopold, in fact, was far less radically friendly 
towards Great Britain and British schemes than he led her agents to 
suppose. He criticised her bitterly in letters to his sister, and he 
would almost certainly have risked the rejection of the status quo, 
for his armies were doing well on the Danube, had Catharine promised 
more powerful support 2 . On both sides, Great Britain's influence 
was limited — far more limited than a first reading of Ewart 's des- 
patches suggests. Ewart threw every ounce of it into the scale ; but 
the deciding weights were in other hands, as can be read between the 
lines of his despatches 3 . 

For a month the discussions continued. Private agents came and 
went between Reichenbach and Vienna. All the personal forces at 
work in the Prussian Court made themselves felt. Varying news from 
the seat of war, and as to whether the Sultan would accept territorial 
sacrifices, supposing such were suggested by his new Ally Prussia — 
who left the Treaty of January still unratified — affected the course of 
the negotiations. The British and Dutch representatives laboured 
for peace. In the back-ground stood Russia, refusing to participate in a 
conference which implied mediation from outside, but influencing its 
course by a policy shifting and hard to interpret 4 . About July 21st, 
war seemed certain ; and Frederick William sent Hertzberg "repeated 
orders to prepare the manifesto 5 ." By this time, the Prussian King 

1 Copy in Ewart to Leeds, June 17th. 

2 Wolf, Leopold und Marie Christine, pp. 163 sqq. Salomon, p. 585. 

3 A long series, July 1st, 8th, 16th, 18th, 22nd, 25th, 28th, August 4th. I over- 
rated the importance of Ewart's influence in my Causes of the War of 1792, pp. 61-2. 

4 See Rose, 1. 527. 5 Ewart to Leeds, July 25th. 



THE CONGRESS OF REICHENBACH 197 

had anchored his tossing mind to the alternative of the strict status 
quo or war. He hoped to pin Austria on one horn of this dilemma. 
Hertzberg's view was that Leopold could not accept the strict status 
quo without dishonour 1 . Thus, he expected, and now desired, war. 
At Vienna, Kaunitz shared Hertzberg's view. But on July 23rd came 
news that Austria would not fight for her compensation; and on the 
27th Declarations and Counter-declarations were exchanged. 

Austria declared herself ready to conclude an armistice with the 
Porte, with a view to a status quo peace, though a hope was expressed 
that the Sultan might accept a few frontier adjustments. She would 
not participate in the Russo-Turkish War, should it continue. Prussia 
stipulated that, if the Sultan freely gave Austria anything, Austria 
must give Prussia something. Prussia and the Sea Powers were to 
guarantee Belgium to Austria, but also Belgium's ancient Con- 
stitutions. The Sea Powers promised to support the whole settlement 
— which was exactly what the British Cabinet had always desired — 
and to continue their mediation at the ensuing Peace Congress 2 . At 
the last, both Hertzberg and Kaunitz had to be forced to sign, by 
personal notes from their respective masters 3 . 

And now, wrote Frederick William to Hertzberg, we must work 
through Ewart to get English support in forcing the status quo on 
Russia. He had already used an opportunity of binding England to 
him by gratitude for services rendered. Two months earlier, Hertz- 
berg had told Ewart that, if England's quarrel with Spain led to war, 
she might count on Prussia. 

On January 7th, 1790, Consul-general Merry had written to the 
Duke of Leeds from Madrid: "Accounts have just been received here 
from Mexico that one of the small ships of war on the American 
establishment... has captured an English vessel in the port of Nootka 
(called by the Spaniards San Lorenzo) in Lat. 50 North of the coast 
of California. There are different relations of this event." A month 
later 4 , the Spanish Ambassador in London claimed for his country 
the sovereignty of those parts, i.e. the modern Vancouver Island and 
British Columbia. Leeds replied stiffly that, until the ship was 
restored and the violence atoned for, the question of principle must 
wait 5 , though, as his despatches show, the British Cabinet had no 

1 Salomon, p. 485. 2 Ewart to Leeds, July 28th. 

s Heigel, 1. 267. 

4 February nth, Rose, 1. 565. As to the very complicated question of what 
actually happened in Nootka Sound, see Rose, passim. 

5 February 16th. A rather bullying despatch, drafted by Pitt. 



198 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

intention of conceding the principle. In Spain, Count Florida Blanca 
was distressed, so he said, at the British tone : in these times especially, 
such matters ought to be discussed without heat 1 . In April, there 
were preparations both in English and Spanish dockyards; and at 
the end of the month the heat in this country was not lowered by the 
reception of a memorial from the aggrieved party, Meares, an ex- 
lieutenant of the Navy, who had bought land from the Indians at 
Nootka and was carrying on the fur-trade there. He made strong 
charges of cruelty and bad faith against the Spaniards. 

War was already in sight. " I can see only one circumstance," Merry 
wrote on April 12th 2 , "which may incline the King of Spain and his 
Ministry to war — it is the idea that it might be the means to re- 
establish the royal authority in France, as that Kingdom would 
naturally take a part." The whole tone of Florida Blanca's communi- 
cations with Eden in 1789 justifies the assumption that the motive 
indicated may have been at work 3 . But, when Merry wrote, he did 
not think it would prevail to overcome the Spanish Minister's desire 
for peace. However, after Great Britain had officially intimated that 
she was arming, and had sent out the pressgangs, opinion at the 
Spanish Court became more warlike. This was in the first week of 
May 4 . Merry's explanation was " that the national vanity of Spain had 
so much increased of late, as well by the situation of France, as by the 
manner in which she has been flattered by the Imperial Courts" — in 
connexion, that is, with the schemes for a Quadruple Alliance 5 . It 
is true that Florida Blanca had been losing his hold on affairs, since 
the death of Charles III in 1788; persons vain in every sense of the 
word were acquiring influence at Court. Indeed, the British agent 
had suggested that the Count might conceivably be contemplating 
war, in order to secure his position against them 6 . 

Meanwhile, Pitt, who had not forgotten how the Family Compact 
had helped Washington, took a hand in the game of revolution- 
making in a rival's discontented provinces, as played by Hertzberg, 

1 Merry to Leeds, March 22nd. 

2 To Leeds. 

3 See, especially, Eden to Leeds July 27th; August 10th. It maybe noted that 
Eden had " never... seen reason to doubt either the veracity or the candour of Count 
Florida Blanca." To Leeds, February 23rd, 1789. % 

4 Leeds to Merry, May 3rd, notifying armament, and the May despatches from 
Madrid. The pressgangs were out on the 5th. A French agent in England wrote: 
" Si Vonjuge des projets du gouvernement anglais par les preparatifs, on doit croire a une 
guerre la plus longue et la plus severe possible." Sorel, 11. 85. 

B To Leeds, May 20th. 

6 In his letter of April 12th. 



NOOTKA SOUND 199 

by entering into personal relation with Miranda, Brissot's friend, the 
exiled advocate of South-American independence 1 . Pitt, with the full 
support of his King, was now challenging Spain on the question of 
principle 2 — the claim to sovereignty over the Pacific coast up to 
6o° N. Not wishing to exclude a peaceful solution, he sent Alleyne 
Fitzherbert on a special mission to Madrid, at the end of May. But 
it would appear that in no case did he mean to withdraw. His ready, 
almost brutal, acceptance of this challenge to a struggle in which 
maritime prestige and the freedom of colonisation were at stake is in 
notable contrast with his laboured approach to any Continental 
problem. The reaction is instinctive: there are to be no abstract 
rights over blocks of parallels of latitude : the beard of the King of 
Spain is to be singed. 

Fitzherbert went by Paris, to test the strength of the Family 
Compact ; for no one supposed that Spain would fight, if the Compact 
now proved too weak to hold France to her. He was "inclined to 
believe that M. de Montmorin is perfectly sincere in the desire that 
he professes to see our difference with Spain terminated amicably," 
but could "plainly perceive that many of the other members of the 
aristocratical faction are anxious to bring on a war." ' ' However, their 
opponents begin to be aware of their drift and... have chosen the 
present time for carrying into execution their plan of transferring the 
power of making war and peace from the Crown to the National 
Assembly 3 ." It was the King's intimation, given on May 14th, that 
he proposed to arm forty ships of the line as a precautionary measure, 
which had roused the Assembly. Montmorin hoped that the threat 
from the old enemy, risen from her humiliation of seven years ago, 
might rally the representatives of the people to the Throne. On the 
contrary, it crippled French diplomatic and military action by ren- 
dering the seat of authority uncertain. Robespierre was up on the 
15th of May, proposing that France should renounce all wars of 
conquest; Petion followed on the 17th, Volney on the 18th, Barnave 
on the 21st. Mirabeau stood for the King and was called a traitor. 
By the 22nd it had been decided that the King might propose war 
to the Assembly, but might not declare it without their concurrence. 
"England has nothing more to fear from France and can lay hands 
on the hegemony of the two worlds, without scruple and without 

1 Details in Rose, I. 569. 

2 Despatch of May 4th. 

3 Fitzherbert to Leeds, May 20th. 



200 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

fear," bitterly wrote a French agent from London 1 . Fitzherbert went 
on to Madrid with some confidence. 

He found the Spaniards unexpectedly, and as he thought stupidly, 
warlike — from a feeling of jealousy, he supposed. They seemed, he 
said, not to count much on France, but had hopes of the United States 2 . 
However, before the end of July he had signed an agreement with 
Florida Blanca as to the actual episode of Nootka Sound. Spain pro- 
mised satisfaction 3 . "Their present object," he now reported, "is 
to preserve peace on almost any terms." 

No doubt, one reason was that they had asked France for armed 
assistance in the middle of June and had hitherto received no reply. 
Montmorin only laid the matter before the Assembly on August 2nd. 
It was referred to the Diplomatic Committee, presided over by Mira- 
beau. Not knowing what the outcome might be, Pitt kept his fleets 
ready. On August 25th, at Mirabeau's suggestion, the Assembly 
decided to arm forty-five capital ships and begin a negotiation with 
Spain for the transformation of the Family Compact into a National 
Compact. A little earlier, Florida Blanca had told Fitzherbert that 
his appeal to France had been merely pro forma and occasioned by 
England's similar, and earlier, appeal to her Ally the United Provinces. 
He did not expect help from the National Assembly, "nor in truth 
did he desire to receive any, at the immediate risk of introducing 
by that means into this kingdom those democratic principles now so 
universally prevalent... in France 4 ." He would, however, welcome 
support from Russia and Austria, but — this of course he did not say 
— he had received no encouragement from either. When the proposal 
for a new sort of Compact was ready, in September, he explained that 
his King loathed it, but would have to accept, "if the Court of London 
pressed too hardly upon him in the present juncture 5 ." But, since 
the proposal was accompanied by the suggestion that Spain should 
restore Louisiana to France, and since Spain neither wished to do 
this, nor desired an alliance with the democrats, nor yet believed in the 
fighting value of such an alliance, Florida Blanca yielded to relentless 
pressure from London 6 , and signed, on October 28th. The claim to 

1 Sorel, 11. 91. 

2 To Leeds, June 16th. 

3 Fitzherbert to Leeds, July 25th. 

4 Fitzherbert to Leeds, August 19th. 

5 Fitzherbert to Leeds, September 16th. 

6 On October 2nd Leeds is writing of "one further effort" and "our final and 
unalterable decisions," which if not accepted negotiations are to be broken off. To 
Fitzherbert. 



THE NOOTKA SETTLEMENT AND FRANCE 201 

Pacific dominion north of the actual Spanish settlements was with- 
drawn : the Pacific, though not these settlements, was declared open to 
British commerce and fishery : and full restitution and compensation 
were guaranteed to the parties aggrieved at Nootka Sound 1 . 

In Continental history, the most famous aspect of the Nootka 
Sound affair is its relation to the career of Mirabeau. What was 
his policy ? Why did he suggest armament yet go no further ? What 
were his exact relations with Pitt's two semi-official agents, his own 
friend Hugh Elliot and W. A. Miles? Did either of them use the 
legendary "gold of Pitt"? The probability is that they did 2 . But 
these are, in truth, all secondary problems in the history of British 
Foreign Policy. Nothing suggests that, had France vigorously sup- 
ported Spain, Pitt's policy would have been altered. From the 
French side, it is most doubtful whether such vigorous support could 
have been given, whatever course Mirabeau had followed. And Spain 
never really wanted alliance on the only terms considered in France. 
"His Catholic Majesty could not reconcile it to His Feelings to 
contribute, at a critical moment like the present, to the extinguishing 
the reviving hopes of the partisans of the French monarchy by... a 
renunciation on his part of the Family Compact 3 ." 

But the correspondence relating to the negotiations with Mirabeau 
raises a wider issue. When consenting to Elliot's mission, King George 
stipulated that there should be no interference whatever in French 
internal affairs, no taking sides among the French parties. "We have 
honourably not meddled with the internal dissensions of France," 
he wrote, "and no object ought to drive us from that honourable 
ground 4 ." Pitt's relations with Miranda show that such interference 
was not beneath the dignity of the British Cabinet ; but the King's 
statement was nevertheless true. The British inaction had surprised 
Continental observers. Even in 1789, the diplomatic gossips in Berlin 
could not understand Pitt's conduct; they thought he could not be 
such a fool as not to declare war 5 . And a German scholar wrote: 
"What do you think of the French Revolution? That England has 

1 For the final stages see Fitzherbert's despatches of October 14th, 18th, 24th, 
28th. On October 14th, on receipt of Leed's of October 2nd, he feared rupture. 

2 Rose, Pitt, 1. 577 sqq. — a discussion which goes nearer to providing satisfactory 
answers to these questions than any other. 

3 Fitzherbert to Leeds, November 28th, 1790. 

4 To Pitt, October 26th, 1790. P. V. Smith MSS. p. 368 in H.M.C. Duke of 
Beaufort MSS. and others. The collection was made by Pitt's secretary, Joseph 
Smith. 

5 Report of the Comte d'Esterno from Berlin, September 9th, 1789. Sorel, 
11. 2gn. 



202 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

allowed it is a tribute to her heart, but not to her head 1 ." No doubt, 
the heart had its influence. An English statesman could scarcely 
have interfered, had he wished it, in the early days of sympathy for 
a people struggling for freedom. And the King's honourable horror 
of such interference as that from which he had himself suffered during 
the American War was always a restraining force. But a main reason 
for abstention was a calculation of the head, which proved to be 
wrong — that France was no longer dangerous. That "the rival of 
Great Britain was, at least for the present annihilated," was still an 
axiom in the Foreign Office at the end of 1790 2 . Great Britain did not 
at once realise, as the German scholar did, that" the republic of twenty- 
four millions would give her more trouble than the autocracy." In 
1789-90, she did not foresee a republic. 

In one of his despatches to Fitzherbert, Leeds had explained that 
Great Britain could not reduce her naval establishment until France 
did the same. He had added that it would not be wise to do so, with 
the Russian matter still pending 3 . At that time, the representatives 
of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Holland and Turkey were preparing 
to move to the dirty little oriental town of Sistova on the Danube 4 , 
to arrange an eastern peace on the basis of the status quo. Sir Robert 
Keith arrived there on December 20th 5 . No Russian came. On 
December 22nd, Suvoroff, Bessarabia now behind him, stormed 
Ismail, far down the river, and was in a position to organise an in- 
vasion of the Sultan's home provinces, by way of the Dobrudja. 
Earlier in the month (December 2nd), Leopold's armies, set in motion 
against his rebellious subjects in Belgium, had entered Brussels 
without difficulty. The Belgians had been ruined by their divisions. 
All through 1790, the democratic party, headed by Vonck, had been 
working against the Catholic and Constitutional party of van der Noot. 
These "Red Patriots," as an English agent called them 6 , had been 
encouraged by the visits of two French agents, first La Fayette's 
confidant Semonville, then Dumouriez, who had reported very un- 
favourably on the military prospects of any Belgian Government 7 . By 

1 Georg Forster. Cf. Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution, p. 304. 

2 From a long unsigned and undated memoir On a Defensive Alliance with Spain, 
a subject under discussion after the Nootka settlement. 

3 Leeds to Fitzherbert, October 2nd, 1790. 

4 Now in Bulgaria. 

5 Memoirs of Sir R. M. Keith, II. 324. 

6 Colonel Gardiner to Leeds, February 2nd, 1790. 

7 Gardiner's reports of July 12th and 26th and August 2nd contain a full 
account of this mission and an excellent appreciation of Dumouriez. 



CONGRESS OF SISTOVA. GUSTAVUS III OF SWEDEN 203 

the beginning of 1791, not only had Belgian opposition to Leopold 
collapsed ; his tact and discretion had calmed the rest of his dominions. 

It is not therefore surprising, nor really very discreditable, that 
the Austrian representatives at Sistova should have wasted time and 
attempted to escape from their promise about the status quo 1 . The 
promise had been extracted by pressure. Suvoroff was now exerting 
great, if indirect, counter-pressure. That the Triple Alliance would 
be able to force Catharine to renounce her conquests seemed unlikely. 
If Turkey collapsed, were the Habsburgs, who had suffered much in 
contributing to that collapse, to go away empty handed? 

Catharine's position had been strengthened during 1790 by the 
action of Gustavus III of Sweden. Saved from what looked like a risk 
of destruction in 1788, he had managed to carry through a coup d'etat 
against the aristocratic party, in 1789. But his political successes 
at home had not improved his financial position. He always tried 
to drive hard bargains with the Triple Alliance; and, at any time, the 
prospects of active Swedish campaigning depended on the success of 
such bargains 2 . In 1790, he could only secure a small part of his 
demands — from Great Britain and Prussia, the Dutch being unwilling 
to assist. Catharine made him attractive offers after Reichenbach. 
Moreover, ever since October, 1789, he had been passionately interested 
in the fate of his ancient Ally the King of France, and he wished to 
be free to champion the cause of monarchy. His solicitude for that 
cause, if romantic and impracticable, was disinterested. Suddenly, 
in July, 1790, although a British fleet was ready to sail to the Baltic, 
and although he had promised not to conclude a separate peace with 
Russia, he sent Baron Armfelt to conclude such a peace. The way 
was made easy for Armfelt, and Peace was signed on August 14th, 
1790 3 . 

This defection had increased the desire, which had long existed 
in London, to widen the Triple Alliance. Gustavus himself had been 
an ally designate. Among other possible allies were Denmark — but 
she was unlikely — and the reformed Republic of Poland, which would 
have been glad of this admission to the circle of Great Powers. As 
the chief British promoters of this extended system of alliances were 

1 See Keith's Memoirs, 11. 369 sqq. Letters of February to June, 1791. 

2 "The Swede is not much to be depended on even when highly paid." Auck- 
land to Grenville, April 20th, 1791. Dropmore Papers, II. 49. 

3 See Geffroy, Gustave III et la cour de France, 11. 102 sqq. and Rose, Pitt, 
1. 530-2. In January, 1791, Gustavus wrote to Catharine to suggest a joint refusal 
to recognise the tricolour flag. Geffroy, II. 1 1 1 . 



204 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

Ewart at Berlin and Hailes at Warsaw, the chances of Poland's 
admission to what these Ambassadors, in their despatches, referred 
to as "the great federal chain 1 " at one time seemed good. The final 
detachment of Poland from her Russian connexion was specially 
attractive at a time when Catharine appeared the chief obstacle to 
"the restoration of general tranquillity." But Prussia looked on Poland 
as her own preserve and suspected any proposal for a commercial 
treaty, the form into which the projected Anglo-Polish rapprochement 
was first thrown. " It is contrary to my interests and insidious and must 
be set aside," King Frederick William wrote in October 2 . He was con- 
scious that any strengthening of Poland would make her less likely to 
cede the necessary minimum after all these years of effort, that is, Thorn 
and Danzig. At the end of the year the Poles had a representative in 
London, Count Oginski, who had a series of interviews with Pitt 3 . 
Poland was, also, in treaty with the Porte for a commercial outlet 
down the Dniester, to evade a Prussian throttling of the Vistula trade. 
She was most reluctant to cede anything, and was furious with 
Prussia who had not won for her any part of Galicia, yet still talked of 
compensation. Pitt gave Oginski good economic advice, and sug- 
gested the cession of Danzig alone, in return for a commercial treaty 
with Prussia providing for outlets in that direction. The suggestion 
was acceptable neither to Poland nor to Prussia. Thus, when, in 
January, 1791, actual proposals for the admission of Poland to the 
Triple Alliance were sent to Berlin and Warsaw, the business lan- 
guished until the break up of the Alliance in April; and it was 
never revived 4 . At this very time, Hertzberg was preparing the way 
for the Second Partition by secret personal dealings with Russia 5 . 

Catharine was known to demand Oczakoff and its district. It 
was supposed, but not certainly known, that this was meant to cover 
all the land to the Dniester, including Odessa — at that time a village 
never mentioned in the despatches. Frederick William was com- 
mitted to the support of Turkey, and was at this time resolute for the 
status quo. If he could force it on Russia, Austria could not evade it, 
and, at least, no rival would gain territory and "souls " — the currency of 
Princely bargains — when he as yet had acquired none. But he did not 
want war. In England, his most valuable advocates were Whitworth, 

1 Hailes to Leeds, June 18th, 1790. He has heard with delight from Ewart 
of the prospect of Poland, Sweden and the Porte entering our " great federal chain." 

2 October 21st. Salomon, p. 500. 

3 See Rose, 1. 59459(7. and Salomon, pp. 506-7. 

4 Rose, 1. 595, 599. 6 See Rose, 1. 597. 



GREAT BRITAIN AND POLAND. OCZAKOW 205 

whose despatches from Petrograd led Pitt to suppose that Russia 
must yield to a threat of force 1 , and Joseph Ewart, on leave from 
Berlin in the winter of 1 790-1. Ewart had laid before Pitt a series of 
Considerations on the expediency of combining Poland, Turkey and one 
of the inferior Baltic Powers in the defensive System of the Allies 2 . He 
insisted on the enormous importance of Oczakoff and the risk to 
British prestige which its acquisition by Catharine would involve. 
There was also the certainty of losing our chief Ally, who had stood 
by us in the Nootka business, and, with him, all control over Leopold 
and the course of events. Ewart 's argument was traversed by Auck- 
land, now Ambassador at the Hague. Writing to Pitt personally he 
urged " the importance of peace to your whole system of government," 
suggested that "we overrated the object in question," as Oczakoff 
was not really vital, and explained that he had good reason to believe 
that the King of Prussia had no wish for a Russian war 3 . The 
Pensionary van de Spiegel supported Auckland. 

Ewart won. By the beginning of February Great Britain was com- 
mitted in principle to the enforcement of the status quo on Russia 
by a threat of force, though a final decision was postponed. Reluctance 
to risk the break up of an Alliance which had done much for the 
peace of Europe and our own prestige ; a measure of gratitude to the 
King of Prussia; fear lest the Austro-Turkish Peace, for whose 
character Great Britain stood pledged, should miscarry; forebodings 
of an ultimate clash of interest between Russia and ourselves in the 
Near East ; and perhaps some desire to school a particularly arrogant 
woman — all contributed to the decision. Ewart was arguing his case, 
but also stating the main issue as he induced Ministers to see it, when 
he wrote to Auckland on January 5th : " I am sure your Lordship will 
agree with me... that Oczakoff and its district. are very secondary 
considerations in comparison of the great influence which the decision 
of the present question must have on the strength and permanency 
of the system of the Allies on which the preservation of peace likewise 
depends 4 ." 

Auckland did his duty at the Hague with reluctance. "If that 
Russian business could happily be settled we might sit still and look 

1 Rose, 1. 598. 

2 Pitt MSS. Salomon, p. 502. There are also two able Memoirs by Ewart on 
Anglo-Russian relations, dated April, 1791, in the Dropmore Papers, II. 44 sqq. 

3 To Pitt, January 29th, 1791. Dropmore Papers, 11. 22. 

4 Auckland MSS., B.M. Add. 34435. J. B. Burges, the Under- secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, wrote more and more in this same strain to Auckland — e.g. March 
ist, 1 79 1, showing that Ewart's doctrine had become official orthodoxy. 



206 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

at the French story like spectators in a theatre," he wrote to his 
brother in January. And, in March, he wrote to Grenville: "This 
phantom of Oczakoff has appeared to me for some time to beckon 
us towards an abyss of new debts and endless difficulties at a moment 
. . .when it may be essential perhaps to the very existence of our govern- 
ment and of many other civilised states, that we should maintain our 
own internal peace... 1 ." Auckland had now comprehended the 
possible dangers from "a republic of twenty-four millions," which 
Georg Forster foresaw in 1789. 

Pitt took no risks and worked at all the Courts, beginning with 
his Allies, before reaching his final decision. Plans were communicated 
to the Hague and Berlin. At the Hague, information was sought from 
the Dutch Admiral Kingsbergen, who had recently visited Oczakoff. 
Frederick William was told that London saw no possible counter- 
alliance which might prevent the humbling of Russia in the spring 2 . 
At Madrid, Fitzherbert was to solicit Spanish help or, failing that, 
a promise of neutrality. He secured the latter — a promise of "the 
strictest neutrality 3 ." Copenhagen made the same promise. At 
Stockholm, Liston failed to catch "the Swede" with offers of money. 
Lord Elgin, who had been sent on a special mission to Leopold II 
in November, 1790, to congratulate him on his accession and facilitate 
a Belgian settlement by direct negotiation, was, if he could, to secure 
Austrian cooperation in a general settlement, and to speed up the 
Congress of Sistova; or at least, to keep Leopold from helping the 
Tsarina 4 . Paris was not neglected. Hugh Elliot and Miles were to 
let it be known privately that Pitt was not making preparations against 
France 5 . 

By the end of February, Frederick William had learnt, as he 
supposed, that Austria might be kept quiet — possibly by concessions 
at Sistova — in the event of a Prusso-Russian war. He had learnt it, in 
a way characteristic of his methods, by the despatch to Vienna of his 
personal favourite and confidant Colonel Bischoffswerder. Pitt, mean- 
while, was testing the information about Oczakoff supplied from 
Holland, which, coming through Auckland, insisted on the un- 

1 To Morton Eden, January nth; to Grenville, March 5th. B.M. Add. 
34435-6- 

2 Leeds to Jackson (Ewart's deputy), January 8th. 

3 Leeds to Fitzherbert, January 3rd; Fitzherbert to Leeds January 29th. 

4 Elgin's special mission, F.O. Austria, vol. 23. Despatches of January to 
February. 

8 Miles Correspondence, 1. 43, 280. All these various negotiations are referred 
to by Salomon, pp. 504-6. 



OCZAKOFF. PITT'S WITHDRAWAL 207 

important aspects of the place 1 . Leeds was talking of how to avoid 
war without sacrificing honour. He feared we were too far committed 2 . 
In Berlin, at the same time, Hertzberg was thinking of the same things, 
though from another angle. Hertzberg, however, was not Prussia. The 
King did not desire war, but wrote, on March nth, a personal letter 
to his Ambassador in London explaining the reputedly favourable 
attitude of Leopold, and suggesting the coercion of Russia by a 
"display of force 3 ." This letter decided the British Cabinet. On 
March 27th, the ultimatum went to Russia, and plans for naval and 
military preparations to Berlin 4 . Catharine was to resign all the 
conquests of this war, but might retain the Crimea, absorbed in 1783. 
It was to recover the Crimea that Turkey had declared war in 1788. 
There remained Parliament, which was apprised next day of the 
need for naval preparations. The Lords were critical, but yielded 
a substantial majority. In the Commons, Pitt seems to have opened 
badly; the Whigs had excellent opportunities; but the majority was 
again considerable. Yet there was no enthusiasm for the policy of 
Ministers, which is in no way surprising, in view of the remoteness 
of the object and the hesitation they had themselves shown in adopting 
it. Further, on the day they despatched their ultimatum, news came, 
first, from Auckland — who controlled a better cabinet noir than any 
other British diplomatist — that "he had happened to see" a ciphered 
Prussian despatch which showed clearly that, in spite of the King's 
letter, the Emperor was not to be trusted, and, secondly, from Drake 
at Copenhagen, that Catharine was likely to prove reasonable in 
negotiation 5 . The Cabinet met often and discussed long, early in 
April. Some change of front was suggested, but opposed by Leeds, 
who did not see how it could be managed with honour 6 . By April 
10th Pitt was confessing to Ewart, that he had failed to make the 
House understand the matter and could never carry the vote of credit, 
and was "repeating, even with tears in his eyes, that it was the greatest 
mortification he had ever experienced 7 ." Within a few days, Leeds 
had refused to sign despatches suggesting a modification of the 
ultimatum, and had made way for William Grenville. Before the 

1 Rose, 1. 604. 

2 To Auckland, March nth. Quoted in Rose, I. 605, from B.M. Add. 34436. 

3 Rose, 1. 607-8, where the King's letter is quoted from the F. O. records. 
Salomon (p. 514) failed to find the original at Berlin. 

* Leeds to Jackson and Leeds to Whitworth, March 27th. 

6 Rose, 1. 614-5. 

8 See Browning, Political Memoranda of Francis, Fifth Duke of Leeds, 150-73. 

7 Major-General Sir Spencer Ewart's MSS., first used by Rose, 1. 617. 



208 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

end of the month, Ewart, returning to Berlin from a sense of loyalty 
towards Pitt, in order to undo his own policy, had seen the King, who 
said repeatedly that, "as he was convinced the intentions were good, 
however mortified he might be at the change, he would concur in 
doing everything in his power to prevent bad consequences 1 ." In 
July, Auckland was explaining to his brother how much he preferred 
Grenville to Leeds, and how "from the hour of his taking the seals 
we have laboured hard to get not quite disgracefully out of a very 
bad scrape, and I begin to hope that it will end tolerably well 2 ." This 
was after the flight to Varennes — the hinge on which European history 
in 1 79 1 swings. "All political speculation will now turn to France," 
Auckland wrote in August. Russian affairs, he said, were not working 
out so ill after all 3 . Catharine would obtain her Dniester boundary, but 
no more. His desire to see these affairs out of the way, that the 
English might " look at the French story like spectators in a theatre," 
seemed near fulfilment. 

Spectators they became for a year and more. From every Court, 
when once the debris of Russian policy and the Sistova Congress have 
been cleared up, the reports of the British Ambassadors are those of 
a profoundly interested audience at the great Continental play. The 
Triple Alliance faded into nominal life, a "conviction of good in- 
tentions" being a poor foundation even for a political friendship. 
"I know now," Ewart wrote in August, "that though the King and 
Colonel Bischoffswerder professed to be satisfied with the explanation 
I gave them, they immediately lost confidence in the resources both 
of the Alliance and of this country 4 ." So, Great Britain lost her 
diplomatic point d'appui. The Congress of Sistova was speeded up, 
not so much because Elgin demanded it, as because Leopold became 
absorbed in French affairs, anxious to put others aside, and thus 
accessible to Colonel Bischoffswerder, the leading Prussian advocate 
of interference in France. In May and June, Elgin was following 
Leopold up and down Italy, trying to detach him from Russia, ac- 
cording to instructions. While Elgin was talking in terms of the 
previous year's diplomacy, Leopold — aware of his sister's projected 
flight — was debating whether the friendship which Great Britain 
offered might not be used to establish a European Concert for the 
settlement of France. Elgin came to think that Leopold was mainly 

1 Ewart to Grenville, April 30th. 

2 July 10th. B.M. Add. 34438. 

3 To Morton Eden, August 12th. B.M. Add. 34439. 

4 To Grenville, August 21st. 



ISOLATION OF GREAT BRITAIN 209 

concerned to check the "progress of democratical principles." " Nay, 
his Imperial Majesty went so far as to suggest the expediency of 
guaranteeing not only the possessions, but also the Constitutions of 
the different States of Europe 1 ." 

A month later, Bischoffswerder came to Italy from Berlin to offer 
an alliance, and was well received. Before the news of Varennes 
arrived, Leopold had promised to finish at Sistova and had issued the 
necessary orders. He had agreed to a defensive alliance with Prussia, 
and to a personal interview with Frederick William. Elgin, though 
kept on the fringe of affairs, knew the outline of all this 2 . After the 
Varennes catastrophe, Leopold issued his Padua Circular to the Powers, 
with its suggestion of joint action to "vindicate the liberty and honour 
of the Most Christian King and his family, and to limit the dangerous 
extremes of the French Revolution." 

Great Britain did not commit herself over this Circular, until she 
was sure that Leopold meant to finish at Sistova. Such was now his 
intention. By August 13th the Sistova Treaty was ratified at Vienna. 
After the lapse of a year, the Reichenbach agreement had been strictly 
carried out and British policy endorsed. Attached to the main Treaty 
was a separate Convention specifying "the small and voluntary con- 
cessions which the Turks were disposed to grant 3 " ; but this had been 
allowed for at Reichenbach. Three days earlier, Catharine's negotiators 
had agreed to preliminaries of peace with Turkey. No mediating 
Powers were there: Catharine had never intended otherwise. She 
secured her Dniester boundary. In consequence of Great Britain's 
volte-face in the matter of Oczakoff, the event forms no part of the 
history of British Foreign Policy, though, perhaps, but for that 
policy and its reactions on Austria, Catharine might not have re- 
nounced Bessarabia. 

After that, Great Britain hardly made a pretence of remaining in the 
Triple Alliance or of continuing to figure on the Continental stage. 
Witness Grenville's private letter to Auckland of August 23rd: "The 
conclusion of the Sistova business has removed every difficulty which 
there was in the way of our speaking out, and avowing our determina- 
tion of the most scrupulous neutrality in the French business — and 
I now hold this language to all the foreign ministers, in order that 
it may be clearly understood that we are no parties to any step the 

1 To Grenville, May 9th, 1791. 

2 His despatches June 13th, 14th, 18th contain fairly full accounts, derived 
apparently from Bischoffswerder. 

3 Keith to Grenville, August 2nd, 1791. 

W. &G.I. 14 



2io PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

King of Prussia may take on this subject 1 ." Or see Grenville's Instruc- 
tions to Keith a month later, after Leopold and Frederick William 
had issued the Declaration of Pillnitz (August 27th), and the Emigrant 
Princes their insolent address to King Lewis, in which they told him 
he had no right to sign the new Constitution: "With respect to the 
concert which has been proposed to His Majesty and to other Powers 
by the Emperor, or to the measures of active intervention which 
appear to have been in contemplation for the restoration of the French 
monarchy... the King has determined not to take any part either in 
supporting or in opposing them. This resolution he has already ex- 
plained to his allies and also to other powers, and... he commanded 
me to instruct you to use a similar language at Vienna 2 ." 

Six months later, March 20th, 1792, Auckland, now in retirement 
at Beckenham, yet "every day seeing well-informed men of all 
descriptions," wrote to a friend that he had heard recently from 
Mr Burges, the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office; but that "the 
remarks which he makes are general and chiefly calculated. . .to explain 
that England has little concern now in what is going forward on the 
Continent" — the Revolutionary Wars began a month later — "except 
perhaps with regard to Poland, to which the Empress seems to turn 
her attention in a manner that may eventually interest other powers 
though it will not implicate us." Catharine was moving up her 
armies to destroy the reformed Polish Constitution, completed in 
May, 1 79 1, after the Triple Alliance and with it Great Britain's Polish 
policy had cracked. She was also inciting Prussia and Austria to 
attack France, in order to obtain "elbow room" in Poland 3 . "His 
remark," Auckland continued, "that we have no concern in foreign 
politics is true in another sense to a degree that I cannot describe to 
you... and this indifference as to foreign affairs is general thro' the 
kingdom ; you may trace it even in your newspapers ; perhaps it may 
justly be attributed to the great prosperity of the country, which 
confines all attention to interior and insular details. I have lately 
much wished to pass a day or two at the Hague for the sake of a little 
rational conversation 4 ." Auckland instanced, as the kind of topic in 
which no interest whatever was taken by representative Englishmen, 
the death of the Emperor Leopold (March 1st, 1792). It was a well- 

1 B.M. Add. 34439. 

2 Grenville to Keith, September 19th, 1791. 

3 Sorel, 11. 216-7. See also Kaunitz' analysis of her motives in Vivenot, Quellen 
zur Geschichte der . . .Kaiserpolitik Oesterreichs, I. 358. 

4 B.M. Add. 34441. 



BRITISH INSULARITY 211 

chosen illustration; for, although it is most unlikely that Leopold 
would have averted the clash between Old Europe and revolutionary 
France in 1792 — both he and the French were too deeply committed 
to war before he died — yet it is certain that the loss of his skilful 
and mediating personality and the substitution for it of a young and 
ignorant Prince, dominated by a mixed group of advisers, were a 
disaster for Europe. 

Auckland wrote as a diplomatist, with a high standard of interest 
in foreign affairs. There was in England no lack of vague interest; 
Burke's Reflections sold well; but, from Pitt downwards, the country 
was in a mood to wash its hands of Continental matters. Even Pitt's 
interest in them had been intermittent. Now, the old enemy was 
believed to be crippled. She must be watched, but need not be 
countered. Hardly anyone had begun to think regularly of Russian 
power as a danger to English interests. In 1790, some attention had 
been given to a pamphlet which made much of the Russian threat to 
the Balance of Power in Europe; but Oczakoff revealed the funda- 
mental indifference. Only a handful of experts had ever understood 
the working of the Triple Alliance. It was an affair of Cabinets and 
Courts and favourites, of intercepted despatches and Congresses in 
inaccessible places. No single event in its history, since the initial 
strokes in the Low Countries, was of the least interest to the average 
educated Englishman. With Nootka Sound it had been different. The 
place was more remote than Sistova or Oczakoff; but, even down to 
the No-Popery mobs of London, Englishmen could understand a 
maritime quarrel with Spain. 

"The English," we find Albert Sorel writing, towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, "only make up their minds to fight when 
their interests seem absolutely threatened. But then, plunging into 
the struggle because they feel themselves bound to do so, they apply 
to it a serious and concentrated passion, an animosity the more 
tenacious because its motive is so self- regarding. Their history is 
full of alternations between an indifference which makes people think 
them decadent, and a rage which baffles their foes. They are seen, in 
turn, abandoning and dominating Europe, neglecting the greatest 
Continental matters and claiming to control even the smallest, turning 
from peace at any price to war to the death 1 ." During the early years 
of Pitt's Ministry, they had been in one of these phases of apparent 
indifference. From 1787 to 1791, they seemed to be preparing for 

1 L'Europe et la Revolution Frangaise, I. 240. (First published in 1885.) 



2i2 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

the alternative phase. Had Oczakoff led to a general war — but for 
the change of front, a very probable contingency — then the phase of 
rage might have set in ; for a general war would soon have threatened 
England's nearer interests. As it was, the phase of indifference never 
seemed more complete than in the eighteen months which preceded 
the longest of her modern Wars. 

After the rebuff to the Padua Circular, the Powers of Europe made 
no attempt to influence her. The Emigrant Princes tried, nowand again; 
but their cause was so hopeless, in view of England's deliberately 
adopted attitude, that the details have no place in the history of her 
foreign policy. "Repeated applications have been made to His 
Majesty," Grenville wrote at the end of August, 1791, "on the part 
of the Emperor, of the King of Sweden, and of the French Princes, 
to concert in the plans which are in agitation for restoring the French 
monarchy. But His Majesty has determined not to depart from... 
strict neutrality 1 ." From that policy there was not the slightest 
deviation during the following year. It was the same when England 
was approached from another section of French opinion — the Con- 
stitutional revolutionary party. The approaches were made, first, 
informally before the outbreak of war in Europe in 1792, and then, 
formally, after the outbreak. On both occasions Talleyrand was the 
agent. The object was to ensure English neutrality and feel towards 
an Anglo-French entente 2 . 

Talleyrand came first, in the middle of January, 1792. The visit 
and its results were summarised, from the English side, by Grenville, 
writing to Lord Gower at Paris, early in March 3 . "Since I wrote to 
Your Excellency on the subject of M. de Talleyrand I have seen that 
gentleman twice. The first time he explained to me very much at large 
the disposition of the French Government... to enter into the strictest 
connection with Great Britain, and proposed that this should be done 
by a Treaty of mutual guaranty, or in such other manner as the Govern- 
ment of this country should prefer." Grenville told him that he did 
not expect to be able to enter into any kind of negotiation with an 
agent not officially accredited. At the second interview, he confirmed 
this, but had no difficulty in saying to Talleyrand, as an individual, 
" that it was very far from being the disposition of this Government to 

1 To Lord St Helens (Fitzherbert), August 26th, 1791. See W. Grenville to 
George Aust (of the Foreign Office), September 20th, 1791, with Instructions for 
a reply to the Emigrants. The critical passage is quoted in Lecky, v. 558. 

2 See Pallain, La Mission de Talleyrand a Londres en 1792. 

3 Grenville to Gower, March 9th. 



THE VISITS OF TALLEYRAND 213 

endeavour to foment or prolong the disturbances there, with a view 
to any profit to be derived from them to this country." This last 
declaration was perfectly sincere. The day after Grenville wrote, 
Talleyrand returned to Paris. 

He came back at the end of April, nominally second in command 
to Chauvelin, War against the Emperor having just been declared. 
The scheme which he was to advocate ran thus. For the moment, 
England's benevolent neutrality was to save France from complica- 
tions with the United Provinces or Spain. She was to be made to 
understand that the coming French attack on Belgium was a military 
necessity, not a prelude to annexation. And then — then, when this 
war was over, the Constitutional monarchies of the west, the old 
and the new, were to rule Europe and the seas. There was to be a new 
commercial treaty. The Spanish Colonies in South America were to 
be liberated and thrown open to trade. Hand in hand, France and 
England were to share in that trade and in the maintenance of Con- 
stitutional liberties throughout the world 1 . 

Nothing was accomplished. The English Court was frigid, the 
people almost offensive — so reported Dumont, who was a member of 
the Embassy. Only the Whig houses were thrown open. Talleyrand 
said that the English Ministry was "the most secret in all Europe." 
It kept them waiting for a month ; then moved King George to write 
a short, friendly, empty note to Lewis XVI (May 18th), and to issue 
a public Declaration of Neutrality (May 25th). England regretted the 
War ; she intended to respect all Treaties ; she wished to live at peace 
with France, and trusted that France would contribute to peace by 
showing respect for the rights of His Majesty and His Allies. There 
were no real negotiations, and Talleyrand spent his generous leisure 
in composing his Lettres sur les Anglais. He left this country early in 
July ; the indiscreet Chauvelin remaining 2 . 

The rising tone of the French propaganda, and the attack on 
Belgium, explain the suspicious reticence of the British Ministry. 
It is indeed, at first sight, surprising that Pitt did not take an even 
stronger line as to Belgium. But, at this time, he was not faced, as 
he supposed, with that risk of absorption of the Belgian Provinces 
into France which he had so clearly stated, in 1789, to be at all times a 
casus belli for Great Britain. The first French attack northwards, at the 

1 Reflexions pour la Negotiation d'Angleterre en cas de Guerre, March 30th. 
Pallain, pp. 172 sqq. 

2 Sorel, 11. 440 sqq. 



2i 4 PITT'S FIRST DECADE, 1783-1792 

end of April, proved a pitiable failure. All through May and June, full 
accounts of the mismanagement and insubordination of the French 
armies in Flanders were arriving at the Foreign Office, from a most 
capable British representative on the spot 1 . By the beginning of 
July, it was reported that the French had "entirely evacuated" those 
frontier districts into which they had penetrated. A month later, the 
news came that the garrison towns and camps on the French side of 
the frontier were in good order, the fortifications "in the most perfect 
repair, and even considerably added to, since the probability of a 
war with the Emperor." But there was no discipline. The Emigration 
had ruined the corps of officers; "nor is there a remedy against this 
evil." So, although Dumouriez was said to be confident and "the 
soldiery (by which is meant only the private men) and the peasantry 
universally revolutionists," it seemed impossible that France should 
"frustrate, or even derange, the plans of the combined army" of 
Prussia and Austria 2 . Pitt might well conclude that the Belgian 
Provinces were in no danger. 

Throughout the summer, the best-informed men in England 
discussed Continental affairs on the assumption that the military 
plans of the Allies would not be "even deranged." "As soon as the 
German troops arrive in Paris," Grenville wrote to Auckland on 
June 19th, "whatever is the ruling party in Paris must apply to us to 
mediate for them. Such at least is my speculation. Even in that 
case, it would, I think, be right to hold back, and to show no anxiety 
for that sort of interference.... But if the opportunity presents itself, 
I know no end of this troubled scene so advantageous as the bringing 
about by our assistance, an agreement which, I am convinced, all the 
parties will equally wish 3 ." 

On the day on which Colonel Gardiner sent his sanguine military 
report to Grenville, the French monarchy fell. Great Britain recalled 
her Ambassador, accredited to a King, not to a revolutionary Assembly ; 
but her calculations as to the near future remained unchanged. A 
circular was sent round the Courts of Europe, explaining that the 
withdrawal of the Minister made no difference to her neutrality. 
Grenville had still no reason to doubt the early arrival of the Germans 
in Paris. Presumably, he continued his speculations as to the most 
advantageous thing that could happen next. On September 3rd — the 

1 Colonel Gardiner to Grenville, May and June despatches, passim (F.O. 
Flanders). 

2 Gardiner to Grenville, August ioth, 1792. 

3 Dropmore Papers, II. 281. 



THE MISCALCULATION OF 1792 215 

day after that on which the massacres had begun — he heard from his 
Foreign Office subordinate the latest news from France. It announced 
that the successful march on Paris was sure 1 . From every source came 
the same confident news. 

Before the month of October was out, Valmy had been fought and 
lost ; Ferdinand of Brunswick had recrossed the French frontier ; and 
Custine with his army of the Vosges had dashed into Germany, to 
occupy Mainz and Frankfort. On November 6th, Dumouriez, taking 
up in person the Belgian plan of campaign, broke the Austrians at 
Jemappes by Mons; and two days later the Austrian Government fled 
from Brussels. The postulates of British Foreign Policy had become 
uncertain. 

1 J. B. Burges to Grenville, September 3rd. Dropmore Papers, 11, 308. 



CHAPTER II 

THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 



THE overthrow of the French monarchy on August ioth, 1792, 
established the supremacy of men who owed their power chiefly 
to the populace of Paris; and the ensuing September massacres, 
carried out by the Revolutionary Commune of that city, helped still 
further to cow the moderates, disgust the provincials, and establish 
the domination of the capital. Thenceforth, it was the misfortune of 
the French democratic movement, which had claimed to be universal, 
that the driving force was mainly Parisian — a fact which goes far to 
explain the course of French politics during the next two years. The 
Girondin chiefs, now installed in office, possessed little power; it 
rested with the men of the streets and of the clubs ; and the nominal 
leaders always followed the spasmodic impulses of a populace agitated 
by Marat and infuriated by the threats of vengeance that came from 
Emigres serving with Brunswick's army. 

The psychology of Revolution renders difficult the maintenance 
of peace with neighbouring States of the old type. Suspicion and 
aversion naturally set in ; and these are the parents of war. Never- 
theless, proofs abound that, from August to October, 1792, Pitt and 
Grenville sought to continue the policy of strict neutrality which they 
had laid down as their guiding principle. True, they decided to 
recall Earl Gower from Paris, an act which seemed to betoken illwill. 
But Grenville at once informed him, and through him the Revolu- 
tionary Government, that his recall followed as a matter of course 
on the lapse of the authority of Lewis XVI, to whom he had been 
accredited, and was "conformable to the principles of neutrality 
which His Majesty has hitherto observed." Lebrun, the new Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, welcomed this announcement and expressed a 
hope for the continuance of friendly relations, especially in com- 
mercial matters. The credentials of Chauvelin, French Envoy at 
London, having been signed by the deposed monarch, he was 
informed that he could no longer be officially recognised 1 ; but he was 

1 O. Browning, Despatches of Earl Gower (1790-2), p. 209; Ann. Reg. 1792, 
pp. 327-8. 



NON-INTERVENTION POLICY MAINTAINED 217 

received unofficially. For some time, he offered no objection to this 
arrangement ; but later, whether from injured vanity or from a desire 
(as an ex-noble) to show his democratic ardour, he represented it as 
a slight to the French Republic. His frequent association with 
Opposition clubs in London tended to annoy Ministers, but assured 
his popularity in Paris. Unfortunately, during the autumn his 
appointed adviser, Talleyrand, fell under the suspicions of the French 
Convention, which decreed his arrest. He, therefore, remained in 
London, and his sage warnings conveyed to Paris against the aggressive 
tendencies of French policy remained unheeded 1 . 

The characters of the French Ministers were calculated to inspire 
distrust and dislike in George III and his advisers. Danton's appoint- 
ment as Minister of Justice seemed a hideous farce ; Roland for Home 
Affairs was a respectable nonentity ; Claviere, originator of the assignats, 
became responsible for Finance; and Foreign Affairs fell to Lebrun, 
an adventurous journalist, well versed in the Belgian disputes, but 
otherwise displaying the half-knowledge and consequent conceit 
which marked his patrons, Brissot and Dumouriez 2 . With such 
Ministers, ever impelled by Robespierre and the all-powerful 
Commune of Paris, there was reason to expect the extension of 
Jacobin propaganda and the widening of the circle of hostilities. Yet 
Pitt and Grenville showed no sign of joining the party that called for 
intervention on behalf of the cause of monarchy. They differed even 
more sharply from Burke, on grounds not only of sentiment but of 
policy. They believed royalists of the old school to be a less potent 
force in home politics than radical reformers, whose influence would 
be enhanced if the cause of peace were associated with them. The great 
Irishman scouted these calculations as both timid and false. He 
dreaded revolutionary principles as a pest which, if not stamped out, 
would in its rank growth desolate all nations. Pitt, and to a less 
extent Grenville, trusted in the inherent strength of British institu- 
tions and their consequent immunity from Gallic ailments, formidable 
only to weakly organisms. Stripped of its literary adornments, Burke's 
crusading policy was one of pessimism and panic. Their policy, on the 
other hand, however briefly and baldly set forth, was nevertheless one 
of trust in the good sense of the two nations and in the principle of 
non-intervention. So late as November 6th, 1792, Grenville wrote that 

1 For his Memoire of November 25th, 1792, see Pallain, Le Ministere de Talley- 
rand sous le Directoire (App.), and a summary in Sorel, III. 221-3. 

2 A. W. Miles, Corresp. on the French Rev. 1. 24, 144-6. 



218 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

he had, throughout, disapproved of the invasion of France by the 
Austrian and Prussian armies as tending to consolidate the power 
of the Jacobins and delay the reestablishment of order. He now 
expressed some apprehension lest Republican principles should 
spread into England, but deemed the danger minimised, by the 
maintenance of a policy of non-intervention 1 . 

The comparative passivity of George III during this crisis in the 
fortunes of monarchy is not a little curious ; but it may be explained 
by his dislike of a policy of costly adventure, his desire, owing to the 
growing claims of his family, to reduce national expenditure, his trust 
in Pitt and Grenville, and his inveterate dislike of Burke. He also 
utterly distrusted the quixotic proposals of Gustavus III of Sweden 
for the rescue of Marie-Antoinette by armed force 2 . On September 
22nd, while at Weymouth, he approved the somewhat bold proceeding 
of Grenville in discouraging similar appeals from Vienna and Naples 
on her behalf, and added these words : "Undoubtedly there is no step 
that I should not willingly take for the personal safety of the French 
king and his family that does not draw this country into meddling 
with the internal disturbances of that ill-fated kingdom 3 ." He viewed 
the Revolution as a series of disturbances judicially inflicted by 
Providence on France as a penalty for her intervention on behalf of 
the American rebels against divinely constituted authority, and 
therefore discountenanced any attempt to shorten the period of 
retribution. Thus it came about that, even after the September 
massacres at Paris, Burke's fervid appeals for action remained mere 
echoes in the void. 

Alike in temperament and conviction, the men who guided British 
foreign policy were averse from a policy of warlike adventure. A 
decade of unremitting efforts in the direction of retrenchment and 
reconstruction attested the devotion of Pitt to the cause of peace. 
From this, as the sequel will show, he was with great reluctance drawn 
aside by the course of events; and to it he sought to return at the 
earliest opportunity compatible with prudence. Had he possessed 

1 Dropmore Papers, in. 463-7; Burke's Works (Bohn edit.) v. 231-3 ; Auckland 
Journals, n. 464-6; J. H. Rose, Pitt, part II. ch. 11. 

2 Klinckowstrom, Fersen et la Cour de France, 1. p. 173. 

3 Dropmore Papers, 11. 317. Even on November 25th, George wished for a general 
peace, if it could be made "to the real satisfaction of the parties concerned" {Ibid. 
11 • 339)- This corrects the statement of E. D. Adams {The Influence of Grenville on 
Pitt's Foreign Policy, p. 21) that after September, 1792, George III was hostile to 
France. It was her Decrees of November 16th and 19th, 1792, which changed his 
attitude. 



LIMITATIONS OF PITT AND GRENVILLE 219 

more imagination, greater foresight, and a readier power of ex- 
pression, he might perhaps have succeeded in appealing to the heart 
of France during the negotiations of 1795-7, anc ^ nave stood forth as 
the pacificator of Europe. But in his nature there was too much of 
the Grenville stiffness for him to understand, still less to placate, 
Gallic susceptibilities. In truth, he had no knowledge either of 
Continental peoples or their politics. But as to his longing for peace 
there can be no doubt 1 . Equally certain is it that his mistakes during 
the period 1793-1805 arose largely from inability to grasp the stern 
exigencies of war and the calculating selfishness which it often engenders 
in the conduct of Allies towards one another. Virtuous, high-souled, 
patriotic and intensely hopeful, he lacked the critical faculties, 
especially those of distrust and detachment, which are needed for the 
unravelling of intrigues, the detection of rogues, or a due appreciation 
of the chances of success and failure in complex enterprises. He under- 
stood mankind in the abstract, but he did not understand men. There- 
fore, while excelling in the more familiar spheres of British statecraft, 
he fell short of full success at a world-crisis. His nature was far better 
suited to the decade of reconstruction than to that of revolution. 

Similar limitations marked even more strongly the character of 
his cousin. Lord Grenville's accession to the Foreign Office in the 
spring of 1 79 1 marked the definite triumph of a pacific policy; but a 
certain austerity of manner and narrowness of outlook hampered his 
usefulness at all times. Uninspiring, prolix and somewhat tactless, 
both as a speaker and writer, he chilled his friends and irritated his 
enemies; so that, in 1794, we find him expressing to Pitt a wish at the 
termination of the War, to retire from his uncongenial duties 2 . We 
shall not be far wrong in connecting this desire with his later con- 
fession: "I am not competent to the management of men. I never 
was so naturally, and toil and anxiety more and more unfit me for it." 
A phrase of Windham's explains this failure: "He [Grenville] knows 
nobody and is known by nobody." Yet that acute observer pronounced 
him well-informed, high-minded, and more imbued than Pitt with 
ideas of national dignity. In Windham's view, the Prime-Minister 
was, also, unacquainted with mankind and too disposed to live on by 
making concessions and "tiding it over 3 ." In these respects, Grenville 

1 Malmesbury Diaries, II. 101, in. 96, 516; Sorel, II. 383. R. Guyot, Le Directoire 
et la Paix de I 'Europe, p. 303. 

2 Dropmore Papers, 11. p. 513. See, too, Malmesbury Diaries, 11. 441, for Gren- 
ville's predilection for non-intervention on the Continent. 

3 Stanhope, Pitt, 11. 122; Malmesbury, in. 590. 



220 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

supplied backbone to the more pliant and pacific nature of Pitt ; but 
in knowledge of men and management of Parliament they both so 
far yielded the palm to that versatile bonvivant, Henry Dundas, that 
the Administration was dubbed Scottish. To Dundas, however, and his 
impulsive and acquisitive ways Grenville felt an instinctive aversion, 
which was to become more marked as he gained in experience of his 
own. His career is remarkable for the growth of confidence in the 
great qualities of the British people ; and it is hardly an exaggeration 
to say that his will-power, patriotic pride and indomitable persistence 
provided the mainspring of the first two Coalitions against France. 
Grenville, however, lacked the wide sympathies, imaginative outlook 
and inspiring influence that mark a leader of men. To him, still more 
than to Pitt, the French Revolution was incomprehensible. He sought 
to combat it with the old weapons in the traditional ways. Therefore, 
despite his constancy, honesty of purpose and unflinching courage, 
he figures merely as an able Minister of George III, but unequal 
(like most of his colleagues) to the novel demands of the Revolu- 
tionary era. 

Henry Dundas, Secretary of State for Home Affairs, supervised 
far more than the business of that Department and, in fact, claimed 
participation in all affairs of moment. To him Pitt entrusted the chief 
oversight of executive war policy ; and in this sphere his unbounded 
energy and assurance not seldom led him to impulsive and diffuse 
designs. Indian affairs interested him intensely, and, from 1792 
onwards, the development of British influence in the Mediterranean 
was his special care. For the present, he opposed all interference with 
France. So late as November 25th, 1792, he wrote: "I think the 
strength of our cause consists in maintaining that we have nothing to 
do with the internal politics of foreign nations 1 ." 

The Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs up to the year 1795 was 
James Bland Burges, 1751-1814, who was unremitting in his warnings 
as to French aggressiveness and the danger of democracy. He, prob- 
ably, inclined Grenville to the stiffer attitude adopted from November 
to December, 1792. On December 18th, he wrote to Auckland that 
a war with France was inevitable, and the sooner it came, the better ; 
for public opinion in England was excellent, and there was "an 
earnest desire to go to war with the French 2 ." Bland Burges was 

1 Veitch, The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform, p. 235. For mordant attacks on 
Dundas, see Fortescue, British Statesmen of the Great War, and Hist, of the British 
Army, vol. IV. parts I. and 11. 

2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34446. 



BRITISH DIPLOMACY: MALMESBURY ; AUCKLAND 221 

probably the only one of our leading officials or diplomats who had 
as yet come to this conclusion. We may note here that, in 1794, he 
received a hint from Grenville that his services would be better 
appreciated abroad ; and, on ignoring it, he, was superseded by a friend 
of his chief. George Hammond, who became his successor in October, 
1795, had been British Envoy at Washington. 

The influence of our Ambassadors has rarely counted for more in 
the shaping of Foreign Policy than in this period ; for, as the ablest of 
them noted in 1785, Ministers at home were too engrossed in parlia- 
mentary affairs to attend to events on the continent. "I never yet 
received an Instruction that was worth reading 1 ." This irreverent 
assertion (less applicable after Grenville's acceptance of the Foreign 
Office) was made by Sir James Harris [1746-1820], who in 1788 
became Baron, and afterwards first Earl of, Malmesbury. After the 
retirement of Sir Murray Keith from the embassy at Vienna, Malmes- 
bury was the most distinguished, though not the most important, 
personage in the British Diplomatic Service 2 . In 1792-3, his 
predilections were hostile to France, and his severance from the 
Foxites in 1793 paved the way for diplomatic missions of the first 
importance. The doyen of the diplomatic circle was then William 
Eden, first Baron Auckland (1744-18 14). As Ambassador Extra- 
ordinary at the Hague in 1790-3, he displayed exceptional activity 
in the acquisition of news, for which his position gave him unequalled 
facilities ; and his intimacy with both Pitt and Grenville contributed 
to the enriching of a correspondence which is of prime importance, 
Auckland advocated strict neutrality in regard to French affairs: 
"Our general wishes on the one hand" (he wrote on September 
18th, 1792) "are that France may never again resume the same rest- 
less and troublesome system which has so often been fatal to the peace 
of nations ; and, on the other, that an executive government may exist 
there so as to restrain the present lawless and atrocious spirit." He, 
also, agreed with Grenville in thinking that the armed intervention 
of Austria and Prussia only emphasised the disorders in France which 
it was designed to crush 3 . On November 9th, he suggested tentatively 
to Grenville the advisability of recognising the French Republic (in 
order to ensure Lewis XVI and Marie- Antoinette against violence) and 

1 Malmesbury, Diaries, n. 112. 

2 Cf. ante, pp. 160 ff., as to the personality and early achievements of le ruse et 
audacieux Harris (as Mirabeau termed him). 

3 Journal and Corresp. of Lord Auckland, II. 443, 465. 



222 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

of making secret overtures to Austria and Prussia with a view to 
ending their contest with France 1 . 

The secondary figures in the diplomatic circle were Auckland's 
younger brother, Sir Morton Eden, Ambassador first at Berlin and 
then at Vienna, where his mediocre abilities failed to make head 
against the masterful personality of the Chancellor, Thugut; also, 
Sir Charles Whitworth, Ambassador at Petrograd in the years 1788- 
1800, a man of soldierly bearing and firmness of character which 
withstood alike the craft of Catharine and the whimsical impulses of 
Paul I. At Madrid, Lord St Helens and his successor, Francis 
Jackson, worked tactfully, and for a time successfully, in conciliating 
that Court, always touchy and exacting as an ally; and scarcely less 
difficult were the tasks of John Hampden Trevor at Turin and Colonel 
Gardiner at Warsaw, the latter being instructed by Grenville to avoid 
entanglement in the Polish imbroglio 2 . The Hamiltons at Naples 
belong rather to the spheres of art and romance, until the crisis of the 
autumn of 1798 involved them in events from which they emerged 
with discredit. Ainslie and his successors at Constantinople helped 
to avert the danger of a Franco-Turkish Alliance, which seemed 
probable in the winter of 1792-3 ; but, with this partial exception, 
British Ambassadors strictly upheld the policy of non-intervention 
enjoined by Grenville. 

The general diplomatic situation furnished adequate reasons for 
a policy of strict neutrality. The Triple Alliance of 1788 with Prussia 
and the United Netherlands had virtually lapsed, so far as the 
Hohenzollern Power was concerned 3 . Frederick William II now 
sought to withdraw as speedily as possible from his adventure beyond 
the Rhine, in order to procure more profitable spoil on the Vistula. 
With our former Ally, Austria, we were, also, on cool terms, both the 
German Powers maintaining that they had fought our battles for us 
in Champagne, while, as has already appeared, we disapproved of 
that enterprise and somewhat distrusted Francis II and his advisers 4 . 

1 Dropmore Papers, II. 329. Many more of his letters are in the Brit. Mus. 
(Add. MSS. 34446 et seq.). 

2 Gardiner's predecessor, David Hailes, in his last despatch, of July 25th, 1792, 
warned Grenville of the fragility of the Polish Constitution of May 3rd, 1791, and 
the discredit attaching to its authors. On August 4th, Grenville instructed Gardiner 
that Great Britain would not intervene in favour of Poland and charged him to 
discover the intentions of the three neighbouring Powers "on whom the fate of 
Poland seems now entirely to depend" (F.O. Poland, 6). 

3 Dropmore Papers, II. 194, 241, 257, 262, 279. 

4 Stratton, our Charge d'affaires at Vienna, thought the Emperor's ability and 
steadfastness unequal to his moral rectitude; he had no mental vigour or decision 



DOUBTFUL ATTITUDE OF CATHARINE II OF RUSSIA 223 

Spain, too, was still smarting under the grievance of the Nootka 
Sound affair, which the now all-powerful Minister, Godoy, Duke of 
l'Alcudia, kept open by all the arts of chicanery. It soon transpired 
that Spanish officials at Nootka refused to give up Nootka to Captain 
Vancouver, who had been despatched to take it over 1 . Further, the 
odd complaisance of Spain to the new French Republic betokened a 
desire for friendly relations with Paris, which, in fact, were only to 
be severed by the execution of Lewis XVI. Even at the close of 1792, 
Great Britain had to reckon Spain among her possible enemies. 

Moreover, the attitude of Catharine II of Russia was ambiguous. 
The unscrupulous ambitions of the Tsarina, far from sated by recent 
triumphs over the Turks, now turned in the direction of Poland. Fler 
many incitements to the Monarchs of Sweden, Austria and Prussia 
to champion the cause of Lewis XVI and Marie-Antoinette were 
accompanied by no tangible proof of crusading zeal ; and, on November 
9th, 1792, Whitworth reported that she would "continue to look on 
at the conflagration with the utmost composure"; and again, that she 
had throughout sought "to engage all Europe in the quarrel [with 
France] and to remain herself a spectator of the desolation." The 
knowledge of her Machiavellian designs on Poland not only weakened 
the efforts of the German Sovereigns against France, but imposed 
caution on the one Power which had maintained its neutrality (as 
Whitworth put it) "with so much dignity and sound policy." A 
slight ruffle of anxiety overspread the serenity of the Tsarina when she 
learnt that the French Republic was vigorously striving to set the 
Turks against her; for the incursion of a Franco-Turkish fleet into 
the Black Sea might involve the destruction of the new and almost 
unprotected fleet at Sevastopol. By the end of the year, therefore, 
a feeling of relief pervaded the Russian Court at the news of the 
Anglo-French complications, as tending to restrain the Republic from 
oriental adventures and thereby to leave Catharine free for her long 
meditated move against Poland 2 . It was now discovered that French 
principles were making alarming progress among the Poles — a source 
of infection which neither she nor Frederick William II could allow 
on the borders of their dominions. 

of character. On Grenville pressing for a declaration of Austria's war aims, the Acting 
Chancellor, Count Philip Cobenzl, on December 22nd stated that she would insist 
on the complete liberty of Lewis XVI, and on applying to France the essentials of 
a monarchical Constitution (F.O. Austria, 32). 

1 F.O. Spain, 25. F. J. Jackson to Grenville, December 29th, 1792. 

2 F.O. Russia, 23. Whitworth to Grenville, November 9th, 23, December nth; 
Sorel, La Question d'Orient, p. 770. 



224 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

The atmosphere being charged with electricity in both the east 
and the west of Europe, the only wise course for the British Govern- 
ment was to maintain a watchful aloofness. But an unkindly fate 
began to extend the storm area over these islands. The persistent 
rains, which hindered Brunswick's operations in Champagne, also 
ruined the harvests of Great Britain and the north of France, thereby 
causing widespread dearth and an eager competition for foreign corn. 
Hence arose not only commercial tension between the two nations, 
but internal discontent, resulting, on both sides, in a notable increase 
of democratic and levelling ardour. These sentiments, again, were 
accentuated by the astounding triumphs of the French arms. Sep- 
tember saw the Austro-Prussian forces retreat from Champagne and 
the Sardinians driven from the capital of Savoy; in October, the 
Allies recrossed the Rhine in disorder ; early in November, the French 
occupied Frankfort and utterly defeated the Imperialists at Jemappes — 
a victory which laid at their feet the Austrian Netherlands and brought 
the victoiious tricolour to the borders of the Dutch Republic 1 . 

In the nervous and irritable state of public opinion, these events 
wrought a magical change. The French were filled with boundless 
confidence in the complete triumph of democracy over all the old 
Governments; and cognate aspirations spread among their many 
sympathisers in the British Isles. The sharp rise in prices favoured 
the growth of discontent, which found expression in numerous 
"Constitutional clubs," where the principles of the new French 
Constitution were vehemently acclaimed. The next development was 
destined to have far-reaching results. Delegates from the most 
important of these clubs, especially those of London, Newington, 
Manchester, Derby and Norwich, proceeded to Paris, and read to the 
Convention addresses of congratulation and fraternity at the sittings 
of October 31st, November 7th, 10th and 28th. The address bearing 
the signatures of Thomas Hardy and Maurice Margarot declared that 
the Elector of Hanover was uniting his troops to those of traitors and 
robbers; but that England was not Hanover. — "A Triple Alliance, 
not of crowned heads, but of the people of America, France and Great 
Britain, will give liberty to Europe and peace to the world 2 ." These 
addresses, which were circulated throughout France, created the 

1 Jomini, Guerres de la Revolution, Bk 11. chs. ix. x. 

2 "A Collection of Addresses... to the Nat. Convention of France," London, 
Debrett, 1793 ; Ann. Reg. (1793), pp. 344-352. Veitch. op cit. pp. 221-230, 363-6; 
Moniteur, November 8th and 12th, 1792. 



THE SCHELDT DECREE 225 

impression there that the British people would support France in any 
effort made by her on behalf of democratic movements in other lands. 
The French Convention, hereupon, conceived aggressive designs. 
Already, it had ostentatiously favoured addresses from Dutch 
"Patriots"; and, elated by the occupation of Brussels and by pro- 
mises of support from British and Dutch democrats, it passed the 
Decrees of November 16th and 19th. By the former, the navi- 
gation of the Scheldt and the Meuse was declared open to and from 
the sea, though the Dutch Republic, by the terms of the Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648), absolutely controlled that navigation within its 
borders. On the same day, the French Executive Council resolved 
that Dumouriez should pursue the enemy even on Dutch territory, 
if he took refuge there. On the 19th, the Deputies of France decided 
to grant fraternity and assistance to all peoples desirous of re- 
covering their liberty. Lebrun laid great stress on the Scheldt Decree, 
and, on November 30th, communicated a dissertation on the subject 
to Chauvelin, in which he spoke of it as an affair decided by the 
imprescriptible laws of universal justice, which France must have the 
courage to apply 1 . By that time, he must have known of the British 
Declaration to support the United Provinces at all points; but his 
language implied a resolve to go to war rather than compromise on 
this head. The importance of the Scheldt question has often been 
denied. Now, it may freely be granted that the right of the Dutch 
to close the navigation of that estuary to all other vessels was per se 
unjust 2 . But they had enjoyed it since 1648. So late as 1785, France 
had formally recognised it; and to abrogate it without consultation 
was an unheard-of proceeding. Moreover, most Dutchmen clung to 
the privilege in question. In 1784, the Grand Pensionary declared 
that the Netherlands ought to expend their last florin in maintain- 
ing it 3 . 

Meanwhile, the conditions which induced the French Convention 
to pass these decrees, also led the British Ministers stiffly to oppose 
the first signs of aggression. In mid-October, they prepared to 
reassure the King of Sardinia by a Declaration stating, inter alia, that 
the retention of Savoy by France would create a new order of things 
which Great Britain could not accept 4 . But far more significant was 

1 Sorel, in. 233. 2 Cf. ante, ch. i, pp. 161 ff. 

3 Malmesbury, Diaries, n. 89: see, too, Marsh, Politics of Great Britain and 
France, chs. x, XI, xm. 

4 Dropmore Papers, II. 322. On November 27th, the French Convention annexed 
Savoy to France (Sorel, in. 203). 

w.&g.i. 15 



226 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

their action on receipt of the news that the French forces were before 
Brussels. Antwerp would be the next stage; and the siege of that 
stronghold must bring up the vexed question of the navigation of the 
Scheldt estuary. Moreover, on its battks, France would impinge on 
territory which for naval and commercial reasons England has never, 
since the days of Edward III, allowed to pass into the hands of a great 
rival Power. From the time of the battle of Sluys to that of the battle 
of Jutland, her action has been consistent on this head ; and her resolve 
now to warn the French off the Scheldt estuary and neighbouring 
coasts opened the struggle which ended in 1815 with the expulsion of 
Napoleon from Belgium. 

On the receipt at Whitehall of the news of the evacuation of 
Brussels by the Austrians, the Dutch Ambassador, Nagel, took alarm 
and came to Pitt to request advice and help. Pitt suggested the 
despatch of notes to the two German Powers offering mediation, with 
a view to ending the War with France. Grenville met the crisis more 
stiffly. He at once informed Auckland at the Hague that the danger 
to the Dutch must be encountered firmly — "for, much as H.M. desires 
to maintain peace, he does not hesitate to aid the Dutch Republic 
against any attempt to invade it or disturb its Government 1 ." 
Accordingly, he forwarded a Declaration to that effect, which was 
at once to be delivered publicly to the States General of the United 
Provinces. It assured them of H.M.'s "determination to execute at 
all times with the utmost good faith all the different stipulations of 
the treaty of alliance so happily concluded in 1788," but added that 
the correct conduct of the two nations ought to remove all grounds 
of apprehension. Auckland delivered it to the States General on 
November 16th — the very day on which the National Convention 
passed the Decree abrogating the rights of the Dutch over the estuary 
of the Scheldt and the Meuse. The States General thanked the British 
Government for its assurances of support, but expressed the hope 
that it might not be needed. The Stadholder, Prince William V of 
Orange, in a letter dated November 16th, thanked King George III 
for the Declaration, and suggested that British warships should be 
moored in the Downs, in readiness to proceed to the Scheldt if 
occasion demanded. It soon arrived. On November 22nd, the senior 

1 F.O. Holland, 41, Grenville to Auckland, "most secret," November 13th, 
1792. Pitt also believed that "the explicit declaration of our sentiments is the most 
likely to prevent the case occurring." See, too, Pitt to the Marquis of Stafford, 
November 13th, 1792 {Diaries, etc. of the Hon. G. Rose, 1. 115); also my article in 
the Eng. Hist. Rev. (January, 1912). 



THE CONVENTION'S NETHERLANDS POLICY 227 

officer of two French gunboats at Rammekens demanded, in the name 
of Dumouriez, the right to pass up the Scheldt " pour fair e prospdrer 
les armes de la Republique Franpaise" — obviously, in order to assist 
their land forces in reducing the Austrian garrison of the citadel of 
Antwerp. The Dutch authorities refused permission, but secretly 
instructed the commander of their guardship not to use force if the 
gunboats persisted in forcing a passage. They did so, and were soon 
reinforced by more powerful craft. Auckland explained to Grenville, 
that the Dutch intended "to temporise as far as may be practicable 
without essential disgrace or detriment"; but Nagel made a strong 
appeal to the British Government for succour to a faithful Ally in view 
of the imminence of a French invasion 1 . In fact, the Dutch were 
utterly unprepared for war, and saw with alarm a large French force 
on their borders, having all but open communications with the mal- 
content "Patriots" who sought to overthrow the Dutch Constitution. 
The chief difficulty of the situation lay in the Dutch Government not 
daring to plead openly for British succour, lest the French should 
burst in, with the aid of the Patriots. To temporise and quietly prepare 
for defence was therefore the only prudent course. Grenville under- 
stood their difficulties, and hoped by maintaining a firm attitude to 
conjure the danger. 

The occurrence of riots in parts of Great Britain, also, alarmed 
him ; and he concluded that there was a close connexion between the 
aggressive policy of the National Convention towards the Netherlands 
and the republican propaganda in these islands. On hearing of the 
Scheldt Decree (on or just before November 27th), he wrote to 
Auckland: "There is, I am afraid, little doubt that the whole is a 
concerted plan to drive us to extremities with a view of producing an 
impression in the interior of the country, which I trust and hope will 
fail." These statements (repeated even more strongly in his letter 
of December 4th) differ entirely from those of November 25th, 
when he heard from Auckland of a possible opportunity of setting 
on foot an informal negotiation for a general peace, through the 
medium of a French agent in Holland. Grenville then commended 
the scheme and secured a guarded expression of approval from 
George IIP. Two days later, after hearing of the Scheldt Decree, he 
completely changed his language ; and thenceforth he never swerved 

1 F.O. Holland, 41 . Nagel to Grenville, November 29th ; Auckland to Grenville, 
November 27th, 30th. 

2 Dropmore Papers, n. 339, 341 , 344. His letter of November 14th to the Marquis 
of Buckingham makes light of the supposed sedition. (Mems. of C. J. Fox, in. 29.) 



228 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

in his resolve to oppose the novel pretensions of France. On 
November 30th he informed Auckland that a small squadron of 
observation would be sent to the Downs. On December 7th, owing 
to the outbreak of sporadic disorders, the Government issued a 
Proclamation ordering the embodying of the militia in certain counties, 
in consequence of the conduct of evil-disposed persons "acting in 
concert with persons in foreign parts" — a statement repeated in 
the King's Speech of December 13th. Fox denied the existence of 
seditious practices, and denounced Ministers for creating and utilising 
a panic. The charge has been repeated; but the utmost that can 
fairly be urged is that they exaggerated the connexion between 
British democrats and French aggressions. Such a connexion un- 
doubtedly existed; but it was unfair to charge our democrats with 
consciously provoking French action. All the addresses to the National 
Convention were drawn up, and half of them presented, before that 
body passed the aggressive Decrees which occasioned the volte-face 
of November 27th in British policy. 

War was certain to result from the decisions of the British and the 
French Governments, publicly announced on November 16th, unless 
one side gave way. But to give way was difficult; for principles, 
considerations of honour and material interests were alike at stake. 
Great Britain took her stand on the sanctity of treaties ; France, on 
the imprescriptible laws of nature as to the navigation of rivers in 
general and the rights of Antwerp in particular. Great Britain was 
resolved to stand by her Dutch Ally; France, to support the Dutch 
Patriots in the attempt to reverse the events of 1787. Moreover, 
neither side could retreat without loss both of prestige and material 
advantages. For the French Republic, to secure control of the Dutch 
Netherlands involved a gain of power such as Lewis XIV had never 
achieved; for Great Britain, it meant the establishment of her rival 
in estuaries that threatened the mouth of the Thames and her long 
and exposed east coast. At bottom, the issue was naval, therefore 
vital. 

Events now tended towards war. Dumouriez' occupation of 
Liege and his demand to enter Maestricht (over which the deposed 
Prince- Bishop had joint control with the Dutch) threw new light on 
the French Decree freeing the navigation of the lower Meuse 1 . 

1 Nagel in a note verbale of November 29th to Grenville stated that French 
vessels were assembling at Dunkirk and Ostend to ascend the Meuse and Scheldt 
into the heart of the United Provinces. He begged for British support. (F.O. 
Holland, 41.) 



PROVOCATIVE ACTION OF THE CONVENTION 229 

Nevertheless, Pitt and Grenville endeavoured to come to a friendly 
agreement with the French Republic by means of informal dis- 
cussions with a private French agent. On December 2nd and 14th, 
Maret (the future Due de Bassano) had interviews with Pitt, the 
earlier of which promised a good understanding; but, in the later, 
Maret had to announce the resolve of his Government to adhere both 
to the November Decrees and to its demands for the recognition of 
the French Republic and of Chauvelin as a fully accredited Envoy. 
To the recognition of the Republic Pitt and Grenville might possibly 
have acceded at an earlier date ; but that of Chauvelin (now a persona 
ingrata at Whitehall) was out of the question 1 . With Maret in his 
place much more might have been accomplished, though probably, 
in any case, George III would have vetoed the recognition of the 
Republic. Fox's motion in Parliament on December 15th for sending 
a Minister to Paris to treat with the French Government was nega- 
tived. The occasion was rendered memorable by Burke, Windham 
and other Whigs taking their seats on the Ministerial side. 

The French Convention now took a highly provocative step. In 
a Decree of December 15th, it declared for the suppression of the 
existing authorities in all districts occupied by the French troops, 
whose Generals were ordered to place under the protection of the 
French Republic the whole property of the deposed Government and 
of its adherents. Further, it invited the liberated people to accept the 
principles of liberty and equality, and to form a Provisional Govern- 
ment on those bases. Wide powers were, also, given to French 
Commissioners to provide means for the maintenance of the troops. 
Finally, it denounced as hostile any people which desired to preserve 
its Prince and privileged castes. This Decree, offering limitless 
opportunities of extortion, plunder and malversation, was an added 
threat to neighbouring nations 2 . 

To Grenville's practical mind, this profession of a desire to extend 
the bounds of liberty meant merely spreading the control of France 
over all lands which she coveted. Such is the dominant note of his 
reply of December 29th to a recent proposal of Catharine II for joint 
action of the Powers in setting bounds to the expansion of French 
power and influence. He stated that King George III saw with great 

1 For details of these interviews and those of Auckland with a French agent in 
the Netherlands, see Rose, Life of Pitt, II. chs. III. iv.; W. A. Miles, Correspondence, 
1. 61-72. 

2 Fox privately expressed horror at the Decree of December 15th and "thought 
war likely" (Malmesbury, Diaries, 11. 482). 



2 3 o THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

satisfaction the similarity of their views and, while abstaining from 
all interference in French domestic affairs, he would oppose the efforts 
of the National Convention to abrogate treaties and overturn all 
institutions in neighbouring countries. He, therefore, agreed with the 
Empress in desiring to form a League of the Powers, not for the 
purpose of imposing on France by force any form of government or 
Constitution, but in order to assure their own safety and curb French 
aggrandisement. In a covering letter of the same date to Whitworth 
at Petrograd, Grenville emphasised the distinction, already drawn in 
the Russian note, between the policy of imposing a particular form of 
government on France, and that of providing for the security of the 
other Powers. He then suggested tentatively that the Powers not at 
war should consult together as to the conditions which they might 
offer to the French — viz., "the withdrawal of their arms within the 
limits of the French territory, the abandonment of their conquests, 
the rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any 
other nations, and the giving in some public and unequivocal manner 
a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles or to excite 
disturbances against other Governments." If France assented to 
these terms, they would forego all thought of hostility to her and live 
in amity with her Government. If not, they would take active steps 
to secure those ends, and possibly require some indemnity for their 
exertions. For Great Britain and Russia, the War with France, if it 
ensued, would be mainly maritime and would assure supremacy at 
sea, especially if Spain did not join the French. Russia should induce 
Denmark and Sweden to stop all supplies going to France ; and she 
might possibly send a force to be landed on the French coast under 
cover of the British fleet 1 . 

These pronouncements mark out clearly the line of policy which 
British statecraft was to follow down to ,1815. They differ entirely 
from the original plans of Prussia and Austria, which aimed at the 
restoration of monarchy in France (together with considerable gains 
of territory at her expense) and very extensive acquisitions in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Great Britain desired little more than the status 
quo ante helium, and was prepared to recognise the existing Govern- 
ment in France, in case it made peace and ceased all subversive 
propaganda. Catharine assented to these proposals, except that which 
referred to a negotiation with the French Government ; for she refused 
to take any step which seemed to imply an acknowledgment of the 

1 F.O. Russia, 23 ; also in B.M. Add. MSS. 34446. 



POLICY OF THE GREAT POWERS: RUSSIA 231 

Republic. Whitworth toned down Grenville's expressions on this 
head, but without avail ; the Tsarina scouted the thought of recognising 
any country in revolt from its lawful sovereign, and had, for this reason, 
refused to recognise the United States of America. In vain Whit- 
worth pointed out " how difficult it would be for His Majesty to make 
the establishment of any form of government in France the pretext 
of a war with that country 1 ." 

With a royalism so naming as Catharine's the cool and cautious 
Grenville could with difficulty frame a concert. Her political creed 
corresponded very nearly to those of the Habsburgs and Hohen- 
zollerns. But under this display of zeal there was cunning. Whitworth 
found reason for believing that her recent overture was prompted by 
a desire to stiffen the attitude of the British Government towards 
France, and thereby to increase the chances of a rupture between the 
Western Powers. Her scheme of partitioning Poland was maturing 
apace; and, on the 27th, he reported the general desire in Russian 
official circles that it should remain unknown in London until the 
Anglo-French rupture occurred. That wish was to be gratified ; for 
on March 1st, the day on which the Partition Treaty was ratified, he 
stated that there was great satisfaction at our being forced into 
hostilities "without any further negotiation, from which it was always 
feared some pacific system might ultimately have resulted 2 ." It soon 
appeared, then, that between the United Kingdom and the Great 
Powers there existed a deep contrariety. We could count on frank and 
complete union with only one State — the United Netherlands. 

We may pass rapidly over the ensuing negotiations with France. 
They were complicated by the suspicion that Chauvelin was in- 
triguing with British malcontents, and desired to bring about the 
overthrow of the Pitt Administration. Certainly, he was jealous of the 
preference shown by our Ministers to Maret; and, perhaps because 
Maret's tone was conciliatory, his was haughty. He associated 
ostentatiously with the Opposition, and announced the resolve of 
Lebrun not to retract the Scheldt Decree, but to insist upon the 
acknowledgment of the French Republic in the person of Chauvelin. 
He also boasted that, if he were not received as Ambassador, the 
height of his ambition was to leave England with a Declaration of 
War 3 . These assertions harmonised with the Report of the French 

1 F.O. Russia, 23. Whitworth to Grenville, January 22nd, 1793. 

2 Ibid. Whitworth to Granville, January 22nd, 25th, 27th, March 1st, 1793- 

3 W. A. Miles, Authentic Corresp. zuith Lebrun (1792), p. 84; id. Corresp. on the 
French Revolution, I. 369. 



232 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

Diplomatic Committee, of which that mischievous busybody, Brissot, 
was chairman. In presenting it to the Convention on January ist, 
1793, Kersaint pointed out the vulnerable character of the British 
Empire, which could be revolutionised in Ireland and attacked with 
deadly effect in Canada and the East and West Indies. War, should 
it take place, ought to be considered as Pitt's War, not that of the 
British nation 1 . 

Chauvelin echoed these statements in his next notes, which 
elicited vigorous retorts from Whitehall. His reiterated claim to be 
considered the official representative of the French Republic met with 
a cold refusal. He also attacked the Aliens Bill for subjecting all 
foreigners, including himself, to official supervision (December 31st, 
1792), alleging that that measure infringed the Commercial Treaty 
of 1786, which stipulated freedom of intercourse and sojourn for the 
inhabitants of both countries. But this Aliens Bill was less rigid 
than a similar measure adopted at Paris in May, 1792, which con- 
sequently had already infringed that Treaty. Equally unfounded was 
Chauvelin's assertion that the refusal to recognise him officially 
implied a rupture of relations with the French Republic. Grenville 
retorted that he (Chauvelin) could not be officially acknowledged 
except as the Envoy of Lewis XVI, though unofficial explanations 
might still pass between them. In answer to Chauvelin's assurances 
that the Decree of November 16th was not intended to impugn Dutch 
rights, save in a matter of minor importance (the Scheldt), and that 
the Decree of November 19th applied to a community desirous of 
assuring its new-found liberty — not to a few seditious persons in that 
community — Grenville pointed out that a French flotilla had forced 
an entrance up the Scheldt in spite of Dutch protests, and that the 
whole affair showed a resolve to set at naught treaties and the rights 
of neutral nations; also, that the later Decree was accompanied "by 
the public reception given to the promoters of sedition in this country 
and by the speeches made to them precisely at the time of this Decree." 
He further denied the imputation of harbouring illwill towards 
France, but enjoined her, if she desired to maintain friendship, "to 
renounce her views of aggression and aggrandisement and to confine 
herself within her own territory, without insulting other Governments, 
without disturbing their tranquillity, without disturbing their rights." 
The whole despatch, though needlessly stern in form, proves that 
Pitt and Grenville did not object to the French Republic per se, but 

1 Hist. pari. xxn. 365-378; O. Browning, p. 278. 



FRENCH DESIGN ON THE UNITED PROVINCES 233 

to its aggressive claims and subversive propaganda. Lebrun's answer 
of January 7th, was temperate in tone; but he refused to give way 
on the main point at issue, the Scheldt Decree. On the same day, 
Chauvelin wrote an acrid note respecting the Aliens Bill; indeed, on 
this and other topics his tone embittered the discussions. The points at 
issue were far from irreconcilable; and a tactful negotiator like Maret 
would perhaps have found means to effect a reconciliation. 

The whole affair, however, was complicated by the deepening 
conviction of Grenville (perhaps also of Pitt 1 ) that the French were 
working hard to undermine the British and Dutch Constitutions, and 
that Dumouriez' forces were preparing to invade the United Provinces. 
Such was the news derived from a French agent at the Hague, who 
was on a confidential footing with the Grand Pensionary, and 
informed him secretly, but with absolute certainty, that the French 
would invade his country by January 25th. Grenville received this 
news on December 29th, and thereafter disregarded the pacific 
assurances of Lebrun and Chauvelin 2 . His despatch of January 10th 
to Trevor at Turin implied that hostilities were imminent — an 
inference rendered the more probable by the shifty character of 
Dumouriez 3 . So far back as November 20th, that General wrote to 
Maulde, French Envoy at the Hague, that he intended to carry liberty 
to the Dutch as he had to the Belgians 4 . During his visit to Paris 
at the end of 1792, he seems to have convinced the French Ministers 
of the feasibility of that enterprise and of the immense results certain 
to accrue from it; for, on January 10th, the Executive Council sent 
secret orders to his second in command, General Miranda, to prepare 
to invade Dutch Flanders and Zealand within twelve days 5 . Probably, 
he would have done so, but for lack of food and transport. Grenville 
did not know of these orders ; but the evidence coming from the Hague 
pointed to the imminence of a French invasion. Thus, when most of 
the British warships were about to be withdrawn from off Flushing in 

1 On December 13th, Noel, a French agent in London wrote to Lebrun de- 
scribing Miles's informal efforts for peace and his assurances that Pitt was entirely 
for peace — more so than Grenville. Miles added: " Ne craignez rien denotre arme- 
ment" (referring to the embodying of part of the militia and the sending of a small 
squadron to the Downs). Miles, Corresp. on the French Revolution, I. 68. 

2 Dropmore Papers, 11. 360. For his reply of December 29th to Auckland, see 
Appendix A. 

3 See W. Eliot's despatch of February 23rd, 1793 from Berlin to Grenville in 
Appendix B. 

4 F.O. Holland, 41. Enclosure in Auckland's despatch of November 23rd, 
1792. 

5 "Corresp. de Miranda avec Dumouriez..." (Paris, 1793), pp. 3-8. 



234 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

order that their crews might help the press-gang, the Prince of Orange 
begged that they might not depart, as their presence greatly encouraged 
his Government. On January 20th Grenville enclosed for Auckland's 
use a copy of the French plan of campaign, which had been secretly 
procured at Paris, and urged greater expedition in the Dutch defensive 
preparations. He also stated that the transactions with Chauvelin, 
and the manifestos recently issued by the Convention, left little 
doubt as to the resolve of that body to bring about a rupture. 
If the Dutch were attacked, a British force would be sent to aid 
in their defence. By that date, even Pitt deemed a war with France 
inevitable 1 . 

In all these discussions, the fate of Lewis XVI, which was then 
trembling in the balance, was scarcely mentioned. Obviously, the 
rupture would have occurred, even if his execution had not taken 
place. But, on the news of that event reaching London on January 24th, 
the Privy Council at once met and ordered the withdrawal of Chauvelin 
from the realm within eight days. Technically, this measure was 
correct, as that Envoy had been accredited by Lewis XVI and was 
received solely in that capacity. On his arrival at Paris, Brissot and 
the Diplomatic Committee drew up a report declaring that George III 
had not ceased, especially since August 10th, 1792, to give proofs of 
his malevolence to France and his attachment to the Coalition of the 
Kings; that he had violated the Anglo-French Treaty of 1786 and 
ordered armaments clearly intended against France ; that he had just 
concluded a Secret Treaty of Alliance with the Emperor, and had 
drawn the Stadholder of the United Provinces into the same Coalition. 
These falsehoods found ready acceptance ; and an inflammatory speech 
by Brissot decided the Convention to pass unanimously a Declara- 
tion of War against the King of Great Britain and the Stadholder 
(February 1st) 2 . The inclusion of the latter in this Decree proved the 
aggressive designs of the French Government ; for, whatever might 
be thought of the action of the British Government, that of the United 
Provinces had given no cause of offence. The acquisitive spirit of the 
Convention further appeared in the Decree of January 31st, annexing 
Nice, and in that of a few days later, annexing the Belgic Provinces, to 
France. It is also noteworthy that, among the charges drawn up in 
October, 1793, by the Jacobins against the Girondins as a party and 
against Brissot in particular, he and they were accused of brusquely 

1 Malmesbury, Diaries, II. 501. 

2 Hist. Pari. xxiv. 194-207. 



BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND WAR WITH FRANCE 235 

proclaiming war against the British and Dutch peoples and other 
Powers which had not yet declared themselves 1 . 

It has often been stated that a conflict between Great Britain and 
the French Republic was inevitable because the one represented the 
old order, the other the new, so that between them there was a fixed 
antagonism. The statement is overstrained. There was no irrecon- 
cilable opposition between British statesmen and the French leaders, 
until the latter, amidst the exaltation produced by the conquest of 
Belgium, adopted an aggressive policy which was at variance with the 
best traditions of their predecessors. The French conquest of Belgium 
and the ensuing trial of Lewis XVI produced an artificial excitement, 
a flamboyant patriotism, an eager competition between Jacobins and 
Girondins each to outdo the other, which infused a dash of the old 
Chauvinism into the fanaticism of the new age. The heady mixture 
was not the true wine of the Revolution. It was nauseous to Talley- 
rand, the inheritor of the Mirabeau tradition; and, in his obscure 
lodgings in London, he had to look on helplessly while the fate of 
France and of Europe was decided by the coxcomb Chauvelin, the 
journalist-adventurer Lebrun and the charlatan Brissot. To assert that 
these men represented either France or the Revolution is to insult her 
and degrade her progeny. 

Furthermore, the statement errs in assuming that George III, Pitt 
and Grenville desired to make war on the Revolution. The reverse is the 
case. Until near the close of 1792, the King wished to remain at peace. 
Pitt and Grenville disapproved of the two German Powers embarking 
on a monarchical crusade, because they foresaw its effect in identifying 
Jacobinism with France and, up to the end of November 1792, they 
hoped by an understanding with all the Powers to mediate with a view 
to a general pacification. They were, also, prepared to recognise such 
de facto rulers of France as should conclude peace — that is, to recognise 
the French Republic if it proved to be pacific and non-interfering. 
True, in Parliament, in December, 1792, they opposed the motion for 
sending a Minister to Paris; but, at the same time, they were quietly 
taking steps which might lead to the resumption of friendly relations, 
if France renounced her aggressive designs. For they were aggressive. 
The Scheldt Decree was a violation of a recent French Treaty with 

1 Hist. Pari. xxix. 435. For proofs that the so-called mission of Maret to 
London at the end of January was unauthorised, and that the pacific proposals of 
Dumouriez were unimportant and doubtful, see Rose, Life of Pitt, II. 109-m; 
W. A. Miles, Correspondence on the French Revolution, 11. 62; Lecky (vi. 126) over- 
rates their importance. 



236 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

the United Provinces and infringed the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1788. 
The British Government has been blamed for laying too much stress 
on the Decrees of November 16th and 19th; but, viewed collectively, 
they constituted a claim to the right to abrogate treaties and interfere 
in the internal affairs of neighbouring lands. Moreover, the French 
authorities followed up the Scheldt Decree by action which revealed 
their design of making Antwerp a French naval port. Their whole 
conduct with regard to the Austrian Netherlands was such as to 
warrant the belief that annexation was intended. The Decrees of 
November, therefore, became, not only a test question with respect 
to the maintenance of treaties, but a matter of vital importance to 
Great Britain and the United Provinces. 

On the other hand, the procedure of Pitt and Grenville must be 
pronounced stiff and ineffective. Without divulging too much of the 
sacrosanct treasures of the Foreign Office, they might surely have 
made it clear, not only to diplomats but to the two nations concerned, 
that British policy was essentially peaceful and aimed at achieving 
a just settlement of the War, with a view to the eventual recognition 
of any truly pacific Government established at Paris. A declaration 
of this kind would have at the same time allayed resentments in France 
and discontents at home. But Ministers allowed their good intentions 
to be shrouded by old-world reserve; and Grenville met the pert 
insistence of Chauvelin with an aristocratic hauteur which irritated 
that Envoy and played into the hands of the aggressive party at 
Paris. Pedantic insistence, there, on the imprescriptible laws of nature, 
and rigid adherence, here, to the text of treaties complicated a question 
which, with goodwill and tactfulness on both sides, might have been 
settled in a month. As it was, the two great nations of the West drifted 
into a conflict which stirred the dying embers of Continental strife 
into a mighty conflagration, destined to rage over the whole of Europe 
and finally to bring back the exhausted principals to the original point 
in dispute — Antwerp. 

II 

The divergence between the policy of Great Britain and that of 
the chief potentates of the Continent appeared very clearly so 
soon as they deemed her entangled in the dispute with France. The 
conduct of Catharine has already been described, and that of Austria 
and Prussia now claims attention. In the first days of 1793 , Sir Morton 
Eden reported that Prussia was about to send her best troops against 



GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMAN GREAT POWERS 237 

Poland, and that his request to spare some for the defence of the 
United Provinces was disregarded. The reason became clear in the 
course of an interview which Grenville had at Whitehall, on January 
1 2th, with the Austrian and Prussian Ambassadors, Count Stadion 
and Baron Jacobi. They stated the decisions of their Courts: that 
Prussia should obtain in Poland an indemnification for her expenses 
in the French War, and should, in return, withdraw her opposition 
to the long-cherished Habsburg plan of acquiring Bavaria in exchange 
for the Belgic Provinces. Grenville protested against this cynical 
scheme and pointed out "the mischief which must result to the 
common cause from such an evident act of injustice 1 ." But the 
transaction was irrevocably settled between Vienna and Berlin; for 
on January 19th Eden reported that the King of Prussia would no 
longer act as a - principal in the French War, if these indemnifications 
were not forthcoming; also, that Russia had her plans for aggrandise- 
ment at the expense of Poland, those of Austria in that quarter being 
doubtful 2 . On February 5th, when the French Declaration of War 
was known, Grenville informed the German Powers that Great 
Britain, while protesting against the Partition of Poland, would not 
oppose it by force; also, that, if France continued the War, the Great 
Powers must exact from her the renunciation of all her conquests 
and of " all policy of interference in the affairs of other States." 

As this programme involved the abandonment by France of the 
Belgic Provinces, part of the Rhineland, Savoy and Nice (not to speak 
of Avignon), it opened the way to an understanding with the German 
Powers and the Empire, as also with Sardinia and the Pope ; and this 
prospect undoubtedly encouraged the Empire to declare war on 
France, as it did on March 23rd, 1793. The Court of Turin also 
resolved to persevere in a contest which, without Britain's financial 
and naval assistance, must have been hopeless. On this territorial 
basis, then, the foundations of the First Coalition could be laid; but 
in the sphere of moral, as distinct from material, interests there was 
slight hope of an understanding, save with the smaller States threatened 
by France. Our attention may now be concentrated, first, on the 
formation of the Treaties which built up the First Coalition, secondly, 
on British efforts to secure the active cooperation of Prussia and to 
lessen the friction with Spain. 

1 F.O. Prussia, 27. Draft of January 12th, 1793, in Grenville's writing. 

2 Ibid. Eden to Grenville, January 19th. On February 5th, Eden was appointed 
to succeed Sir Murray Keith at Vienna. He arrived there at the end of the month. 



238 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

Before the entry of Great Britain into the War, no attempt (apart 
from the rather doubtful proposal of Catharine) had been made to 
frame a general concert of the Powers ; and in that sphere British policy 
was to effect results no less important than in the naval and military 
operations. From Catharine, little was to be expected except skilfully 
baited incitements to the continuation of the War. They took the 
form of two companion Treaties, signed by Grenville with VorontzofF 
at London on March 25th, 1793, viz., a Commercial Treaty renewing 
that of 1766, with a few variations favourable to British trade, and a 
Treaty of Alliance containing vague offers of mutual assistance in the 
War, but binding each of the two Powers to prohibit all exports to 
France and to hinder neutrals from sending them, or from granting 
any protection to French property or commerce, whether in their 
ports or at sea. This last proviso, besides rendering impossible a 
renewal of the League of Armed Neutrality of 1780, implied an 
embargo on French ships and property in the ports or in the territory 
of neutrals. Moreover, it prevented the revival of the old French 
practice which, in time of war, opened up to neutrals commerce with 
French Colonies forbidden in time of peace. 

On April 25th, Grenville signed with the Sardinian Ambassador, 
the Comte de Front, a Treaty granting to that kingdom during the 
War a subsidy of £200,000 a year, conditional on the maintenance of 
a Sardinian army of 50,000 men. Great Britain engaged to send a 
fleet into the Mediterranean, and to secure the restoration to Sardinia 
of her lost provinces of Savoy and Nice. A month later, the Treaty 
of Aranjuez with Spain established a close concert for the purpose of 
opposing French views of aggrandisement, and binding the two Powers 
to prevent neutrals from according protection to French commerce. 
With Naples no treaty was signed, until that Power knew that Lord 
Hood with a powerful fleet was in the Mediterranean. Then, on 
July 12th, 1793, Sir William Hamilton and General Acton, Prime- 
Minister at that Court, signed a compact of a more intimate nature 
than the preceding. The King of the Two Sicilies, thereby, agreed to 
supply for service with the British forces in the Mediterranean 6000 
troops, 4 sail of the line, and 8 smaller warships; while Great Britain 
engaged to maintain in that sea "uneflotte respectable" and to protect 
Neapolitan commerce. With Prussia, owing to the exertions of Sir 
James Murray and Lord Beauchamp, a Treaty was signed on July 14th, 
1793, at the headquarters of Frederick William II at Mainz. It estab- 
lished a perfect concert with her, and assigned a subsidy for her 



AUSTRIAN TURN TOWARDS GREAT BRITAIN 239 

military support, while obtaining from her assurances as to neutral 
commerce similar to those secured from Russia and Spain. These 
assurances, also, reappeared in the otherwise rather vague compacts 
concluded on August 30th and September 26th with the Emperor and 
the King of Portugal respectively. Subsidy Treaties with Baden and 
the two Hesses also promised to swell the totals of the Allied armies. 

The Treaty of 1788 still subsisted with the United Provinces; 
and the first naval and military efforts were put forth by Great Britain 
in February, 1793, resulting in the blocking, at the Hollandsdiep, of 
Dumouriez' scheme of invasion of Holland. Foiled there, he was 
utterly beaten on March 17th by the Austrians at Neerwinden, with 
the result that the Belgic Provinces once more came under their 
control. When Dumouriez, after planning the overthrow of the 
regicides at Paris, was constrained to fly for refuge to the Austrians, 
the Allies seemed to have the game in their hands 1 . The opportunity 
was lost, largely because the Austrian commander, Prince Frederick 
Josias of Coburg, in the course of a conference on military affairs held 
at Antwerp early in April, issued a proclamation which implied that 
the Allies would demand territorial indemnities from France. Nothing 
could have tended more certainly to unite all Frenchmen together 
in defence of la patrie. 

For this blunder Prussia's action in Poland was largely responsible. 
By the end of March, it was clear that Prussia and Russia would share 
between them the spoils of the Second Partition, to the exclusion of 
Austria. In consequence, Francis II honourably removed the Vice- 
and Acting-Chancellor, Count Philip Cobenzl, who had been duped 
by those two Powers, and in 1794 appointed to the general control of 
Foreign Affairs Thugut, a diplomat remarkable alike for his versa- 
tility in the choice of means and for his persistent pursuit of 
fundamental aims. Thugut resolved that Austria, while opposing 
the Partition, should make use of Prussia and Great Britain to 
secure acquisitions of territory proportionate to those of Prussia 
and Russia in Poland. He declined to specify where those acquisi- 
tions should be found 2 . The most obvious were the recovery of the 
Belgic Provinces (together with Liege) and the addition of territory 
to be conquered from France. He therefore pressed a close under- 
standing with Great Britain ; and Grenville now held out to the Court 
of Vienna the prospect of acquiring Lille, Valenciennes and other 

1 So urgent was the crisis that Lebrun wrote to Grenville, on April 2nd, to 
propose discussions for peace. For Grenville 's reception of the proposal see his 
letter of May 18th, 1793 {Appendix B). 

2 F.O. Austria, 32. Eden to Grenville, April 15th, 1793. 



2 4 o THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

strong and populous cities of north-eastern France as a barrier against 
that Power. This revived Barrier-scheme offered some temporary 
advantages. It would root Austria more firmly in her Belgic lands, and 
thereby tend to efface her desire for the Belgic-Bavarian exchange, a 
project always strongly opposed at Whitehall. When the Allied arms 
prospered in May-July, the Court of Vienna viewed these proposals 
with favour, and, in deference to British representations, seemed to 
abandon finally the proposals for the exchange. This decision pleased 
the Hohenzollern Court; but, dissembling its satisfaction, it now 
proceeded to mark time in the west, to the exasperation of Great 
Britain and Austria. The motives of Prussia were clear enough. Having 
secured her booty in the east, she now desired to see her southern rival 
go empty away from the territorial scramble planned between them 
early in 1792 ; and, at the close of August i793,Lucchesini,the Prussian 
Envoy at Vienna, declared that his Government would object to any 
serious diminution of the power of France as detrimental to the balance 
of Europe 1 . 

These facts explain the course of the campaign in France. The slow 
and methodical reduction of the French Barrier fortresses in the north- 
east (most faulty as a military measure, when France had no good army 
in the field) was due mainly to the Anglo- Austrian understanding as to 
the eventual acquisition of those fortresses by the Habsburgs ; and the 
efforts of Coburg and the Duke of York, which, on the reduction of 
Valenciennes (July 28th), came very near to success, were wasted 
by the calculating selfishness of Prussia. The remonstrances of British, 
Austrian and Dutch statesmen at her feeble and belated operations 
in the west had no effect. Finally, on September 23rd, Lucchesini 
handed to Lord Yarmouth, our special Envoy at Prussian head- 
quarters (where Frederick William still was) a note bewailing the 
expenses of the campaign, the troubles in Prussian Poland, and so 
forth, and requiring, not only our guarantee for the possession of that 
land, but also a subsidy by the Allies towards the expenses of the War. 
These demands being declined, Frederick William quitted his army, 
ordering it not to engage in serious undertakings; whereupon 
George III commented: "The sudden retreat of the King of Prussia 
completes the very ill-advised line of conduct that has attended every 
step he has taken for these four or five years 2 ." 

The results of Prussia's apathy were severely felt in another sphere 

1 F.O. Austria, 34. Eden to Grenville, August 31st, 1793. 

2 Dropmore Papers, 11. 441. See too, pp. 446, 451, 470. 



TENSION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN 241 

of war, Toulon. On August 28th, the French Royalists, dominant 
in that city, handed it over, with its dockyard and fleet, in trust to 
the British Vice- Admiral, Lord Hood. The Spanish fleet under 
Admiral Langara sailed in immediately after. The plan of the British 
Government, who on September 13th heard of this unexpected 
success, was to collect as large a force as possible of Austrians, 
Spaniards, Sardinians and Neapolitans for the succour of the Royalist 
cause in the South of France, and to press the Republic hard on that 
side. The unwarlike character of the Spanish and Neapolitan con- 
tingents (those of Sardinia were highly efficient) rendered very neces- 
sary the despatch of at least 5000 seasoned Austrian troops from her 
Milanese province. On September 24th, Thugut reluctantly assented 
to Eden's requests to this effect ; but, on various pretexts (chiefly the 
inactivity of Prussia in the Rhenish campaign), the Imperial Govern- 
ment delayed the fulfilment of its promise until too late. Toulon fell on 
December 19th, before the Austrian troops began their march seawards. 
This disaster also strained severely the relations between Great 
Britain and Spain. The Court of Madrid had claimed the right to 
appoint the Commander-in-chief on shore, even though Toulon was 
surrendered to Hood, and though most of the seamen and troops 
present by the end of September were British or subsidised by Great 
Britain. Much friction ensued, but Pitt and Grenville ordered the 
retention of the command by a British General. Spain, also, har- 
boured resentment at the overtures made by Paoli on behalf of 
Corsican Royalists to Lord Hood for placing their island under the 
protection of George III. Another faction, headed by Buttafoco, 
treated with Langara for calling in the Spanish forces 1 . Neither 
move had any effect until after the evacuation of Toulon by the 
Allies on December 19th; but Hood thereafter resumed his relations 
with the Paolists; and in the spring of 1794 British forces set about 
the reduction of the remaining French garrisons. The Spanish 
Government resented this conduct as unfriendly on the part of an 
Ally, and declared it one of the causes of the rupture of 1796. 
Grenville sought to divert the thoughts of Spain to acquisitions in 
Roussillon and Beam ; but his motive of promoting hostility between 
her and France was too obvious to draw away her attention from 
the leading preoccupations of her statesmen, viz., the extension of 
British power in the West Indies and the Mediterranean 2 . 

1 F.O. Genoa. F. Drake to Grenville, December 22nd, 1793. 

2 F.O. Spain, 27. Grenville to St Helens, July 19th, 1793. (See Appendix B.) 

w.&G.i. 16 



242 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

Another relation which the Toulon affair brought to a crisis 
was that of the British Government to the French Princes and the 
Royalist party. Up to the month of August, 1793, the British Govern- 
ment declared its resolve not to intervene in favour of any party or 
form of Constitution. But the informal alliance with the Royalists 
of Toulon — perhaps, also, disgust at the deepening atrocities of the 
Reign of Terror — somewhat modified its attitude. It continued to 
discountenance the Emigres. In common with all who had experienced 
their intolerable arrogance and old-world bigotry, British statesmen 
and commanders were determined to keep them at arm's length 1 . 
But a very delicate situation arose in October, when it appeared that 
the Comte de Provence (afterwards King Lewis XVIII) who had 
assumed the title of Regent of France, proposed to proceed to Toulon ; 
also, that the Spanish Court favoured the scheme as a means of 
increasing Spanish influence there. At once, British Ministers took 
alarm; for it was certain that Monsieur would dictate military and 
political measures, and would prevent the Allies from holding any terri- 
torial conquests as gages for the indemnities on which they were still 
hopefully counting. On October 22nd, Grenville fired off despatches 
to St Helens at Madrid and Drake at Genoa, bidding the former 
oppose the scheme and the latter, in the last resort, even prevent the 
embarkation of the Prince 2 . His slow progress and the rapid success 
of the Republican arms prevented that harlequinade from taking 
place; but the whole affair strained our relations both with Spain 
and with the Royalists of Toulon. 

While discouraging the "pure" Royalists, George III and his 
Ministers avowed their preference for a limited monarchy. In the 
Instructions, drawn up almost entirely by Pitt and signed on 
October 19th, for the three British Commissioners appointed to 
administer Toulon, there occurs this passage: "You will be par- 
ticularly careful on all occasions in stating H.M.'s conviction that the 
acknowledgment of an hereditary monarchy and of Lewis XVII as 
lawful sovereign, affords the only probable ground for restoring 
regular government in France." A less distinctly monarchist Declara- 
tion, drafted by Grenville and issued from London on October 29th, 
stipulated merely that " some legitimate and stable government should 
be established, founded on the acknowledged principles of universal 
justice, and capable of maintaining with other Powers the accustomed 

1 F.O. Sardinia, 13. Mulgrave to Trevor, October 19th, 1793. 

2 Cottin, pp. 425, 428. 



UNCERTAIN RELATIONS WITH PRUSSIA 243 

relations of union and peace." On this head, Grenville's policy was 
more flexible than that of Pitt and left the Administration free to treat 
with any French Government that did not pursue aggressive and sub- 
versive aims. Of this wider definition Pitt was glad to avail himself 
in the negotiations of 1796 and 1797 ; though by that time, as will duly 
appear, Grenville's predilections had become less pacific and rather 
more monarchical than those of Pitt 1 . The British Declarations were 
less royalist in tone than those of our German Allies and far less so than 
the vehement professions of Catharine. Thus, by the autumn of 1793, 
the four Allies had taken up a standing not unlike that of the year 
1 8 14. For the present, their pronouncements placed them signally 
at variance with French Republicans, and tended to rally all of them 
round any Government which could drive out the invaders. Thus, 
the Toulon episode, which bred discord among the Allies, solidified 
Jacobin rule in France. By the end of the year, her soil was almost 
freed from the Allied armies — a result due no less to the fatuities of 
their Generals than to the blunders and selfishness of their Cabinets. 
The signal failures of the Allies in the campaign of 1793 emphasised 
the need of securing substantial help from Prussia for that of 1794. 
That Court, however, seemed resolved to continue marking time on 
the Rhine, while acting energetically beyond the Vistula. Its guiding 
spirit was Lucchesini, formerly reader to Frederick II. Having 
espoused the sister-in-law of Bischoffswerder, the still powerful 
favourite, he had secret means of influencing the highly susceptible 
Monarch; and, by dint of cajolery or bullying, generally had his way. 
Though his policy was persistently anti-British and anti-Austrian, he 
had gained too greatan influence over our Envoy, the Earl of Yarmouth. 
Pitt, therefore, advised the despatch of Lord Malmesbury on a special 
mission to Berlin to clear matters up. At Whitehall Ministers differed 
as to the value of Prussia's Alliance. Grenville was so convinced of 
her falseness as to advise the refusal of all further subsidies. Pitt was 
more hopeful; but, on October 9th, the Cabinet decided on the with- 
drawal of the subsidy and the transmission of remonstrances (toned 
down at Pitt's suggestion) to the Court of Berlin. It was well not to 
insist overmuch ; for the Prussian Ministers could claim that they had 
as much right to crush the so-called Polish revolt as we had to extend 
British sway in the East and West Indies; and, later, the Anglophil 
Duke of Brunswick mildly reproved our exigence at Berlin. Frederick 

1 Dropmore Papers, n. 433, 438, 443; Pari. Hist. XXX. 1060; Cottin, p. 423; 
E. D. Adams, pp. 22-24. 

16 — 2 



244 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

William II, with all his defects, was not devoid of chivalry, and a 
personal appeal of George III to him would probably have cleared 
the air. As it was, the British remonstrance produced an angry 
counterblast, which Yarmouth explained as due to annoyance at our 
refusal to meet Prussia's lofty demands for payment of actions 
required by her treaty obligations 1 . 

The Prussian problem being insoluble except by consummate 
skill and tact, Yarmouth was superseded by Lord Malmesbury. On 
his way to Berlin, he stayed at the Hague, Brussels and Frankfort, 
in order to probe the situation. He found it unpromising. At Brussels, 
he met the Austrian Ambassador, Mercy d'Argenteau, formerly the 
Anglophobe counsellor of Marie- Antoinette, who now, under the 
chastening stroke of her execution, confessed that everything depended 
on the union of England and Austria. He extolled the exertions of 
the Duke of York's army, but declared that Austria had no further 
troops available except 10,000 in the Milanese. In his view, the 
conduct of the Prussians, both Ministers and Generals, was equally 
reprehensible and foolish; but Frederick William must understand 
that abandonment of this contest spelt ruin. At Alost, Malmesbury 
found the Duke of York indignant at the mismanagement of the 
campaign, and his officers discontented or even insubordinate. At 
Frankfort, he gleaned useful hints from the Dutch Envoy, Vice- 
admiral Kinckel, as to the influences, male and female, which played 
upon the Prussian monarch, and as to the success of that arch-intriguer 
Lucchesini, in removing from the royal councils all friends of Austria 
and Great Britain. Austria's representative, Count Lehrbach, was 
unpopular, owing to his rough overbearing ways. The Prussian Court, 
therefore, oscillated between hatred of French principle and fear of 
Russia, the dominating motive being to incorporate thoroughly its 
late gains in Poland and to leave Austria beggared by her Rhenish 
campaigns. An imperious necessity, however, controlled these oscilla- 
tions. The treasury at Berlin was nearly empty. Frederick William 
having squandered money on mistresses and official embezzlers, four- 
fifths of the treasure inherited from Frederick the Great had vanished ; 
and Prussia possessed no system of finance capable cf meeting the 
huge yearly deficits 2 . 

Herein lay the secret of Frederick William's complaisance to 

1 Dropmore Papers, 11. 442, 446, 470. 

2 Malmesbury, Diaries, in. 14-23; Vivenot, Quellen zur Geschichte der Politik 
Oesterreichs, iv. 11 et seq.; F.O. Prussia, 28. G. Rose to Grenville, November 3rd, 
1793. 



PRUSSIA AND THE SUBSIDIES 245 

Malmesbury. When our Envoy saw him at Berlin on December 25th, 
he proffered almost indignant assurances of his fidelity to the Treaty 
of 1788, though recent notes from Berlin had left it doubtful; but he 
added that, in the exhausted state of his exchequer, he could not 
undertake another campaign, and that, a loan being out of the 
question, he must recall nearly all his troops from the Rhine unless his 
Allies granted pecuniary support. Such a step he would regret, for 
he abhorred the French Jacobins ; and he trusted that Great Britain 
would not leave him "degraded and sunk," but would enable him to 
proceed with the French War. These earnest professions, added to the 
assurances of George Rose {Charge d'affaires at Berlin) as to Prussia's 
poverty, produced a great impression, especially when the King stated 
his keen desire to increase his Rhenish army to 100,000 men. Malmes- 
bury hoped that, if the honest old Field-marshal Mollendorff com- 
manded such a force, the results would be decisive. Despite warnings 
from Lehrbach, that Prussia meant to desert her Allies and join 
France, our Envoy hoped for the best; and his influence turned the 
scale in Downing Street 1 . Grenville cast off his scepticism, and, 
while grumbling that the Germans thought England a pretty good 
milch-cow, looked about anxiously for the necessary subsidy of 
£2,000,000. On January 28th, 1794, he wrote to Malmesbury, 
promising this sum — Great Britain to contribute two-fifths, Austria 
and Holland each one-fifth, the last fifth remaining as a charge either 
on a beaten France or on the conscience of Catharine 2 . 

The reception accorded to these offers at the Allied capitals threw 
light on the loose texture of the First Coalition. Frederick William 
at once computed that such a sum would not enable him to act up 
to the limit of his desires for the great cause. To the Dutch their quota 
seemed excessive. The appeal to the conscience of Catharine found it 
numb ; and Thugut saw in the British subsidy to the Hohenzollerns 
a means whereby they could arm a great force, maintain it in a central 
position and possibly even launch it against Vienna 3 . The Austrian 
General, while less nervous than the Minister, protested against the 
advent of the great Prussian subsidised force near Liege, and pointed 
out West Flanders as its proper sphere of operations. As the spring 
approached, much ink was spilt in drafting plans for the defence of 

1 After January 24th, 1794, the F.O. despatches were dated from Downing 
Street. 2 Dropmore Papers, II. 491-7. 

3 F.O. Austria, 36. Eden to Grenville, February 15th, 27th, 1794. Malmesbury, 
Diaries, ill. 53-68. The best survey of Thugut's policy is in H. Hiiffer's Quellen, 
edited by F. Luckwaldt (1907), Pt n, vol. 1. 



246 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

Ypres and the lines of the Lys and Sambre ; but the Imperialists now 
pointed out that the British and Dutch contingents were 30,000 below 
strength 1 . Worst of all, a revolt of the Poles strengthened the Franco- 
phil party at Berlin, which always received powerful support from 
the King's uncle, Prince Henry. Finally, the British Envoy induced 
the chief Prussian Minister, Count Haugwitz, to suggest the trans- 
ference of the negotiation to the Hague. There, on the scene of 
Malmesbury's former triumphs in 1787-8, they concluded a Treaty 
(April 19th, 1794), whereby Prussia was to supply an army of 62,400 
men, under a Prussian Commander-in-chief, for service against 
France, Great Britain and the United Provinces paying her £50,000 
a month and £300,000 for initial expenses, also her costs in bread 
and forage, calculated at the rate of 32 shillings a month per head. 
The movements of this army and the conquests made by it were to 
be at the decision and disposal of the Maritime Powers. Of the yearly 
subsidy Great Britian was chargeable for £1,600,000 and the United 
Provinces £400,000 a year; also, for the other expenses in similar 
proportion. The Treaty was framed ostensibly for the year 1794, but a 
separate article stipulated its renewal and for the duration of the War 2 . 
Malmesbury had somewhat exceeded Grenville's instructions ; but 
he could plead that only by liberal payments to Prussia could she 
be induced to act with vigour. As the compact aided her finances, 
spared those of Russia, and promised to fulfil the aims of the Allies, 
it should have formed the basis of a stable Coalition. Various cir- 
cumstances, however, militated against it. Inter alia, Pitt and Grenville 
recalled Malmesbury to London for further information, but, on his 
arrival, were so absorbed in the suppression of sedition as not to see 
him or provide for the payment of the first subsidy during nearly 
three weeks. The delay was disastrous. It gave a handle to the 
Francophils at Berlin, and they seem to have won over to their side 
Haugwitz, whose constancy had always depended on the influence of 
Malmesbury. Thereafter, the Count always shunned meeting him 3 . 
Lucchesini now had his way at Berlin, the result being that Mollen- 
dorfT, commanding the subsidised Prussian army, was induced to 
raise various difficulties as to the method of its employment beyond 
the Lower Rhine. Seeing that the Austro- British force under Clerfait 
and the Duke of York, on May 18th, suffered a heavy defeat at 

1 Vivenot, iv. 367. 

2 Martens, v. 283 ; Garden, v. 233 ; Malmesbury, Diaries, in. 91-3. 

3 Malmesbury, Diaries, m. 91-6. 



AUSTRIAN EVACUATION OF BELGIUM 247 

Turcoing-Roubaix, the arrival of the Prussians for the defence of the 
United Provinces was urgently necessary 1 . The British and Dutch 
Envoys, General Cornwallis and Kinckel, added their arguments to 
those of Malmesbury during lively interviews with the Marshal near 
Mainz, but failed to overcome his objections to so lengthy a march. 
Malmesbury discovered that the Anglophobes of the Prussian Court 
had been influencing him; and, in the absence of Haugwitz, Baron 
Hardenberg seemed to be the only official at Prussian headquarters, 
anxious for the fulfilment of the Treaty. Hardenberg consented to 
represent to MollendorfT the disgrace and isolation which must befall 
Prussia, if, after receiving the British and Dutch subsidies, she failed 
to perform her bounden duty to those hard pressed Allies. It was in 
vain. Not without some show of reason, the septuagenarian Marshal 
represented the immense difficulty of a march northwards, and kept 
his army in cantonments with the maximum of economy, British and 
Dutch money being therefore available for the other requirements of 
Berlin 2 . 

Meanwhile, events had occurred which began to awaken jealousy 
of British maritime power. The occupation of the French colony of 
Hayti and the conquest of Tobago and Pondicherry in 1793 were 
followed up, early in 1794, by the capture of Martinique and St Lucia, 
the keys to the West Indies. On June 1st, 1794, Lord Howe gained a 
decisive victory over the Brest fleet, thus confirming British naval 
supremacy. On the other hand the Anglo-Austrian forces sustained 
a serious reverse at Fleurus (June 25th). Thereupon, in pursuance of 
Thugut's policy, Coburg tamely evacuated the Belgic Provinces, 
abandoning the garrisons of Valenciennes and three neighbouring 
fortresses. Probably Thugut now cherished the hope that, if Belgium 
were to be recovered at all, it would be at the cost of Colonial 
sacrifices made by Great Britain for the sake of maintaining the 
Flemish Barrier system. Thenceforth, he took little interest in the 
recovery of Belgium. The entry of Austria's troops into southern 
Poland, early in July, manifested her intention to claim her share of 
the now imminent Partition 3 . 

This event should have convinced British Ministers that Thugut's 
policy of finding an indemnity there for the loss of Belgium had 
definitely triumphed. Even in June, Whitworth reported from 

1 Fortescue, Hist . of the Brit. Army, iv. (Pt I), ch. x. Mollendorff always opposed 
the compact with England. See Hardenberg, Denkwitrdigkeiten, I. 186. 

2 Cornwallis Mems. n. 248-256; Dropmore Papers, 11. 577. 

3 F.O. Austria, 37. Stratton to Grenville, July 9th, 1794. 



248 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

Petrograd that the King of Prussia pressed the Empress Catharine 
to undertake a Third Partition. For a time, she seemed to disapprove, 
probably from a surmise that the scheme would palsy his efforts 
beyond the Rhine, and thereby leave Austria weak for the acquisition 
of her promised indemnities in that quarter. In July, however, her 
scruples seemed to vanish, and her only difference with Frederick 
William was as to Austria sharing in the proposed Partition 1 . The 
Empress favoured it; he opposed it; but, after the Prussian troops 
had suffered sharp reverses at the hands of the Poles, his opposition 
relaxed. She, also, read him some severe lectures as to the evil influence 
of the former Partitions (primarily due to Berlin) on the struggle 
against France, and reminded him that she had shared in them only on 
condition of his waging war vigorously beyond the Rhine. There is 
no sign that these reproofs were received any more seriously than the 
original advice. But Whitworth continued to assure Grenville of 
Catharine's enthusiasm for the French War, in which, however, she 
reluctantly declined to participate until after the settlement of the 
Polish question 2 . 

The almost complete silence of Grenville on this question be- 
tokens a feeling of despair. Indeed, it is difficult to see how Great 
Britain, when immersed in the Revolutionary War, could have averted 
the Partitions. Certainly, neither Pitt nor Grenville assigned sufficient 
importance to these events. Pitt's knowledge of Continental politics, 
especially of those of eastern Europe, was scanty; and, looking at the 
European situation from a somewhat insular standpoint, both he and 
Grenville underestimated the drag of the eastern undertow. A signal 
proof of Pitt's hopeful half-knowledge appears in his Memorandum 
of July, 1794. While the Imperialists were evacuating Belgium, and 
Mollendorff refused to move northwards, the Prime-Minister insisted 
on the necessity of bringing up the total of the former to 100,000 men, 
with a view to the rescue of the besieged garrisons and the recovery 
of that land; he also demanded "the immediate march to Flanders of 
the army under Marshal Mollendorff." The hoped-for result of these 
combinations was to be the muster, by the spring of 1795 3 , of 238,000 
Allied troops in Belgium. 

1 F.O. Russia, 27. Whitworth to Grenville, June 27th, July 18th, 1794. 

2 Ibid. Whitworth to Grenville, September 26th, October 14th, November 4th, 
1794- 

3 Dropmore Papers, II. 599-600. Grenville's note of July 19th to Spencer and 
T. Grenville gives an estimated total of 230,000 — a proof of the close relations 
between him and Pitt. (F.O. Austria, 38.) 



AUSTRIAN RETIREMENT 249 

Pitt was, at this time, elated by the accession of the Portland Whigs, 
which left the Foxite or anti-War party a mere handful. One of the 
Old Whigs, Thomas Grenville, brother of the Minister, was now 
selected, together with Earl Spencer, to proceed on a special mission 
to Vienna for the purpose of stimulating Austria to further efforts 
by the prospect of her acquiring the French Barrier fortresses from 
Lille to Sedan 1 . A further attempt to galvanise Mollendorff into 
activity was made by a Supplementary Convention with Prussia on 
July 27th, 1794, which renewed and extended the stipulations of the 
recent Treaty. 

It was a characteristic of British policy, in this period, to make these 
convulsive efforts, after the misfortunes which prompted them had 
become irreparable. Spencer and Grenville, on their arrival at Vienna, 
found a very general disposition to give up the struggle. The Emperor 
had just dissolved his Government of the Belgic Netherlands 2 , thus 
fulfilling the wishes of Thugut to be rid of that encumbrance. The 
Chancellor now founded his chief hopes on Catharine's intervening to 
keep Prussia in the right path. To the British Envoys he laid stress on 
the financial plight of Austria, and, insisting that she could not 
continue her efforts without a liberal subsidy, claimed for Vienna that 
which was wasted on Berlin. On August 12th, Thomas Grenville 
thus summed up the situation: "They (the Austrians) will, I fear, 
again play with us by giving orders to move when they get money 
only, and they will probably get none till the places are lost which they 
ought to recover 3 ." In comparison with this dominant fact, the 
difficulty of Lord Grenville having omitted to specify how extensive 
a barrier the Emperor was to acquire from France seemed trivial. In 
truth, the Allies were about to lose all the French strongholds acquired 
in 1793 ; and, whatever promises were forthcoming at Vienna, per- 
formance was lacking. To keep up appearances, Coburg was replaced 
by Clerfait ; but the retirement continued 4 . When the French advance 
threatened Maestricht, Clerfait called on the Duke of York with his 
scanty British and Dutch forces to rescue it, but himself remained 
inactive, in spite of vigorous protests from Downing Street. Early 
in October, he retired behind the Rhine 5 . The Dutch troops, dismayed 

1 F.O. Austria, 38. Despatch of July 19th. 

2 Vivenot, iv. 375. 

3 Dropmore Papers, II. 614. 

4 Pitt and Grenville wished the Archduke Charles to take over the command, 
with Mack as adviser. (F.O. Austria, 38. Grenville to Spencer and T. Grenville.) 

5 Fortescue, iv. Pt I, ch. u ; Vivenot, iv. 365-8. 



2 5 o THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

at their abandonment by both Prussia and Austria, had already shown 
signs of collapse, the stronghold of Bois-le-Duc being surrendered in 
disgraceful fashion (September 28th). 

This display of ineptitude and cowardice at the front was accom- 
panied by chicanery both at Berlin and Vienna. Malmesbury had 
noticed a semblance of activity in MollendorfFs army, whenever the 
British subsidies fell due, and a rapid relapse after their payment 1 . 
At Berlin, also, the politicians showed alarm at the mere report that 
the British subsidy was to be transferred from them to the Habsburg 
Court. The hope of such a transfer (with substantial additions), kept 
up a show of energy at Vienna ; but Thugut more than once hinted 
that Great Britain, having virtually destroyed the navy and commerce 
of France and captured several of her colonies, could well afford to 
"buy back" the Belgic Provinces for Austria at the general peace 2 . 

He thus gave expression to a notion always popular among Great 
Britain's Allies. It amounted to this: that her triumphs at sea were 
to atone for their failures on land, the sacrosanct principle of the 
Balance of Power being also invoked to justify her colonial renuncia- 
tions and their territorial recoveries. The classic instance of this 
procedure had been the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), when 
George II sacrificed an important conquest overseas in order to re- 
establish Austria in the Flemish Barrier fortresses. Thugut, however, 
knew little of the British people, or even of George III, if he believed 
that a similar bartering away of colonial gains, made or likely to be 
made, would take place after the Flemish campaigns had aroused 
general disgust with the Austrian Alliance 3 . Mercy d'Argenteau, who 
was sent as Austrian Special Envoy to London, seems not to have 
urged any such argument. Thugut hoped that Mercy's action would 
avail at least to procure a loan ; but he died at London on August 25th, 
after accomplishing there nothing worthy of note. The Ambassador, 
Starhemberg, continued to press for a considerable loan 4 . The more 
flagrant the incapacity of Habsburg officers and officials, the more 
urgent became their demands for money. Thugut now insisted on a 

1 F.O. Prussia, 35. Malmesbury to Grenville, September 26th, 1794. On 
September 30th he threatened to stop the subsidy unless MollendorfT moved to 
cover Clerfait. 

2 Dropmore Papers, II. 627. 

3 Those feelings were increased by the cowardice of the Austrian commander 
of Valenciennes, who, on surrendering that fortress, tamely handed over a large 
number of Emigres to be butchered. (Vivenot, iv. 447.) 

4 Vivenot, iv. 389-407. See ibid. p. 441 for Austria's hopes of a new Barrier. 
It included Lille. 



APPROACHING COLLAPSE OF THE ALLIANCE 251 

loan of £6,000,000, which both Spencer and Thomas Grenville 
declared to be an impossibly large sum. They returned to London 
late in October, re infectd. 

Early in that month, Pitt's indignation against Prussia boiled 
over in an interview with her Ambassador, Jacobi ; and thereupon he 
stopped the subsidies. Grenville promptly intervened and resumed 
the payments ; but the mischief could not be undone. Berlin clamoured 
at the breach of the Treaty; and Frederick William threatened to 
recall his Rhenish army, unless the full arrears were paid up 1 . Pitt's 
intervention in the affairs of the Foreign Office was the more unfor- 
tunate, because, as the autumn wore on, the rot spread alarmingly in 
the Grand Alliance. On October 24th, the Elector of Mainz proposed 
to the Diet of the Empire a motion in favour of peace, begging the 
Emperor and the King of Prussia to concert measures for an armistice, 
with a view to a pacification 2 , provided that the integrity of the 
Imperial frontiers were maintained. Disgust at the War also pervaded 
the Allied armies, and to this cause, rather than to any special prowess 
of the French arms, must be assigned the discreditable collapse in the 
campaign of 1794. Not a sign appeared of the ancient determination 
of the Dutch in the defence of their land ; and the powerful faction of 
the Patriots assisted the French invaders and paralysed the military 
preparations. In vain, the Prince of Orange added his entreaties to 
those of the British Government for help from Prussia. Frederick 
William replied that he was engaged in a war with Poland; and that, 
as the Dutch could not supply him with succours for that struggle, 
their demands on him were consequently cancelled. Another ominous 
symptom was the discontent of the Germans. Malmesbury found the 
Rhinelanders clamorous for peace, and prejudiced against Great Britain 
because of her "views of ambition and conquest." They were proof 
against his arguments that she was the chief bulwark against French 
ambition and conquest 3 . 

In a last attempt to stay the flood of French invasion over Holland, 
the British Government decided to despatch Malmesbury to Brunswick 
with a formal request to the Duke to command an Allied army assembled 
behind the Waal for the defence of the United Provinces. The Duke 

1 F.O. Prussia, 35. Grenville to Malmesbury, November 13th, 1794; Paget 
Papers, I. 50, 63. 

2 Malmesbury 's despatch of October 21st to Grenville ascribes this proposal 
to Barthelemy, French Envoy at Berne, though BartheUemy said France would 
probably demand the Rhine boundary down to Coblentz or Cologne. (F.O. Prussia, 
35.) 

3 Malmesbury, Diaries, HI. 143; Paget Papers, I. 57. 



252 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

himself had made proposals as to the operations of such a force 1 , and 
the recent engagement of his daughter Caroline to the Prince of Wales 
furnished another reason for his consent. Malmesbury, therefore, 
undertook the mission with some degree of hope, but he met with a 
refusal. The Duke made it clear that His Prussian Majesty vetoed the 
project 2 . The Envoy passed judgment on Prussian policy as embodying 
"as many bad political qualities as can possibly exist at the same time 
in the same Power, weakness, perfidy, insolence, avarice and folly 3 ." 

The contempt felt by the Russians for their Prussian fellow-con- 
spirators against the independence of Poland appeared in an incident 
at Warsaw. Scarcely had the King of Poland abandoned that city than 
the victorious Russians tore down the insignia from the Prussian 
embassy with every sign of contumely. Francis II so far demeaned 
himself as to congratulate the victor, Suvoroff, by declaring in a letter 
to him that his success would be the means of changing the system 
of all the Cabinets of Europe 4 . The fact was largely true, though the 
admission of it was needlessly humiliating. The fierce jealousies of 
the Central Powers subordinated them to Catharine; she virtually 
dictated the terms of the Third Partition now imminent, though it 
was not completed until October, 1795 5 . Great Britain, of course, 
was helpless to prevent this catastrophe. Thus, in the winter of 1794-5, 
as two years before, the scramble for Polish lands distracted the policy 
of Berlin and Vienna, nullifying all the efforts of Great Britain to 
construct a solid barrier against French aggressions in the West. When 
those efforts appeared to be futile, Pitt and Grenville turned to Russia, 
and concluded a Defensive Alliance, signed at Petrograd on February 
1 8th, 1795, for granting mutual armed assistance in case either party 
was attacked, Russia furnishing 12,000 troops and Great Britain 12 
sail of the line 6 . 

Meanwhile, the Dutch in despair of defending their land, proposed 
to the British Government to enter into negotiations for a general peace. 
With this plan our Government did not comply, but signified that, if 
the United Provinces chose to seek their safety in a separate peace, 

1 Paget Papers, 1. 79. 

2 F.O. Prussia, 35. Malmesbury to Grenville, November 25th, 1794; Paget 
Papers, l. 98. 

3 Dropmore Papers, II. 653. 

4 F.O. Poland, 8. Gardiner to Grenville, January 7th, 10th, 1795. 

5 Sorel, iv. 447. 

6 Garden, v. 297. Probably the treaty contained a secret article specifying 
Russia's naval help; for in June, 1795, she sent 12 sail of the line to reinforce 
Duncan in the North Sea. 



THE WRECK OF THE FIRST COALITION 253 

we would not oppose such a step 1 . The overtures were abruptly ended 
by the French, so soon as weather conditions favoured a renewal of 
their advance. Before the utter collapse of the Allied defence on the 
Waal, Pitt and Grenville induced the King to recall the Duke of York 2 . 
The leadership of that prince had been meritorious ; but he was clearly 
unequal to the ever increasing difficulties ahead, not the least of them 
being the almost open insubordination of the British army and the 
active ill will of the Dutch. The Duke reported at Windsor that he was 
in every instance thwarted by the people whom he was trying to save 3 . 
Pitt further showed his zeal for the public service by substituting Lord 
Spencer at the Admiralty for the too leisurely Lord Chatham. 

But no changes of men could as yet avail to turn the tide of events. 
What was needed was a change in the spirit of the nations concerned ; 
and this came about only under the pressure of ovenvhelming calamities. 
The French Revolution, under the subtle alchemy of militarism, was 
to become by turns conquering, rapacious and tyrannical to its neigh- 
bours, until finally it was personified in the most awe-inspiring ruler 
of the modern world. Under his vigorous but oppressive sway, peoples 
previously torpid acquired new strength and a passion for independence 
unknown before. Rulers, too, were compelled to rely wholly on their 
subjects ; and the national consciousness thus aroused on all sides served 
to endow peasants with patriotism, Generals with determination, officials 
with honesty and Governments with efficiency. That transformation, 
however, was to come only with a radical change in the methods of 
waging war and with the overthrow of the old governmental systems. 
So long as the Allies could jog along with hired troops and British 
subsidies, no reform was possible. The payment of such subsidies was 
irritating to the donor and humiliating to the receiver. It promoted 
exacting captiousness on the one side and slack performance on the 
other. Not until both parties could unite frankly and enthusiastically 
under the stimulus of a great cause could great deeds be accomplished. 
The story of the year 1794 is the story of the wreck of an imposing 
Coalition, partly through divergences of aim, but also through a 
demoralising reliance upon the cash-nexus 4 . 

1 Dropmore Papers, II. 646. Minute of Cabinet of November 18th, 1794. This 
corrects the misstatement of Garden (Traites, v. 249), that we opposed the Dutch 
proposal. 

2 For the correspondence on this topic see Rose, Pit t and Napoleon : Essays and 
Letters. 3 Dropmore Papers, 11. 644, 659. 

* Thus, a delay (due to bankers) in the payment of the July subsidy led Frederick 
William at once to order Mollendorff to halt, until the sum due was paid. (F.O. 
Prussia, 35, Paget to Grenville, July 26th, 1794.) 



254 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

As always happens, perseverance in a bad system led to increasingly 
evil results. The year 1795 completed what 1794 had begun. Illwill 
between London and Berlin strengthened the Francophils at the 
Prussian Court ; and overtures made by the French Republic through 
the Prussian legation at Bale were warmly welcomed on the ground of 
the inner community of interests between the two Powers. Haugwitz 
and others assured Sir Arthur Paget (now Secretary of Legation at 
Berlin), that Frederick William entered on this discussion only in order 
to sound the intentions of France, and to discover whether a general 
pacification were possible 1 . It soon appeared that the reverse was the 
case. Despite an urgent remonstrance from Catharine against his nego- 
tiations with France, the Prussian monarch persevered with them. The 
Tsarina, thereupon, more decidedly favoured Austria's territorial 
claims in the Partition of Poland 2 . The Prussian politicians, attributing 
her conduct to a resolve to humiliate their country, were, all the more, 
bent on making peace with France. Thus, as at all stages of the Revolu- 
tionary War, the efforts of Great Britain in the west were thwarted by 
the intriguers of the east, over whom (as Grenville now perceived) she 
had no sure hold. Indeed, her subsidies to them, which were intended 
for the protection of Flanders, were often used to effect the subjection 
of Poland. Earl Spencer, during a mission to Berlin, found the im- 
pressionable monarch occasionally intent on renewing the struggle 
against France ; but, with very few exceptions, all his advisers counselled 
peace. Seeing that Grenville now differed from his colleagues as to 
the advisability of making further advances to Prussia, Spencer long 
remained without instructions, and could only observe helplessly 
Prussia's policy of drift. Instructions from Dundas reached him on 
April 20th, fifteen days after Prussia and France had concluded peace 
at Bale. 

That Treaty (due largely to the tact of Barthelemy, and the con- 
ciliatory ways of Hardenberg) empowered the French troops to occupy 
Prussia's lands west of the Rhine, prevented the Allies from passing 
across any of her territories, and brought about a truce with all the 
northern States of Germany. In pursuance of this last clause, a line 
of demarcation was agreed on, including the Circles of Saxony, West- 

1 F.O. Prussia, 37. Spencer to Grenville, January 6th, 10th, 1795. See, too, 
Appendix B. Sir Arthur Paget (1771-1840) had been in the Berlin Embassy under 
Ewart, then at Petrograd. After 1794, he was Minister at Mainz, Ratisbon, Naples 
and Vienna. 

2 F.O. Russia, 29. Whitworth to Grenville, February 16th, March 3rd, 19th, 
27th, 1794. 



AUSTRIA, GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA 255 

phalia, Franconia, and part of those of the Rhine, in order to separate 
the territories no longer at war with France from those which remained 
true to the Emperor and therefore at war. Prussia, also, invited the 
Diet of the Empire to make peace under her mediation — an open bid 
for the substitution of Hohenzollern control for that of the Habsburgs. 

As a retort to this move, the Emperor on May 19th, 1795, invited 
the Diet to take the first steps towards assuring a general pacification. 
On July 3rd, it requested him to summon a Congress for this purpose 1 . 
His position had been strengthened by a Treaty with Russia of 
January 3rd, 1795, which favoured his claims in the Third Partition 
of Poland and held out to the Habsburgs tempting prospects of 
acquisitions at the expense of France, Turkey or Venice 2 . Further, 
on May 4th, Thugut signed with Morton Eden at Vienna a compact 
whereby Great Britain agreed to be responsible for the payment of 
interest on a loan for £4,600,000 raised for the Emperor, he agreeing 
to maintain during 1795 an army of 200,000 men. And, on May 20th, 
they signed another Treaty, whereby the two Powers mutually agreed 
to guarantee their possessions and to invite Catharine to form a Triple 
Alliance for the maintenance of the European System. It was con- 
cluded on September 28th, 1795, when Catharine engaged to furnish 
to the two Powers either 30,000 troops or an equivalent in money. 
These compacts signified the retort of the Allies to the defection of 
Prussia and of two other States, whom Great Britain vainly sought to 
keep true to the Coalition, viz., the United Provinces and Spain. 

Among the Allies of 1793, none underwent a harder fate than the 
United Provinces. In the winter of 1794-5, tne Y were overrun and 
pillaged by the hungry and ragged troops of France, having already 
suffered from the disorderly elements in the British army. On January 
19th, 1795, the tricolour was borne in triumph into Amsterdam. The 
Prince of Orange and his chief partisans fled to England; and, on 
February 24th, the Patriots, now dominant in the States General, 
declared for the abolition of the Stadholderate and for alliance with 
France. Early in the same month, the Dutch East India Company 
issued orders to all Dutch vessels to leave British ports, and requested 
the French to abstain from attacks on their merchantmen. The 
detention of British vessels in Dutch ports led the British Government 
to adopt, on March 19th, a similar measure and to order the capture, 

1 Garden, Traites, v. 284-290. For the negotiations at Bale, see Hardenberg, 
op. cit. vol. v. chs. xi-xvi; Papiers de Barthilemy . . .en Suisse, vol. v. pp. 1-168; 
H. Stroehlin, La Mission de Barthelemy en Suisse (Geneva, 1900). 

2 Sorel, iv. pp. 193-5. 



256 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

when necessary, of Dutch warships 1 . The Patriots now opened 
negotiations with France, which resulted in an Alliance both defensive 
and offensive, directed especially against Great Britain (May 16th). 
France required from her new Ally the services of 12 sail of the line 
and 18 frigates, also of half of the troops at the disposal of the Dutch 
Government ; she restored the conquered districts except the southern 
parts and the Maestricht territory, and secured the right to garrison 
Flushing. The United Provinces further agreed to pay 100,000,000 
Dutch florins as an indemnity — a crushing fine, which the Committee 
of Public Safety deemed essential for the avoidance of bankruptcy 2 . 
In return, the Dutch received a recognition of their Independence, 
which can scarcely have deceived even the most credulous of the 
Patriots. The rigorous conditions now imposed on the Dutch were of 
world-wide importance ; for they extended the War more than ever 
over seas, and imparted to it, more and more, the character of a 
Colonial struggle. Foreseeing that the French would use the Dutch 
settlement at the Cape of Good Hope as a means of attacking India, the 
British Government prepared to strike at that strategic point, which 
was occupied, in September following, by Rear-Admiral Sir Keith 
Elphinstone and General Sir James Craig. 

As has been shown in this Chapter, the War between France and 
Great Britain was not, for us at least, mainly a war of principle. The 
material issues at stake always outweighed those arising from a clash 
of political ideals. But now, the defection of Prussia and the Alliance 
of the Dutch with France transformed the struggle increasingly into 
one for Colonial and commercial supremacy. The change was to be 
rendered more complete by the most striking events of the year 1796, 
viz., the Anglo-Spanish rupture and the rise of Bonaparte. 

The friction between the Courts of St James's and of Madrid 
never ceased during the period of uneasy alliance, (1793-5). To that 
old sore, Nootka Sound, there were now added the irritants often 
arising from seizures at sea, disputes during the joint occupation of 
Toulon and afterwards from the British occupation of Corsica. Despite 
the offer of Paoli to place that island solely under the protection of 
Great Britain, the Spaniards conceived a violent jealousy, when, after 
the reduction of the French garrisons by British seamen and troops, 
the assembly of chieftains at Corti proclaimed George III King of 
Corsica. Possibly, jealousy played some part in the unceasing in- 

1 F.O. Holland, 57 ; Cape Records, 1. 98 ; Dropmore Papers, III. 35. 

2 R. Guyot, he Directoire et la Paix d'Europe, p. 106. 



DISPUTES WITH SPAIN 257 

trigues which perplexed the British Viceroy, Sir Gilbert Elliot (after- 
wards Earl of Minto), and clogged his administration. The French 
quickly took advantage of this marked divergence between Great 
Britain and Spain. 

But, already, a more serious cause of dispute had arisen, when the 
French planters of Hayti, in despair at the anarchy devastating that 
once wealthy colony, offered to place it in the hands of George III , In 
April, 1793, the King consented, and an expedition was subsequently 
prepared to occupy the chief port of Hayti (San Domingo). Grenville, 
foreseeing annoyance on the part of Spain, who owned the central 
and eastern parts of the island, sought to turn her attention towards 
acquisitions in the south of France 1 ; but, after the servile revolt in 
the French part of Hayti, she revived her ancient claim to the whole 
of that island, and saw with disgust the occupation of the most fertile 
parts by the British. Among other influences hostile to the Alliance 
was that of the Spanish Ambassador at London, the Marquis del 
Campo, who exacerbated every dispute 2 . The Minister of Marine, 
Don Valdez, also openly declared the weakening of the French navy 
to be a misfortune for that of Spain; and the all-powerful Duke of 
Alcudia finally used his unbounded influence over the Queen against 
the British connexion. Early in February, 1795, during an interview 
with the King and Alcudia, Valdez hotly declaimed against Great 
Britain for her ambitious proceedings in Hayti and Corsica. Alcudia 
repeated these charges to Francis Jackson, our Minister at Madrid, 
and warned him of the results that might ensue, adding: "If His 
Catholic Majesty finds another road less dangerous than that which 
he now follows, he will take it with the dignity becoming his rank." 
The French incursion into Catalonia and the utter failure of all British 
military efforts in Europe, added emphasis to this statement, and the 
Spanish Ministers hereupon adopted a hostile attitude. In vain did 
Grenville point out the advantages to Spain accruing from British 
naval successes, and hold out prospects of help from Russia in 1796. 
It soon appeared that Spain would make peace with France in 1795 3 . 

In the hope of averting this disaster, Grenville despatched the 
Earl of Bute as Ambassador, with Instructions to placate the Court of 

1 See Grenville's despatch of July 19th, 1793 in Appendix B. 

2 Dropmore Papers, II. 383, 386, 398, 406 ; III. 10. The condemnation of the San 
Iago, a Spanish prize obtained by a French privateer, and rescued by a British war- 
ship, greatly annoyed the Spaniards. 

3 F.O. Spain, 36. F. Jackson to Grenville, February nth; March 18th, 1795. 
Grenville to Jackson, March 20th, 1795. 



258 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

Madrid, and incite it to further efforts for the acquisition of territory 
north of the Pyrenees 1 . The Instructions show that Grenville's tenacity 
clouded his imagination. For of what use was it to hold out such hopes 
to Spain, when Catalonia was in danger and French arms everywhere 
triumphed ? But a phrase at the end of the despatch is highly sig- 
nificant. Bute is warned to observe closely the condition of the 
Spanish Colonies, and, if discontent exists, to ascertain where an attack 
may be delivered. From May to June, 1795, tne accession of more 
moderate men to power at Paris and the reviving activity of the French 
Royalists induced Grenville to plead for help from Spain in a con- 
templated attempt to aid them in Brittany; but, by that time, Alcudia 
was deeply committed to negotiations with France. In April, 1795, he 
despatched an Envoy, Yriarte, to Bale with instructions vague enough 
to leave him free to conclude peace. Yriarte, a friend of the French 
Ambassador Barthelemy, showed his bias by drafting proposals, early 
in June, for assuring a Franco- Spanish control of the Mediterranean 
and the complete exclusion of British trade 2 . Such, doubtless, were 
the aims of Alcudia and Valdez. On June 23rd, Alcudia informed Bute 
that England and Spain would soon be left alone in the War, and that 
financial distress, added to the troubles in the Spanish Colonies 
occasioned by emissaries from the United States and France, com- 
pelled the Court of Madrid to accede to French invitations for a 
" composition " ; but " composition " did not imply peace. Spain had 
begun the War in order to suppress French principles; but the 
conduct of the Allies had united the French people. " Somehow or 
other" (added Alcudia), "England always got the better of Spain." 
Bute's comment was that the only way to keep Spain true to the 
Alliance was to bribe Alcudia 3 . 

But matters had gone too far even for this. The French negotiators, 
in view of the enormous advantages to be derived from the Spanish 
navy and commerce, gave way on certain points, and signed the 
Treaty of Peace at Bale on July nth, 1795. France thereby restored 
her conquests in the north of Spain, but acquired the Spanish portion 
of Hayti, and promised to acknowledge the mediation of the King of 
Spain for accommodations with Portugal and the Italian Princes at 
war with the Republic 4 . Considering the irritation caused by British 



1 F.O. Spain, 37. Grenville to Earl of Bute, April 13th, 1795. 

2 Tausserat-Radel, Papiers de Barthelemy .. .en Suisse, vi. 14. 

3 F.O. Spain, 37, 38. Bute to Grenville, June 23rd; July nth, 19th, 1795. 

4 Papiers de Barthelemy, VI. 68 et seq.; Garden, v. 305-7; Sorel, IV. 368-70. 



WAR WITH SPAIN 259 

intervention in the west of Hayti, it is not easy to account for the joy 
manifested at Madrid at the news of a pacification which involved the 
abandonment of the whole of that island. The humiliation of the 
King was completed a few weeks later, when he conferred on his chief 
Minister, the Queen's paramour, the title of Prince of the Peace. 

Grenville at once pointed out that the cession of San Domingo to 
France was a violation of the Treaty of Utrecht, which forbade Spain 
to cede to the French any of her American possessions ; and he charged 
Bute to find out the strength of her forces in the West Indies. That 
Envoy, also, saw whither the recent compact tended, and foretold that 
it would soon be followed by war with England. He, therefore, warned 
Admiral Hotham, commanding the Mediterranean fleet, to be on his 
guard, and even hinted at a dash upon Cadiz 1 . Grenville's despatches 
to Bute at Madrid prove that the British Government desired to keep at 
peace with Spain. The attack on San Domingo was postponed, because 
Godoy asserted that it was not yet a French possession ; and in other 
ways deference was shown to Spanish susceptibilities. But all was in 
vain. In the year 1796, the prospect darkened, and Ministers at home, 
as well as Bute, expected a rupture whenever it should suit Spain 
to attack us. Godoy's private appeal in July, that we should not 
consider his recent Offensive Treaty with the French as a casus belli, 
was clearlya ruse topostpone hostilities to a more convenient time 2 . On 
October 5th, Godoy handed to Bute the Declaration of War, the chief 
complaints of which referred to the conduct of Lord Hood at Toulon, 
the British conquest of Demerara, the occupation of Corsica and the 
west of Domingo, various naval incidents, and the establishment of 
British Commercial Companies along the river Missouri for the 
evident purpose of penetrating to the " South Sea." The rupture 
marked yet another stage in the transformation of the War into a 
commercial and colonial struggle. Its more immediate effect was the 
evacuation of Corsica, Elba, and the Mediterranean by the British 
forces, with the view of effecting a concentration in the Atlantic and 
in home waters. Its later results were the ruin of the Spanish navy, 
the capture of Trinidad and other Colonies, and the increase in the 
number of securities held by Great Britain as a set-off to the losses of 
her Allies on the Continent. 

We have looked ahead, in order to survey connectedly Anglo- 

1 F.O. Spain, 38. Grenville to Bute, August 7th; Bute to Grenville, August 
10th, 1795. 

2 See Despatches in Appendix C, also Dropmore Papers, in. 148, 214, 233, 246. 

17—2 



260 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

Spanish relations to the date of their rupture. But it is time to return 
to the autumn of 1795, which witnessed the first efforts of Great 
Britain for a general peace. By that time, the Coalition had sustained 
successive shocks in the defection of Tuscany, Prussia, Holland, and 
Spain ; while the attitude of the Imperial Diet was doubtful and the 
prospects of Sardinia were gloomy. On the other hand, Great Britain 
had concluded Treaties of Alliance with Russia and Austria ; her fleets 
bad swept from the seas both the warships and the merchantmen of 
her enemies; she had captured, or was about to capture, their chief 
Colonies; her finances, though strained, were vigorous; and her spirit, 
in spite of sporadic riots, was undaunted. Accordingly, Parliament, 
at the opening of the autumn session, heard with some surprise the 
following sentence in the King's Speech (October 29th) : " Should this 
crisis at Paris terminate in any order of things compatible with the 
tranquillity of other countries, and affording a reasonable expectation 
of security and permanence in any treaty which might be concluded, 
the appearance of a disposition to negotiate for a general peace on just 
and equitable terms will not fail to be met, on my part, with an earnest 
desire to give it the fullest and speediest effect." "Meanwhile" (the 
speech continued), "we must carry on the war with a vigour which 
would conduce to this desirable end." Ministers seem to have im- 
posed their pacific views on George III ; for, two days previously, he 
had written to Grenville that no attempt at negotiation ought to be 
encouraged, as it would tell against an active prosecution of the War 1 . 
Further, it appears that the Duke of Portland, Windham and their 
Whig followers who had coalesced with the Pitt Administration 
regarded with apprehension or active dislike a policy which implied 
recognition of the Republic and the abandonment of the monarchical 
cause 2 . 

It may be well here to recall Pitt's pronouncements on the subject 
of negotiation with France. On January 26th, 1795, he deprecated 
them as tending to encourage the enemy and "to bury the remains of 
opposition in France." On March 24th, in combating a motion by 
Fox, he disclaimed all notion of fighting in order to impose monarchy 
on the French people; but he added that "we shall gain all possible 
aid from the French Royalists": and he defined our leading object as 
"security." On May 27th he resisted Wilberforce's motion in favour 
of early negotiations for peace on the ground that "perseverance in 
the contest is more wise and prudent, and more likely in the end to 
1 Dropmore Papers, in. 143. 3 Ibid. ill. 135. 



BRITISH HOPES OF FRANCE 261 

effect a safe, lasting and honourable peace than any attempt at negotia- 
tion." Admitting the reverses of the Allies, he yet claimed that France 
was nearly exhausted, her assignats being worth less than 5 per cent, 
of their face value; and, viewing her Government as regicide, he 
declared: "I will not acknowledge such a Republic." 

How, then, are we to explain the proffer of the olive branch on 
October 29th? Probably, it was due to recent events in France. The 
new French Constitution had not the ultra-democratic character of 
its predecessors; and, though the Royalist or malcontent risings at 
Paris and elsewhere had been crushed, the prospect had arisen of a 
return to ordinary methods of government. In Pitt's words, if the new 
deputies could "speak on behalf of the people of France, I then have 
no difficulty in saying, from that time all objections to the form of 
that Government, and to the principles of that Government, all 
objections to them as obstacles to negotiation will be at an end." He 
still hoped for success in the War, bade the country show a firm front, 
and reproved the Opposition for dwelling on the reverses of the 
Coalition. 

The present suggestion, then, was little more than an appeal to 
the French people for reasonableness in their foreign relations. It 
resembled somewhat that suggested by the Austrian Chancellor early 
in April. Thugut had then proposed the issue of a proclamation to 
the French people, declaring that they had been the aggressors and 
urging them to adopt "a Government such as may enable foreign 
Powers to treat with them with security 1 ." British Ministers seem at 
the time to have passed by the suggestion, perhaps because Grenville 
harboured hopes of a Royalist reaction in France, which William 
Wickham was to further from the embassy at Berne. If we may judge 
by the number and length of his letters to Wickham, the usually 
cautious Grenville continued long to believe in this chimera 2 . Evidently, 
he had not learnt the lesson, writ large on the Toulon episode, that 
foreign help during an internal dispute tends to the discredit and 
undoing of the party thus supported 3 . The lesson was once more to be 
illustrated, in ghastly guise, in the British-Royalist expedition to 
Quiberon. The failure, also, of all Wickham's emissaries to Lyons and 
other centres of anti- Jacobin activity proved that the Royalists dis- 
trusted outside assistance 4 , and that the French people wanted peace, 

1 F.O. Austria, 40. Eden to Grenville, April 8th, 1795. 

2 Corresp. of W. Wickham, 1. pp. 9-86. 

3 Ibid. 1. 93. 4 Sorel IV. 350. 



262 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

order, and the retention of the chief social conquests of the Revolu- 
tion. The unpopularity of Lewis XVIII, his decision to stand by the 
principles of Henry IV, above all, the utter failure of the rising of the 
Royalists of Paris on October 5th, seem to have dispelled the hopes of 
Grenville. The baffling uncertainty as to obtaining military help, or 
even any definite decision, from the Court of Vienna, further disgusted 
him; and, though hitherto more favourable than Pitt to the Austrian 
connexion, he now decided to send Francis Jackson on a special mission, 
to press urgently for a decision, seeing that "we might possibly not 
find it very difficult to make either war or peace with advantage, if 
Austria will set her shoulders to the work in earnest 1 ." Grenville, 
then, though of late less pacific in tone than his cousin, was apparently 
not averse from a negotiation with France. 

On December 8th, the King sent a message to Parliament, stating 
that the crisis in France had led to an order of things which would 
induce him to meet any disposition to negotiation on the part of the 
enemy. Sheridan and Grey challenged Ministers to say wherein the 
order of things in France differed from that of 1793-4; Dut P^ tt: 
declared that her Constitution and her conduct need no longer prevent 
an accommodation. The distinction which he drew was overstrained ; 
but it is clear that he objected to the French Republic only because 
it had been a mighty agency for the propagation of levelling principles. 
This it had now ceased to be. At home its democratic fervour had died 
down; and, on all sides, the liberated peoples were crying out against 
their Jacobin liberators. As a conquering and acquisitive organism, 
the Republic aroused none of the enthusiasm inspired by the appeals 
of Vergniaud and the challenges of Danton. Pitt, therefore, viewed 
with no grave concern the recent Declaration at Paris, which in effect 
pronounced "the natural boundaries," to be an essential part of the 
new Constitution 2 . Frenchmen have generally applauded that resolve. 
They forget that it has always involved a war with Europe. For the 
present, the helplessness of the Empire, the inertia of Austria, the 
short-sighted selfishness of Prussia, and the calculated aloofness of 
Catharine, postponed the struggle ; but it lay in the nature of things ; 
and British Ministers were not afraid of the prospect of a negotiation 

1 Dropmore Papers, ill. 137 ; E. D. Adams, p. 37. 

2 Decree of October 1st, 1795 (Sorel, iv. 428-31, v. 2; Sybel, iv. 444 Eng. 
edit.). Soon after decreeing the natural boundaries, the French Government sent 
proposals to Vienna, offering Bavaria to Austria, if she would acknowledge the French 
annexation of the Belgic Provinces and not oppose that of the left bank of the Rhine 
— a bribe to her to desert England. 



BRITISH OVERTURE FOR PEACE 263 

with France, which, if successful, would bring temporary relief, 
and, if unsuccessful, would exhibit the French Directors as the 
political heirs of Lewis XIV. 

The sincerity of Pitt and Grenville in this overture for peace has 
been sharply questioned by Sybel, Sorel, and other historians ; but the 
foregoing considerations both explain and justify the conduct of 
Ministers. Pitt, also — though perhaps not Grenville — assigned some 
weight to the news brought from Paris by Baron de Beaufort, to the 
efTect that the Directory would gladly receive a pacific proposal 1 . 
Doubtless, the French Government hoped to separate England from 
Austria. If so, it failed ; for, from the outset, the Foreign Office declared 
that no separate negotiation would be undertaken. Further, its good 
faith appears in the elaborate measures at once adopted to assure the 
collaboration of the Allies. On December 22nd, Grenville wrote a 
"most secret " despatch to Eden at Vienna, setting forth the desirability 
of the two Courts at once exchanging views so that they and, if possible, 
all the Allies should arrive at an agreement before a negotiation began. 
A recent statement by the Directory set forth terms of peace which 
Grenville regarded as "extravagant and insulting"; but the internal 
difficulties of France seemed to promise a more reasonable programme. 
On her side, Great Britain now abandoned the fantastic notion of 
annexing the north-eastern fortresses of France to the Belgic Provinces. 
She proposed the restitution to Austria of those territories (with the 
addition of Liege and the southern parts of the United Provinces 
recently acquired by France); also, the recovery of Savoy by Sardinia 
(Nice was not mentioned), and the restoration of the Stadholderate. 
From the outset, the British Government utterly disclaimed the plan, 
which busybodies in Vienna had fathered on it, of making a separate 
peace. 

Circumstances appearing to favour this project, Ministers, on 
January 30th, 1796, approved the draft of a despatch to Eden inviting 
the issue of a joint Declaration by the two Powers as to their readiness 
to discuss terms of peace. George III disapproved it, but informed 
Grenville that he would not offer "any obstinate resistance," and 
hoped that the proposal would be rejected by France 2 . Grenville was, 
also, doubtful as to its success ; but he instructed Wickham to open 
the matter to Barthelemy at Berne, with a view to the assembling of a 
Congress. The overture was made in Switzerland, mainly in order to 

1 Guyot, pp. 146-9. 

2 Dropmore Papers, in. 169, 170. 



264 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

allow of Austria and Sardinia readily cooperating if they desired. Pitt 
was more sanguine ; and , consideri ng the hopefulness of his nature, there 
is no reason to doubt his sincerity in the matter. Grenville wrote to 
Eden that the Declaration should be issued "for the double purpose 
either of securing advantageous terms of peace or of laying the founda- 
tion of a vigorous prosecution of the war 1 ." 

Unfortunately, the British Government now held back the sub- 
sidies due to Vienna. Apparently, it deemed the defensive Austrian 
tactics, lately pursued with such fatal results, not worth the stipulated 
financial support, or else it believed in the speedy advent of peace. 
Nothing could have been more unfortunate. Austria was left without 
the sinews of war, just before the opening of Bonaparte's Italian 
campaign. On April 9th, Eden reported the utter inability of Austria 
" to provide even for the common expenses of the war " ; and discontent 
on this head must have hindered cordial cooperation with regard to 
the peace proposals. Already, Thugut had thrown cold water on them, 
declaring that the Emperor, while declining to join in the Declaration, 
would, in due course, issue one of similar import. On March 5th, he 
harked back to the recently discarded notion of the Belgic-Bavarian 
Exchange — a proof that he was toying with that scheme which France 
had dangled before him. Eden expressed deep regret at the revival 
of this proposal, as to which the two Governments had so often been 
at variance 2 . 

Affairs at Turin were not more promising. Since the disasters of 
the year 1794, that Court had been a prey to constant fears, which 
found expression in tentative overtures for peace. Such at least was 
the first belief of Thugut and Grenville, the latter even for a time with- 
holding the subsidy due to Sardinia, and thereby weakening her before 
the blows of Bonaparte fell upon her discouraged troops. The proposal 
of a joint Declaration of the Allies completed the dismay of the 
King and his advisers, who believed that the French Directory was 
bent on a ruthless prosecution of the War. 

They were right. Aggressive aims were now uppermost at Paris, 
doubtless because the Directory detected further signs of collapse in 
the Coalition and felt confident of victory. In the month of January, 
1796, when the British Government set on foot its scheme for a 
general pacification, Carnot accepted the plan of Bonaparte for the 
conquest of Italy. The final British note to Barthelemy, perhaps, erred 

1 Wickham Corresp. 1. 271-3. See too my article in Eng. Hist. Rev. April, 1903. 

2 F.O. Austria, 45. Eden to Grenville, March 2nd, 5th; April 9th, 1796. 



PITT'S PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR POLICY 265 

on the side of firmness, and it omitted all reference to the French 
Republic 1 . But the counterblast from Paris ended all hope of peace. 
As handed in at Berne on March 26th, it implied the retention by 
France of the " natural frontiers" (Rhine, Alps, Pyrenees and Ocean). 
The Belgic Provinces were not named among her acquisitions, because, 
by the Decree of October 1st, 1795, she had incorporated them 2 . The 
French answer, moreover, involved the restitution of all the Colonial 
conquests of Great Britain during the War. These conditions put an end 
to the negotiation. They were announced in the days when Bonaparte 
was preparing to drive the Allies from the passes leading from Savona 
into the plain of North Italy. His conquest of that land was destined 
to postpone for eighteen years a favourable opportunity of effecting 
a durable peace. 

Ill 

Criticisms on Pitt's proposals for peace were twofold. The most 
fundamental were those of Burke, Windham and other Old Whigs who 
rallied to his side. Their devotion to the Royal cause led them to censure 
the whole conduct of the War as having been waged for material 
securities, when in reality it was— to use Burke's trenchant phrase — 
a war against "an armed opinion." Stamp out that pest, or it will 
infect, enfeeble and finally destroy you ! Wage the war not for self- 
interest but for a principle! Distrust Prussia, Austria and other 
acquisitive States ! Ally yourselves with the French Royalists against 
the murderous despotism now enthroned at Paris ! Spurn all thought 
of compromise and peace as a cowardly betrayal of a sacred trust! 
Such is the burden of Burke's Letters on a Regicide Peace (1796-7). 
It formed the fighting creed of Windham, and ultimately had great 
influence on Grenville, while it echoed, in philosophic tones, the 
primitive predilections of George III. 

Over against this clear-cut theory stood the contentions of Pitt — 
that, for Great Britain, the War did not arise out of a Royalist crusade 
(which was undeniably true), but from a resolve to gain "security" 
against French encroachments on a land fronting our exposed east 
coast ; that treaty obligations and expediency alike bade us expel her 
from that land ; that we had entered into a Coalition already virtually 
formed, and, from the weakness of our army, could only play a second- 
ary part in military operations ; that, therefore, we were inevitably drawn 

1 Guyot, pp. 153-5. 2 Wickharn (Corresp. I. 321), forgot that fact. 



266 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

into the orbit of the Germanic Powers for land warfare and had to 
rely mainly on naval pressure to compel France to a peace. This 
implied the seizure of her Colonies, especially when the best of them, 
Hayti, was offered to us by the French inhabitants. Cooperation with 
the roving bands of Chouans or the Royalists of Provence, had been 
tried without success. 

In the main, these statements were undeniable. Wholly unprepared, 
Great Britain was engaged in a struggle of unexpected magnitude and 
duration. Her methods were therefore empirical, her warfare tentative, 
her blunders colossal. Trusting inevitably to her Allies, she saw them 
falter or fall away, a prey to the jealousies necessarily aroused by her 
policy of limited largesse on land and unlimited acquisitions at sea. 
Critics from among his own supporters could, therefore, claim that his 
war policy was a failure, when judged by his own standard. 

In a sense, both Burke and Pitt were right. The one Ally certain 
never to fail us was French Royalism. But how utilise it, when its 
champions were errant bands of Breton peasants and waspish cliques 
of intractable Emigres! Burke's theory was as inspiring as its practice 
was impossible. He and Windham could demonstrate very forcibly 
the mistakes in Pitt's war policy. But, in the peculiar circumstances 
of 1793-4, now could they have conducted the War on purely Royalist 
lines? That was the question which Pitt, if he had had time for literary 
embroidering, might have pressed home in Letters on a suggested 
Royalist Crusade. 

The all-important fact, however, was that by the year 1796 both 
of these methods of warfare had utterly failed. Royalism, after being 
half stifled by the scheming monarchs of Berlin and Petrograd, was 
now buried under the Old World trappings of" Lewis XVIII." On the 
other hand, Pitt's policy of winning security had ended in the loss of 
the whole of the Netherlands and the all but complete collapse of the 
First Coalition. Therefore, Royalist theorists and political pragmatists 
should have joined in discovering a way out of the impasse. Instead, 
the theorists held aloof and added to the difficulties of the men of affairs 
in seeking to retrace their steps. 

Despite the fact that Pitt's peace overtures of the winter of 1795-6 
had played into the hands of Bonaparte, the Prime-Minister prepared 
to renew them. His second proposal, however, was prefaced by 
schemes almost comparable to those of our Allies. As French victories 
in Italy and Rhineland portended disaster to the First Coalition, Gren- 
ville (now a partisan of the connexion with Prussia) sought to ensure 



FAILURE OF BRITISH OVERTURES TO PRUSSIA 267 

her active support by suggesting her acquisition either of the Belgic 
Provinces or of extensive domains in Germany. George III returned 
the proposal with the cutting comment: " Italian politics are too com- 
plicated for my understanding 1 ." Nevertheless, in its desperation, the 
British Cabinet prepared to act on the degrading principle of gaining 
the help of a powerful State by conniving at its annexation of a weak 
neighbour; and, at the close of July, 1796, George Hammond, Under- 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, received instructions to pro- 
ceed to Berlin to tempt Frederick William by the offer above noted. 
George III again demurred, but did not actively oppose. Grenville 
sought to gild the pill for Austria by pointing out the urgent necessity 
of bringing in Prussia ; and he even held out the prospect of the acquisi- 
tion of Bavaria by the Habsburgs. No palliative could reconcile Thugut. 
He received the suggestion very coldly, declaring that either alternative 
would break up the Empire 2 . Hammond's mission to Berlin, also, failed 
owing to the absence of Frederick William, during which no important 
business could be transacted ; and the Envoy seems not to have con- 
sidered it worth while definitely to offer the bait 3 . Useful assistance 
was offered by Gouverneur Morris, an American citizen who, after 
actual experience of the French Revolution, decided to support Great 
Britain by all the means in his power 4 . But neither the address of 
Morris nor the vaguely alluring suggestions of Hammond could elicit 
a definite reply from Haugwitz. He betrayed unusual embarrassment, 
which was not unnatural, seeing that he had just signed a Secret Treaty 
with the French Ambassador binding Prussia to a system of neutrality, 
and accordingly missed the advantages, both public and private, which 
would have accrued from Anglo-French competition for favours at 
Berlin. The Franco-Prussian Treaty marked out the line of neutrality 
for northern Germany along the course of the Fulda, Ruhr and Lower 
Rhine, and promised to Prussia the eventual acquisition of the 
Bishopric of Minister 5 . Another Treaty, also signed on August 5th, 
will be noticed later. 

The British invitation for the support of Prussia having merely 
caused annoyance at Vienna, and the War in Italy going from bad to 
worse, Pitt recurred to his proposals for a pacification. In August, 

1 Dropmore Papers, III. 172-4. 

2 F.O. Austria, 45. Eden to Grenville, August 15th, 1796. 

3 Droptnore Papers, in. 225, 235. 

4 The unsigned letters to Grenville in Droptnore Papers, m. 222, 224, 230, 258 
are almost certainly from Morris. See, too, 111.563, Sparks, Life of G.Morris, ill. 93. 

5 Garden, v. 359; Guyot, 219, 265-7. 



268 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

1796, he saw a politician named M. Nettement, who claimed to 
know that the Moderates in the French Directory secretly desired 
peace, which was certainly longed for by the great mass of the 
nation. If, therefore, so he assured Pitt's private secretary, Joseph 
Smith, an affable and tactful envoy were sent to Paris, who would 
interview the Directors privately and use his influence with the chiefs 
of parties, a reconciliation might well be reached ; otherwise, the peace 
would be one of exhaustion 1 . So dark was the outlook, especially in 
regard to finance, that Pitt resolved to seize this opportunity, and 
for a time induced Grenville to make the effort. By September 2nd, 
Ministers had drawn up a Minute embodying the terms to be offered 
to France through the medium of Denmark. These were: the cession 
to France of Savoy and Nice (she had acquired them by her recent 
Treaty with Sardinia); also, of "all the conquered countries on the 
Rhine not belonging to Austria"; she would regain her Colonies lost 
in the War, while Great Britain restored to Holland the conquered 
Dutch Colonies, except the Cape, Ceylon and Cochin. Austria was to 
recover the Belgic Provinces and other territories conquered by the 
French ; but, in case they refused to give back the Belgic Provinces to 
Austria, and the latter insisted on the Belgic-Bavarian Exchange, we 
would not oppose it, provided that those Provinces were placed' " in a 
situation of as little dependence as possible on France 2 .' 

Here were the outlines of a possible settlement. The chief objec- 
tions to them were the considerable renunciations asked from France 
in the heyday of triumph, and the heavy losses to be imposed on the 
Dutch, in order that Austria might regain her pre-war position. The 
British Government, receding from its decision, of September 14th, 
1794, not to sacrifice any of its colonial gains for the securing of better 
terms to Austria, now proposed to restore to the French our conquests 
overseas at their expense, also two or three small Colonies to the Dutch, 
in order to induce the French to evacuate Belgium, Lombardy and 
most of the Rhineland ; but we retained the best of our acquisitions 
from the Dutch, who consequently would be the chief losers by the 
War. This shabby proposal was actually carried out, in part, at the 
Peace of Amiens, Spain, also, then figuring as a forced contributor to 
the expenses of the contest. 

The proposals of September 2nd displeased George III, who 
deemed them undignified and untimely ; but, in view of their almost 

1 Beaufort MSS. (Hist. MSS. Commission), pp. 369-71 ; Guyot, 273-6. 

2 Dropmore Papers, in. 239-42. As the Directory rejected the offer of the good 
offices of Denmark, the overtures were made direct to Paris. 



COLD RECEPTION OF PEACE PROPOSALS 269 

certain rejection at Paris, he did not withhold his consent. Grenville 
also expected the Directory to find " a frivolous pretext for refusing a 
peace contrary to its interests " — so he wrote to Eden on September 7th 
— and he hoped the affair would merely serve to show who was guilty 
of the continuation of the War. He proceeded with the negotiation, 
but in a spirit different from that of Pitt. His despatch to Eden 
diverged somewhat from the proposals mentioned above. He (lately so 
insistent on an alliance with Prussia) now laid stress on maintaining 
the power of Austria, for which cause Great Britain would sacrifice 
many of her maritime gains, and he also insisted on the entire inde- 
pendence of the Belgic lands. Before sending Lord Malmesbury 
to Paris for the purpose of opening the negotiation, he reminded him 
that "the King is bound not to make peace without the consent of 
Austria, except on the terms of procuring for that Power the restitution 
of all it may have lost in the war 1 ." Thus Grenville stiffened the 
original proposals, which bore the mark of Pitt's more pacific nature. 

Even so, their reception at Vienna was very cool. Fortune then 
favoured the Imperialists. In October they threw back the French 
to the Rhine and confidently expected to drive Bonaparte from Mantua. 
Further, Catharine, true to her policy of prolonging war in the west, 
offered 60,000 Russians for the next campaign on consideration of 
receiving a British subsidy, which she finally fixed at nearly £8,000,000. 
Thugut, before he was aware of this exorbitant demand, had conceived 
great hopes of Russia's help and disapproved the pacific overtures 
as likely to arouse her distrust 2 . Thus Habsburg pride, reliance on 
Catharine, and the gleams of success in Germany disinclined that 
Court to thoughts of peace, even on the liberal terms outlined by 
Grenville. So stiff was Austria's attitude that, as will soon appear, he 
warned her of the fatal results likely to ensue. 

The general situation in October, 1796, also offered but slight hopes 
of a settlement. True, the fortunes of France were for a time overcast. 
Nevertheless her diplomatic position was favourable, owing to the 
conclusion recently of Treaties with some secondary German States 
and Naples 3 . On the other hand, the Triple Alliance of September, 

1 Dropmore Papers, in. 260. 

2 F.O. Austria, 46. Grenville to Eden, September 20th; October 7th: Eden to 
Grenville, October 16th, 18th, 1796. For Thugut's confidence up to November 12th 
of military success see Vivenot, Thugut, Clerfait und Wurmser, pp. 511-518. 

3 Naples gave up no territory and was not compelled to exclude British ships. The 
Directory hoped probably to facilitate a separate peace with Austria, since the 
Empress Maria Theresa was a daughter of Queen Maria Carolina, of the Two 
Sicilies. Guyot, pp. 205-7. 



270 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

1795, had also reconstructed the First Coalition, and now the prospect 
of the active participation of Catharine in the War seemed no longer 
a chimera. With the aim of averting a Franco-Spanish domination of 
the Mediterranean, which appeared imminent after the Anglo-Spanish 
rupture, the British Cabinet decided to offer to the Tsarina Corsica, the 
object of her ardent desire. So confident were Ministers of bringing in 
the Russian fleet as a makeweight, that on October 19th they decided 
to suspend the evacuation of that sea by Jervis's fleet, a change of plan 
heartily approved by George III 1 . So well balanced seemed the com- 
batants that the French Foreign Minister, Delacroix, at his first con- 
ference with Malmesbury on October 23rd, adopted a tone far less 
truculent than that of his earlier despatches. He even affirmed the desire 
of France for peace — a statement confirmed by the deep weariness, the 
almost unbroken silence, which hung over the land. The issue, how- 
ever, rested, not with the disillusioned populace, but with the masterful 
faction which still overawed it. Yet, the need of humouring public 
opinion being urgent, the British overtures could not be declined 
forthwith. Indeed, on both sides of the Channel they were regarded, 
at least by those who disliked them or doubted their success, as a means 
of influencing public opinion. In London it had to be stimulated, at 
Paris calmed. 

These considerations explain the somewhat artificial character of 
the ensuing negotiations. The Directory tried to induce Great Britain 
to treat for peace separately, alleging the greater simplicity and speed 
of this procedure. She, of course, refused to separate from Austria. 
Thence ensued sharp differences, which were increased by the harsh 
tone of the French reply and by Grenville's stiff rejoinder on Nov- 
ember 7th. It has been claimed that, by this time, Grenville had 
resolved on a rupture, and that Pitt resigned himself to that ending of 
his hopes 2 . But their letters of that date and Grenville's Memorial 
to the Directory do not warrant so extreme a statement. The French 
effort to separate the two Allies was calculated to increase the distrust 
of Grenville and overcloud the hopefulness of Pitt 3 . There is, how- 
ever, nothing to show that even Grenville then desired a rupture of 
the negotiation. He instructed George Canning, now Under-Secretary 
at the Foreign Office, to commend Malmesbury 's tact in passing over 
certain annoyances and irregularities at Paris. Further, his two im- 

1 Dropmore Papers, III. 261. 

2 Adams, p. 49. Guyot, p. 293. 

8 Malmesbury, Diaries, III. 295-303. 



AUSTRIAN DELAYS 271 

portant despatches of November 7th imply a desire for peace. In the 
former of them, he charged Eden to inform Thugut that, if Austria 
declined to share in the negotiation for peace, Great Britain might find 
herself compelled to open one separately, assuring to her Ally the best 
terms possible. In the latter despatch, he sent a warning calculated 
to dispel the last hopes of the Chancellor for the Belgic-Bavarian Ex- 
change. No Power but Austria or Prussia (he said) could hold the 
Belgian Provinces against the French. If the Habsburgs declined, 
then Prussia should be invited, to do so. In either case, the success of 
any general settlement depended on her consent, and Austria must 
formulate her policy without delay 1 . 

These are not the words of a man who desires a rupture at Paris, 
but rather of one who seeks to avoid it by inducing Austria to act 
promptly and reasonably. By all the claims of honour he was bound 
not to make peace with the French without putting forth all possible 
efforts to include her in the settlement ; and, in view of her precarious 
financial situation, his remonstrance of November 7th, together with 
his constant refusal to satisfy her exorbitant pecuniary demands, ought 
to have induced a desire to treat for peace. But the eyes of the Emperor 
and his counsellors were holden. Even the news of Bonaparte's victory 
at Areola on November 18th, failed to open them. On Eden reporting 
Grenville's warning as to a possible reversion of the Belgic lands to 
Prussia, Thugut hotly exclaimed that his master would oppose it by 
force of arms. Not until December 13th, when the news of the 
sudden decease of Catharine reached Vienna, was that Court able to 
perceive its imminent danger ; and then it was too late for participa- 
tion in the negotiation at Paris. 

There, the British decision to act along with Austria had aroused 
some annoyance, which was increased by our Foreign Office instructing 
Malmesbury not to disclose the essentials of his Instructions. This 
prudent reserve (fully consonant with diplomatic usage) resulted chiefly 
from the above-mentioned decision, which involved waiting on the ever- 
deferred declaration from Vienna. Thus, affairs gyrated in a vicious 
circle, from which there was no escape until the course of events de- 
clared decisively for one of the disputants. It favoured France and told 
against the Allies. Areola confirmed her conquest of Italy. The death 
of Catharine shattered the new Triple Alliance ; for it soon appeared 
that her successor, Paul I, would reverse her policy. Further, the 
Directory hoped much from Hoche's great expedition for the invasion 
1 See Appendix D for these despatches. 



272 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

of Ireland ; and it is significant that the date of his sailing from Brest 
(December 17th) coincided with the drawing up of a warlike note by 
Delacroix, in which he advised the rejection of the British proposals. 
Those proposals drawn up by Grenville on December nth, were 
delivered to Delacroix after the news of the death of the Tsarina 
reached Paris. Since they included the retrocession of the Belgic Provinces 
to Austria and the evacuation of Italy by the French armies, with 
comparatively small colonial retrocessions by Great Britain, the 
Directory naturally termed them ces conditions dishonor antes, and, on 
December 19th, bade Malmesbury leave Paris within 48 hours. He 
believed this haughty conduct to result largely from the news of the 
death of the Empress 1 . 

Grenville's final proposals were, probably, designed to lead to a 
rupture. If so, he succeeded ; for it came about in a manner calculated 
to throw the odium upon the Directory. But that Government could 
now afford to disregard the moderate or peace party in France. Its 
successes bade fair to overturn old Europe and extend French control 
to the Tiber and the Upper Danube. Moreover, the British Opposition 
hotly denied the good faith of Ministers in the late negotiation ; but, 
in spite of a brilliant attack by Fox, Ministers carried the day against 
his amendment by 212 votes to 37 (December 30th, 1796) 2 . 

Thus ended this gloomy year. In European waters, the British 
Navy had achieved little of note ; for the failure of Hoche's expedition 
to Ireland was due rather to a faulty start and bad weather than to the 
dispositions of Admirals Bridport and Colpoys. Nevertheless, in distant 
waters British seamen won several triumphs, securing from France 
St Lucia, Grenada and St Vincent ; from the United Provinces Am- 
boyna, Demerara, Berbice, together with Colombo and other Dutch 
settlements in Ceylon. On the other hand, our forces serving in Hayti 
suffered terrible losses from disease, which almost warranted the scathing 
censures of Windham on our West India policy. 

In view of the growth of discouragement at home and of anti- 
British feelings in Austria, it is surprising that Grenville did not 
publicly explain the motives underlying British policy. Gouverneur 
Morris, a good friend to England, urged this course of action in a 

1 Malmesbury, Diaries, in. 339-65; C. Ballot, Les Negotiations de Lille (1910), 
pp. 38-40. 

2 I doubt the story of the Prussian Ambassador, Sandoz-Rollin (in Bailleu, 
Preussen und Frankreich, 1. 106), that Malmesbury went to him on December 20th 
and accused Grenville of bad faith — a breach of confidence of which (to say the least) 
Malmesbury would surely not have been guilty — and to the envoy of Prussia ! E. D. 
Adams (p. 50I, seems to accept the story. 



UNSATISFACTORY COURSE OF THE WAR 273 

letter of October 5th, 1796, from Vienna, stating that Anglophobes 
were accusing her of protracting the miseries of Europe in order to 
complete the conquest of the two Indies. He admitted that Grenville 
had to appease home opinion by dilating on the value of our Colonial 
acquisitions ; but such statements were utilised by hostile pressmen, 
until they embarrassed even the autocrats of Vienna. He, therefore, 
suggested that Grenville should issue a reasoned defence of his policy, 
to the effect that the security of the British possessions required the 
capture of the French and Dutch Colonies ; but that this, though a 
legitimate war measure, was not the ultimate object of the War, which 
was to protect Germany and the Netherlands 1 . This statesmanlike 
advice Grenville seems to have disregarded as an unheard-of departure 
from the traditions of diplomatic reserve endemic at Downing Street. 
The ominous tightening of the financial situation, the arrival of 
serious news as to the daring outrages of the United Irishmen 2 , and 
the popularity of Erskine's pamphlet, A View of the Causes and Conse- 
quences of the present War with France (January, 1797), concurred to 
arouse in Pitt once more the resolve to seize the first opportunity for 
a general pacification. His desire was strengthened by the course of 
the War. Though Jervis's brilliant victory over a greatly superior 
Spanish fleet (February 14th) had dealt a heavy blow at that navy, yet 
the general prospects were gloomy. As usual, Austria was a load about 
our neck. The surrender of Mantua (February 2nd) and the speedy 
collapse of her defence of the Carnic Alps portended a final disaster. 
Naturally enough, the attacks in Parliament on the Government's policy 
of subsidising Austria became more bitter. On April 4th, Sheridan's 
motion for an enquiry into this subject gained 87 votes, as compared 
with37 for the anti-War motion of December30th. The numberswould 
have trebled, if members could have read the reports then being penned 
by Eden and Colonel Graham at Vienna as to the refusal of Austrian 
officers and soldiers to fight and the utter confusion at headquarters. 
The Emperor, it is true, had repelled suggestions for a peace made by 
General Clarke through the Grand- duke of Tuscany, and Thugut was 
struggling manfully against a surrender. But they both complained 
that we were compromising the campaign by withholding adequate 
pecuniary support and naval assistance in the Adriatic. Thugut de- 
manded a large subsidy and the despatch of Jervis's fleet (then observing 
Cadiz) to operate on the Venetian coast. The British Government 

1 Dropmore Papers, m. 258; Sparks, Life of G. Morris, in. 93. 
3 Lecky, vn. ch. xxvm. 
w.&g.i. 18 



274 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

declined both requests, but on April 4th decided to send a force of 
frigates and light craft to that quarter 1 . 

On the same day, Grenville signed a despatch to Eden, affirming 
the willingness of Great Britain to treat for peace conjointly with 
Austria. He again suggested the issue of a joint Declaration stating 
their wishes for a combined negotiation. If France agrees, then Austria 
may propose the locality, provided it be not too far from London. Great 
Britain will sacrifice certain of her Colonial conquests in order to assure 
the welfare and security of her Ally, " on which His Majesty holds that 
of Europe essentially to depend 2 ." These proposals were prompted, 
not only by Austria's defeats, but also by news which reached London 
on March 30th from Lord Elgin, British Ambassador at Berlin, as to 
the Secret Treaty of that Court with France on August 5th, 1796 3 . 
Grenville, true to his earlier conviction of the value of a Prussian 
Alliance, had decided to make one more bid for it. Now, it seemed 
hopeless ; and the need of peace was the more urgent. On April 9th 
the Cabinet decided to send Hammond to Vienna to arrange a joint 
negotiation to that end. George III deemed the measure big with 
evils, but did not actively oppose. He could scarcely do so, in view of 
Pitt's statement that the Cabinet was unanimous. The following words 
in his letter of April 9th to the King are noteworthy: " In this opinion 
he knows that none concur more decidedly than those of Your Majesty's 
servants who have been most anxious to resist, while they thought it 
possible, the sacrifices now proposed." Grenville's letter to the King 
of the same date is equally decisive 4 . 

The Instructions of April 1 ith, 1797,10 Eden, taken by Hammond, 
were drawn up with the special purpose of safeguarding Habsburg 
interests. They aimed at securing a general armistice, so as to allow 
time for consultation with Vienna and Petrograd, but set forth alter- 
natives in case Austria needed to act at once. If so, Eden and Hammond 
might advise the cession of the Belgic Provinces, provided that she 
acquired indemnities in either Germany or Italy sufficient for the main- 
tenance of her position as a Great Power. On other topics, Grenville 

1 F.O. Austria, 48. Eden to Grenville, March 8th, 22nd, 25th, 1797. For 
Thugut's opposition to the French offers of peace sent through General Clarke and 
with the recommendation of the Grand-duke of Tuscany see Appendix D.also Huffer, 
Quellen, Pt II, vol. I. pp. 112 et seq. Sorel, ill. chap. iv. 

2 Ibid. Grenville to Eden, April 4, 1797. 

3 Dropmore Papers, ill. 304. 

4 Stanhope, Pitt, in. App. p. v. Dropmore Papers, in. 310. But see Windham's 
account (Diary, p. 357) of George Ill's remark to him : " I honour you for your firm- 
ness" (probably in opposing the peace proposals). 



GOOD FAITH OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP 275 

proposed as a general basis the status quo ante, the French recovering 
all their former Colonies except Martinique : or, if we gave up that 
island, we claimed, in lieu of it, Trinidad and either Tobago or St 
Lucia. Similarly, we would restore to the Dutch their Colonies taken in 
the War, except the Cape and Ceylon, deemed essential to the pro- 
tection of our East Indies. No British possessions having been lost, 
we offered these restitutions, in order to assure satisfactory terms to 
Austria and Portugal 1 . The arrival of news of further defeats of Austria, 
probably also of the outbreak of the mutiny at Spithead, decided 
Grenville, by April 18th, to name conditionally further concessions, 
viz. that, if it were necessary to save her from complete disaster, His 
Majesty would forego all his recent conquests in the West Indies, 
except Tobago, where British commercial interests were supreme. 

These despatches and others printed in the Appendix vindicate the 
good faith of the Cabinet in regard to this overture. George III dis- 
approved of it; but he had long ago regarded persistence (not to 
say obstinacy) as the foremost of the political virtues. Statesmen who 
viewed the whole situation with an open mind must have deemed peace 
essential. Great Britain, though severely strained by recent events, 
held strong ground . She could fight on alone , unencumbered by Allies ; 
but at present she was bound to do her best for them. On their behalf, 
she now prepared to rescind her earlier decision not to surrender her 
colonial acquisitions, in order to alleviate their peace conditions. Of 
what use, indeed, was it to continue a conflict in which Austria's 
military disasters continually cancelled the effects of British naval 
triumphs ? The statesmen of London and Paris must already have seen 
that affairs were approaching a deadlock. The French fought desperately to 
secure the " natural frontiers " as a safeguard against Austria and England ; 
while those Powers struggled on from a conviction that the new frontiers 
would place France in a position of dangerous preponderance. In the 
process, Austria was losing Northern Italy and her possessions in Suabia 
and the Rhineland. Great Britain was pouring forth subsidies and 
making conquests overseas, whose chief use was to serve as barter at 
some ever receding pacification. The result would be either the destruc- 
tion, or some artificial reconstruction, of the old Flemish Barrier. If 
so, as in the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), the British navy would 
have served merely to redress the Balance of Power on the Continent. 
As Burke truly said respecting the horrible loss of life in our West 
India campaigns : " If we look for matter of exchange in order to ransom 
1 See Appendix D. 



276 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

Europe, it is easy to show that we have taken a terribly roundabout 
road 1 ." 

Grenville feared that the British proposal might arrive too late; 
and therefore sent after Hammond another, to the effect that, if Austria 
had made peace, he was to proceed to Berlin and accept an earlier, and 
rather suspicious , offer of that Court to mediate for peace 2 . On arriving 
at Vienna at the end of April he found that Bonaparte had imposed on 
that Court the Preliminaries of Leoben (April 18th). Thugut main- 
tained the utmost reserve and concealed them from him. Hammond, 
therefore, said nothing about the projected overture at Berlin 3 , which 
was certain to annoy Thugut. Proceeding to Berlin, he acted 
warily, and again fulfilled Grenville's revised intention, which was "that 
he should state merely Britain's readiness to enter into pacific negotia- 
tions, saying nothing meanwhile as to our actual relations to Austria. 
By this cautious reserve, Grenville and Hammond rendered possible a 
resumption of close relations with Austria. The wonder is that, after 
reiterated proofs of the bad faith of Prussia, Grenville should, even in 
the present desperate straits, have thought of seeking her mediation. 

Starhemberg, who believed that Hammond had unguardedly dis- 
closed the secrets at Vienna, reproached Grenville and expressed the 
hope that Great Britain would never cease to trust Austria and Russia, 
united as they were by friendly ties. But the mischief of the situation 
was that we were drifting apart from Austria, who answered our in- 
vitation to a joint negotiation with excuses and reserve, or by complete 
silence. Further, it was clear that neither did she wholly trust the Tsar 
Paul, nor he her. Grenville had contemplated an application even to 
that unaccountable potentate for his good offices; but the mere in- 
tention illustrates the British statesman's desperation 4 . It would be 
unfair to blame Francis II and Thugut overmuch for the collapse of 
1797, in view of the utter demoralisation of the Austrian army, the 
craven spirit of nobles and burghers, and the delays in our financial 
succour 5 . But it soon transpired that the Habsburg Court was con- 
templating an alluring alternative — an entente with France with a view 
to the partition of the Venetian Republic 6 . Herein lay the chief reason 

1 Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace (No. II). 

2 Dropmore Papers, ill. 298. 

3 So he declared (Dropmore Papers, III. 322) Starhemberg heard the contrary 
(Ibid. p. 325); he thought the secrecy of his Court culpable. 

4 Ibid. in. pp. 299, 312; Ballot, chap. IV. Vorontzoff at London was working for 
a rapprochement with England; but the inconstancy of Paul made it very difficult. 

5 Hiiffer, Quellen, Pt II, vol. 1. pp. civ, 178-184. 

6 See Appendix D; also, Huffer, Quellen, Pt II, vol. 1. p. 153. 



PITT'S INTENSE DESIRE FOR PEACE 277 

for the secretiveness of its policy during the spring and summer of 
1797. Frequently did Grenville and Eden ask for the communication 
of the Austro-French terms signed at Leoben. Thugut kept them 
jealously secret. He, also, refused to ratify a convention for the repay- 
ment of sums lent by Great Britain to Austria ; and, in spite of reiterated 
protests from the British Government that such conduct sapped all 
confidence in Austria's integrity, he took no steps to satisfy these just 
claims, believing probably that her isolation and need of an Ally would 
lead to the cancelling of the debt. Sharp opposition in Parliament com- 
pelled the Pitt Administration to hold firm in this matter, the result 
being a marked divergence between British and Austrian policy. Thus, 
the hope of setting on foot joint negotiations for peace came to naught. 
In fact, the Triple Alliance of 1795 was defunct. Paul pirouetted 
apart; Francis II was drifting towards a tame but not unprofitable 
surrender; and Great Britain, hard pressed by the mutinies in the 
fleets at Spithead and the Nore, seemed for a time at the mercy of the 
French. The cheery pessimism of George Canning found expression 
in the following lines (May 12th, 1797): 

Come, Windham ! celebrate with me 
This day of joy and jubilee, 

This day of no disaster. 
Our Government is not o'erturned — 
Huzza ! Our fleet has not been burned, 

Our army's not the master 1 . 

The intensity of Pitt's desire for peace is at no time more evident 
than his venturing, even in the midst of these civil discords, to sound 
the disposition of the French Directory on this question. On June 4th 
he privately assured Lord Carlisle that overtures were being made at 
Paris 2 . To take such steps while the Nore mutineers were blockading 
the Thames and Consols were down to 48, was the most questionable 
proceeding in Pitt's career; and it was, almost certainly, disapproved 
by Grenville. On May 26th he ordered Hammond to leave Berlin, 
where nothing could be effected, and on June 2nd he informed Eden 
that we were making peace overtures at Paris in consequence of Austria 
having come to terms with the French and observing complete silence 
on those terms ; but he ordered Eden merely to state these facts as a 
proof of our desire still to remain in concert with her. As to the method 

1 Windham Papers, n. 53. 

2 See Appendix D, also, for the reasons why Grenville refused Austria's futile, 
because belated, proposal of a General Congress. 



278 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

of our negotiations with the Directory, there arose a sharp division in 
Downing Street. Grenville, Portland, Spencer and Windham still 
desired close cooperation with our Allies, Austria and Portugal. Pitt, 
Loughborough, Dundas, Chatham, Cornwallis and, finally, Liverpool, 
carried the day in favour of a limited negotiation 1 . George III, very 
reluctantly, concurred. Grenville, however, in his note of June 17th 
to Delacroix, declared that Great Britain must look after the interests 
of her Ally, Portugal, and that those of Spain and Holland might be 
considered on the representation of France. 

We can here consider merely the causes of the failure of the ensuing 
negotiation at Lille. Malmesbury, our Plenipotentiary, well summarised 
the influences at work in the concluding sentence of his letter of 
July 25th to Grenville : " The fate of the negotiation will depend much 
less on what passes in our conferences here than on what may shortly 
happen at Paris." This remarkable forecast was prompted by the 
critical state of affairs at Paris. There, the violent trio that controlled 
the Directory procured the dismissal of Delacroix and other Ministers, 
the Foreign Minister's place being taken by Talleyrand as Plenipo- 
tentiary at Lille. Not that this diplomat was, either by nature or 
conviction, a Jacobin ; but, since at this juncture his diplomatic talents 
would be invaluable, he became their man for a time. In his opinion, 
the British Government was secretly encouraging Austria to resist the 
French terms, or rather the terms which Bonaparte was thrusting on 
her. " Force the Austrian peace by hurrying on the British peace " — 
such was his motto. If left to himself, the young conqueror would 
probably have humoured the islanders to some extent, in order to 
crush Austria. That Powerwas playing a dangerous game. Obstinately, 
she held her British Ally at arm's length, until Grenville declared that 
her suspicious reserve and belated proposals for a General Congress left 
the Court of St James's free to go its own way, cooperation with her 
being out of the question, unless Gallic haughtiness compelled both 
States to fight on to the death. Malmesbury, also, affirmed that we 
had done more than our duty by her, while she forgot what she owed 
to us 2 . As for Portugal, her Envoy complicated matters on August 10th 
by hurriedly signing a Separate Peace, which his own Government 
promptly disavowed. 

Thus, in the month of September, the Directory seemed to have 

1 Life of Sir G. Elliot, II. 408. Windham, Diary, pp. 365-8. For Burke's last 
despairing letter on public affairs, see The Windham Papers (1913), vol. 11. pp. 53-6. 
For the British peace proposals of July 8th, 1797, see Ballot, App. xiv. 

2 Malmesbury Diaries, III. 465. 



FAILURE OF THE LILLE NEGOTIATIONS 279 

the ball at its feet. Recent events had puffed up its leading members 
with intolerable pride. They hoped to arouse a great revolt in Ireland, 
stir up panic in England by invasions and plots of malcontents, and 
group the Baltic States in a new Armed Neutrality against her. The 
Tsar Paul being inclined towards peace, they hoped to refashion the 
Armed Neutrality of 1780, and to overwhelm both Great Britain and 
Austria. Their forceful policy having succeeded in the domestic crisis, 
the coup d'etat of 18th Fructidor (September 4th, 1797), which led to 
the triumph of the violent trio and the exile of their moderate opponents, 
the victorious faction was about to apply similar methods to their foes 
abroad. Reubell, the most energetic of the three, hated England viru- 
lently and believed that she could be revolutionised and ruined 1 . A 
week later, Talleyrand and Maret were replaced by Treilhard and 
Bonnier, Talleyrand becoming Foreign Minister. On September 1 6th, 
they sent a note, asking Malmesbury whether he had full powers to 
agree to a complete restitution of all British conquests made from 
France or her Allies; failing which, he should leave Lille within 
twenty-four hours. This brusque demand involved the restitution to 
the Dutch, not only of their settlements in Ceylon (as to which Pitt 
and Maret were ready for a compromise), but also of the Cape, as to 
which no British statesman would give way 2 . On other questions, an 
agreement had been virtually reached during informal discussions 
between Malmesbury and Maret; but this sudden demand was equi- 
valent to a rupture. In vain did the French Plenipotentiaries declare 
that it was designed pour activer la negotiation, and that, if Malmesbury 
chose to depart, they would await his return. That device was a sop 
to public opinion in France, which had longed for peace. With more 
reason, the British Government could urge that France had broken off 
the negotiation by a sudden and imperious demand. Accordingly, 
the whole affair tended to accentuate the war spirit on both sides of 
the Channel. 

It is, however, doubtful whether a compromise was practicable. 
The French Plenipotentiaries might, in private, deride the lofty claims 
of their Spanish Allies for the recovery of Gibraltar and Nootka Sound, 
the demand of territory in Newfoundland for their fisheries and of a 
virtually exclusive possession of the Pacific coasts of America. But, 
after the revival of Spanish pride consequent on Nelson's repulse at 

1 Ballot, chap. xvm. 

2 Malmesbury Diaries, in. 385, 400, 456, 471, 557. Pitt and Grenville differed 
respecting Ceylon. 



2 8o THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

Teneriffe, the Directory could not entirely overlook the claims of its 
chief Ally, nor indeed those of the Dutch, who, while less pretentious, 
were far more persistent. Maret believed that if Great Britain would 
forego Ceylon, she might retain the Cape by bribing each Director 
to the extent of £50,000* . On the score of character the suggestion 
is quite credible; but on that of expediency it is more than questionable. 
For such a proceeding could not remain secret ; and its disclosure would 
damn for ever the men who resorted to it at the expense of a faithful 
Ally. There was, apparently, some chance of the Dutch accepting a 
substantial sum from England for the Cape, in order to discharge their 
pecuniary obligations to France, that Colony being then regarded as 
financially burdensome and useful only as the outpost guarding the 
East Indies 2 . But the spirit prevalent at Paris after Fructidor forbade 
any chaffering on this head. Probably, Bonaparte's influence prevented 
the cession of the Cape to " the intriguing and enterprising islanders " 
who alone stood between him and the conquest of the East. Ostensibly, 
the question of the Cape was the chief crux at Lille, Ceylon and 
Trinidad presenting fewer difficulties. But, in reality, it was the 
domineering spirit of the Directors which occasioned the rupture 3 . 
Could they have foreseen the events of the next nine months — the 
Dutch navy crushed by Duncan at Camperdown (October 12th), the 
revival of British finance and prestige, the miserable failure of French 
plans for Ireland, the hatred aroused by the French invaders of Switzer- 
land and Rome, and the rapid rise of Bonaparte at the expense of " the 
lawyers of the Directory," they would have made peace and have 
figured as the benefactors of Europe, not as the dupes of the Great 
Corsican. 

In view of the evidence now in our possession, the charge that 
Grenville always desired the breakdown of the negotiation at Lille 
must be revised. He felt the need of peace, if it could be obtained on 
terms neither dishonourable nor too disadvantageous 4 . But, clearly, 
Pitt was more eager than he for a settlement. His desire to end the 
War appeared in his entertaining some vaguely alluring offer to restore 
peace on not unfavourable terms, if £2,000,000 were secretly paid to 
the five Directors. The offer was either a hoax or an attempt to 
manipulate the Stock Exchange ; and Pitt's dallying with so suspicious 

1 Ballot, p. 237. 

1 Mahnesbury Diaries, in. 439, 454, 464, 470. 
* Ballot, pp. 474-6, 298-309. 

4 See Appendix D; also Dropmore Papers, ill. 372, 378; Huffer, Quellen, Pt II, 
vol. 1. p. cxx note. 



TREATY OF CAMPO FORMIO 281 

a proposal seems to have induced Windham to write the sarcastic 
letter of October 10th, referring to the constant lowering of our terms, 
in the hope of some day finding at Paris a Government that would grant 
conditions of peace " not utterly destructive " ; for to that course Pitt's 
system of "tiding over" was rapidly reducing us 1 . The prestige and 
credit of Great Britain never sank lower than in the summer of 1797. 
Thenceforth, under the pressure of French pretensions she began to 
recover spirit and energy. 

In every respect, the coup d'etat of Fructidor marks the beginning 
of a new period. In France, it brought about a recrudescence of 
Jacobinical violence. The rupture at Lille also opened the period of 
definitely offensive war. Both events were decided largely by the 
forceful will of Bonaparte, which, with military help, overbore the 
Moderates and launched France on a career of conquest and plunder. 
An attempt has been made by Sorel to prove the essential unity of all 
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars ; but that theory is at variance 
with certain plain facts. Before Fructidor and Lille, the military efforts 
of Frenchmen had been to a large extent directed to the acquisition 
of what they deemed secure boundaries. Afterwards, they aimed at 
foreign conquests. There is a wide difference between the campaigns 
of Carnot and those of Bonaparte. The former was now an exile, the 
latter was now the uncrowned king of the French. Up to September, 
1797, the hopes of democrats everywhere centred in France. Thence- 
forth, they turned against her. That month marks the turning point 
both in the French Revolution and in European History. Brumaire 
and the Empire were but the natural sequel of Fructidor. 

That event also led the Directory and Bonaparte to conclude peace 
promptly with Austria. "We have war with England (wrote Bona- 
parte on October 18th), that enemy is formidable enough." Fearing 
that she was about to frame a new Coalition, he bullied Cobenzl into 
a surrender of the chief outstanding Austrian demand, the Ionian Isles, 
then forming part of the Venetian Republic, which the two disputants 
had resolved to partition. By the resulting Treaty, signed at Campo 
Formio near Udine on October 17th, 1797, France acquired the 
Venetian fleet, and for her subordinate Cisalpine Republic the western 
districts of the Venetian mainland, while Austria obtained the city of 
Venice, Eastern Venetia, Istria and Dalmatia. She also ceded to the 
French the Belgic Provinces, recognised the (nominal) independence 
of the lands now forming the Cisalpine Republic, promised to transfer 

1 Windham Papers, II. 61. 



282 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

her Breisgau to the dispossessed Duke of Modena and agreed to the 
assembly of a Congress for the settlement of German affairs. The main 
outlines were marked out in secret articles whereby the Emperor 
pledged himself to use his good offices to procure from the Empire 
the cession to France of all German lands west of the Rhine, she in 
return using her endeavours to secure for him the Archbishopric of 
Salzburg and part of South-East Bavaria. The signatory Powers further 
agreed that, if one of them made more acquisitions than these in 
Germany, the other should gain an equivalent indemnity 1 . 

Such was this disgraceful compact. The two Powers now extin- 
guished the unoffending Venetian Republic and agreed on a policy 
of spoliation at the expense of the lesser States of the Holy Roman 
Empire. The Emperor consented to schemes which involved the breach 
of his coronation oath ; and the French Republic placed itself on the 
level of the despoilers of Poland. The success which, also, attended 
the French negotiations at the Congress of Rastatt hastened the dis- 
solution of the Holy Roman Empire and assured the predominance 
of France in German affairs. Bonaparte, after participating for a few 
days in the early sessions at Rastatt, repaired to Paris, where he received 
a rapturous welcome, and was bidden by Barras to proceed to the 
northern coast and overthrow " the giant corsair that infests the seas." 
Duncan's victory at Camperdown deprived this verbiage of all sig- 
nificance; but unrest in England and unceasing outrages in Ireland 
darkened the outlook in the autumn of 1797 2 . If the French Republic 
had not soon belied its reputation of liberator of oppressed peoples, 
the democratic ferment in our large towns would have been formidable. 
For a time British malcontents looked with hope to Bonaparte's forces 
mustering on the coasts of Picardy and Flanders. It soon appeared 
that those preparations were, on his part, a blind to hide his real aims 
which pointed towards Egypt. When his ambitions became manifest 
and the plunder of the Swiss Cantonal treasuries was known, the 
sympathy of British democrats with France rapidly cooled ; and the 
War received whole-hearted support. The rise of Bonaparte syn- 
chronises closely with the decline of British Republicanism, fear of 
which had in a measure influenced Grenville's foreign policy. 

The truth that the excess of an evil works its own cure likewise be- 
came manifest, though slowly, in the international situation. The domi- 

1 Garden, v. 415-425. Austria lost 3,604,300 inhabitants, but gained 3,050,000 
in Italy, etc. 

2 Dropmore Papers, III. 378, 385-9. 



ACCESSION OF FREDERICK WILLIAM III 283 

neering behaviour of the French Envoys at Rastatt, the rapacity of 
French officials in theRhineland,andthe spoliation of Rome and central 
Switzerland alarmed and disgusted all neighbouring Powers. Thugut, 
while secretly satisfied with the terms signed at Leoben, resented the 
far more onerous conditions of the Treaty of Campo Formio, and 
regarded it as a truce, to last until the Triple Alliance could be renewed 
under more favourable auspices. The conduct of the French convinced 
the statesmen of Vienna, Petrograd and London that the time was 
fast approaching 1 . 

For a brief period, some hope was entertained that Prussia would 
enter on a different course. In November, 1797, the death of Frederick 
William II brought to the throne his son of the same name. The new 
monarch was virtuous; and his accession and that of his beautiful 
consort Louisa, ended the scandals which had disgraced the Court of 
Berlin. His national patriotism revolted at the terms of the Treaty of 
Campo Formio and the intrusion at Rastatt of French influence into 
Germanic affairs. He, therefore, sought to come to an understanding 
with the Emperor Francis II. The attempt produced little result, owing 
to the incurable distrust between the two Courts. Further, there 
appeared in Frederick William III signs of that narrowness of outlook 
and paralysing indecision which were destined often to warp or thwart 
Prussian policy; and the hopes of a change of policy harboured by 
Lord Elgin, British Ambassador at Berlin, soon faded away. The Duke 
of Brunswick, who went thither with the purpose of influencing the new 
monarch in favour of Great Britain and Austria, soon had to lament 
his timidity and reliance on the old clique, especially on Haugwitz, 
a man (said Brunswick) "whom no honest man could trust." 

Very different was the character of George III. As he once wrote 
to Pitt, " I never assent till I am convinced what is proposed is right, 
and then I keep." This excellent quality, together with the quenchless 
optimism of Pitt, the stern tenacity of Grenville, the valour of her 
fighting men and the marvellous buoyancy of her finances, made 
Great Britain the sole hope of European independence. Mallet du 
Pan, on reaching our shores in the spring of 1798, was astounded at 
the confidence which prevailed. "The nation (he wrote) had not 
yet learnt to know its own strength or its resources. The Government 
has taught it the secret, and inspired it with an unbounded confidence 
almost amounting to presumption." This dogged determination was 
certain to reinvigorate our former Allies, so soon as they had full 

1 Dropmore Papers, HI. 384, 395-7. 



284 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

experience of the dealings of France with her neighbours. On 
January nth, 1798, George III wrote to Pitt, urging the need of an 
alliance with Austria, Russia and Prussia, and the despatch of Lord 
Minto to Vienna for the initial negotiations, England acting as a 
guarantor for an eventual Austro-Prussian settlement. No such steps, 
however, were taken for the present, but de Luc, George Ill's agent 
in Germany, worked hard to safeguard the Princes of the Holy Roman 
Empire and remove the obstacles to a union of the Powers. For the 
present, the scramble for "indemnities " at Rastatt left Central Europe 
a prey to French intrigues; and, by a vote of the Congress on March 
9th, 1798, France secured the Rhine boundary, the ecclesiastical 
domains further east being earmarked for the dispossessed German 
Princes from beyond that river 1 . 

These and other high-handed actions on the part of the French 
induced Thugut to angle warily for support from London ; but, on 
the score of Austria's poverty, he declined to repay her loan of 
£1,600,000, now overdue at London. Pitt and Grenville insisting on 
the discharge of this obligation, a diplomatic deadlock ensued, des- 
tined to produce serious consequences. True, on April 1st Starhemberg 
proffered to Grenville proposals, drawn up by Thugut on March 18th, 
probably owing to the French diplomatic success of March 9th at 
Rastatt. They aimed at the formation of a league between the four 
great monarchies in order to oppose France, now " decidedly bent on 
the subversion of every part of Europe and totally regardless of the 
faith of treaties." Austria, also, asked for pecuniary aid, the despatch 
of a British fleet into the Mediterranean, and enquired whether, if 
necessary, action could be taken in theyear 1799. Starhemberg, further, 
hopefully suggested that the one thing necessary to make the Tsar act 
was to convince him that peace with anarchic France was impossible, 
and that, if Prussia were unfriendly, he should at least neutralise her. 
At best, however, a Quadruple Alliance could be formed with which 
the Scandinavian and Italian States would probably coalesce. He, also, 
opposed the notion of the Belgic Provinces ever falling to Prussia, but 
in any case begged for British financial support 2 . Here he encountered 
the fixed resolve of Pitt and Grenville, which barred further progress. 
For a brief space, the question of reparation for an insult to the French 
flag at Vienna on April 13th promised to lead to a rupture; but the 

1 Rose, Pitt and Napoleon: Essays and Letters, pp. 240, 243 ; Dropmore Papers, 
in. 400-7, iv. 43-60; Guyot, pp. 673-684; Le Congres de Rastatt, 1. pp. 1-256; 
H. Hiiffer, Der Rastatter Kongress, vol. II. passim. 

2 Dropmore Papers, IV. 153-9. 



FRENCH SEIZURE OF MALTA AND ALEXANDRIA 285 

incident ended in a tame compromise which for a time seemed likely 
to lead even to an Austro-French entente. The Directory sought to 
entice both Austria and Russia to a partition of the Turkish Empire, 
but met with little response. Prussia, likewise, rejected its overtures 
for an alliance. 

In the early summer of 1798, the impasse in European affairs 
seemed hopeless. Great Britain was for a time distracted by the for- 
midable revolt in Ireland, which the fleets of Brest and Rochefort 
promised, but failed, to foster. Italy and Switzerland lay at the feet 
of the French ; and the helplessness of the Holy Roman Empire stands 
revealed in the remark of Bonaparte, that, if that institution did not 
exist, France would have to create it. But now, as was so often to 
happen, his masterful ambition launched France into an ocean of 
adventure, overburdening her with new responsibilities and exaspera- 
ting all the Powers. Instead of striking at Ireland, where the blow 
would have been mortal, he purposed to ruin Great Britain by the 
seizure of Malta and Egypt, as a preliminary to the acquisition of her 
Indian Empire. Setting sail from Toulon on May 19th, his great 
armada easily captured Malta (June 12th). The news aroused a pro- 
found sensation at Rastatt. "It caused, first stupor" (wrote Debry, 
the French plenipotentiary on August 6th), "then rage. Not for a 
week has a single friend of Austria come to my house 1 ." Bonaparte's 
capture of Alexandria produced an equal sensation. It threw light on 
the French projects for a partition of Turkey, and spurred on that 
Power to a declaration of war. On August 15th, the Sultan appealed 
to the Emperor of Morocco and other Moslem Princes for a joint 
effort against the French, who had without " any declaration of war, as 
practised by all regular governments, sent a wretch named Bonaparte 
against Egypt with a view to an attack on the whole Mohammedan 
world." Though the Sultan failed to stir up a Jehad against France, 
he found an unexpected Ally in Russia. The seizure of Malta, for 
whose Knights the Tsar Paul had long cherished a romantic admira- 
tion, threw him into transports of rage and ended his hesitations as 
to a war with France. His zeal for the expulsion of the French from 
Malta increased, when many of the exiled Knights repaired to Russia 
and, in October, 1798, elected him Grand-master of their Order. At 
once, he prepared to help Turkey with a fleet, and Austria with troops 
subsidised by Great Britain. The news of Nelson's victory at the Nile 
(which did not reach Paris until September 14th, and London on 

1 Le Congrds de Rastatt, I. 270. 



286 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

October 2nd and 3rd) aroused intense satisfaction in Austria and Russia 
and ecstasies of joy throughout southern Italy, where a French in- 
vasion had seemed imminent. Bonaparte's Eastern expedition was, im- 
mediately, seen to be a gigantic blunder. Besides shutting up in Egypt 
the best Generals and troops of France, it incited Paul to hostility, 
encouraged Austria, and brought on immediate war with the Turks, on 
whom France had always counted to immobilise half the armies 
of the Imperial Courts. Soon, the subjects of the Sultan witnessed the 
strange spectacle of a Russian fleet sailing down the Bosphorus to help 
the Porte in the Mediterranean. What British diplomacy had failed to 
effect, British seamanship accomplished by one mighty blow. Nelson's 
exploit brought to life all the latent elements of opposition to the 
domination of France, and threw back that Power on the defensive. 



IV 

Nevertheless, so discordant were the Gallophobe States that neither 
the zeal of the Tsar nor the persistence of Grenville could fuse them 
into lasting union. Now, as ever, the hostility of Austria and Prussia 
was incurable, and Talleyrand counted on it for paralysing the nascent 
league. Of late, he had declared that he did not fear Coalitions, and 
had sent Sieyes to Berlin to keep Prussia quiet. The Envoy so far 
succeeded in working on the fears or covetousness of the Berlin Court, 
that neither the efforts of Russia nor those of Great Britain could effect 
a reconciliation with Austria 1 . Frederick William III professed a 
strong desire to expel the French from the Netherlands, but would not 
move until Great Britain paid him a subsidy and the Habsburgs opened 
the game. They, again, would not stir without money from London. 

Similar requests had also arrived from Petrograd. On July 24th, 
1798, the Chancellor, Prince Besborodko, officially declared to Whit- 
worth the desire of Paul to become a principal, instead of an auxiliary, 
in the war, for the purpose of re-establishing peace on safe and honour- 
able terms, not for the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne of 
France. Russia's cooperation, however, was conditional on the receipt 
of a British subsidy. Grenville, in his reply of August 27th, pointed 
out the straightened condition of the finances of Great Britain, her 
extraordinary exertions in all spheres of the war, and stated that, 
having been disgracefully abandoned by the Habsburgs, she could not 
frame a concert with them. She would, however, accept the Tsar's 
1 Dropmore Papers, iv. 272, 306-313, 35°. 35 8 » 3 6 3- 



BRITISH COALITION PROGRAMME 287 

mediation for the re-establishment of such a concert, especially with 
a view to restoring the cantonal system in Switzerland ; and Whitworth 
was empowered to sign a Subsidy Convention for the support of "a 
powerful Russian army " to cooperate with Austrian forces in the west. 
If such action were impossible, Grenville suggested an Anglo-Russian 
expedition to free the Dutch Republic, "exasperated as it is by the 
insulting tyranny of the French." If, however, Austria would help 
the Swiss, equally irritated against the French, we would assist Russia 
in acting conjointly with Austria for their liberation 1 . 

In these suggestions appear the first outlines of the campaigns of 
1799. They proceeded largely on the lines sketched at Downing Street 
— a fact which differentiates the Second from the First Coalition. The 
British programme matured very slowly, owing to distrust of Austria 
and to the impossibility of satisfying the pecuniary demands of merely 
potential Allies. Pitt and Grenville agreed that, despite the excellent 
revenue returns, we could not possibly spare more than £2,000,000 
for the three exigent States ; and Pitt sagaciously concluded that the 
best course for the present was to continue "to fight well our own 
battle ; and Europe must probably be left some time longer to its fate 2 ." 
The formation of the new league was, also, hindered by the skill of the 
French Plenipotentiaries at Rastatt in fomenting German jealousies, 
and by Austro- Russian disputes concerning Suvoroff's army destined 
for service under the Habsburgs. 

While diplomats bargained at Rastatt and the Tsar showered angry 
notes on Vienna, Ferdinand IV, King of the Two Sicilies, rushed into 
the fray. He had reasons for prompt action. By the Defensive Treaty 
of May 20th, 1798, with Austria, he would, in case of attack by the 
French, receive help from 60,000 whitecoats, or send 40,000 Neapoli- 
tans to succour the Habsburgs if they were assailed. On July 16th, 
the Court of Vienna ratified this compact, together with two supple- 
mentary articles whereby the Emperor promised to defend Naples, if 
attacked in consequence of opening the ports of the Kingdom to the 
British fleet. That case soon occurred, Nelson with some initial 
difficulty procuring at Syracuse the provisions and water which his 
Instructions from Earl St Vincent entitled him to demand. These 
resulted finally from the understanding with Austria, which involved 
the right of procuring provisions from Austrian and Neapolitan 
ports. As it was Austria which first pressed for the despatch of a 

1 F.O. Russia, 40. Grenville to Whitworth, August 27th, 1798. 

2 Dropmore Papers, iv. p. 355. 



288 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

British fleet to that sea, within which there was no British station, 
she was bound to succour the Neapolitans in case of a French attack, 
consequent on their supplying the needed provisions and water ; and 
the aggressiveness of the French (witness their forcible occupation of 
Turin on July 3rd) warranted the belief that they would attack Naples 
on the first plausible pretext. In this respect, then, the despatch of 
Nelson's squadron to the Mediterranean, primarily for the protection 
of Naples, was almost certain to lead to a new war; and Thugut's 
assurances to Eden, especially on June 23rd, pointed to the proffer of 
prompt assistance to that State, if it were assailed in pursuance of 
actions necessarily resulting from Austria's demand. 

Nevertheless, so dependent was she on the Tsar (himself a waving 
reed) that, on October 3rd, Grenville warned Hamilton as to the danger 
of Naples breaking with the French Republic, unless it had "the 
fullest assurances of support from the Court of Vienna." By some 
mischance, this despatch did not reach Hamilton until November 19th ; 
and, two days earlier, King Ferdinand had rushed into war. Whether he 
counted on armed help from Austria is doubtful. On September 28th 
General Acton assured Nelson and Hamilton that " Naples was deter- 
mined to declare war, not wait for the Emperor ; that they well knew the 
plan of the French against them." His rival, the Marchese di Gallo, in- 
culcated caution and therefore incurred the hot displeasure of Nelson. 
Succumbing to the fascination of Lady Hamilton (herself the favourite 
of Queen Maria Carolina) the Admiral urged instant war. When 
admitted to their councils he roundly scolded Gallo and strengthened 
the party of action. The arrival of the Austrian General Mack, and 
his belief in the soldierly qualities of the 30,000 Neapolitan troops who 
made a fine show at Caserta, clinched the matter. On November 12th, 
Nelson assisted at a council at which it was decided that he should 
carry 4600 men to Leghorn, to menace the French rear, and, on the 
17th Mack advanced to attack them at Rome, " trusting to the support 
of the Emperor." The latter plan must, however, have been formed 
during the absence of Nelson off Valetta (October 24^-3 1st); for, so 
early as November 10th, news from Naples reached Thugut to the 
effect that the kingdom was about to make war; and, on behalf 
of the Emperor, he angrily declared to Eden that if it acted thus, 
it would receive no help from Austria. He had sent a similar warning 
to Naples, which arrived late on the 12th, five days before the Nea- 
politans were to advance ; but the King and Queen, stimulated thereto 
by Nelson, nevertheless resolved to attack. Evidently, the Admiral 



THE BREAKDOWN AT NAPLES 289 

had jumped to the conclusion that the Emperor would act, or must 
be forced to act 1 . 

The result was disastrous. The Neapolitans broke at every en- 
counter, rushed back in rout to the capital; and, on December 23rd, 
Nelson in H. M.S. Vanguard carried the royal family and the Hamiltons 
for safety to Palermo. This ignominious collapse exasperated the 
Emperor ; and on December 22nd he hotly asserted to Eden that the 
precipitate action of his father-in-law, King Ferdinand, in attacking 
France was due to the British Government, which had sought to drag 
Austria into war, though it knew her to be unprepared. The charge 
against the Government is demonstrably false ; if it had been levelled 
at Nelson, it would have contained some measure of truth. In any case, 
the precipitate action of Ferdinand marred the opening of the War of 
the Second Coalition and deprived that struggle both of the momentum 
and the general goodwill which might have assured the overthrow 
of France. Never was she weaker and more hated; never were her 
opponents stronger than after the Battle of the Nile ; and it is a matter of 
enduring regret that the rashness of Nelson at Naples compromised 
the political results of that glorious triumph. 

Meanwhile, the whims of Paul, the narrow suspicions of Francis, 
and the conscientious objections of Frederick William to any forward 
move, let slip the opportunity. While France was arming systematically 
in pursuance of her new Law of Conscription (September 23rd, 1798), 
the three Powers were engaged in futile chaffering. In order to bring 
the Tsar to a point, Grenville on November 16th despatched to Whit- 
worth proposals for an Anglo-Russian Alliance which should form the 
basis of a European League. Taking warning from the fate of the First 
Coalition, he sought to effect a just and stable settlement of Con- 
tinental problems by means of a firm compact between the two Great 
Powers that were but slightly concerned in the central tangles. Great 
Britain and Russia were to lay the foundations of a Quadruple Alliance 
with Austria and Prussia for the master-aim of reducing France within 
her ancient limits, the Allies contracting not to lay down their arms 
until this purpose should be attained. Since, however, its attainment 
might be hindered by the territorial ambitions and mutual jealousies 
of the Central Powers, Grenville sought to exorcise them by a pre- 
liminary understanding, the Habsburgs being invited to look towards 
Italy, in order not to exasperate Prussia. Her monarch was to be 

1 Sir H. Nicolas, Despatches of Nelson, II. 144, 148, 170, 171. See also 
Appendix E. 

w.&gJi. iq 



2 9 o THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

invited to indicate his desires for territory — a request not calculated 
to placate Vienna. For the rest, Grenville assumed that neither of the 
Central Powers would desire the Belgic lands, and that the best plan was, 
therefore, to add them to the United Netherlands under the restored 
Stadholder, the Prince of Orange. The freedom of Switzerland and the 
restitution by the French of Savoy (Nice was not named) and of the 
Rhenish lands to their former owners were, also, stipulated 1 . 

Viewed at large, the document may be called a rough draft of the 
Treaties of Vienna and Paris of 18 14-15; while the almost nervous 
bid for Prussia's aid for the deliverance of the Netherlands associates 
this programme with the Anglo-Dutch-Prussian Alliance of 1788. At 
several points, the outlines are shadowy, notably as relating to the ex- 
pansion of Prussia and the future of the kingdom of Sardinia. The 
latter State is not named, doubtless because it had on April 4th, 1797, 
framed a close Alliance with the French 2 , and was now under their 
control. Nevertheless, the future of Sardinia should have been as much 
a matter of concern as that of the Dutch Republic, which was equally 
in the hands of the enemy. 

Grenville 's Instructions of November 16th led to the formation of 
the provisional Anglo-Russian Treaty of December 29th, 1798, which 
stipulated pecuniary support by Great Britain for a subsidised Russian 
army of 45,000 men, to act in the west together with a Prussian force. 
At this time, Grenville cherished high hopes of inducing Prussia to 
take up arms for the liberation of the United Provinces. Cooperation 
with her almost necessarily involved alienation from Austria. Accord- 
ingly, as the Court of Vienna maintained its suspicious reserve, he 
sharply rebuked Whitworth for allowing himself, at the instance of Paul 
and in contradiction to Instructions from home, to be drawn into futile 
pourparlers with that inveterate schemer, Count Lewis Cobenzl 3 . These 
were cut short, and Grenville despatched his brother Thomas on a 
special mission to Berlin, for the purpose of arranging an Anglo- 
Prusso-Russian invasion of Dutch territory, if possible with the help 
of Denmark or Sweden. The family connexion of Frederick William 
with the House of Orange, and his known desire for the liberation of 
that land, told in favour of the scheme; but, finally, Francophil in- 
fluences, added to his innate indecision of character, prevailed. He 
decided to stand aloof, but considered that his profession of benevolent 

1 Dropmore Papers, IV. 377-380. 

2 Sorel, V. 154. On December 9th, 1798, Charles Emmanuel IV abdicated and 
retired to the island of Sardinia. 

3 F.O. Russia, 42, Grenville to Whitworth, January 25th, 1799. 



IMPERFECT BEGINNINGS OF SECOND COALITION 291 

intentions warranted the payment of a British subsidy. Haugwitz, then 
posing as Anglophil, early in May started a scheme for putting 60,000 
Prussians at our disposal on good financial terms; but this proposal, 
whether sincere or not, was shelved by Frederick William near the 
end of July, when the adoption of any other extensive plan of opera- 
tions was almost impracticable 1 . Accordingly, the British programme 
of a great Coalition with Russia and Prussia (Austria, Naples and the 
Scandinavian States being accessories) fell through. Nothing, there- 
fore, remained but hastily to adopt more limited schemes for the 
remainder of 1799 — a fact which goes far to explain the very unsatis- 
factory operations of that year 2 . To these, so far as they resulted from 
British initiative, we must now turn. 

For reasons already stated, no compact was possible with Austria. 
But the provisional Anglo-Russian Treaty of December 29th, 1798, 
was prolonged by a Convention of six months later. Compacts of the 
two Powers with Naples and Turkey added to the scope, though not 
to the strength, of the Second Coalition. Meanwhile, an Austro- 
Russian Alliance had led to the despatch of Suvoroff's army (finally 
about 60,000 strong) with a view to assistance against the French in 
northern Italy; but disputes between the two Courts delayed, first its 
departure, then its progress, and not until the end of March, 1799, did 
that doughty warrior and his vanguard enter Vienna. At once, disputes 
broke out with the Hofkriegsrath, which regarded him as an Austrian 
Marshal entirely under its control. That any success was ever gained 
under this insensate arrangement is a supreme tribute to his genius. 
Scarcely more promising were the Anglo-Russian plans for the cam- 
paign. Not until the end of April, 1799, on receipt of the British 
ratification of the December Treaty, did the Tsar issue orders for the 
westward march of the subsidised Russian army under Korsakoff — 
a delay which hindered the successful opening of the campaign on the 
Upper Rhine. It soon transpired that the effective strength of this 
force was far below what Great Britain was paying for. Disputes also 
arose with Austria as to the objective of this army, she pointing to the 
Palatinate, while we desired the liberation of Switzerland as a pre- 
liminary to an Austro-Russian invasion of Franche-Comte. Finally, 
the British alternative prevailed. 

1 Dropmore Papers, iv. 464, 479, 492, 514, 519-527; v. 3-8, 14, 46, 68, 195-9. 
Wickham Corresp. II. 86. 

2 H. Huffer, Der Krieg des Jahres 1799 und die zweite Koalition (2 vols. Gotha, 
1904), has missed this important consideration. 

19—2 



292 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

With the Court of Vienna a close understanding was impossible, 
owing to the mystery in which Francis II and Thugut shrouded all 
their proceedings. Eden surmised that they were considering attractive 
offers from France ; and his suspicion was correct. This obscure situa- 
tion was cleared up by the action of the Directory, which, in March, 
1799, issued what amounted to a declaration of war against Austria. 
Seeing that France then had only 235,000 troops ready for action, her 
aggressiveness can be explained only by the conviction of her Envoys 
as to the weakness of the new Coalition. The long-drawn-out farce of 
the Rastatt Congress now ended in tragedy, when Szekler Hussars 
assassinated two of the French Plenipotentiaries. Such was the 
opening, chaotic and barbaric, of the War of the Second Coalition. 

Thenceforth, British policy was directed chiefly towards the fol- 
lowing objects— the healing of Austro-Russian discords, with a view 
to a joint invasion of Franche-Comte, the expulsion of the French 
from Dutch territory, the strengthening of our position in the Medi- 
terranean and the East as a retort to Bonaparte's oriental efforts, and 
the breaking-up of the Armed Neutrality League. It will be well to 
treat these topics in the order here indicated. 

The triumphs of the Russian and Austrian armies in Italy, under 
Suvoroff and Melas respectively, soon brought to a head the discords 
of those Governments. Apart from military disputes, a question of 
high policy soon sundered the two Courts. On the recapture of Turin 
from the French (May 20th, 1799), Paul, the self-styled champion of 
divine right and legitimacy, ordered the reinstatement of the King of 
Sardinia at his capital. This behest Francis II countermanded 1 ; and 
the diplomatic efforts of Great Britain and Russia at Vienna elicited 
proofs that he looked to the kingdom of Sardinia as one of his in- 
demnities. Anxious, now that northern Italy was conquered, to be 
rid of Suvoroff, the Emperor concurred in a British proposal for the 
transfer of that army to Switzerland, and a joint invasion of Franche- 
Comte. To humour the Tsar, Grenville first made the proposal at 
Petrograd ; when Paul agreed, Francis II expressed his assent, and for- 
warded corresponding instructions to Suvoroff. The veteran, who was 
planning an incursion into Nice, received the news with astonishment 
and indignation. To force the St Gothard in face of the French defence, 
to find subsistence in the Central Cantons, already impoverished by 
strife, and to join Korsakoff near Zurich signified a succession of 
problems never contemplated by the civilians who drew up the scheme. 
1 R. Gachot, Suvoroff en Italie, p. 192; Hiiffer, pp. 55 et seq. 



AUSTRIAN SECRETIVENESS 293 

In fact, the whole story forms an instructive commentary on paper 
strategy and Coalition campaigns. 

In order to pave the way for the liberation of Switzerland, Gren- 
ville had despatched Wickham (latterly in close relations with General 
Pichegru and other French Royalists) to stir up the Swiss, to concert 
a rising of the malcontents of eastern France, and so far as possible 
to cooperate with the Russian and Austrian commanders in Switzer- 
land. Arriving at Schaffhausen late in June, Wickham found that the 
Austrian Government discountenanced the diversion of the Arch- 
duke Charles's army into Switzerland, and that he felt unable either 
to attack the French or to restore the Cantonal system which the 
majority of the inhabitants desired. It soon appeared that nothing 
would induce Thugut to act promptly in that quarter 1 ; and he alone 
had influence with the Emperor. In truth, the early successes in 
Germany and Italy, and the absence of Bonaparte and his army in the 
East, had conduced at Vienna to a mood of boundless confidence ; and, 
since Great Britain supplied no money and much advice, she counted 
for nothing. 

Yet the importance of her influence ought not to have been ignored. 
It alone had imparted some consistence to the First Coalition, and 
was now needed as much as ever. Her squadrons in the Mediterranean 
not only cut off Bonaparte, but prevented a large Franco-Spanish fleet 
under Bruix (which entered that sea in May, 1799) from achieving 
more than the revictualling of the French garrison besieged in Genoa. 
That single incident should have opened the eyes of Francis II. But 
they were blind, save to the near and the obvious. Concentrating his 
efforts on Italy and the Rhineland, he refused to push on with the 
British plan, which, if properly backed, might have produced great 
results. The secretiveness of Austrian policy exasperated Grenville. 
Deeming Eden somewhat slack in his duties and too subservient to 
the masterful Minister, he recalled him in June, substituting for 
him Lord Minto (formerly Sir Gilbert Elliot) 2 . But the change was 
of little avail. On July 16th, Grenville wrote that Thugut, regarding 
the conquest of Italy as complete, seemed bent on thwarting his friends 
or Allies, and did so as thoroughly as if he were paid by France 3 . This 
was no exaggeration. The uncertainty as to the schemes of Francis 
and the intentions of Paul and Frederick William hampered the 

1 Wickham Corresp. n. 194 et seq. 

2 Dropmore Papers, iv. 515, 523 ; v. 85. Minto did not arrive until August 2nd. 

3 Ibid. v. 147. Cf. 199, 400-6; VI. 254. 



294 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

British naval and military plans to an unparalleled extent ; and the key 
to the mistakes committed in both services in that War is to be found 
in the halting or perverse diplomacy of Petrograd, Vienna and Berlin. 

The transference of Suvoroff's army to Switzerland, far from 
ending Austro-Russian disputes, exacerbated them. Jealous of the 
Marshal's fame, the Austrian authorities did nothing to further, and 
much to clog, his difficult task 1 ; and before his heroic Russians could 
struggle across the St Gothard and hew their way down the defile 
of the Reuss, Massena had crushed Korsakoff at Zurich (September 
25th-26th). The Court of Vienna, having ordered the Arch-duke to 
leave Switzerland, only a small Austrian force was left to help that 
Russian army, and it was overpowered. Suvoroff thereupon turned 
aside, and, brushing away the French, forced a passage into the Grisons, 
arriving at Chur on October 8th with an exhausted, but still undaunted, 
army. He swore never again to work for Austria, and all cooperation 
between her and Russia was thenceforth impossible. As for Paul, he 
was beside himself with rage, forthwith declared his Alliance with 
Austria at an end, and sought spasmodically to frame a fantastic union 
with Great Britain, Prussia, Turkey, Sweden and Denmark, for setting 
limits to Habsburg aggrandisement in Italy 2 . 

Thus ended the British plan for the liberation of Switzerland and 
the invasion of Franche-Comte. As a political conception it possessed 
certain merits ; for the occupation of Switzerland by the French had 
given them control over northern Italy, Tyrol and Suabia. To eject them 
thence was the alpha and omega of Europe's liberation. But to attempt 
that task, especially from Italy, without making sure of wholehearted 
support from the valley of the Upper Rhine, bordered on the fantastic. 
Even apart from the tenacious French defence, the achievement 
demanded the most exact cooperation between the armies of Korsakoff, 
Suvoroff and the Archduke Charles. Austrian schemings and jealousies 
disarranged a programme which called for the most energetic and 
punctual performance. But the underlying conception, when carried 
out faithfully and intelligently in 1814, contributed materially to the 
overthrow of Napoleon. 

The liberation of the Dutch Netherlands bulked large in the Anglo- 
Russian schemes for 1799 ; and, as has been seen, the help of Prussia long 
seemed a possibility. Had it come to pass, a great Russo-Prussian army, 

1 Gachot, chaps, vi, xvn ; Huffer, II. chap. 11. Minto thought Thugut's aim was 
to spare the Austrian army (Wickham Corresp. II. 215). 

2 Dropmore Papers, vi. 19, 32; Wickham Corresp. 11. 329; Huffer, II. chap. II.; 
Waliszewski, Paul I, chap. XII. 



COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND COALITION 295 

with British and possibly Danish or Swedish contingents, would prob- 
ably have swept the French out of that land, as a composite Allied 
force did in 1814. In May, 1799, the prospects were highly favourable ; 
for the French, owing to their defeats by the Austrian arms, had with- 
drawn most of their troops from the United Provinces 1 . Nevertheless, 
on July 2 1 st, 1799, Frederick William decided that he would try to 
arrange by negotiation for a French evacuation of that country. It was 
now full late for Great Britain and Russia to prepare adequately for 
the alternative course, a joint landing on the Dutch coast. The prepa- 
rations were, however, hurried on, the most ardent advocate of the 
scheme being the usually cautious Grenville. Indeed, his optimism 
called forth a mild rebuke from Dundas (since held up to scorn as the 
embodiment of ignorant presumption!), who warned him against 
endorsing the hopeful estimate of George III, that the Allies ought to 
occupy the whole of the Netherlands before the advent of winter 2 . 
Dundas promised to do his best to send enough British regiments ; but 
the calls for them in Ireland (now menaced by French raids) and else- 
where were so exacting as to leave only a sprinkling of good troops 
among a number of raw battalions. Admiral Duncan's force, indeed, 
captured 13 Dutch warships at the Helder, thereby completing his 
previous two years' work and putting an end to all fears of invasion 
from that quarter. The land operations, however, miscarried. The 
Batavian troops did not rally to the proclamations of the Prince of 
Orange, as his supporters had led us to expect. First, the late arrival 
of the 17,000 Russian troops, and then their precipitate action in 
the attack at Bergen, marred the whole enterprise, and the Duke of 
York, by the capitulation of October 18th, withdrew the Allied forces. 
This failure, coming soon after the miscarriage of Suvoroff's enter- 
prise, exasperated the Tsar, who in December wrote to Vorontzoff at 
London, that he intended to abandon the Coalition and recall his 
troops to Russia. He would, however, during the winter of 1799- 
1800, leave them in their present quarters, hoping that those in England 
(really in the Channel Islands) might in the spring be used against the 
Biscay coast of France. If he remained in the Coalition, it would be 
on condition of the dismissal of Thugut and the renunciation by Austria 
of her system of unjust and excessive acquisitions. His effort would 
be the last chance of saving Europe 3 . With this characteristic explosion 

1 F.O. Russia, 42. Grenville to Whitworth, May 3rd, 1799. 

2 Dropmore Papers, v. 198, 206-210; Spencer Papers, II. 352; Fortescue, IV. 
Pt II, passim. 

3 Dropmore Papers, vi. 109, 286. 



296 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

the Second Coalition collapsed. It is a tribute to the forceful personality 
of Thugut that the fury of the Tsar, the representations of Minto, and 
the fixed hostility of Arch-duke Charles alike failed during six months 
of bewildering change to shake his authority. Hectoring, yet at times 
insinuating, passionate but adroit, the veteran in his " infernal cavern " 
now wore himself out for the aggrandisement of the Habsburgs in 
Italy; and, as Fortune favoured the Habsburgs in 1799 and frowned 
on their Allies, he could defy all the protests that came from London 
and Petrograd. 

But now there befell an event which placed everything at hazard. 
On October 9th, 1799 (the day after Suvoroff's veterans had struggled 
into Chur) Bonaparte landed in Provence. Nelson and Sidney Smith 
considered that his escape from Egypt was due to the strange in- 
activity of the Turkish and Russian squadrons, which ought to have 
helped in patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean 1 . His arrival in France 
and overthrow of the Directory brought about a bewildering change. 
France, latterly divided and dispirited, rallied to his call for unity; and 
Habsburg haughtiness so far abated as to consent to a settlement of 
the wearisome loan dispute with Great Britain, thus opening a prospect 
of an Anglo-Austrian Alliance 2 . The old suspicions, however, hindered 
joint action far into the year 1800, probably because Francis II and 
Thugut were wavering between alluring arrangements held out by 
Bonaparte and a treaty with Great Britain, offered by the long-suffering 
Grenville. In the month of May, Thugut begged for three days to 
consider some of its provisions ; but the three days lengthened out to 
six weeks. This exasperating delay hindered, inter alia, the despatch 
to the Genoese coast of Sir Ralph Abercrombie's force (finally sent to 
Egypt), which otherwise might have doubled the effectiveness of the 
help tendered by the fleet of Lord Keith to the Austrians engaged in 
besieging Massena in Genoa 3 . As it was, that General's defence was 
so prolonged as materially to assist Bonaparte in the re-conquest of 
Italy. The lightning stroke of Marengo (June 14th) blasted the wide- 
spreading designs of Vienna, and reduced that Court to the position 
of a suppliant. 

Shortly before the arrival at Vienna of news of that disaster, Minto 
signed with Thugut a Subsidy Convention for £2,000,000 (June 20th, 

1 Nicolas, iv. 44, 76, 89, 131, 140, 145, 171. 

2 F.O. Austria. Minto to Grenville, December 10th, 1799. 

3 Dropmore Papers, vi. 163-7, J 74> I 86, 243, 250, 256, 262, 300. Plans of Anglo- 
Russian operations on the Biscay coast also came to naught. See ibid. V. 407-9, 434; 
vi. 53, 60, 85, 89, 146, 151. 



MALTA 297 

1800). As usual, that compact came too late to retrieve the situation, 
and served merely to pay part of the debts heaped up by Habsburg 
ambition. Wickham had signed similar compacts with Bavaria, Wiir- 
temberg and Mainz, in the hope of filling up the void caused by the 
departure of the Russians. But these scrambling efforts merely dissi- 
pated British treasure, and scarcely even delayed the collapse of this 
ill-knit confederacy. In September, 1800, Francis on the advice of the 
Minister Count Lehrbach, accepted an armistice with the French; 
whereupon Thugut indignantly resigned, and a time of confusion en- 
sued, ending with the Treaty of Luneville (February 9th, 1 801), a replica 
of the compact of Campo Formio. The dependence of Naples on the 
Habsburgs was illustrated by her surrender to the French in the Treaty 
of Florence (March 28th, 1801), whereby she ceded to them her part 
of Elba, excluded British vessels, and admitted French troops to her 
south-eastern ports. The chief Land Power now controlled all Italy, 
and seemed once more about to dominate the Mediterranean. 

While the grandiose schemes of Austria on the shores of the Medi- 
terranean made shipwreck, those of Great Britain gained in strength. 
In 1800 the siege of the French garrison in Valetta went steadily for- 
ward. The native Maltese made no impression whatever on its ramparts ; 
but the blockade by sea became increasingly close, until on September 
4th, 1800, the gallant Vaubois, hard pressed by famine, surrendered 
to the British commander, General Pigot. The Russians and Neapo- 
litans did next to nothing in assuring this surrender. Hitherto, the 
British Government had entertained no thought of retaining the island. 
The restoration of the Knights of St John was more than once stated 
by Grenville to be the aim of his policy 1 . Indeed, the touchiness of 
the Tsar on that subject and his insistence that Russian troops must 
form part of the future garrison of Valetta were alike notorious ; and 
both British Ministers and Nelson were puzzled that he had not sent 
his Mediterranean fleet, with troops on board, to assist in the re- 
capture of the island. Nevertheless, in the hope of humouring Paul, 
Grenville maintained that the island should either revert to the Knights 
or be assigned to him. On the other hand, Sir Augustus Paget, who 
had succeeded Hamilton at Naples, insisted on due satisfaction being 
accorded to that Court, which possessed ancient rights of suzerainty 
over the island ; and he protested against Pigot's conduct in not hoisting 
the colours of Naples and the Knights by the side of the Union Jack. 

1 E.g. Grenville to Whitworth, October 5th; November 15th, 1798 ; Grenville to 
Hamilton, October 3rd, 1798. (F.O. Russia, 40, 41.) 



298 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

The Home Government, finally, justified Pigot's conduct. These 
incidents revealed the extraordinary difficulty of finding any durable 
settlement of the Maltese problem ; but there is no sign, before mid- 
October, 1800, that the British Government desired the retention of 
the island. Dundas, Wickham, Windham and other correspondents 
had long sought to bend Grenville to this decision, but without success 1 . 
It is also noteworthy that the Maltese strongly opposed the rule either 
of Russia, Naples or of the Knights, and more than once solicited 
British sovereignty over the island. By October 17th, 1800, Grenville 
had decided on the retention of Malta, on the ground of the com- 
mencement of hostilities against us by Russia 2 . 

The expulsion of the French from Malta facilitated the despatch 
of a British expeditionary force against their army still holding Egypt. 
This measure had long been urged by Dundas, ever preoccupied con- 
cerning the security of India ; and it is worth noting that on September 
7th, 1798, when news reached the East India House in Leadenhall 
Street of the landing of the French in Egypt, the Directors begged 
Pitt to regard India as the French objective, so that the crisis concerned 
the nation, and not merely the Company. Nevertheless, it was ready 
to advance the sum of £500,000 for the defence of India, trusting, 
however, to be reimbursed by Government 3 . The news of the battle 
of the Nile allayed these fears, and, at the close of 1798, the resourceful 
Dundas advised the despatch of a force from India to aid in the ex- 
pulsion of the French from Egypt 4 . Nothing, however, was done for 
the present. Sidney Smith's brilliant success in beating off the French 
attack on Acre, and his generally successful blockade of their force left 
in Egypt, induced him to conclude with Kleber, Bonaparte's successor, 
the Convention of El Arisch (January 24th, 1800), for the peaceable 
evacuation of Egypt, the condition being exacted that they should not 
serve again during the War. The British Government having previously 
instructed Admiral Keith to insist on unconditional surrender, he dis- 
avowed the action of his subordinate; and, though the Government 
finally decided to honour the Convention, the French, after defeating 
a Turkish army at Heliopolis, resolved on holding Egypt. Bonaparte, 
as First Consul, made repeated, but fruitless, efforts to succour the 
French troops, his persistence serving to convince Dundas of the im- 

1 Dropmore Papers, vi. 75, 187, 199, 207, 385, 400, 421, 430, 449, 452. 

2 See other evidence in Hardman, History of Malta (1798-1815), ed. by J. H. 
Rose, Introd. and chaps, xi, xn; Paget Papers, 1. 274. 

3 Pitt MSS. (in Pub. Record Office) 353- 

4 Dropmore Papers, v. 413. 



EGYPT AND THE NORTH 299 

portance of expelling them from that land. The other Ministers saw 
grave difficulties in the way; and undoubtedly, the imminence of 
hostilities in the Baltic, and the presence of French and Spanish 
squadrons in the Mediterranean, rendered an expedition to Egypt 
highly perilous. The British Government has been sharply censured 
for plunging blindly into the Egyptian enterprise 1 . The Addington Ad- 
ministration actually sent a message to recall the expeditionary force 2 . 
Fortunately, the message arrived too late. Thanks to the skill and 
devotion of Admiral Keith and General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, the 
landing was successfully accomplished. After the death of the latter, 
the enterprise was successfully carried through by General Hutchinson, 
who received the surrender of the French force at Cairo on June 
17th, 1 80 1, their last garrison, that at Alexandria, surrendering on 
August 30th. In both cases, conveyance to France on British and 
Turkish vessels was stipulated, no restriction on the use of those troops 
in the War being imposed 3 . Considering the uncertainty as to the 
advent of peace, the removal of 25,000 veterans from Egypt, where 
they were almost harmless, to France, where they might take part in 
one of Bonaparte's invasion schemes, must be pronounced a singularly 
lame ending to a brilliant exploit. 

Meanwhile, Great Britain had confronted a formidable confederacy 
in the North. Its soul was the Tsar Paul. His unaccountable whims, 
unbridled wilfulness and frequent convulsions of rage had long been 
the despair of his advisers, who from the first noted the dominion of 
mere trifles and baubles over him. The Order of the Knights of St John 
shared with a new mistress and an intriguing valet the chief place in 
his fancies. " The rock of Malta " (wrote Whit worth) "is that on which 
all the sufferers split 4 ." As his wrath at Bonaparte's seizure of Malta 
largely accounts for Russia's participation in the Second Coalition, so, 
too, his childish joy at receiving the island as a present from Bonaparte 
when it was certain to surrender to the British goes far to explain Paul's 
swing round from friendship to hostility in the summer of 1800. Bona- 
parte further incited him by tales of English maritime tyranny and hopes 
of the conquest of India. The Swedes and the Danes, noting his change 
of front, plied him with complaints of the rigours of British maritime 
law; and, when his hope of controlling the Mediterranean from Corfu 

1 J. W. Fortescue, iv. Pt II, chaps, xxvm, xxix. 

2 Pari. Debate of December 8th, 1802. 

3 H. Bunbury, The Great War with France, pp. 139-168 ; Diary of Sir J. Moore, 
11. chaps, xviii, xix ; R. T. Wilson, British Expedition to Egypt, pp. 157 et seq. 

1 F.O. Russia, 41 ; Waliszewski, Paul I, chap, xn ; Dropmore Papers, vi. 279-287. 



3 oo THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

and Malta vanished, he resolved to be at least the guardian of the 
Baltic and liberator of the seas. This new mood chimed in perfectly 
with the fixed policy of Bonaparte ; and the two potentates began to 
plan a Northern League which should complete the isolation and ruin 
of the islanders. 

Circumstances favoured the renewal of the first Armed Neutrality 
League of 1780. The Danes, the chief carriers of the North, now again 
had cause of complaint against us, especially concerning the capture 
of their frigate Freya and her convoy in July, 1800. The British 
Government instructed Whitworth (now Lord Whitworth) to proceed 
to Copenhagen, with a view to a friendly settlement of this affair. The 
desire of Grenville for such a settlement appears in his note of July 
30th, 1800, to the Danish Government; and Earl Spencer instructed 
our cruisers to refrain from looking for neutral convoys, so that we 
might tide over that critical period without further disputes 1 . In order, 
however, to back up Whitworth's negotiations, the Admiralty des- 
patched a squadron to the Sound. Thereupon, on August 27th, Paul 
invited Sweden, Prussia and Denmark to reestablish the Armed 
Neutrality of 1780 ; and, two days later, he proclaimed an embargo on 
British ships in his ports, placing the crews under restraint. This 
hostile action led to no countermeasure by Great Britain, probably 
from a hope that a change of the moon would alter his mood. 
The news of a friendly settlement between England and Denmark 
mollified him for a time ; but, early in October, the tidings of the 
surrender of Valetta to the British threw him into a paroxysm of rage ; 
he reimposed the embargo, rigorously imprisoned the crews and 
expelled the British Embassy. Again, Grenville did not retaliate, and 
he counselled a conciliatory demeanour towards the other Baltic 
States, which had manifested no desire to join the new League. The 
only threatening sign was the occupation of Cuxhaven (a possession 
of Hamburg at the mouth of the river Elbe) by Prussian troops. 
Against this act Lord Carysfort, British Ambassador at Berlin, was 
ordered to make a firm protest. 

On December 16th Russia concluded Conventions with Denmark 
and Sweden, defining the claims of the Armed Neutrals. They were 
in substance the following: (1) All vessels may sail on the coasts of 
belligerents. (2) Goods of belligerents, except contraband, are free 

1 F. Piggott and G. W. T. Omond, Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities, 
I. 379-384, 398-439; J. B. Scott, Armed Neutralities of 1780-1800, pp. 478-480; 
Dropmore Papers, VI. 287. 



THE 'ARMED NEUTRALITY' OF 1800 301 

on board neutral shipping. (3) No port is reckoned as blockaded, 
unless the blockade be effective. (4) Neutral ships may be stopped only 
on adequate cause ; and procedure as to prizes shall be judicial and 
uniform. (5) The declaration of a naval officer escorting a convoy, that 
it carries no contraband, shall guard it against search. In addition to 
these general principles, severe penalties are imposed on officers 
allowing contraband on board their ships, and other neutrals are in- 
vited to join the League 1 . This programme, but for the addition of 
the fifth item, follows in general terms that of the First Armed Neu- 
trality. But Catharine then assured Sir James Harris of her friendship 
for Great Britain and twice termed her league la Nullite Armee. The 
present procedure of Paul was avowedly hostile . Further, in view of the 
readiness with which, in 1793, Russia and Prussia had accepted the 
British policy of excluding all neutral commerce from France, those two 
Powers could not consistently complain of the maintenance of milder 
measures at the end of the same War. The fact that in 1793 they were 
Allies, and in 1800 were neutrals, could not justify their change of 
front if the question at issue were solely one of principle. It proved 
the question to be one, not of principle, but of expediency. 

Here, indeed, was the weak part of the schemes of 1780 and 1800. 
Excellent in theory, in practice they were always infringed by States 
that held, or hoped to hold, command of the neighbouring seas. From 
the time of Philip II of Spain to that of Catharine, such had been the 
case. Besides, experience proved that the carriage of goods by neutrals 
to belligerents brought profits so enormous as to tempt to the breach 
of well recognised rules, and that, in the last resort, these could be 
upheld only by the maintenance of the right of search. In practice, 
therefore, the whole problem centred essentially in two questions: 
(1) Is due consideration shown to neutrals in the method of 
search? (2) Is the tribunal which adjudicates on doubtful cases a 
fair one? 

British Ministers were resolved to uphold our claims, the stern 
and unbending nature of Grenville asserting itself the more markedly 
as the national danger increased. The sudden rally of half Europe to 
the side of France could not daunt him. He knew the fallaciousness of 
a mushroom Coalition well enough to expect that she would fare no 
better, and England would fight far better, for this transference of 
numbers. Nelson had always deemed the Allies a burden. The British 
navy and army were now highly efficient; and, while our seamen kept 
1 Piggott and Omond, I. 385 et seq.; Camb. Mod. Hist., ix. pp. 45-9. 



3 02 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

watch over Brest, Cadiz and Toulon, and were reducing the hostile 
Colonies, it would have been alike weak and foolish to allow neutrals 
to convey unhindered the timber, hemp and tar of the Baltic lands 
to our enemies. "If we give way to them" (so wrote Grenville on 
December 2nd), "we may as well disarm our navy at once and deter- 
mine to cede without further contest all that we have taken as a 
counterbalance to the continental acquisitions of France 1 ." The argu- 
ment was sound. Moreover, we had to do with a semi-lunatic whose 
sudden access of Anglophobia was deplored by most of his subjects. 
A sharp blow would probably bring his ' system,' if not himself, to the 
ground. The preparations, therefore, went on apace for a great ex- 
pedition to the Baltic ; and on January 14th, 1801 , an order was issued 
for laying an embargo on all Russian, Danish and Swedish vessels in 
British ports. 

But at this moment, when Pitt and his colleagues were defying half 
the world in arms, they were overtaken by a crisis which revealed the 
frail hold on life even of the strongest Cabinet. That Administration 
had weathered eighteen years of storm. In its infancy it had triumphed 
over a parliamentary majority. The nation beheld with wonder and 
delight a mere youth steadily restoring the finances and prestige of 
an apparently bankrupt and discredited State. His Ministry, fre- 
quently changing in personnel, yet ever informed by his master spirit, 
confronted with success both domestic crises and the convulsions of 
the French Revolution. When dragged reluctantly into war, he and 
his cousin framed two Coalitions to limit the overgrown power of 
France. They saw those Coalitions fall asunder, yet they themselves 
stood firm; and their Government aroused the admiration of friends, 
the malicious despair of enemies, and the wonder of all. 

Nevertheless, as is well known, that Administration fell— a victim 
to one of its own measures and to the excessive conscientiousness of 
the King. Early in February, 1801, Pitt and most of his colleagues 
tendered their resignations, assuring the King of their desire to facilitate, 
so far as possible, the task of their successors. Thereupon George in- 
vited a dull, safe man, the Speaker, Dr Addington, to form a Cabinet 
which, when completed in March, comprised Lord Hawkesbury at 
the Foreign Office, Earl of St Vincent at the Admiralty, Lord Hobart 
at the War Office. The agitation excited by these events produced a 
return of the King's besetting ailment, lunacy, which induced all 
patriots to seek by all possible means to end the internal crisis, in order 

1 Dropmore Papers, VI. 400. 



NELSON IN THE BALTIC: DEATH OF PAUL I 303 

unitedly to confront the foreign crisis 1 . It is significant that the secret 
orders issued to Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, in command of the 
Baltic fleet, were signed on March 15th, 1801, in pursuance of In- 
structions issued the previous day by Henry Dundas. Thus, the policy 
which led to that brief campaign was that of the Pitt Cabinet, though 
its successors reaped the credit of the success achieved both there 
and in Egypt. 

Parker, with Nelson as nominally the second in command, was 
ordered to proceed to the Baltic, guiding his proceedings, while off the 
Danish coast, by the negotiations then pending with that Power. 
Whether peace or war resulted, he was as soon as possible to attack 
Reval and then Cronstadt. If Sweden proved to be hostile, he must 
attack her, or, in the contrary case, protect her from the resentment of 
Paul. Prussia was not named in these Instructions, which further 
evinced a desire to avoid a rupture with Denmark and Sweden. Not 
until late in March did Prussia declare her intention of occupying 
Hanover and closing the mouths of the Elbe, Weser and Ems to 
British commerce. As the Russian and Swedish fleets were still ice- 
bound, the brunt of responsibility fell upon Denmark. With her, efforts 
at conciliation were made by Parker, but without effect. Nelson's 
conduct at this crisis was marked by political insight no less than naval 
daring. Knowing that Russia was the real enemy and the Danes little 
more than her catspaw, he was far more eager to strike at her than at 
them, and he used the first moments of decided triumph at Copen- 
hagen for pacific overtures, couched in the friendliest words. They 
produced a speedy effect, all the more so because the Danish Govern- 
ment had just received news of the assassination of the Tsar Paul. 

In the light of modern evidence, it would be superfluous to refute 
the stupid slander, inserted in the Moniteur, which ascribed that 
tragedy to England. Whitworth, who had long left Russia, was, 
of course, guiltless. The chief conspirators were Pahlen and Platon 
Zuboff, Panin and others having suggested the plot, of which the 
Grand-duke Alexander had but a limited knowledge. But nearly 
everyone welcomed the event. The mot of the occasion was uttered by 
Talleyrand : "Assassination is the usualmethodof dismissal inRussia." 

1 Evidently, this motive prompted the assurance of Pitt to the king, during his 
recovery, that he would not bring forward again in his reign the question of Catholic 
Emancipation. See Dropmore Papers, vi. 443, 445-7, 458, 474 ; G. Rose, Diaries, 1 
305-8; Castlereagh Corresp. iv. 10-12, 32, 39-48; Cornzvallis Corresp. in. 350; Sir 
G. Cornewall Lewis, Administrations of Great Britain, -pp. 151-3 ; ]. H. Rose, Pitt, 
II. chap. xx. 



304 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

Nelson proceeded to Reval, and had a friendly reception, the new Tsar, 
Alexander, expressing a desire for peace with Great Britain 1 . By the 
subsequent compromise of June 17th, 1801 (accepted by the other 
Baltic States) Great Britain and Russia agreed that in wartime the 
neutral flag should exempt from capture all cargoes except contraband 
of war and enemy property; and that blockade, to be legal, must be 
effective; contraband was defined, the right of search limited, and the 
rules of prize-courts were declared subject to the principles of equity 2 . 
Finality in such a matter was not to be expected, and the usual dis- 
putes soon supervened; but, for the time, this Convention went far 
towards reconciling Continental peoples to the British maritime code 
and put an end to Bonaparte's plans of rousing all nations against 
"the tyrant of the seas." 

Indeed, he had no chance now of overcoming Great Britain, who, 
when rid of embarrassing Allies, displayed her full striking power in 
the two brilliantly successful expeditions of the year 1801 . Apart from 
these major operations, her arms had prospered. Saumarez retrieved 
his failure at Algeciras by a signal triumph over a Franco-Spanish 
squadron in the Gut of Gibraltar (July 12th- 13th, 1801); and the 
capture of several West India Isles crowned the naval triumphs of the 
year. Other signs were propitious. The national finances had acquired 
stability since 1798, the temper of the nation was firm, and Ireland 
under the Union was becoming less unsettled. The supremacy of 
France on land being as incontestable as that of Great Britain at sea, 
peace seemed to be the natural outcome of the equipoise reached by 
eight years of warfare. 

But, while some Britons pointed out the hopelessness of reducing 
the power of Bonaparte, others, noting his high-handed interference 
with the Dutch Republic whose independence he was pledged to 
respect, deprecated a surrender that must be the prelude to endless 
humiliations. Such were the objections of Grenville to any accommo- 
dation with Bonaparte. His implacable spirit (the epithet is Corn- 
wallis's) had been shown in the reply to Bonaparte's pacific overture 
of Christmas, 1799 — to the effect that peace would best be assured by 
the restoration of the French royal House. That reply was evidently 
designed primarily to satisfy the two Imperial Courts and the French 
Royalists, with whom we were then concerting extensive plans; but 

1 Czartoryski, Memoirs, 1. chap. xi. ; Waliszewski, Paul J, chaps, xv, xvi ; General 
Lowenstern, Memoirs, 1. p. 75; Nicolas, iv. 370-9. 

2 Scott, pp. 595-606. For Grenville's criticisms see Dropmore Papers, vil. 30-3. 



PRELIMINARY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 305 

it, undoubtedly, tended to rally all Frenchmen around the First Consul. 
Pitt, at that time, probably shared Grenville's animosity; for passion 
pervaded his speech of February 3rd, 1800, in which he recounted the 
aggressions and perfidies of Bonaparte. The great work of reconstruc- 
tion accomplished by the First Consul had now altered the whole 
situation; and Pitt did not oppose the proposals for peace, which took 
form in September, 1801. His conduct was not consistent; for the 
Netherlands, which, alike in 1793, 1796 and 1797, he had declared to 
be essential to Britain's security, were now virtually at the disposal of 
France. But his change of front was probably due to war- weariness 
or hopelessness. He was in honour bound to support the Addington 
Ministry ; yet he knew it to be unequal to the struggle with Bonaparte. 
Better, then, to end the War while we could do so without discredit. 
Such seem to have been his views. They clashed with those of Gren- 
ville ; and the two kinsmen were destined never again to act together. 

The Addington Ministry lent a friendly ear to pacific overtures 
from Paris. They were begun, in March, 1801 , by Otto, deputed to this 
country for the exchange of prisoners ; and they continued in London 
intermittently until the early autumn . Then , negotiations were resumed 
in earnest. On September 17th, Bonaparte issued Instructions to hurry 
them on, because he conjectured that Menou and the French garrison 
could not hold out at Alexandria beyond September 23rd (in point of 
fact, they had surrendered on August 30th), and, therefore, he desired 
to finish with England before the arrival of those tidings. The Addington 
Cabinet, weak in procedure, unlucky in regard to news, and eager for 
the French evacuation of Egypt, was conceding point after point, in 
order to secure this illusory advantage. It held out for the retention 
of that mainly British island, Tobago; but Bonaparte opposed a stiff 
refusal to this and other contentions, and ordered Otto to present the 
alternative of signature before October 2nd or war 1 . Hawkesbury 
signed, on October 1st, the very day before the arrival of news of the 
French surrender at Alexandria and the forthcoming evacuation of 
Egypt. In no important British Treaty of modern times have haste 
and secrecy played so prominent a part; and there is little definite 
evidence as to the motives which led to so singular a compact. It may 
be thus summarised. All the British conquests overseas were restored 
to France, Spain and the United Provinces, except Trinidad (Spanish) 
and the Dutch settlements in Ceylon. The restitution of the Cape to 
the Dutch was conditional on its being opened to British and French 
1 Nap. Corresp. vn. 255. 

w.&g.i. 20 



3 o6 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

commerce. Malta was restored to the Knights of St John, subject to 
various conditions. The French agreed to evacuate the kingdom of 
Naples and the Roman States, also Egypt, which reverted to Turkey, 
the British retiring from Elba. The integrity of the Turkish and Por- 
tuguese dominions was reaffirmed. The Signatories further recognised 
the independence of the Republic of the Seven Islands (the "Ionian 
Islands"), and reasserted the former rules as to the Newfoundland 
fisheries, leaving room, however, for new arrangements by mutual 
agreement. 

The complacency of Hawkesbury appears in the fact that he at 
once sent news of this compact to Grenville, who received it with the 
utmost concern and indignation. "At no period of the greatest diffi- 
culty" (so he wrote to Dundas), ''did I ever entertain an idea of 
agreeing to concessions that can be named with these." And he declared 
that he could not remain silent respecting sacrifices which would bring 
only a short interval of repose. Thomas Grenville thought the main- 
tenance of a strong navy to be far more important than the details of 
the compact. Pitt, also, regarded peace as very precarious ; but, while 
regretting the surrender of the Cape and the vagueness of the Maltese 
settlement, he pronounced the Treaty honourable 1 . This verdict he 
amplified during the debate of November 3rd. Grenville and several 
other Pittites having bitterly attacked the Peace, the ex-Prime- 
Minister declared that the retrocessions of the Cape and Malta were 
matter for regret ; but certain authorities held them to be of secondary 
value (a statement backed by the vigorous assertions of Nelson in the 
Upper House), and he believed Ceylon to be far more important than 
the Cape for the defence of India. As to the Mediterranean, that was 
a sphere of secondary import, when compared with the East and West 
Indies. In these last, we had secured Trinidad, more valuable for its 
wealth and its strategic position than Martinique, Guadaloupe or 
St Lucia. With respect to our former Allies, Naples, Sardinia and 
Portugal had made peace with the enemy, and we were not bound to 
do more for them; also, the claims of the House of Orange were still 
under consideration. As regards the French Royal House, we had never 
insisted on its restoration, but merely declared such a settlement to be 
the best safeguard for peace and security. In conclusion, he predicted 
that, if Bonaparte wished to establish a military despotism, this nation 
had proved itself so redoubtable that it would not be the first object of 
his attack. If the wishes of France corresponded to our own, we might 

1 Dropmore Papers, VII. 47-50. 



THE TREATY OF AMIENS 307 

hope for a long term of peace. The motion in favour of the Treaty, 
in spite of sharp attacks, was carried without a division. Pitt's pro- 
nouncement, while unsatisfactory even on the score of consistency, 
evinced small strategic insight and a lamentable lack of political fore- 
sight. At nearly every point, Grenville's sagacious pessimism was 
destined to be justified, at the expense of Pitt's kindly optimism. 
Public opinion was sharply divided as to the terms of peace. The Times, 
Sun, Herald and True Briton defended them, while sharp criticisms 
came from the Morning Post, Morning Chronicle, Courier, Star, 
St James's Chronicle, and, most of all, from Cobbett's Porcupine. 
Canning declared that the unreflecting multitude welcomed peace, 
while, after conversation with "many persons, merchants, planters 
and gentlemen," he found a universal condemnation of its conditions 1 . 
But worse was to follow. The Addington Cabinet now added to 
its mistakes by sending to Amiens, for the redaction of the definitive 
Treaty, the Marquis Cornwallis, who had lately described himself to 
a friend as out-of-sorts, low-spirited, and tired of everything 2 . Though 
well supported by Merry, this weary negotiator utterly failed to 
hold his own against Joseph Bonaparte and Talleyrand ; and the serious 
rebuffs sustained at Amiens were with reason ascribed to the " drowsi- 
ness" and utter want of experience of Cornwallis 3 . It is impossible 
within our limits even to refer to the negotiations. After numerous 
surrenders by Cornwallis, the terms of the Treaty of Amiens (March 
25th, 1802) repeated those of the Preliminaries of London, except that 

(1) Portugal now surrendered part of her Guiana territory to France ; 

(2) the Maltese compromise was defined in Article X, consisting of 
13 clauses, the purport of which will appear later; (3) the Cape was 
ceded to the Dutch " in full sovereignty" ; (4) the House of Orange was 
promised an indemnity, not at the expense of the Dutch Republic. It 
soon transpired that the indemnity would be found in the Germanic 
body, then in a state of flux owing to the Secularisations. 

The omissions from the Treaty were also remarkable. It did not 
require that Bonaparte should evacuate Dutch territory or recognise 
the independence either of that Republic or of the Helvetic and 
Ligurian (Genoese) Republics. In his Treaty of Luneville with 
Austria, he had undertaken to respect their independence ; but events 
were to prove that the Addington Government erred in not insisting 

1 The Windham Papers, II. 174. 

2 Cornwallis Corresp. m. 382. 

3 Malmesbury, Diaries, iv. 71, 261 ; Eng. Hist. Rev. April, 1900. 



3 o8 THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 

on a similar contract. Neither did the Treaty of Amiens stipulate the 
renewal of a treaty of commerce with France, Addington declaring on 
May 3rd that he opposed such a measure. Therefore British merchants 
soon saw their products virtually shut out not only from France, but 
from the French Colonies which Great Britain now restored. The 
Treaty, also, effected little for the House of Orange, and nothing for 
that of Savoy, both of which, in 1793, we had undertaken to uphold. 
Above all, in face of the well-marked trend of Bonaparte's oriental 
policy, the Peace of Amiens surrendered the keys of India, viz., the 
Cape and Malta, to weak authorities over whom he could readily 
acquire complete control. It reestablished at Valetta the Order of 
the Knights of St John (much enfeebled by recent events), required 
the speedy withdrawal of the British garrison and the temporary 
admission of 2000 Neapolitan troops, and placed the island under 
the guarantee of the Great Powers. Obviously, these arrangements 
were precarious ; and the events of the next few months proved that, 
while extending his power in Europe, Bonaparte was resolved to make 
the Mediterranean a French lake and to recommence the plans which 
had been shorn asunder by the genius of Nelson. 



CHAPTER III 

THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 
i 802-1 812 

I 

A TREATY of peace has small chance of surviving, unless it corres- 
ponds to the vital needs of the signatories. If it cramps the 
expansive energies of great nations, it will prove to be but an uneasy 
truce. In these fundamentals, as also in lesser details, the Peace of 
Amiens was radically defective. It concluded a War in which Great 
Britain and France parted on even terms. The British, triumphant at 
sea, had taken all the Colonies of France, besides expelling her troops 
from Egypt. The French had conquered the Belgic Provinces and 
large parts of Germany and Italy, but had failed to acquire any British 
territory. Their primacy in western and southern Europe was more 
than balanced by the world-supremacy achieved by the British Navy. 
Their commerce and industries had been held as in a vice, while, 
thanks to the Industrial Revolution and Sea Power, those of the United 
Kingdom continued steadily to advance. Strategically, the combatants 
had come to a stalemate. Economically, the advantage lay with the 
Island Power. 

Nevertheless, the Addington Administration had concluded the 
Peace " in such an unskilful, hasty and conceding way " (the words are 
those of Pitt 1 ), as to lead to the restitution of all the French Colonies, 
leave Bonaparte almost a free hand in Continental affairs, and fetter 
British industries and commerce. The Treaty of Amiens repeated and 
even exaggerated the characteristic defects of that diplomatic dead- 
lock, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748; for, while sacrificing the 
conquests achieved by the British Navy overseas, it failed to assure the 
Balance of Power on the Continent. Consequently, the military and 
political energies of France, now directed by the untiring brain of 
Bonaparte, were to have free play on the weak and crumbling States 
on her borders ; whereas the industrial energies of the British people, 
far from gaining the full advantages expected from a peace, in certain 
quarters experienced a check; for, owing to the strange dislike of 

1 Malmesbury, Diaries, IV. 76 



310 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

commercial treaties entertained by Addington and Hawkesbury, no 
condition as to the renewal of commercial relations was stipulated at 
Amiens. Accordingly, Bonaparte was free to exclude British products, 
not only from France and the States subject to her, but also from the 
French Colonies, which Great Britain restored at the Peace. On June 
30th, 1802, he instructed General Andreossi, about to proceed to 
London as his Ambassador, that he would accord "if not a Treaty of 
Commerce, at least a series of private arrangements and compensa- 
tions"; and to this end he sent over commercial agents, who were to 
visit the chief British centres. But the Addington Government, 
regarding them with suspicion, refused to let them proceed in their 
official capacity, because there was no Treaty of Commerce between 
the two nations; while Bonaparte declared their investigations a 
necessary preliminary to any such compact. Accordingly, a deadlock 
ensued on this important question. 

Equally serious was the failure of Addington and his colleagues to 
require in the Treaty the recognition by Bonaparte of the indepen- 
dence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics. 
They regarded those questions as settled by Article 13 of the recent 
Austro-French Treaty of Luneville, which stipulated the independence 
of those States. He, on the contrary, maintained that those stipula- 
tions concerned France and Austria, not Great Britain; and he 
instructed Andreossi that his "first care" must be "to prevent on 
every occasion any intervention of the British Government in Con- 
tinental affairs." In fact, before the signature of the Treaty of Amiens, 
he had intervened in the affairs of the Batavian and Cisalpine States, 
retaining his troops in the former, securing his nomination as 
President of the latter (now entitled the Italian Republic), and largely 
deciding the character of their Constitutions. The weakness of 
Addington, in not formally protesting against these actions before 
the signature of the Peace, deprived him of the technical right of 
protest against further proceedings consequent upon them. But the 
affairs of nations are not decided by technicalities ; and Bonaparte's 
claim to exclude Great Britain from all participation in Continental 
affairs was certain, if persisted in, to lead to war; for such a claim, 
when emphasised by the continuance of French troops in Dutch 
territory, implied French control of the ports facing our eastern coast 
and of the Cape of Good Hope. The Preliminaries of London had 
stipulated that Cape Town should become a free port belonging to the 
independent Batavian Republic ; but by the Treaty of Amiens it was 



APPARENT COMPLETENESS OF NAPOLEON'S SUCCESS 311 

ceded to the Dutch "in full sovereignty"; and they were, therefore, 
free to dispose of it as they thought fit. Great concern was expressed 
on this head by Windham, Grenville and others in the debates of 
May 3rd-i3th, 1802; and the bland optimism of Addington and 
Hawkesbury failed to restore confidence. Much concern was also 
felt at the cession by Spain of the vast territory of Louisiana to 
France. 

Passivity or timidity also characterised the policy of the Continental 
monarchies ; and Napoleon (his Christian name was officially used after 
the assumption of the Consulate for Life in August, 1802) pushed on 
his designs without hindrance. Supreme in the Ligurian and Italian 
Republics, he assured his control over that Peninsula by annexing 
Piedmont, Parma and Elba, in September and October respectively. 
Against these encroachments the British, Austrian and Neapolitan 
Governments alike failed to proffer any effective protests. The Tsar 
Alexander, preoccupied in domestic affairs and annoyed at the Maltese 
settlement effected at Amiens, treated Great Britain with marked cold- 
ness; and Napoleon, for a time, successfully flattered his vanity by 
arranging with him many of the details respecting the Secularisations 
of the German Ecclesiastical States. Francis II, cowed by the defeats 
of 1793-1800, acquiesced in the tame counsels of dull but acquisitive 
bureaucrats of his own stamp. At Berlin, Frederick William III fol- 
lowed suit. "The King's chief happiness " (wrote the British Charge 
d'affaires, Sir George Jackson), " consists in the absence of all trouble. 
...He is guided by his fears and distrusts his own powers." Further- 
more, in view of the Francophil tendencies of President Jefferson, the 
precarious mental condition of George III, and the subservience of 
Charles IV of Spain to his consort's paramour, the world seemed to 
lie prostrate at the feet of Napoleon. 

The first sign of a revival of spirit occurred early in October, 1802, 
when Napoleon intervened in the civil strifes of the Swiss, marched 
a French column into their land and bade them send delegates to Paris 
to accept his mediation. On this question, the Addington Cabinet 
acted with a show of firmness. On October 9th, Hawkesbury drew up 
a note expressing regret at this infraction of the Treaty of Luneville, 
and a hope that France would not "further attempt to control that 
independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights." He 
also instructed Paget (now at Vienna) to enquire whether that Court 
would aid the Swiss to resist ; and he despatched an agent, Moore, to 
concert plans with the leaders of the Federals. Both overtures failed. 



3 i2 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

Vienna, expectant of further favours from Paris, declined to move on 
behalf of Helvetic Independence ; the Tsar was equally inert ; and the 
Swiss Federals, overawed by a large French force, acceded to the 
demands of Napoleon 1 . 

That these events caused a marked change in Anglo-French rela- 
tions, appears in the difference of tone between the Instructions of 
September ioth and those of November 14th, issued to Lord Whit- 
worth when proceeding as Ambassador to Paris. The former emphasise 
"our desire to give proof on all occasions of our sincere disposition 
to cultivate a good understanding between the two countries." The 
latter authorise Whitworth to "state most distinctly His Majesty's 
determination never to forego his right of interfering in the affairs of 
the Continent on every occasion in which the interests of his own 
dominions or those of Europe in general appear to him to require it." 
Further, Hawkesbury pointed out that, as Talleyrand had recognised 
the reasonableness of Great Britain acquiring compensations for the 
recent extensions of French territory and influence, she might now 
justly claim the retention of certain of her conquests. In particular, 
Whitworth was charged to protest against the continued occupation 
of Dutch territory by French troops, seeing that we had restored 
important Colonies to that Republic, on consideration of its remaining 
entirely independent. He was to keep silence respecting the aims of 
British policy, especially respecting Malta ; for, though we should be 
justified in holding that island as some counterpoise to the immense 
increase of French power, no decision had yet been reached on that 
subject. Instructions of this character proved that the Peace of Amiens 
was hanging by a thread. In part, the dispute resembled that which 
had brought the two nations to war ten years before : had the French 
the right to interfere with the independence of the Dutch Republic? 
On the present occasion, however, the menace to this independence 
was far more serious than in 1792-3. Then, Pitt and Grenville had 
resisted the French attempt to abrogate the treaty rights of the Dutch 
to control the Scheldt estuary. Now Addington and Hawkesbury 
were protesting against Napoleon's endeavour to control by armed 
force the policy of that people. 

Moreover, the extension of his power over Italy, his keen interest 
in the recovery of Egypt and the partition of the Turkish empire 
brought Mediterranean questions to a prominence undreamt of in 
1793, and made Malta a storm-centre no less threatening than that of 

1 Cobbett's Ann. Reg. (1803), pp. 1018-20; Dropmore Papers, vn. 128. 



PROGRESS OF NAPOLEONIC POLICY 313 

the Dutch Netherlands. Malta was an outpost of Egypt, as Egypt was 
of India. If the island were held only by the moribund Order of the 
Knights of St John, then the overland route to India would speedily 
pass into the hands of Napoleon. If he continued to control the Dutch 
Republic, then the Cape of Good Hope, and with it the sea route to 
the East Indies, would be at his disposal. Thus, the increase of French 
power in the Netherlands and on the shores of the Mediterranean in 
time of nominal peace was bringing within his grasp the two alter- 
native schemes for the ruin of Great Britain which the events of 1798 
seemed to have wrecked, viz. an invasion from the coast whence it 
can best be attempted, and a resumption of the oriental adventures 
cut short by the exploit of Nelson. 

By the autumn of 1802, so clear were the danger signals that 
Addington assumed a firm tone ; but, by this time, so accustomed was 
Napoleon to submission or complaisance that he abated not one of his 
demands. The protests of the Dutch Ambassador against the retention 
of French troops in his country were disregarded. Delegates from the 
Swiss Cantons were summoned to Paris to receive eventually at the 
hands of Napoleon the Act of Mediation, sagaciously designed by him, 
as Mediator, for healing their schisms and assuring his control. Spain 
was sinking under his control. The Turks were alarmed by French 
intrigues in Corfu, the Morea and the Levant, which portended a 
partition of their empire. Early in the year 1802, Lord Elgin, our 
Ambassador at Constantinople, wrote as follows: "The Porte con- 
siders her interests and tranquillity secure while England possesses 
Malta, but not so after our abandoning it." Whitworth, also, reported, 
in December, 1802, that Egypt was the great object of Napoleon's 
ambition and that he might acquire it by coercing or bargaining with 
the Turks 1 . 

So threatening was the outlook that public opinion in these 
Islands began to harden. Protests against the overbearing conduct of 
Napoleon multiplied in the Press and called forth angry retorts in the 
Moniteur, often from the First Consul himself. He, also, complained 
of the deference shown to the Comte d'Artois at Holyrood and the 
harbouring of French Emigres. Nevertheless, Ministers, while refusing 
to fetter the Press or expel refugees, endeavoured to humour the First 
Consul. Even after the Swiss embroglio, Otto, the French agent at 
London, could write as follows : 

1 F.O. Turkey, 35. Elgin to Hawkesbury, January 5th, 1802; Paget Papers, n. 
61, 72; O. Browning, England and Napoleon, pp. 6-10, 16, 25-9. 



3 i4 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

I have received the most peaceful assurances from the Cabinet, who mark 
with the greatest satisfaction anything which is likely to strengthen the 
control of the First Consul in home affairs, and would even wish to see his 
family secure the hereditary tenure of his office, a wish that is very generally 
felt in this country ; but anything that tends to the external aggrandisement 
of this power must necessarily claim the attention of the British Minister 1 . 

Andreossi, who arrived early in November, had a friendly reception 
from the King and the Prince of Wales, who manifested a keen desire 
for peace, even while expressing some apprehensions, because Bona- 
parte was "still greater as a politician than as a warrior." Andreossi 
reported that the Emigres in England were losing all hope. Another 
reassuring fact was that, on November 20th, the British Government 
despatched orders to the Cape of Good Hope for the withdrawal of 
British troops. 

It is clear, then, that the Court and Cabinet were not opposed to 
Napoleon on personal grounds, and during some time hoped for the 
resumption of friendly relations with him. The King's Speech, read 
on November 23rd to the newly-elected Parliament, dwelt on the 
national prosperity (increased by a bounteous harvest), and the need 
of watchfulness in European affairs and of measures to guarantee our 
security. Thereupon, Fox, while deploring the immense aggrandise- 
ment of French power, deprecated any increase of armaments ; but he, 
Wilberforce, Whitbread and Burdett stood alone in offering deter- 
mined opposition to an increase of the army. In the ensuing debates, 
Lord Hobart, Secretary at War, stated that it had been reduced from 
250,000 men at the end of hostilities to 127,000, whereas that of France 
numbered 427,000 men, and that, in face of her hostile proceedings, 
it was desirable to raise our total to 200,000 exclusive of the forces in 
India. The discussion was rendered remarkable by a speech of Sheridan, 
in which he declaimed vehemently against Bonaparte's encroachments, 
as aimed at the enslavement of Europe and the destruction of British 
commerce. Earl Temple and Windham complained of the apathy of 
Ministers and their belated and clumsy intervention on behalf of the 
Swiss. Grenville, also, adverted to the increase of the French and 
Dutch navies and to our exclusion from every port in the Mediterranean 
except Valetta, which therefore it was an urgent necessity for us to 
retain. In reply, Addington admitted the gravity of the situation, but 
stated that, as France, Spain and Holland together could muster only 
131 sail of the line, while we possessed 196, there was no serious danger 

1 Coquelle, Napoleon and England (Eng. edit. p. 5) ; Lettres inedites de Talleyrand, 
p. 24. 



NAPOLEON'S ORIENTAL SCHEMES 315 

of invasion. Hawkesbury advised the country to " try the experiment 
of continuing the Peace," because the maintenance even of the pro- 
posed large forces would cost £25,000,000 a year less than war. In 
the main, the debates showed the rising indignation of the people at 
the overbearing conduct of Napoleon— a feeling that pervades the 
Sonnets of Wordsworth of the autumn of 1802. It is, indeed, un- 
questionable that Napoleon's interference in Swiss affairs, now as in 
1798, contributed, even more than issues of greatest practical import, 
such as the subjugation of the Dutch, to inflame popular resentment 1 . 
It found expression in newspaper articles couched in terms so dis- 
respectful as to elicit formal and bitter complaints. Despite the reply, 
that the Press of this country was free, and that its alleged insults were 
no more objectionable than those against England which appeared in 
Napoleon'sownofficialMora'tewr, he raised the affair to the level of high 
policy, until, as will duly appear, the Addington Ministry, in its desire 
of placating him, prosecuted one of the most conspicuous offenders. 
The year 1803 opened gloomily. As Windham phrased it, France 
was roaming at will all over the world, and the Addington Cabinet 
said in effect : " Go where you please, so that you keep your hands off 
us." Our troops were about to evacuate Egypt and the Cape, and 
arrangements were proceeding for their withdrawal from Malta, when 
an alarming incident occurred. On January 30th, the Moniteur pub- 
lished a menacing Report of Colonel Sebastiani on his mission to the 
East. Though ostensibly he was merely one of Napoleon's Commercial 
Commissioners, his Report contained next to nothing about commerce 
and much that portended a resumption of hostilities. It set forth the 
utter weakness of Turkey, her deadly feud with the Mamelukes, her 
discord with General Stuart, commanding the British force still in 
Egypt, the conclusion being that 6000 French would easily reconquer 
that land. The official publication of so warlike a document caused a 
great sensation. It was probably due to Napoleon's desire of glozing 
over the lamentable failure of his attempt to reconquer Hayti. The 
ravages wrought by fever in that expeditionary force rendered further 
efforts in the West Indies impossible; and, in face of the determined 
opposition of the United States to the French acquisition of Louisiana, 
he now determined to sell that vast domain to them (as he did soon 
after) and to concentrate on Oriental schemes that were nearer his 
heart. The Turco-Mameluke feuds provided an opportunity. He now 
turned the energies of France Eastwards by publishing Sebastiani's 
Report. That it would provoke Great Britain, he must have surmised. 

1 Life of Sir S. Rotnilly, i. 425. 



316 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

All his proceedings were governed by calculation; and one of his 
Councillors deemed this provocation intentional 1 . 

Another of his actions serves to strengthen this inference. In the 
same month, January, 1803, he issued secret instructions to General 
Decaen, now appointed Governor of the French East India Colonies, 
to proceed with a small expeditionary force to Pondicherry, there care- 
fully to investigate Indian affairs and prepare for the future, which (so 
he informed him) might be such as to invest his name with lasting 
renown. He, also, referred to the renewal of hostilities with England 
as probable in September, 1804; and, since they were certain to in- 
volve the Dutch in hostilities with her, he instructed Decaen in that 
case to be ready to occupy the Cape or any other desirable^om* d'appui. 
The despatch of Decaen's expedition in March, 1803, caused some 
apprehension at London, which was finally to be justified by his 
proceedings at the Cape. 

For the present, the anxiety of Ministers centred chiefly on French 
schemes that threatened the security of the overland route to India. 
From the Mediterranean came news as to movements of French troops 
to its coasts, especially to Corsica; and their agents were reported to 
be very active in the Republic of the Ionian Isles and on the coasts of 
Albania and the Morea. Similar information reached Petrograd. There, 
the sympathies of the Tsar had been Francophil. Annoyed at the 
terms of Article X of the Treaty of Amiens respecting Malta, he with- 
held his guarantee of those arrangements, and in this was followed by 
Prussia. But the French moves against Turkey caused him grave 
concern. On January 7th, 1803, Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, 
British Ambassador at Petrograd, reported that, according to Russian 
official advices from Paris, Napoleon was about to notify to Russia 
his resolve to acquire the Morea. Prince Czartoryski, Foreign Minister, 
when confirming that information, added that the Emperor Alexander 
disapproved these projects of partition; and on January 20th he told 
Warren that the Emperor Alexander "wished the English to keep 
Malta." On February 27th, he stated that Napoleon "wished to oblige 
Great Britain to declare war against France." On March 25th, Warren 
reported that the Russian Government "would even be sorry that the 
British troops evacuated the island," and favoured the issue of a 
decisive declaration by us such as would "finish the affair 2 ." 

Apprehensions concerning the Levant were not confined to 

1 Pelet, Opinions de Napoleon, ch. III. 

2 F.O. Russia, 174. See, too, Hardman, History of Malta (chs. xvn, xxi, xxn); 
O. Browning, E?igland and Napoleon, pp. 70 et seq. ; Mollien, Memoirs, 1. 334. 



NAPOLEON AND SEBASTIANI'S REPORT 317 

Ministerial circles in London. In a conversation which Pitt had with 
George Rose, he at once entered on the topic of Sebastiani's Report, 
deeming its publication an announcement of the actual designs of 
France on Egypt. The two friends agreed that her acquisition of Egypt 
would seriously imperil British India; also, that the intrigues of 
Sebastiani in the Ionian Islands, with a view to their reoccupation by 
France, warranted a thorough explanation 1 . So general were these 
fears that the Addington Administration assumed a firm attitude. On 
February 9th, Hawkesbury charged Whitworth not to enter into any 
discussion respecting Malta, until the French Government consented 
either to restore completely the status quo at the time of the Peace of 
Amiens, or to admit the reasonableness of our receiving some suitable 
compensation for the recent extensive additions to French territory. 
In reply to this request no satisfactory assurance was forthcoming. 
Talleyrand blandly reasserted that Sebastiani's mission was "strictly 
commercial," and that Napoleon sincerely desired peace, which more- 
over was imperiously dictated to him by the penury of his finances. 
Shortly afterwards, on February 18th, the First Consul sent for Whit- 
worth and treated him, not to soothing falsehoods, but to pugnacious 
half-truths, complaining that all the provocations came from London, 
that we had broken the Treaty by not evacuating Egypt and Malta, that 
we harboured assassins, that every wind which blew from England 
bore nothing but hatred. He declared that he could easily reconquer 
Egypt, but would not do so, lest he should seem the aggressor, besides 
which that land must sooner or later fall to France. Moreover, what 
had he to gain by a war with England ? Why should not the two nations 
come to an understanding and so govern the world? But nothing (he 
proceeded) would overcome the hatred of the British Government; 
and the issue now was — would we fulfil the terms of the Treaty of 
Amiens or have war? Whitworth, thereupon, temperately set forth the 
material difference between the present state of things and that when 
peace was concluded. Napoleon cut him short : " I suppose you mean 
Piedmont and Switzerland : ce sont des...,vous n'avez pas le droit d'en 
parler a cette heure." He added that Sebastiani's mission was necessi- 
tated on military grounds by our infraction of the Treaty of Amiens ; 
but, soon afterwards, he authorised Talleyrand to state that he was 
contemplating a guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish empire, 
which would remove our fears respecting Egypt. 

1 G. Rose, Diaries, n, 18-20; Papers on the Discussions with France (1802-3), 
pp. 377-86. 



318 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

Whitworth believed that this softening of tone was due to Russia's 
remonstrances against Napoleon's encroachments and his refusal to 
grant any suitable indemnity to the dispossessed King of Sardinia. 
But it seems probable that the naval unpreparedness of France, and 
the desire of Napoleon to assure the safe return of his unfortunate 
expeditionary force from Hayti, explain his subsequent manoeuvres, 
which the Addington Cabinet henceforth ascribed to a resolve to gain 
time. Hawkesbury now stiffened his demands. He pointed out that 
Russia and Prussia had not guaranteed the Maltese settlement, as was 
required by the Treaty; also, that the confiscation of the Spanish 
Priories of the Order of St John, and other pecuniary losses, must 
incapacitate the Order for the defence of the vast fortifications of 
Valetta and tempt Napoleon to renew his facile exploit of June, 1798. 
True, Article X, relating to Malta, stipulated the presence of 2000 
Neapolitan troops there for a year. But of what avail was a temporary 
occupation by the troops of a Power which itself existed on sufferance? 
And what chance of survival was there for the truncated Order, now 
that Malta, emerging from happy obscurity, had become the crux of 
the Eastern Question? Indeed, the Maltese compromise of 1802 was 
workable only in an era of sincere goodwill, and Napoleon had made 
peace more dangerous than open war. 

Apprehensions were also aroused by the official View of the State 
of the Republic, issued at Paris on February 21st, 1803. After dilating 
on the prosperity of France, and referring to the continued British 
occupation of Egypt and Malta, the Report stated that two parties, 
one of them pacific, the other warlike, struggled for mastery in England. 
Therefore, by a deplorable necessity, France must possess an army 
of half a million men, " ready to undertake its defence and avenge its 
injuries. ...Whatever success intrigues may experience in London, no 
other people will be involved in new combinations. The Government 
asserts with conscious pride that England alone cannot maintain a 
struggle against France." Even so, the attitude of the British Govern- 
ment was cautious. On February 28th, Hawkesbury instructed Whit- 
worth to point out that Egypt had been evacuated, and all the other 
conditions of the Amiens Treaty had been fulfilled, except Article X; 
and Malta had not been evacuated, because of the refusal of Russia and 
Prussia to act as guarantors, the weakening of the Order of St John, and 
the threatening moves of France in the East. A guarantee of the 
integrity of the Turkish empire by France would, indeed, banish our 
fears regarding Egypt ; but we would not withdraw from Malta until she 



PROVOCATION AND FORBEARANCE 319 

offered some "substantial security." This was an invitation to a com- 
promise, and, on February 28th, Andreossi assured Talleyrand that 
the British Ministers were peaceably inclined. This appeared in their 
prosecution at this time of a French Emigre, Peltier, who in a journal, 
L'Ambigu, had declaimed against the First Consul. Despite a brilliant 
defence by Sir James Mackintosh, the accused was condemned, but, 
when a rupture with France became imminent, punishment was de- 
ferred, and he was finally released. The French also released a few 
British ships that had been unjustly seized 1 . 

These slight relaxations of tension were nullified by the sight of 
the armaments proceeding in French and Dutch ports. Though 
designed, it was said, for Colonial expeditions, they were deemed part 
of the French programme announced on February 21st. Accordingly, 
on March 9th, a royal message was read to Parliament, inviting it to 
adopt further measures for the national defence, and an increase of 
10,000 seamen was unanimously voted. By way of retort, the First 
Consul issued a Memorandum justifying the retention of French 
troops in Holland and Switzerland and the formation of armed camps 
near Calais. He also, on March 13th, subjected Whitworth to a violent 
tirade before the diplomatic circle at the Tuileries. The Ambassador 
kept his temper, and then privately intimated his resolve to cease 
attending receptions if he received such treatment. Napoleon seems 
afterwards to have regretted his outburst ; for the Russian Ambassador, 
Markoff, resented it and forwarded to the Tsar unfavourable com- 
ments on the incident. The support of Russia being highly desirable, 
both disputants sought to impress the Tsar with the justice of their 
cause. Of late, Alexander had repelled French offers for a partition 
of Turkey and inclined towards a neutrality not unfavourable to us. 
Malmesbury, however, shrewdly surmised that now, as in the days 
of Catharine, Russia would cajole all the Powers, but act with none 
of them. Addington, more optimistic, cherished some hopes from that 
quarter. The chief reason, however, of his forbearance towards France 
was (as he privately stated to Malmesbury) his resolve to wait "till 
she had heaped wrong upon wrong, and made her arrogant designs 
so notorious, and her views of unceasing aggrandisement so demon- 
strable, as to leave no doubt on the public mind, nor a possibility of 
mistake on the part of the most uninformed pacific men 2 ." That 

1 Cobbett, Pol. Register (1802), pp. 276, 289, 315, 374,798; Coquelle (chs. IV, v); 
Dropmore Papers, vii. 140. 

2 Malmesbury, iv. 210, 246, 247. 



3 20 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

Addington's patience and Napoleon's petulance were disgusting the 
nation with the peace became abundantly evident. Canning, an 
enthusiastic admirer of Pitt and a persistent belittler of Addington, 
pointed the contrast between them in his celebrated song : 

And oh ! if again the rude whirlwind should rise, 
The dawning of peace should fresh darkness deform, 
The regrets of the good and the fears of the wise 
Shall turn to the Pilot that weathered the storm. 

Much, however, could be urged in favour of Addington's waiting 
policy. Peace having been concluded, its author had to ensure for 
it a fair trial. Moreover, so impetuously self-willed an opponent as 
Napoleon was likely to put himself in the wrong. Addington, Alex- 
ander I, Fox, Metternich, Hardenberg, Castlereagh and Talleyrand 
were, in succession, to find out the advantage of giving him free rein 
at a crisis; or, as the last named phrased it: 77 n'y a jamais eu de con- 
spirateur danger eux contre lid que lui-meme 1 . The sole hope for the 
preservation of peace in the spring of 1803 was that he should sub- 
stitute reason for menace, and, admitting that his annexations and other 
proceedings had naturally alarmed Great Britain, should offer either 
to forego one or more of them or to admit the justice of her claim to 
compensation, conceded in the negotiations at Amiens. 

This was the gist of Hawkesbury's note of April 3rd to Andreossi, 
which pointed out that France had hitherto refused to give the 
assurances and explanations we had a right to expect; but that a 
settlement was desired on the following bases : Great Britain to retain 
Malta in perpetuity, indemnifying the Knights of St John; France to 
evacuate the Dutch Netherlands and Switzerland, but to retain Elba; 
Great Britain to acknowledge the kingdom of Etruria and the Italian 
and Ligurian Republics, provided that the King of Sardinia received 
a suitable indemnity. These demands were large; but Hawkes- 
bury added that, if they were deemed impracticable, the French 
Government should suggest " some other equivalent security by which 
His Majesty's object in claiming the permanent possession of the 
island of Malta may be accomplished, and the independence of the 
island secured." These terms, then, were merely our first word in a new 
negotiation 2 . In reply, Talleyrand, while urging complaints, declared 
that France would accord all possible satisfaction and security, short of 

1 Talleyrand, Memoir es, II. 135. 

2 Coquelle, p. 54; O. Browning, pp. 54-7. 



THE PROBLEM OF MALTA AND ITS CLIMAX 321 

acquiescing in our possession of Malta. But, after he had seen the First 
Consul, his statement became more defiant. Napoleon, he declared, 
would rather be cut to pieces than consent to a British acquisition of 
Malta, and he took his stand on the inviolability of the Treaty of 
Amiens. Talleyrand suggested, as alternative plans of solving the 
Maltese problem, either a mixed garrison of French, British, Italians 
and Germans in Valetta, or (as Joseph Bonaparte, also, suggested) the 
British possession of Corfu or Crete in lieu of Malta. Whitworth 
declared that nothing but the occupation of Malta for a term of years 
would relieve our apprehensions. Privately, however, he outlined 
to Hawkesbury a possible compromise, viz. either the retention of 
Malta for a term of years or the garrisoning merely of the fortifications 
of Valetta, the rest of the island being left to the Knights. 

By this time, a fresh cause for apprehension had arisen. Early in 
April, Napoleon despatched 7000 more French troops into the Dutch 
Netherlands, where they occupied commanding positions. Here was 
an occasion for the British Government to protest against this further 
violation of the Treaty of Luneville; but Hawkesbury let slip the 
opportunity, and allowed the discussion to turn almost entirely upon 
Malta. On April 13th, he approved Whitworth's proposals and sug- 
gested ten years as the minimum term for our occupation of Malta — 
which would admit of the construction of docks at Lampedusa, 
with a view to the permanent occupation of that neighbouring islet. 
Joseph Bonaparte, in the absence of the First Consul at St Cloud, 
favoured some such solution ; and, on April 1 8th, Whitworth expressed 
hopes of a peaceful settlement. What, then, was his surprise three days 
later to hear from Talleyrand that the crux of the problem was, not 
the reestablishment of the Order of St John, but "the suffering Great 
Britain to acquire a possession in the Mediterranean ! " 

This brought the dispute to a climax; and the British Ministers 
resolved to bring it to a decisive issue. They were moved thereto by 
news as to the concentration of troops on the Northern coasts of 
France and in Zealand as if for an invasion. Further, as the French 
navy comprised only 40 effective sail of the line, a rupture, if it were to 
come, as seemed inevitable, had better come soon, while we possessed 
a clear superiority over the French and Dutch fleets. True, our supplies 
of seamen and naval stores had run dangerously low, owing to the 
economies of the Earl of St Vincent at the dockyards; but, even so, 
the advantage at sea lay with us in 1803, while in 1805 it would be 
precarious owing to Napoleon's control of nearly all the ports of 



322 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

western Europe, from Amsterdam to Spezzia 1 . His policy of coast 
control and the avowal of a design to exclude us from the Mediter- 
ranean threatened the national existence; and no Ministry, however 
pacific, dared run risks on so vital a point. All the advice that reached 
Downing Street was in favour of firmness. From the beginning of the 
crisis, George III, whose influence over the Cabinet was great, had 
been eager for war. The Grenvilles and Malmesbury had throughout 
censured Hawkesbury's proceedings as weak, undignified and certain 
to lead to further humiliations. Pitt, deeming himself privately pledged 
to support Addington, was more tolerant ; but he viewed the European 
situation with " infinite anxiety," and after Napoleon's official Declara- 
tion of February 21st, 1803, held that we must not give up Malta 
"without fresh and substantial security 2 ." Refusing the suggestions 
of several friends that they should all seek to overthrow the Cabinet, 
he continued to it a general support, and privately advised Lord 
Chatham, Master of Ordnance, to act firmly on the Maltese question. 
This indeed was the general opinion; and Addington, for his own 
credit, could not now retreat. In common with nearly all our leading 
politicians, he and Hawkesbury deeply distrusted Napoleon, believing 
him to be animated by boundless ambition, an inveterate hatred of 
this country and an utter disregard of principle. Thus, personal con- 
siderations, not less than regard tor national security, led Ministers 
to insist on a speedy answer to the alternatives : either the possession 
of Malta for ten years, or war. To this fundamental condition, Hawkes- 
bury on April 23rd, appended articles requiring the consent of France 
to the cession of Lampedusa by His Sicilian Majesty 3 , the evacuation 
of the Dutch Netherlands within a month of the signature of a con- 
vention on these topics, and the provision of a suitable indemnity 
for the King of Sardinia, failing which last Great Britain would refuse 
to acknowledge the Italian and Ligurian Republics. If these conditions 
were not accepted within seven days, Whitworth was to leave Paris. 
The arrival of terms so uncompromising, which in all but name 
formed an ultimatum, surprised Whitworth, who, in the first instance 
stated them informally to Talleyrand ; but, when that Minister declined 
to receive them in this way, he repeated them officially, only to meet 
with a stiff refusal. He then requested an interview with the peace- 
maker, Joseph Bonaparte, who admitted that, in private conversations 

1 Dropmore Papers, vu. 148; Barham Papers, in. 68, 69; O. Browning, 44, 100, 
174, 191 ; Coquelle, 62-5. 

2 Dropmore Papers, vu. 149, 151. 

3 Ferdinand IV was willing (A. Bonnefons, Marie Caroline, p. 261). 



DETERMINATION OF THE BRITISH CABINET 323 

with the First Consul, three or four years had been named by the latter 
as the longest possible term for a British occupation of Malta. Joseph 
Bonaparte, also, now declared that he found in his brother a dis- 
position to avoid a rupture, and that he was perplexed how to act. 
Whitworth, therefore, considered that negotiation was still possible, 
but that it was likely to be with the sole purpose of gaining time 
for French preparations. The First Consul had just sent off General 
Lauriston to London, with despatches for Andreossi, who would 
probably be recalled, as too Anglophil in sentiment. Talleyrand, how- 
ever, also wrote to Andreossi, urging him to see Hawkesbury and try 
to bring him to a reasonable decision. But the British Cabinet had 
uttered its last word, and was now as inflexible as it had previously been 
complaisant. At Paris, Joseph Bonaparte and Talleyrand worked hard 
for peace ; and their efforts can hardly but have been furthered by the 
arrival of news of the almost complete destruction of the French forces 
in Hayti. Foreseeing the effects of these tidings on the temper of the 
First Consul, Whitworth did not attend the Sunday reception at the 
Tuileries, and thus escaped the tirade prepared for him, which in 
fractions was vented on those present. 

Various expedients were resorted to by the friends of peace for 
the purpose of delaying Whitworth's departure from Paris, fixed for 
May 3rd. Joseph Bonaparte sent a belated proposal to hand over 
Malta to Russia, which Whitworth declined to consider. Talleyrand 
pointed out, that the final British terms would in any case necessitate 
a consultation of all the Powers named as guarantors in Article X — 
a proceeding evidently designed to gain time. The final proposal, that, 
after Malta had been in British hands for a term of years, it should 
revert to Russia, met with some support from Whitworth, as calculated 
to humour Bonaparte, whose violent temper, if crossed at all points, 
might lead to something desperate. Markoff did not think the Tsar 
would accede to this plan, and, on May 7th, Hawkesbury brushed 
aside all these proposals as "loose, indefinite and unsatisfactory," 
adding that he had authentic information that Russia would not consent 
to garrison Malta. Nevertheless, he sent to Whitworth Instructions 
practically identical with those of April 23 rd. But Napoleon would not 
hear of a longer occupation of Malta than a year or two. In a Council 
of seven persons held at St Cloud on May nth only two, Joseph 
Bonaparte and Talleyrand, were for peace. The others followed the 
First Consul, in approving a course certain to lead to a rupture. 

Unfortunately, the war party was now strengthened by the arrival 



3 2 4 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

of an offer from the Tsar to intervene in the Maltese affair ; and this was 
taken as a sign of his intention to support France. Afterwards, 
Napoleon would not listen to any pacific proposal, even from his 
brother. Accordingly, Whitworth quitted Paris on May 12th, having 
been delayed (as he phrased it) by "infamous chicanery." On the 
morrow, Talleyrand sent after him a note, evidently inspired by the 
First Consul, setting forth with much acerbity the faults of the British 
Government, dilating on his championship of the sanctity of Treaties, 
and declaring that, if France gave way now, she would next be required 
to destroy her harbours, fill up her canals, and ruin her manufactures. 
He charged Great Britain with insulting the French nation and aiming 
at the destruction of the Order of St John ; and he once more offered 
to place Malta under the control of either Russia, or Austria, or Prussia. 
Hawkesbury declined the proposal, as calculated merely to spin out 
the negotiation. Whitworth embarked at Calais on May 17th, and was 
received in London somewhat coolly by Ministers as having exceeded 
his Instructions and listened to dilatory proposals. He, for his part, 
privately criticised Hawkesbury and stated that France, being un- 
prepared for war, would have given way about Malta, if our terms had 
not been so specific. Certainly, Joseph Bonaparte, Talleyrand, and 
a few other leading men, desired peace even at the price of extensive 
concessions; but the British Ministers had become convinced that 
Napoleon's sole aim was to gain time until the naval situation became 
less unfavourable. Talleyrand, finally, declared that, if the British 
Government had humoured Napoleon to some extent, he would have 
made them a present of Malta 1 . No words of the First Consul bear 
out that statement. 

In one important matter, however, the Addington Cabinet had 
offended Russia . If we may trust the statements of Vorontzoff, Russian 
Ambassador at London, he had, previous to the rupture, handed to 
Hawkesbury the Tsar's offer of mediation on the Maltese affair. No 
notice was taken of this offer ; and, after the outbreak of war, Vorontzoff 
was astounded by Addington's statement in the House of Commons 
that, if such mediation had been offered, due regard would have been 
paid to it. To his request for an explanation, Hawkesbury replied that 
he had not had time to bring the matter before the King, but would 
take an early opportunity of doing so. As will shortly appear, Fox 
pressed the House to declare in favour of Russia's mediation, and 
Ministers complied; but, after Hawkesbury's evasion, Alexander, of 

1 O. Browning, 224-69; Malmesbury, IV. 250-4. 



THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RUPTURE 325 

course, refused to deal with the Addington Cabinet. Well might 
Vorontzoff declare that our Foreign Office "spoilt all 1 ." 

In a question so complex as that of the rupture of the Peace of 
Amiens it is not easy to adjust the responsibility with any approach 
to exactitude. That the British Government was, in a technical sense, 
guilty is obvious ; and there is no force in the plea that the terms of 
that Peace were unworkable ; for the men who signed it were also those 
who infringed Article X. Moreover, in the last stages of the negotia- 
tion, their insistence was so rigid as to expose them to the charge of 
breaking the peace of the world in order to acquire Malta. Further, 
their procedure was inconsistent. In the month of April, 1803, they 
assumed an unbending attitude, which was all the more surprising and 
annoying by contrast with their tame acquiescence throughout nearly 
the whole of the year 1802. Doubtless, their intention finally was to 
impress Napoleon with the power of the British Government to make 
out a good case, and of the nation to support it, if need be, by force 
of arms. If so, the change was belated and abrupt. Probably, it seemed 
to him unreal ; for it evoked from him further efforts at intimidation, 
nor did he lower his tone until, to his surprise, he discovered the 
imminence of hostilities which might cost him an expeditionary force. 
There seems, therefore, good ground for concluding that Addington 
and his colleagues never recovered the ground lost by their previous 
tame acquiescence, and that, by the end of the year 1802, Napoleon had 
concluded that they were amenable to methods of intimidation which 
he had found successful in every other instance. A study of history 
should have revealed to him the error of coercing the Island Power over- 
much. But it should, also, have prescribed to the British Government 
the maxim Principiis obsta, in dealing with a man who both in power 
and ambition dwarfed Lewis XIV. Moreover, they took no steps effec- 
tively to explain the British case ; and by failing to bring home to the 
public Napoleon's violations of the Treaties of Luneville and Amiens, 
and by letting the whole stress lie on Malta (the weakest part of their 
case) they appeared before the world as treaty-breakers, while he 
figured as the champion of international justice. No important negotia- 
tions have ever been more signally mismanaged than those of Amiens 
and their sequel by Addington and Hawkesbury. From this censure 
however, the impartial critic will except Whitworth, who, through- 
out, tempered firmness with discretion, manliness with extreme 
forbearance. 

1 G. Rose, Diaries, n. 41-4. Vorontzoff detested Hawkesbury. See Malmesbury, 
lv. 192, 247, 253. 



326 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

On the other hand, it must be admitted that for a self-respecting 
Power to keep at peace with Napoleon was at all times difficult, and 
in 1803 wellnigh impossible. His military and civic triumphs filled 
him with boundless confidence and swelled his inordinate pride. The 
diplomatic success over Great Britain gained at Amiens transcended 
the fondest hopes of Frenchmen 1 . Yet every month of peace aggran- 
dised his power, and so swift was the transformation as to bewilder 
all beholders. Great Britain, who both could and ought to have pro- 
tested at the first infraction of the Treaties of Luneville and Amiens, 
was informed by him that the former Treaty did not concern her ; and 
her statesmen, intent on the "experiment of continuing the Peace," 
failed to insist emphatically on the maintenance of the order of things 
established by those Treaties. But this technical omission could not 
bind their hands indefinitely; and, when even the Orient came within 
the sweep of Napoleon's designs, they could not but intervene. They did 
so awkwardly, even clumsily. They took no effective steps to concert 
with Russia measures such as would, probably, have imposed moderation 
on the First Consul. And when her offer of mediation arrived it 
received cavalier treatment, which was destined to postpone for a year 
all hope of an Anglo-Russian alliance. 

These shortcomings, however, arose from slackness and incom- 
petence, not from lust of domination. In view of the Eastern projects 
of Napoleon, it was but reasonable for Great Britain to require the 
occupation of Malta during a period which would admit of the con- 
struction of docks at Lampedusa, which islet would then serve as a 
Mediterranean base, while Malta reverted to the Maltese. In the cir- 
cumstances, nothing short of this could safeguard the interests of Great 
Britain in the Levant. Her retirement from the Mediterranean at the 
end of 1796 had given free play to the Oriental designs of 1798, which 
had been directed against India. Her exclusion from that sea and its 
domination by France were clearly the aims of Napoleon in gaining 
control over large parts of its coastline in 1802-3. A P eace so fertile 
in menacing aggressions was no peace ; and for its rupture he was in 
effect responsible. Doubtless, he would in any case have made war, 
so soon as the French and Dutch navies were ready ; and his Instruc- 
tions to Decaen point to the autumn of 1804 as the probable time 2 . 
Thus, the Addington Administration, notwithstanding all the futility 
of its procedure, was right in its final resolve to bring matters to an 

1 Pasquier, Memoir es, 1. 161. 

2 For Decaen 's doings at the Cape see Eng. Hist. Rev. January, 1900. 



BRITISH DECLARATION OF WAR 327 

immediate issue. News that arrived from Naples justified their 
decision. Our Ambassador there, a Court, wrote to Hawkesbury, on 
April 20th, that the French Envoy, Alquier, had required the Govern- 
ment to make common cause with France against Great Britain ; for 
(said Alquier) "the interests of the two countries are the same.... It is 
the intention of France to shut every port to the English from Holland 
to the Turkish dominions, to prevent the exportation of her merchan- 
dise and to give a mortal blow to her commerce, for there she is most 
vulnerable. Our joint forces may wrest from her hands the island of 
Malta." Acton, in reply, refused to violate the neutrality of Ferdinand 
towards his former Ally 1 . These tidings from Naples clinched the 
evidence that Napoleon was planning a war of annihilation against the 
Island Power 2 . 

The British Government declared war on May 18th; and, on that 
same day, H.M. frigate Doris, after a running fight, captured off 
Ushant an armed French lugger which resisted detention. The conduct 
of the Doris was perhaps a little severe, Admiral Cornwallis, who 
commanded the squadron off Brest, having on May 16th ordered his 
cruisers merely to detain French vessels 3 . Infuriated by this event, 
the First Consul ordered the detention of all British males of military 
age then in France, a tyrannical act which more than anything else 
tended to make our people wholehearted in the War. These incidents 
and the diatribes of Napoleon against la perfide Albion tended to 
popularise a War which the great mass of Frenchmen had previously 
disliked. On this side of the Channel, the contest was at first taken up 
somewhat doubtfully. Parliament was kept in the dark as to the merits 
of the case, and not until May 23rd was it in possession of information 
sufficient for a debate. Fox, Grey and Whitbread protested against 
the rupture. The views of Fox were a curious mixture of fatuity and 
good sense. To his friends he had long been declaring that Bonaparte 
was really afraid of war, and that the French annexation of Piedmont 
and treatment of Germany were defensible. As for Malta and Egypt, 
he belittled their importance, and more than once asserted that the 
question of Peace or War was bound up with that of turning out the 
Addington Ministry. On the other hand, he saw clearly that we could 
not possibly help the Swiss, and that war with France would probably 

1 F.O. Sicily and Naples, 54. 

2 French troops soon reoccupied the heel of Italy, an act which the French 
Foreign Office sought to justify by reference to an alleged secret article of the Treaty 
of Amiens, which had no existence. See Eng. Hist. Rev. April, 1900, pp. 331-5. 

3 J. Leyland, Blockade of Brest, 1. 14. 



328 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

tend to aggrandise her power 1 . In his speech of May 23rd, he declared 
vehemently that the War was all about " bare Malta, unconnected with 
any great, general, generous interest of Europe " ; but he concluded by 
strongly urging acceptance of the recent proposal of the Emperor of 
Russia to mediate between us and France on the Maltese question. 
Hawkesbury made a lame reply, stating that, while he sympathised 
with the end proposed, yet its realisation must cause hesitation, delay 
and the enfeebling of the nation's effort. Pitt, also, applauded the 
motives of Fox, but advised trust in the Government as to the time 
and manner of giving them effect. Above all, he pleaded for unity in 
the prosecution of the struggle for national security. Finally, Hawkes- 
bury promised to use all possible means for coming to an understanding 
with Russia respecting the subject in dispute. On May 28th, he drew 
up a Note requesting the Tsar to mediate, not merely respecting Malta, 
but also in the affairs of Europe. The following was suggested as a 
basis: Great Britain to retain Malta, unless France would either 
renounce all her Italian possessions and reinstate the King of Sardinia, 
or retire from the Belgic Provinces, placing them under some powerful 
sovereign. The Tsar waved aside these proposals, probably from dislike 
and distrust of the Addington Cabinet. 

The tongue-tied gaucherie of Ministers, when contrasted with the 
effective diatribes of Bonaparte, created so general a prejudice against 
Great Britain as to preclude much hope of her finding an Ally. Con- 
sequently, she had to trust to the pressure of maritime warfare; and 
the course of the War was to reveal the slowness of such methods, 
when contrasted with the swift action of the Land Power, possessing 
the central position and nearly all the strategic points, from the Texel 
to the heel of Italy. The first events of the War, as Fox foretold, at 
once aggrandised the might of Napoleon. Having already massed a 
considerable force in the Dutch Netherlands, he launched it against 
Hanover, despite the Declaration of George III, as Elector and Prince 
of the Empire, on May 16th, that he would maintain strict neutrality. 
The Tsar, though guarantor of the Germanic System, offered no 
effective protest against the invasion of Hanover, and the King of 
Prussia, guarantor of the neutrality of Northern Germany, likewise 
maintained a prudent reserve, probably because he had been cajoled 
or coerced by General Duroc, despatched by Napoleon to Berlin in 
March, 1803. Hanover, therefore, was occupied without opposition 
by General Mortier. He concluded with the Duke of Cambridge, at 

1 Memorials of C.J. Fox, III. 372, 381, 384, 388, 391. 



RUSSIAN AND FRENCH DESIGNS 329 

Suhlingen, a Capitulation, which George III refused to ratify. Mortier 
therefore, treated the Electorate as a conquered land. Its revenues were 
controlled by France and her troops were supported by the popula- 
tion. Napoleon, also, excluded British commerce from the north- 
western coast of Germany, which was, therefore, blockaded by the 
British fleet 1 . The consequent stagnation of trade in Germany induced 
the Tsar to undertake a negotiation for a general settlement, on the 
basis of the evacuation by France of the Dutch Netherlands, Switzer- 
land and all Italy (except Piedmont), Malta also being occupied for 
a time by Russian troops. To these proposals neither belligerent 
acceded, Napoleon deeming them excessive, while the British Govern- 
ment feared to place Malta as a pledge in Russian hands. There were 
some grounds for this mistrust. Alexander had taken the Republic of 
the Ionian Isles under his suzerainty and was now seeking to gain a 
foothold in Albania and the Morea. The designs of Napoleon were 
similar, but far wider, extending to the eventual partition of the Turkish 
dominions. At present, these schemes clashed. But what guarantee 
was there that, so soon as Malta was in Alexander's hands, he would 
not become an accessory to the designed partition? 

In the Mediterranean, circumstances favoured Great Britain far 
more than in the North Sea. True, Napoleon marched a large force 
to hold the heel of Italy and menace Sicily, Corfu, the Morea and 
Egypt. But the menace was hollow, so long as a strong British fleet 
held that Sea. Conscious of the cardinal importance of Levantine 
interests, the Cabinet despatched to Malta a powerful fleet under 
Nelson. His Instructions, of date May 18th, 1803, bade him protect 
Malta, Naples, Sicily, the Ionian Isles and any part of the Turkish 
dominions that was threatened, while preventing Spanish warships 
from joining the French 2 . It soon appeared that there was no im- 
mediate prospect of a Franco- Spanish Alliance; but Nelson was 
fully occupied in covering the Levant and watching the French in 
Toulon and southern Italy. Their designs on Corfu and the Morea 
caused general anxiety. The Porte, alarmed by French and Russian 
intrigues in Albania and the Morea, heard with much satisfaction of 
the arrival of Nelson's fleet at Malta; for its presence at that com- 
manding port sufficed to sterilise the Oriental schemes of the two 
potentates. Fresh light was thrown on Russian designs by a letter 
which Pitt received from the young Earl of Aberdeen, dated Patras, 

1 Garden, vin. 193; Paget Papers, II. 92; Dropmore Papers, vn. 151. 

2 Nicolas, v. 68; also v. 87, 107, no, 166, 282. 



330 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

November ioth, 1803. The Earl, after a lengthy tour in the Morea, 
expressed his sympathy with the downtrodden Greeks, but added: 
"the Russians are more detested than even the Turks themselves. 
They have conceived such an idea of the ignorance and barbarity of 
that nation as renders it perfectly impossible for the Greeks to view 
their conquests with a favourable eye, notwithstanding their being of 
the same race, and other circumstances tending to promote a friend- 
ship 1 ." 

Seeing that Great Britain regarded the Turkish empire as a 
bulwark against French or Russian moves towards India, accord with 
Alexander I was difficult. And, early in the year 1804, another com- 
plication occurred. The childish behaviour of George III betokened 
a return of his mental malady. The change caused much apprehension, 
not only in England but in every Court friendly to us ; for, in case 
of another attack of lunacy, large powers would be wielded by the 
Prince of Wales, still a patron of Fox and the pacifist group 2 . This 
consideration, the political nullity of Ministers, and the coy abstention 
of Pitt from public life, depressed British prestige, and nothing worthy 
of note occurred until the spring of 1804. Then, the participation of 
certain subordinate British Ministers in the Pichegru-Cadoudal plot 
for kidnapping or murdering Napoleon, brought fresh discredit on the 
Administration — a farcical sequel to the affair being the fooling of 
Francis Drake, our Envoy at Munich, by an agent provocateur of 
Fouche's, Mehee de la Touche 3 . This affair, and the inefficient 
preparations of Ministers against a French invasion, helped to pre- 
cipitate a crisis which had long been imminent; and, near the end of 
April, Addington advised the King (who had now in some measure 
recovered) to send for Pitt. 

The opportunity now again presented itself of forming a truly 
national Administration, such as had been proposed in 1794. But now, 
as then, the bitter prejudices of the King against Fox led him to veto 
Pitt's proposal to include the Whig leader and his followers. Nothing 
could bend the royal will. The results were disastrous; for the Gren- 
villes and Windham had latterly united with Fox to overthrow 
Addington, and now declined to join a Cabinet formed " on a principle 
of exclusion." Their abstention, especially that of Grenville, was a 
national misfortune ; for it deprived the country of his great experience 

1 Pitt MSS. 104 (Pub. Record Office). 

2 Dropmore Papers, VII. 214, 223 ; G. Rose, Diaries, chs. 11, in ; Malmesbury, iv. 
288. 3 For evidence see Rose, Life of Napoleon, 1. 450-4. 



PITT'S RETURN TO OFFICE 331 

and stern objectivity, which in time past had so often corrected the 
sanguine viewiness of Pitt. The Prime-Minister now assigned the 
Foreign Office to the Earl of Harrowby, the Dudley Ryder of Pitt's 
happier days at Cambridge and Wimbledon. In 1789-91, Ryder 
served as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs with the Duke of Leeds, 
and afterwards as Paymaster of the Forces and Vice-president of the 
Board of Trade. In the House, his knowledge of currency questions 
and power of exposition gained him repute. He was raised to the 
peerage, as first Earl of Harrowby, in 1803. Uncertain health and 
temper limited the circle of his friends, but these recognised his 
abilities, and augured for him a distinguished career at the Foreign 
Office. Hawkesbury now went to the Home Office, Camden to the 
War Office, and Melville (formerly Henry Dundas) to the Admiralty, 
from which St Vincent gladly retired. Addington was shelved ; but six 
of his colleagues were retained by Pitt. Party spirit was by no means 
assuaged by these arrangements, completed in May, 1804; but the 
genius of Pitt and the recovery of the King's health now encouraged 
our former Allies to regard less unfavourably an Alliance with Great 
Britain. 

Thus, at last, she emerged from the discredit into which the 
Addington Cabinet had allowed her to sink ; but in regard neither to 
home nor to foreign politics was her situation so favourable as it had 
been at the beginning of 1801 , when Pitt and Grenville resigned office. 
The weakness and incapacity of their successors may justly be con- 
sidered as the fundamental cause of the defective Treaty of Peace, of 
its infraction by Napoleon, and of the resumption of hostilities under 
conditions far less propitious than those which had marked the close 
of the Revolutionary War. 

II 

The month of May, 1804, which saw the return of Pitt to office, 
was marked, also, by the proclamation of the French Empire. That 
dramatic event, a sequel to the kidnapping and execution of the Due 
d'Enghien, caused not less satisfaction to the French Jacobins, most 
of whom welcomed the advent of a dynasty stained with the blood 
of a Bourbon, than abhorrence to other Emperors. But, whereas 
Francis II (still German Emperor) resorted to the tame rejoinder 
of declaring himself, Francis I, Hereditary Emperor of Austria, 
Alexander I evinced great indignation and for a time suspended dip- 
lomatic relations with France. There were, however, few signs that he, 



332 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

still less that Francis, would draw the sword on behalf of the Bourbons 
or to avenge the Due d'Enghien, as Gustavus IV of Sweden desired. 
In the previous winter, that monarch had received from Paris tempting 
offers for a Franco- Swedish alliance with a view to obtaining the use 
of the Swedish fleet for the invasion of England. In return for this 
help, Napoleon offered him Norway at the cost of Denmark, the latter 
Power to acquire Bremen and Verden. Prussia he tempted by the offer 
of Swedish Pomerania and part of Hanover 1 . Gustavus, then on a 
lengthened tour in Germany, rejected these degrading proposals, and 
made repeated overtures to her leading States for a monarchical 
crusade. His eccentric behaviour and extravagant profession of faith 
did little to recommend the scheme. 

The first signs of a rapprochement between Russia and Great Britain 
appeared early in 1 804 owing to their alarm at the intrigues of Napoleon 
in Albania and the Morea. On March 9th, the Tsar's Foreign Minister, 
Prince Czartoryski, wrote to Vorontzoff, Russian Ambassador at 
London, expressing satisfaction at Great Britain's intention to oppose 
a French partition of the Ottoman Empire. On March 10th, Warren 
reported a similar resolve on the part of the Tsar. A Russian force had 
left Sevastopol for Corfu, and it was hoped that Great Britain would 
send troops to Malta to cooperate. Thus, out of the revival of the 
Eastern Question sprang the Anglo-Russian accord of 1804 2 . It was 
furthered by sympathy with the dispossessed King of Sardinia and 
anxiety respecting the kingdom of Naples. Here, the royal authority 
existed on sufferance only. Soon after his rupture with Great Britain, 
Napoleon ordered French troops into Neapolitan territory in defiance 
of his Treaty of Florence with Ferdinand IV. Moreover, by occupying 
the heel of Italy the French threatened the Russians at Corfu and the 
anarchic western provinces of Turkey. British and Russian policy, 
therefore, began to converge on the object of expelling the French 
from southern Italy. Since Russia could do little in the Mediterranean 
without the protection of the British fleet, which needed Malta as base, 
Alexander ought to have acquiesced in Britain's occupation of that 
island, which he alone could not possibly hold against the French fleet. 
Naval considerations, therefore, should have led him to forego his 
claim to Malta ; but, as will duly appear, he revived it, thereby nearly 
ruining the Anglo-Russian entente. Moreover, Russia's demands for 
subsidies were lofty, and on so vast a problem as the future settle- 

1 F.O. Austria, 73. C. Stuart to Hawkesbury, March ioth, 1804. 

2 Rose, Third Coalition, pp. viii-x. 



FRENCH OFFENCES AGAINST LAW OF NATIONS 333 

ment of Europe there arose certain differences of opinion. During 
the summer of 1804 discussions proceeded satisfactorily, but, on 
October 10th, Harrowby wrote that Russia and Austria seemed not 
disinclined to join in schemes for a partition of Turkey which 
Napoleon was dangling before them 1 . Accordingly, Russian overtures 
were scrutinised closely, especially when they were followed by a 
demand for the evacuation of Malta. Apparently, Alexander hoped 
that the increasing power of Napoleon and the growing difficulties of 
Great Britain would induce her to surrender that island. 

The general situation was complicated by Napoleon's seizure of 
Sir George Rumbold, British Minister-resident in the Free City of 
Hamburg; and by the rupture between Great Britain and Spain. The 
former incident illustrates the methods of the Land Power, the latter 
those of the Sea Power. On the flimsy pretext that British Envoys on 
the Continent had conspired against him, Napoleon, on October 7th, 
ordered Fouche, Minister of Police, to prepare to carry off Rumbold 
from his residence on the river-front at Hamburg 2 . On the 24th, the 
seizure was skilfully effected, and Rumbold, with all his papers, was 
hurried off to Paris. Not even the eagerness of Bonaparte and the 
guile of Fouche could detect signs of conspiracy in the papers. More- 
over, the violation of the territory of a Free City, which was under the 
protection of the Tsar and the guardianship of Frederick William, con- 
stituted a challenge to both those potentates. The Prussian monarch, 
as Protector of the Circle of Lower Saxony, sent to Paris a pressing 
request for Rumbold's liberation, with which the French Emperor 
ungraciously complied 3 . The incident showed that the Corsican ven- 
detta spirit, incarnate in Napoleon, would stoop to any outrage 
calculated to wreak revenge upon the hated islanders and drive them 
from the Continent. 

The same month, however, witnessed a high-handed infraction 
of the law of nations by Great Britain at sea. True, she had grave cause 
of complaint against the Court of Madrid for its breaches of neutrality 
in the present conflict ; but it could plead force majeure. By the Con- 
vention of October 19th, 1803, Spain had agreed to pay to Napoleon 
the yearly sum of 72,000,000 francs. Further, the Aigle, a French '74, 
had long been in harbour at Cadiz, and five French warships took refuge 
at Corunna, remaining in harbour for months, and necessitating the 

1 Third Coalition, p. 47. 

2 Nap. Corr. No. 8100. 

3 G.Jackson, Diaries, 1. 242-52; Malmesbury, Diaries, iv. 330-5; Hardenberg, 
Denkwurdigkeiten , II. 94 et seq. 



334 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

presence of British ships under Cochrane to observe them. Indeed, 
Napoleon acted in a way which implied control over those dockyards ; 
and Melville, in a review of the naval situation on July 3rd, stated that 
we must regard the Spanish fleet as a probable enemy 1 . The repeated 
protests of Frere, British Ambassador at Madrid, against Spain's 
infraction of neutrality, were ignored or explained away, until, in 
September, news arrived that some 1500 French troops were marching 
from Bayonne to Corunna to reinforce the crews of the five ships ; and 
Cochrane forwarded information as to extensive naval preparations 
there and at Cadiz. The British Government, thereupon, sent orders 
to Frere to leave Madrid unless he received satisfactory assurances. 
But it, also, resolved to seize four Spanish treasure-ships which were 
reported as soon due at Cadiz. On September 18th, the Admiralty 
issued orders to Admiral Cornwallis, commanding the British fleet off 
Brest to detach two frigates, which, with other ships from the Straits 
or off Cadiz, were to detain the treasure-ships. Unfortunately, Captain 
Graham Moore of the Indefatigable could pick up only two more 
British frigates before October 5th, when he sighted the four armed 
Spaniards ; and Spanish pride scouted the thought of surrender to a 
nearly equal force. In the ensuing conflict, one of the Spaniards blew 
up, and the others were overpowered and captured. The Admiralty 
Instructions clearly contemplated the muster of enough British ships 
to banish all thought of resistance. Even in that case, to capture 
four armed treasure ships before a declaration of war constituted a 
breach of the Law of Nations. The British Government, therefore, 
erred, first, in not taking an earlier opportunity to bring matters to a 
decisive issue ; secondly, in deferring action until the Spanish treasure- 
ships were nearing home ; thirdly, in not assuring the despatch of a 
sufficient force to satisfy the amour propre of the Spanish commander. 
Frere did not leave Madrid until November 10th, and was of opinion 
that, apart from this unfortunate incident, a rupture must have 
occurred 2 . But it came about in a way detrimental to British prestige, 
and made an unfavourable impression on the Tsar, thereby increasing 
the difficulty of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement. 

This development was to be furthered by the arrival at Petrograd 
of a far abler Ambassador than Warren, who begged to be recalled 
for service afloat 3 . Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, first Lord Gran- 

1 Nap. Corr. 7007, 7098, 7113, 7742; Nicolas, v. 484; Barham Papers, III. 42. 

2 J. Leyland, Blockade of Brest, 11. 34, 36, 64, 87-9, 126; Nicolas, v. 241 ; Pari. 
Debates, ui. 74,89, 91. 3 Czartoryski, Memoirs, 1. 319; Malmesbury, Diaries, iv. 254. 



CZARTORYSKI'S MEMORANDUM 335 

ville ( 1 773-1 846), was a devoted Pittite, who in 1800 had been 
appointed a Lord of the Treasury. He arrived at Petrograd early in 
November, 1804. His Instructions, dated October 10th, bade him 
assist in the Austro-Russian accord, arrange for a suitable compromise 
between Austria and Sardinia in North Italy, and set right a mis- 
understanding that had arisen as to the proposed Anglo-Russian 
operations in South Italy. Harrowby pointed out that, if the French 
seized the whole of southern Italy, and perhaps Sicily also, the pro- 
visioning of Nelson's fleet would become so difficult as greatly to 
increase the chances of the Toulon fleet capturing the Russian force 
at Corfu, and gaining a foothold in the Morea. Even these arguments 
produced little effect at Petrograd ; for larger questions now arose to 
overshadow them. 

Alexander had decided to lay the basis of a new European System, 
and for this purpose despatched to London his confidant and counsellor, 
Novossiltzoff, who was charged to communicate direct with Pitt and 
Harrowby. His Instructions, dated September nth [O.S.] 1804, pre- 
scribe as guiding principles the liberation of Europe from Napoleonic 
control and the establishment of institutions "founded on the sacred 
rights of humanity." France is to be restrained within just limits, 
Sardinia and other States gaining at her expense. A Federal System is 
suggested for Germany. Above all, European Peace will be guaranteed 
by a league of the Great Powers, headed by Russia and Great Britain, 
a Code of International Law being drawn up for the guidance of all 
States, binding them to use their united forces against any member 
guilty of its infraction. A partition of the Turkish empire is hinted 
at as possible ; and the document closes with the suggestion that, if 
other States gain in territory, the two protagonists should secure 
equivalent advantages; Great Britain, however, being urged to 
mitigate her Maritime Code. This ideal programme was corporealised 
by Czartoryski in a secret Memorandum, which placed Alexander on 
the throne of a Great Poland comprising the "kingdom of Prussia"; 
as an equivalent for which Austria was to absorb Bavarian and Suabian 
lands, Frederick William annexing States in western Germany, and 
even the Dutch Netherlands, if necessary. Turkey was to be left alone, 
until she should somehow dissolve into a Federation of States acknow- 
ledging Alexanderas " Protector of the Slavs of the East." Whetherthis 
secret Memorandum received the Tsar's authorisation or was merely 
Czartoryski's pro-Polish gloss on his phrase " equivalent advantages," 
is far from clear. Alexander, more than once, drew up a lofty pro- 



336 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

gramme and left to subordinates its reduction to profitable practice. 
In any case, Novossiltzoff's mission bristled with difficulties. He had 
to humour the Anglophil Vorontzoff, and yet lower British maritime 
claims ; to remould the Continent on ideal principles by means of a 
Coalition likely to prove distressingly worldly; and, if possible, to 
arrange for the peaceful demise of Turkey and the resurrection of 
Poland at the expense of the Tsar's expected Ally, Prussia. It is not 
surprising that Czartoryski finally declared that " Novossiltzoff did not 
execute the mission to our satisfaction 1 ." 

His further statement that neither Pitt nor Vorontzoff approved 
all the Russian proposals is open to question ; for there is documentary 
proof that Pitt acceded to the most important of them. Harrowby 
having been injured by an accident just after the preliminary in- 
terviews, Lord Mulgrave at the close of 1864 came to supervise 
affairs at the Foreign Office; but the negotiation for the Third 
Coalition needed the action, not of a locum tenens, but of the 
Prime-Minister. In a long Note of January 19th, 1805, to Novos- 
siltzoff, the British Government declared its fundamental agreement 
with the generous designs of the Tsar for the deliverance of Europe 
and its future tranquillity. The basis of Anglo-Russian union should 
be the restriction of France within her former limits, the adoption 
in the liberated territories of measures calculated to ensure their peace 
and wellbeing and to constitute them a barrier against French aggran- 
disement; also to establish, at the peace, a guarantee for the safety 
of the different Powers and to reestablish in Europe a general system 
of Public Law. For the attainment of these great objects a general 
Coalition must be formed, including if possible Prussia. The Dutch 
and Swiss Republics, the kingdom of Sardinia, and Tuscany and 
Modena should be reestablished, while the other lands previously 
conquered or controlled by France must form part of the new Barrier 
System. For the same purpose, the Sardinian monarchy should be 
strengthened, and Austria and Prussia placed in strong positions 
over against France in Italy and near the Netherlands 2 . The British 
Note made no reference to the vaguer topics named in Novossiltzoff's 
Instructions, nor did it mention Malta and the Maritime Code. Prob- 
ably, he left them unnoticed in these his first interviews, and main- 
tained a discreet silence concerning Czartoryski 's favourite scheme for 

1 Czartoryski, Memoirs, chs. iv, V. The Grand-duke Mikhailovich (L'Empereur 
Alexandre I, I. 38) considers the Novossiltzoff mission the Tsar's first independent 
effort in diplomacy. 

2 C. K. Webster, British Diplomacy (1813-1815), App. 1. 



PITT AND THE RUSSIAN PROPOSALS 337 

absorbing the original kingdom of Prussia and pushing her westwards. 
Perhaps , Vorontzoff dissuaded him also from naming Austria's acquisi- 
tion of Bavarian and Suabian territories, a notion always firmly opposed 
by George III and his Ministers. 

Distinguishing the chimerical from the practical portions of the 
Russian programme, we may conclude that Pitt laid stress on the 
latter and kept them to the fore in the negotiations; also, that Malta 
and the Maritime Code were not at first mentioned ; for, on or about 
January 19th, Novossiltzoff reported that the British Government 
entirely agreed with the proposals he had hitherto made, especially 
when he characterised them as designed to restore the Balance of 
Power. Pitt, after promising subsidies amounting to £5,000,000 to 
the Allies, declared that the aims of the two countries exactly coincided, 
as indeed will appear from a comparison of the present proposals with 
those made by Pitt and Grenville to Russia in their Note of November 
16th, 1798, outlining the programme for the Second Coalition. 
Perhaps the more practical portions of the Tsar's programme were 
inspired by that Note, which, in its turn, focussed Grenville 's 
settlement suggested on December 22nd, 1795. There is a marked 
similarity between the British proposals of 1795, 1798, 1805 and 
1814 1 . 

Novossiltzoff's caution in holding back some of the more conten- 
tious of the Russian demands probably arose from a desire not to com- 
plicate further an already tangled situation. As had happened at the 
close of 1799, when Great Britain was discussing with her Allies the 
terms of a possible pacification, so again now, early in 1805, Napo- 
leon sent New Year's offers of peace to George III 2 . The King in 
his Speech from the Throne, of January 15th, referred to them 
courteously, but declined further discussion "without previous com- 
munication with those Powers on the Continent with whom I am 
engaged in confidential intercourse, and especially with the Emperor 
of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wise and dignified 
sentiments with which he is animated, and of the warm interest which 
he takes in the safety and independence of Europe." This reply, like 
that of January, 1800, was calculated to reassure our friends that we 
would not lay down our arms without due consultation with them. 
Vorontzoff, in further interviews with Pitt, found him ready to concur in 

1 For the British draft treaties of January 21st and March 15th, 1805, see Third 
Coalition, pp. 90, 119. 

2 Nap. Corr. No. 8252. On the same day (January 2nd, 1805) he wrote to the 
King of Spain urging him to make war on England. 



338 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

the Russian proposals for the settlement of Europe, but " quite decided 
not to give up Malta," and not to relax the British Maritime Code. 
In the month of May, a breakdown of the negotiation seemed in- 
evitable, for Pitt, though deeply grieved at such an issue, would not 
give way, and intimated that Leveson-Gower's hands were tied on 
those two questions. 

Meanwhile, on April nth, 1805, that Ambassador had signed with 
Czartoryski a Treaty which, in the main, corresponded closely with a 
draft sent from London a month earlier. He met with several diffi- 
culties; for, though NovossiltzofT, on his return to Petrograd, gave a 
satisfactory account of British policy, yet Alexander and Czartoryski 
began to insist on modifications. They required that the King of 
Sardinia should acquire the Genoese Republic, to which Leveson- 
Gower demurred as harsh and unjust to its inhabitants. Then, they 
haggled over the conditions of the British subsidies, and demanded 
that NovossiltzofT, who was to go to Paris to present the Allied terms, 
should stipulate the revision of the Maritime Code by a Congress, also 
the evacuation of Malta by the British troops, and its occupation by 
Russian troops, in case Napoleon absolutely insisted on such a clause 
as a sine qua non of peace. The British Ambassador fought these two 
proposals and finally procured the abandonment of the former, the other 
being made conditional on the consent of the British Government ,which 
of course, would not be forthcoming. Leveson-Gower counted the 
insertion of this proviso a diplomatic triumph ; but he had not reckoned 
on the pertinacity of Alexander, who finally demanded the inclusion of 
the original demand. It met with an equally firm refusal at London, 
Mulgrave declaring, on June 5th, that Great Britain was ready to give 
up important conquests in the East and West Indies, but could not 
now surrender Malta, which protected the Levant and the kingdom of 
Naples. The island in British hands was a purely defensive station, but 
in those of France would be a constant menace to Sicily, southern 
Italy and the East 1 . Moreover, in April, 1805, Great Britain had 
despatched about 7000 troops, under General Sir James Craig, to the 
Mediterranean over a sea not under her control 2 ; while the Tsar was 
sending from Sevastopol and Corfu a larger force, under General Lacey 
(Lasci), which depended largely upon British transports. How Great 
Britain was to support these forces in southern Italy if she gave up 
Malta, was not explained by Alexander and his advisers. 

1 Third Coalition, pp. 127-40, 155. 

2 Gen. H. Bunbury, The Great War, pp. 181-97. 



ANGLO-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS AND NAPOLEON 339 

In a final effort to placate them, Pitt and Mulgrave consented to 
the eventual admission of a Russian garrison to Valetta, provided that 
the States bordering on France should be strengthened sufficiently to 
form a solid barrier against French aggression, and, also, that arrange- 
ments could be made with Spain for the cession of Minorca to Great 
Britain in place of Malta. This last provision found definite expression 
in Mulgrave's despatch of June 7th, while Pitt, in a majestic survey of 
the services of Great Britain to the common cause, set forth cogent 
reasons why the transfer of Malta to Russia would not strengthen her 
efforts. Yet, very reluctantly, he consented to accept some other station 
in the Mediterranean , provided that Sardinia were greatly strengthened , 
that Switzerland gained entire independence, and that Prussia acquired 
Luxemburg and the country between the Moselle, Rhine and Meuse, 
so as to interpose a strong military barrier between France and the 
Dutch Netherlands 1 . The scheme adumbrates that which came about 
in 1814. 

Long before the British despatches of June 5th and 7th reached 
Petrograd, Novossiltzoff had left for Berlin, en route for Paris 2 . The 
situation accordingly was complex and obscure. Ostensibly, he was 
about to offer to Napoleon, in answer to his New Year's appeal, the 
Anglo-Russian terms for a general pacification; but the two Powers 
disagreed on important topics; and their disagreement could hardly 
escape his eager scrutiny. We now know that Napoleon was resolved 
not to listen to Russia's mediation 3 . 

Indeed, during his Italian tour of the early summer of 1805, his 
deeds and writings betrayed supreme contempt for the other Powers. 
A prey to megalomania, he expressed complete belief in the success of 
his schemes for the invasion of England or Ireland, adding that, as a 
result, " the Indies are ours when we want to take them." He scoffed 
at the Anglo-Russian negotiations and ridiculed the notion that another 
Coalition could be formed 4 . Yet he took the steps that were best 
calculated to provoke it. First, he declared himself King of Italy — 
a signal infraction of the Treaty of Luneville — and, soon afterwards, 
he framed the daring plan of annexing to France the Ligurian or 
Genoese Republic, which he carried into effect on June 4th 5 . This 

1 Third Coalition, pp. 165-74; Corbett, Campaign of Trafalgar, App. A. The 
Minorca proposal has been overlooked by Sorel (vi. 417) and most writers. 

2 He left Petrograd on June nth and reached Berlin on June 23rd (G. Jackson, 
Diaries, I. 300). 

3 Lettres inedites de Talleyrand, p. 131. 

4 Nap. Corr., Nos. 8788-92, 8807, 8813. 

5 E. Driault, Austerlitz, p. 179. 



340 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

coup defoudre at once cleared away the murk that hung over the Con- 
tinent. The timid acquiescence of Francis in threats that came from 
Paris, and his peevish exaggeration of trifling differences with the 
Courts of London and Petrograd, gave place to a secret resolve to end 
the humiliating subservience to France. 

Even more marked was the change in the Tsar. Annoyance at the 
stiff resistance of Pitt was overborne by fierce resentment at the 
rapacity of Napoleon ; and he sent off Instructions to Novossiltzoff at 
Berlin, to return to the Prussian officials the French passports which 
they had procured for him and to break off the overture to Napoleon. 
The Envoy, in doing so on July ioth, informed Hardenberg that the 
French annexation of Genoa and the manner of its accomplishment 
ended all hopes of peace. He, also, wrote to Vorontzoff at London, 
stating that the selfishness and isolation of Prussia precluded all hope of 
assistance from her, but that Austrian troops would be ready to march 
westwards by the middle of August. As for the North- Germans, they 
now saw that Napoleon was "no angel but a devil," ready to swallow 
Germany if she remained inactive. At Petrograd, also, after a final 
protest on the Maltese affair, Czartoryski consented to shelve both it 
and the Malta- Minorca exchange proposal. Accordingly on July 28th, 
the Anglo-Russian Treaty of April nth was ratified, the former article 
respecting Malta being omitted. On August 9th, Stadion, the Austrian 
Ambassador, signified secretly the accession of Francis II to that 
Treaty 1 . Thus, within nine weeks the Genoese incident brought about 
the formation of a Coalition which British diplomacy had failed to 
effect during twenty-six months. 

The Treaty of April nth, 1805, forms the first official attempt at 
reestablishing the European System on firm and just foundations. Its 
main object is to form a General League of European States in order 
to restrict France within her ancient borders, and restore the Balance 
of Power on the territorial basis noted above, so as to "guarantee the 
safety and independence of the different States and oppose a solid 
barrier to future usurpations." For this purpose, Great Britain will 
supply her sea and land forces and her transports where necessary, and 
will aid her Allies throughout the War by subsidies at the yearly rate 
of £1,250,000 for each body of 100,000 regular troops, also by pre- 
liminary subsidies. The Allies agree not to lay down their arms before 
the conclusion of a General Peace. Ten separate articles provide for 

1 Third Coalition, pp. 189-97, App. 1, n ; Paget Papers, It, 186; G. Jackson, 
Diaries, 1. 458. 



THE THIRD COALITION 341 

the accession of " the Emperor of Germany " and the King of Sweden, 
if they will act against France within four months ; also of Prussia and 
Denmark; the addition of the Belgic Provinces to the Dutch Republic, 
and of Geneva (then French) to the Swiss; the furnishing of 250,000 
troops by Austria and 1 15,000 (finally increased to 180,000) by Russia, 
"besides levies raised by her in Albania, Greece, etc." other con- 
tingents raising the total to 500,000 men; also, the accession of Spain 
and Portugal, Great Britain using Russia's mediation to make peace 
with, and win over, Spain. By the sixth and seventh separate articles 
the Allies bind themselves not to interfere with the desire of the French 
respecting the form of government, or with that of other countries 
where their armies shall act, not to appropriate to themselves con- 
quests made before the Peace, but on its conclusion to assemble a 
Congress to discuss and fix the bases of International Law. They also 
assign to Prussia, in case she joins them, her former lands west of the 
Rhine, with an addition "more or less great," which will extend her 
dominions to the French frontier on the side of the Belgic Provinces 
(Cologne and Juliers are implied). By a separate and secret article they 
agree to respect the agrarian settlement effected by the French Revolu- 
tion, and state that, though monarchy will best assure the repose of 
France and of Europe, they will seek its restoration by spreading that 
conviction in France, not by a preliminary and formal proclamation. 
They leave the Dutch and Swiss free to choose their Governments, 
but will see with pleasure the choice of the House of Orange by the 
former, and will advise the King of Sardinia to grant to his people 
suitable institutions. They also express the hope that a System of 
International Law may be "guaranteed by general assent and by the 
establishment in Europe of a federal system assuring the independence 
of weak States and presenting a formidable barrier against the ambition 
of the stronger." 

The proposals for the assembly of a Congress for the redaction of 
principles of International Law and the foundation of a European 
Federal System were due to the generous initiative of Alexander ; but, 
according to the testimony of Czartoryski, Mulgrave and Leveson- 
Gower, they met with complete sympathy and support from the 
British Government. The statement just quoted respecting the French 
monarchy also accords with Pitt's earlier declarations; and, but for 
some trace of resentment in Alexander's mind about Malta and Mari- 
time Law, the agreement between the British and Russian Governments 
was complete. By insisting on the differences between the British 



342 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

draft treaty of March 15th, 1805, and the elaborate document that we 
have now summarised, Thiers and other historians have been led to 
expatiate on the distinction between the generous spirit of Alexander 
and the narrowly insular aims of Great Britain. That distinction is 
overdrawn. The early drafts of a compact generally differ greatly from 
its final form; and the British Foreign Office was not accustomed to 
insert ideal aspirations in its treaties. Moreover, in this case it sought 
to provide primarily for the establishment of peace and security. But 
popular liberties were also to be safeguarded and, as we have seen, 
Leveson-Gower championed those of Liguria against Czartoryski 
There is, also, good reason for thinking that, except in regard to 
Maritime Law, Pitt and his colleagues did not fall short of Alexander 
in desiring the foundation of an International System. Where they 
differed was in facility of expression. 

To root ideas in actuality is the test of statesmanship. The task 
was peculiarly difficult in the year 1805. Great Britain could act only 
through the slow and indirect method of maritime blockade. Russia 
could act only by means of the territories of Austria or Prussia, the 
latter of whom clung to a profitable neutrality, while the former was a 
prey to poverty, nervousness and divided counsels. The Habsburg 
Power joined the Allies under the impulse of the news from Genoa, 
which yielded one more proof that peace with Napoleon was more 
dangerous than war. Towards Paget, the British Ambassador, the 
Court of Vienna maintained extreme reserve, and, perhaps for the sake 
of secrecy, it conducted all its negotiations with us at Petrograd, finally, 
after much insistence, securing the offer of an initial subsidy. The 
Chancellor, Count Lewis von Cobenzl, entreated that negotiations 
with France might be kept up to the last so as to avert the danger of 
an attack from Napoleon before the Russians arrived. Yet Austria's 
plan of campaign, first sketched in outline on July 19th, erred in two 
important respects. Believing Napoleon to be absorbed in his scheme 
of invading England, the Hofkriegsrath assigned to the chief army 
under Arch-duke Charles the operations in North Italy ; while General 
Mack, with whom he was on bad terms, was to advance with a smaller 
force into Bavaria. Still more serious was the miscalculation as to 
time, 80 days being reckoned as the minimum within which Napoleon's 
Grand Army could march from Boulogne to the Upper Danube, and 
60 days for the Russian army cantoned near the Galician border to 
arrive in support of Mack. The latter calculation was nearly correct; 
the former was too long by three weeks ; and in that error lay the chief 



BREAKDOWN OF THE THIRD COALITION 343 

cause of the disaster of Ulm which struck the Third Coalition to the 
heart 1 . 

Other causes, however, contributed to this event. Austria counted 
on the aid of the Elector of Bavaria, but wrongly ; for, after dissembling 
his intentions, he joined Napoleon so soon as the vanguard of the 
Grand Army appeared on the River Main. Consequently, the Allies 
were unexpectedly weak at their centre; and it soon appeared that 
they had spent too much strength on enveloping moves at their extreme 
right and left. Russia and Great Britain sent large contingents into 
northernGermany. After wearisome negotiations with Sweden concern- 
ing the choice of Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania as base 2 , an Anglo- 
Russo- Swedish force began to assemble on the lower Elbe, much to 
the annoyance of Frederick William, who, besides being on the worst 
of terms with Gustavus, regarded Hanover as his by reversion. Pitt 
and Mulgrave, hoping to bribe Prussia into active support of this 
expedition, expected that in the spring of 1806, at the least, 250,000 
Allies would sweep the French from the Netherlands and attack 
France through the northern plain — a dream cherished in 1794 and 
1799, but not destined to fulfilment until 18 14. 

Nor was this all. The Anglo-Russian expedition destined for 
southern Italy was to assist in driving the French from the Peninsula. 
As a political move the plan had some merit ; but on naval and military 
grounds it was open to censure . For it was clear that , if (as sound strategy 
required) Napoleon recalled his troops from the heel of Italy in order 
to concentrate in her northern plain, the expedition would merely 
beat the air. This is what happened — and not only in south-eastern 
Italy, but also in Hanover. Recalling his troops from those extremities, 
the great captain massed them in central positions where they would 
act with telling effect. Thus, as happened in the case of all the Coalitions, 
France opposed swift concentration to the enveloping and ill concerted 
movements of Allies, who greatly outnumbered her except at the one 
essential point. 

The danger of Austria succumbing before the arrival of Russian 
succours ought to have stirred Prussia to prompt action. This the 
British Government sought to assure. So soon as Napoleon's moves 
towards the Danube were fully ascertained, it despatched Harrowby 
on a special mission to Berlin, for the purpose of bringing that Court, 
and if possible those of Denmark, Saxony and Hesse-Cassel, into line 

1 Third Coalition, pp. 190, 283. 

2 Koch and Scholl, 11. 366, 370. 



344 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

against France. Alopeus, Prussian Ambassador in London, had already 
been sounding the Pitt Administration about pecuniary help; and, 
on October 27th, Mulgrave instructed Harrowby to offer Prussia 
£2,500,000 a year in subsidies for the support of 200,000 men in 
active service, the purpose being to drive the French from the Dutch 
Republic and to protect Dutch and North German territory during 
the war. In order to complete the Barrier system, the Belgic Provinces 
were to be offered to Prussia, intermediate districts between them and 
her present domains being added, so as to facilitate her communica- 
tions with this new territory. These offers were subject to the approval 
of the Tsar and his representative at Berlin, who would also discuss 
with Harrowby the additions to Austria's territories, if she manifested 
jealousy at Prussia's proposed acquisitions. Great Britain, for her part, 
while vetoing all discussion of her Maritime Code, was prepared to 
forego her colonial gains except Malta and the Cape of Good Hope 1 . 

The choice of Harrowby for so difficult a mission is unaccountable ; 
for his accident had shaken a constitution naturally infirm; and Jack- 
son, with a spice of jealousy, pronounced him a peevish invalid, often 
incapacitated by fits and incapable even of ordinary duties 2 . He arrived 
at Berlin on November 16th, a stranger to its intrigues, and needing 
constant instruction from Jackson, whom for the time he superseded. 
The situation at that capital was highly critical. The Tsar had arrived 
there three weeks earlier , for the purpose of gaining permission (hitherto 
firmly refused) for his troops to enter Prussian territory. In this he 
now succeeded, thanks to the effrontery of the French in violating the 
principality of Ansbach (ceded to Prussia in 1791). Under the sting 
of this insult, Frederick William seemed inclined to act with vigour 
against France. He allowed the Russians to enter his territory and 
entered into friendly discussions with Alexander as to cooperation with 
the Allies, in case Napoleon should refuse to accept the armed media- 
tion of Prussia. Meanwhile, the French having evacuated Hanover, 
in order to concentrate against Mack, he ordered a Prussian force 
to occupy that Electorate. The news followed of the surrender of 
practically the whole of Mack's army at and near Ulm. It clinched 
the predominance of Prussia, and enabled her to raise her terms, while 
the Tsar felt bound to humour her, in order to ensure speedy and 
vigorous action against Napoleon's flank or rear. 

These circumstances explain the conditions which Prussia virtually 

1 Third Coalition, pp. 207-20. 

2 G. Jackson, Diaries, I. 377; Rose, Pitt, p. 545, Pt II. 



PROPOSED TRANSFER OF HANOVER TO PRUSSIA 345 

dictated to the Tsar in the Secret Treaty of Potsdam (November 3rd, 
1805). With 180,000 troops, she would join the Allies, if within four 
weeks Napoleon should refuse her terms for a general settlement on 
the following lines : for France, the boundaries of the Peace of Luneville 
(i.e. "the natural frontiers," with the exception of the south of the 
Dutch Netherlands); an indemnity for the King of Sardinia at the 
expense of the " kingdom of Italy " (a clause which implied the reten- 
tion of Piedmont by France) ; the withdrawal of French troops from 
Germany, the Dutch and Swiss republics and Naples; the indepen- 
dence of the kingdom of Lombardy; the line of the Mincio, with 
Mantua, for Austria in northern Italy ; and a surer frontier for Prussia. 
One or two phrases pointed to a more rigid restriction of French power, 
should Fortune favour the Allies. But the sting of the Treaty lay in 
the first secret article, which stipulated Prussia's eventual acquisition 
of Hanover either by exchange or other arrangement. For the attain- 
ment of this object the Tsar promised, very reluctantly, to use his good 
offices. As for the exchange, Prussia's principality of East-Frisia was 
named ; and Hardenberg (who disliked the whole proposal) spoke of 
the possible acquisition by the House of Brunswick of Upper Gelder- 
land and Juliers — the latter of which Harrowby was about to offer to 
Prussia 1 . 

These last proposals were kept secret from Harrowby ; but a Russian 
Special Envoy, d'Oubril, was charged to present the whole Treaty to 
the British Government. Its disclosure came as a shock to Pitt and 
Mulgrave. That Prussia should angle after Hanover was not surprising, 
though their offers to her (if in time) might have caused some sense 
of shame at her present demand; but that the Tsar should, however 
reluctantly, support a scheme for despoiling his Ally to benefit a 
calculating trimmer, passed belief. The proposal was made shortly 
after the news of Trafalgar had sent a thrill of sorrow but also of 
exultation through these islands. Well, therefore, might Pitt remark 
to Vorontzoff that, if England had been beaten at sea and compelled 
to sign a separate peace, such a proposal would have been out of the 
question. He refrained from so much as naming it to the King, for 
fear of killing him or driving him mad. Vorontzoff regarded it " with 
inexpressible astonishment" and begged that he might be spared the 

1 Hansing, Hardenberg und die dritte Coalition, ad fin.; H. Ulmann, Russisch- 
preussische Politik (1801-6), pp. 237, 270-2; Hardenberg, Denkwiirdigkeiten (11, 
P- 353) stated that Harrowby offered the Dutch Netherlands to Prussia; but he 
offered " such acquisitions on the side of Holland and the Low Countries " as would 
strengthen her influence upon them {Third Coalition, pp. 226, 227). 



346 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

humiliation of presenting a formal demand on this head. If he felt the 
shock, how much more did Pitt! Cut to the quick by Mack's disaster 
at Ulm, though hereupon cheered by the triumph at Trafalgar, he was 
once more struck down by Prussia's demand, backed as it was by 
Alexander. Collecting himself by a visible effort, he declared to 
Vorontzoff his readiness to make great sacrifices to satisfy Prussia, but 
never at the expense of the patrimony of George III. He, also, pro- 
tested against the utter indifference of our Allies to the sentiments and 
interests of Great Britain 1 . 

With a last rebound of his sanguine nature, he sought to satisfy 
Prussia's land-hunger by some other means and thus bring about her 
armed mediation at Paris, which Napoleon, full-blown with triumph, 
would certainly reject. Then Prussia and the Allies might liberate the 
Dutch Netherlands, and a general peace might come to pass, Great 
Britain restoring all her conquests except Malta and the Cape. Or, 
at the worst, she could fight on, leaving " our perfidious Allies " to do 
what they could for themselves. On December 5th, he wrote more 
fully in the same strain. Criticism of Pitt's plans in 1805 is generally 
based on the assumption that they were fantastic and unsound. But 
all the dictates of sound policy should have induced Prussia to take 
up arms against the French Emperor, whose enormous power and 
unconcealed contempt for her threatened her overthrow. It was the 
conduct of Frederick William and his advisers that ran counter to the 
reasonable expectations on which statesmanship is based. Who could 
have foreseen the surrender of Frederick William to Napoleon, his 
mean acceptance of Hanover at the Emperor's hands, and the sequel — 
Jena, with the countless humiliations that followed? 

For a time, Frederick William prepared to draw the sword ; Harden- 
berg (always a friend to England) strove to find some compromise as to 
Hanover ; Harrowby , though now exceedingly ill, made tempting offers 
to Prussia ; and her General Staff not only took under Prussian pro- 
tection and control the Allied forces in Hanover, but also held in leash 
a great army of veterans ready to spring at Napoleon's rear, so soon 
as he should reject the conditions offered by Haugwitz, her Plenipo- 
tentiary, at the sword's point. Through this web of schemes the French 
Emperor struck at Austerlitz. Four days later, Austria concluded with 
the conqueror an armistice on the basis of the withdrawal of the Russians 
from her territory. The Tsar now appealed for help to the King of 
Prussia, who, during a few days, seemed about to grant it. But, mean- 

1 Czartoryski, Memoirs, II. ch. IX. 



END OF PITT AND OF THE THIRD COALITION 347 

while, the Allied cause had been betrayed by Haugwitz. That time- 
servingpoliticianwas only too ready to rise to Napoleon'sbait, Hanover, 
and, bringing with him the attractive offer of peace and the Electorate, 
he returned to Berlin. 

Tidings of these disasters filtered through slowly to the British 
Government in the closing days of the year. Pitt had gone to Bath 
to recover from a sharp attack of the gout and to gain strength for the 
struggle with the Foxites and Addingtonians in the coming session. 
Their recent attacks on Lord Melville (accused of malversation at the 
Admiralty), and their arraignment of the Government's lavish expen- 
diture in aid of uncertain Allies, had already been so fierce that 
Huskisson taunted them with building their hopes of place and power 
on the ruins of Europe 1 . Now their opposition bade fair both to 
overthrow Ministers and to reverse theirforeign policy. Pitt alone could 
defend it adequately before the half- doubtful, half-hostile Commons; 
and even his oratory would pale if Fortune frowned on all his enter- 
prises. The Grenvilles had bitterly censured his sending a large force 
to Hanover on the chance of Prussia's cooperation, and so did the 
Army itself 2 . And now there came news of the havoc dealt by a storm 
to the expeditionary force, then of the defection of Austria and retreat 
of the Tsar, lastly, of the sinister behaviour of Prussia. Surmising 
the truth, that Hanover was her overmastering desire, Mulgrave on 
January 6th, 1806, urged on Pitt the necessity of tempting her to 
immediate action by the offer of the Dutch Netherlands 3 . This 
degrading suggestion elicited no reply. A week later, there fell on 
Pitt the last blow of all, the news that Frederick William had acceded 
to Napoleon's terms. It was true. That monarch, as usual, had 
resolved to take the easiest and most profitable course. His decision 
to accept peace with dishonour was fraught with momentous results. 
On Prussia, it entailed a loss of moral worse than a dozen defeats in 
the field. For the Allies, it involved the reversal of their plans for the 
liberation of the Dutch Netherlands and their withdrawal from Hanover 
at the fiat of Berlin. For Pitt himself, it meant death. On January 23rd 
he sank to rest. 

The political causes of the collapse of this imposing Coalition are 
not far to seek. The inveterate jealousy between Prussia and Austria still 
defied the utmost efforts of Great Britain and Russia to bring those 

1 Horner, Corr. i. 347. 

- Dropmore Papers, VII. 316-20. 

3 See Appendix F. 



348 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

Powers to accord. For a short space after the Ansbach incident, a 
union of the four Great Powers appeared to be near at hand ; and if 
Hardenberg had been sovereign of Prussia, her splendid army, 
launched against Napoleon's rear, might have altered the course of 
history. But short-sighted selfishness then dictated her policy; and 
the Coalition, strong at the wings but weak at the centre, reeled under 
the home-thrust of a master of war whose expansive policy in time of 
peace had not yet betrayed him into a diffuse and ineffective strategy. 
Eight years were to pass before adversity grouped them in a compact 
phalanx, and prosperity relaxed his grip on both political and military 
combinations. 



Ill 

The Pitt Administration was succeeded by an ill-assorted union 
of the Grenvilles with Foxites and Addingtonians, soon to be dubbed 
"the Ministry of all the Talents." Lord Grenville became First Lord 
of the Treasury, and in September, 1806, his brother Thomas suc- 
ceeded Grey at the Admiralty ; Fox took the Foreign Office ; Spencer, 
Home Affairs, and Windham the War and Colonial Office. Addington 
(now Lord Sidmouth) became Lord Privy Seal, and, in October, 1806, 
Lord President. The Grenville Ministry, as it should be called, carried 
the Abolition of the Slave Trade, and some other useful measures of 
late postponed by Pitt. But its raison d'etre was, first, opposition to 
his policy of European Coalitions, and, second, the conclusion of 
peace, if it could be secured without too great sacrifices. Accordingly, 
Ministers sought to withdraw from Continental entanglements and to 
embark on a more purely British policy. Trafalgar, Austerlitz and the 
defection of Prussia pointed the moral of the situation. The three 
Coalitions against France, sapped by mutual distrust and jealousy, had 
served but to aggrandise her power. Thanks to the First Coalition, 
she had acquired "the natural frontiers" together with a firm control 
over the United Netherlands and northern Italy. The Second Coalition 
yielded to her Piedmont and the hegemony of Switzerland. And now, 
the pitiful collapse of the Austro-Russian defence enabled her to 
acquire from the Habsburgs eastern Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia, to 
drive them out of Germany and exalt their rivals, Prussia and Bavaria. 
Well might Napoleon defy Great Britain to attempt to form yet 
another Coalition 1 . 

1 Nap. Corr. 9929. 



SICILY HELD 349 

The diffuse efforts of the Allies against southern Italy and Hanover 
were now speedily reversed. Napoleon's swift centripetal moves from 
those outlying parts having won decisive triumphs in the valleys of the 
Danube and the Po, he now prepared to reoccupy southern Italy and 
to make profitable use of Hanover in the hitherto unratified compact 
with Prussia. In both cases, as also in the crushing terms imposed on 
Austria, there appears the new Leitmotif of his policy, his "coast- 
system," soon to be re-named the Continental System. A note of 
intense eagerness pervades all his references, early in the year 1806, 
to southern Italy and Sicily. As Ferdinand IV and Maria Carolina 
had thrown off the mask of neutrality and admitted the Anglo-Russian 
expedition, he now accused them of perfidy, declared them deposed, 
and ordered Massena and Joseph Bonaparte with a large French force 
to drive the Allies into the sea. "Above all do not lose a moment in 
tryingto capture Sicily 1 ." The Crown of theTwo Sicilieswasheld out as 
the prize for Joseph. On the collapse of the Neapolitan defence, General 
Craig determined to embark for Sicily, which his original Instructions 
pointed out as far more important than Naples; and, despite the 
clamour of Maria Carolina and the representations of our Ambassador, 
Hugh Elliot, he withdrew the British force to Messina. Lacey also 
retired with his Russians to Corfu. The King, Queen and H. Elliot 
sought refuge at Palermo, where General Acton (latterly out of favour) 
resumed his position as Chief Minister. There can be little doubt that 
Craig's prompt withdrawal and the measures taken by Collingwood 
to protect the Bourbons at Palermo saved Sicily from French domina- 
tion. The Sicilians detested the Bourbons and longed for British rule, 
a fact which partly explains the tortuous intrigues of Maria Carolina 
against our officials in Sicily. A British victory at Maida in Calabria 
(July, 1806) averted all danger of a speedy French conquest of that 
island 2 . 

Though Great Britain thus retained in the Mediterranean two 
islands which prevented Napoleon's domination of that sea — but 
principal de ma politique — yet on the coast of the North Sea he achieved 
over her a bloodless triumph, the fruit of his masterly bargainings with 
Prussia. That Power, having occupied Hanover and assured the 
ignominious retirement of the Anglo-Russian forces, demobilised, as 
though peace were secure. Never was there a worse blunder. Napoleon, 

1 Nap. Corr. 9781, 9788. 

2 Bunbury, The Great War with France, pp. 210-56, 415-36; Collingwood, 
Memoirs, 183-96; Diary of Sir John Moore, II. ch. xxn. 



350 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

encouraged by this news and by the appointment of Fox as British 
Foreign Minister, believed that he had the game in his hands; and, 
when Haugwitz at Paris in February, 1806, sought to gain his consent 
to certain changes in the Franco-Prussian compact of December, 1805, 
he found the Emperor inexorable. Finally, on February 15th, 1806, that 
luckless statesman had to sign what was in effect a new Treaty, whereby 
Prussia ceded Ansbach to the Elector (now King) of Bavaria, and was 
forced to agree to the immediate and definitive acquisition of Hanover, 
and to close all that coastline to British trade. Frederick William 
must now have seen the significance of Napoleon's "Greek gift" of 
Hanover. Eventually, it must involve war with Great Britain. Never- 
theless, on March 9th, he ratified the new Treaty, and sought to 
placate George III by offering him East-Frisia and certain other 
districts. In reply, King George protested against the spoliation of his 
ancestral territory, urged the King of Prussia not to " set the dreadful 
example of indemnifying himself at the expense of a third party," 
and concluded by appealing to the Head of the Empire, and to the 
Tsar as guarantor of the Germanic System. Nothing came of this 
appeal ; for the Holy Roman Empire was tottering to its fall. But Great 
Britain, already indignant at Prussian perfidy, promptly retaliated 
against exclusion from the most valuable corridor still open to British 
commerce. On May 16th, Fox ordered the blockade of the estuaries 
of the Trave, Elbe, Weser and Ems, and this was soon extended to the 
whole coastline between the Elbe and Brest. This "paper blockade" 
caused great annoyance to neutrals, especially to the United States; 
and the blockade of Prussia's new territory led to a state of hostility 
which was formally recognised on June nth. Thus did Napoleon 
extend his coast-system. He had " thrust Prussia into the North " and 
compelled her to annex Hanover, in order to embroil her with the 
Island Power 1 . 

When peace aggrandised the Napoleonic System no less swiftly and 
surely than war, it might have seemed futile to enter into negotiations 
for a general settlement. Yet, so sanguine was the nature of Fox that he 
made the attempt. The warm sympathy that endeared him to all his 
friends had welled forth to all the manifestations of French democracy ; 
and an admirer noted that his excessive hopes for that movement 
sprang from his habit of giving free rein to sentiment and too little 
time to enquiry and reflexion. The same generous failing, probably, 
accounts for his predilection for Napoleon. After a visit to Paris in 
1 Nap. Corr., 9810, 981 1. 



FOX ATTEMPTS NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE 351 

1802, the Whig leader expressed the belief that the First Consul, 
however hostile to this country, desired to reduce the military spirit 
and to make the French a commercial people 1 . Romilly, who was also 
in Paris, came to an opposite and far saner conclusion 2 . The belief 
that Napoleon was wedded to peace and "afraid of war to the last 
degree" was another of Fox's delusions, worthy of a place beside his 
conviction that, if war came, Grey was "literally" the only Briton 
who could conduct it 3 . The situation was therefore piquant, when Fox, 
with his fervid aspirations after peace , sought to compass it under a chief 
whom he had firmly opposed because of his bellicose and reactionary 
tendencies. Unfortunately, his letters are rare in these last nine months 
of his career; but his actions betoken so unruffled a dignity amidst 
countless disappointments, so firm a resolve to tread the path of 
honour, as to reveal the loss which the nation sustained through his 
exclusion from office in 1794 and in 1804 by the fiat of George III. 
On February 20th, 1806, Fox prepared the way for the negotiations 
by revealing to Talleyrand the details of an alleged plot for the murder 
of Napoleon, which had been mooted to him. The Emperor replied 
in suitable terms and, in his speech of March 2nd to the Corps 
Legislatif, offered peace to Great Britain on the basis of the Treaty 
of Amiens. Conscious, perhaps, that this Treaty was now defunct, 
he modified the offer in his survey of French affairs to the Senate 
(March 5th). True, he spoke in terms which implied the continuance of 
French domination over the Netherlands, the Rhineland and Italy, the 
annexation of Genoa being also explained as a necessary result of that of 
Piedmont. He further alluded to the extension of his federative system 
over the Dutch Netherlands, Istria and Dalmatia as indispensable 
to French power, and therefore irrevocable ; but he proposed a pacifica- 
tion on the general principle of recognising our recent acquisitions in 
the Indies as an equivalent to the extension of his power in Europe 4 . 
Here was a conceivable basis for a settlement; and, on March 26th, 
Fox replied, stating that some of the Amiens terms were vague, but 
expressing the hope of the British Government for an equitable com- 
promise between the two Powers and their respective Allies. He added, 
however, that he could not negotiate, still less conclude, a treaty 
without the participation of Russia. To this statement, Talleyrand, on 
April 1st, sent the rejoinder, that Napoleon attributed the rupture of 

1 F. Horner, Memoirs, I. 255, 348. 

2 Life of Sir S. Romilly, 1. 415-23. 

3 Corr. of C. J. Fox, in. 372, 381, 385, 391, 406. 

* Nap. Corr. No. 9929; Moniteur, March 6th, 1806. 



352 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

the Peace of Amiens, not to this or that article, but to his refusal to 
conclude with Great Britain a treaty of commerce such as would harm 
French industries ; that she must give up all thought of interfering 
in French arrangements (presumably those relating to commerce); 
that she was a great Sea Power, while France was a great Land 
Power; therefore, the participation of another Land Power (Russia) 
would be unfair, and he would never place himself, as regards 
Continental affairs, at the discretion of Great Britain and that of Russia 
operating conjointly. 

This reply augured ill for an accommodation. Under the specious 
plea that Great Britain and France were equal in strength on their 
respective elements and therefore must meet each other alone, 
Napoleon was about to eliminate our Ally from the negotiation which 
Fox had declared must proceed conjointly with her, or not at all. 
Besides, it was certain that Napoleon would bring in his Spanish, 
Italian and Dutch Allies; otherwise the peace would be partial. Accord- 
ingly, Great Britain must, in honour, include Russia and Sweden in the 
negotiations. Such was the purport of Fox's answer on April 8th ; and 
he further stated that, while deeming a treaty of commerce advantageous 
to both countries, he would postpone it as a matter for future arrange- 
ment. Napoleon, however, absolutely declined to discuss matters with 
the Coalition and insisted on treating with Great Britain alone. To 
this demand Fox, on April 21st, sent a firm refusal, repeating it on 
June 14th, with the expression of a hope that the negotiation might 
secure the tranquillity of Europe. Meanwhile, Talleyrand had sent 
for the Earl of Yarmouth, who was then at the depot for British 
prisoners at Verdun, and proposed through him to make secret com- 
munications to Fox 1 . With this proposal Fox concurred. Talleyrand, 
therefore, when pressed by Yarmouth, stated that Napoleon would 
make no difficulty about the restitution of Hanover by Prussia to 
George III. As for the Bourbons and Sicily, "vous Vavez ; nous ne vous la 
demandons pas." Asked whether France would guarantee the integrity 
of the Ottoman empire, he replied in the affirmative ; but it must be 
soon; for "beaucoup se prepare, mats rien n' est fait." 

The hint gained in significance from the weekly extensions of 

Napoleon's authority. After aggrandising his South-German Allies 

and proclaiming Joseph Bonaparte King of Naples, the Emperor 

1 Francis Seymour, Earl of Yarmouth and second Marquis of Hertford (1743- 
1822), sat in Parliament from 1766 to 1794, and was Plenipotentiary to Berlin and 
Vienna in 1794 (see ch. 11). The despatches summarised above are in Pari. Papers 
(December 22nd, 1806). See, too, Ann. Reg. (1806), pp. 708-91. 



INTENTIONS OF NAPOLEON 353 

declared his brother Lewis King of Holland, a project dating from 
March 8th, 1806, and carried into effect on June 5th. On the same 
day, he appropriated the Papal enclaves of Benevento and Ponte- 
corvo, assigning them as dukedoms to Talleyrand and Bernadotte 1 . 
Meanwhile, he was pressing on with his German lieges the scheme of 
the Confederation of the Rhine; and on July 12th he secretly signed 
with the Kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, and certain lesser Princes, 
a Treaty to that effect 2 . For the present, he concealed it, probably in 
the hope of inducing Great Britain and Russia to sign separate treaties 
of peace before they heard of this revolutionary change in Central 
Europe. Thus, partly by intimidation, partly by secret diplomacy, he 
intended to separate his opponents and compel them to surrender at 
discretion. 

His intentions appear clearly in his Correspondence. On May 31st 
he writes to Talleyrand, complaining that the extreme weakness of 
Prussia leaves him little hope that she will assist him in compelling 
England to make peace. She will not even close the Sound to British 
ships. Therefore, he must go on with the British negotiation and look 
about for some other lands to grant to Prussia, in case she has to give 
back Hanover to George III. Some domain of 300,000 inhabitants, 
say, Hesse-Cassel, will do for her. Further, he urges King Joseph to 
prepare to seize Sicily ; for peace will be made with the British when 
that island is secured. By July 4th, he decides never to allow Great 
Britain to keep Malta and maintain control over Sicily ; for this would 
form an "impassable barrier" to French communications with the 
Adriatic and the Levant. She must therefore give up either Malta or 
Sicily ; and in either case, he will humour her about Hanover. Similarly, 
he will grant a separate peace to Russia, reluctantly leaving Corfu to 
her 3 . These letters explain why neither Great Britain nor Russia could 
make peace with him, and why Prussia broke with him. For the 
present, his divulsive plans prospered. The Russian Plenipotentiary, 
d'Oubril, who arrived at Paris on July 6th, was so dazzled by his 
splendour, or cowed by his threats, as to sign with Talleyrand a separate 
Treaty, a secret article of which stipulated the cession of Sicily to 
King Joseph, Ferdinand IV receiving from Spain the Balearic Isles 

1 Nap. Corr. 9944, 10314, 10316. 

2 H. A. L. Fisher, Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany, ch. v; E. Driault, 
Austerlitz, pp. 376-88. On August 6th, Francis II abdicated as Head of the Holy 
Roman Empire; and that venerable organism expired. 

3 Nap. Corr. Nos. 10396, 10409, 10416, 10448, 10499. For Gentz's comments 
on the negotiations of 1806, see Sir R. Adair, Mission to Vienna, ad fin. 

W.&G. 1. 23 



354 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

for his son Francis, the former Prince Royal (July 20th). Believing 
that he had saved Germany from the projected Napoleonic League 
and Austria from ruin, d'Oubril hurried back to Petrograd, there to 
meet with an indignant reception by his master, who repudiated this 
degrading compact. 

Yet Napoleon had won a respite of some weeks, and had for the 
time separated the Allies. He now turned against Great Britain, 
resolved to wrest Sicily from her at all costs : witness the last sentence 
of his letter of August 6th to King Joseph — " Peace or war, you shall 
have Sicily 1 ." Accordingly, his Plenipotentiary, General Clarke, 
declared to Yarmouth that, since France had gained a signal success 
by separating the Allies, she must now raise her terms. Yarmouth 
being so indiscreet as to produce his full powers for treating in regular 
form, the negotiation promised to be short. But Fox, rebuking 
Yarmouth for this lapse, sent out to Paris a statesman known for his 
pacific views, the Earl of Lauderdale, to assist him and finally to take 
over his duties. 

The conferences with Clarke during the month of August revealed 
the hopelessness of coming to an accord. Napoleon now scornfully 
rejected the original basis of uti possidetis , which implied Great Britain's 
retention of St Lucia, Tobago, the Cape and Surinam. True, early 
in September, on hearing that Alexander I refused to ratify the Oubril 
compact, he seemed inclined to lower his tone. But now, as ever, the 
crux was Sicily. The principle of good faith to our Neapolitan Ally 
and the dictates of naval strategy alike forbade the surrender of that 
island to Joseph Bonaparte. Moreover, Fox is said to have attached 
great importance to the maintenance of British power in the Mediter- 
ranean 2 . Unfortunately, early in August, he fell seriously ill of the 
dropsy. The symptoms , perhaps , were aggravated by despair at the un- 
favourable turn of the negotiation. When his nephew, Lord Holland, 
ventured to suggest that, after all, some indemnity might be found for 
the Bourbons in lieu of Sicily, he replied : " It is not so much the value 
of the point in dispute as the manner in which the French fly from their 
word that disheartens me. It is not Sicily, but the shuffling, insincere 
way in which they act that shows me they are playing a false game ; and 
in that case it would be very imprudent to make any concessions which 
by possibility could be thought inconsistent with our honour, or could 

1 Nap. Corr. 10657. 

2 Lord Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, II. 340; also, Ann. Reg. (1806), 
ch. IX, which is by him. 



DEATH OF FOX: SICILY REMAINS THE CRUX 355 

furnish our Allies with a plausible pretence for suspecting, reproaching 
or deserting us 1 ." 

Fox died on September 13th. French writers have often represented 
that event as the chief cause for the breakdown of the negotiation, 
asserting that Fox's colleagues and Lauderdale were less peaceably 
inclined than the deceased statesman. Such assertions are at variance 
with the evidence. Holland, who knew both Fox and his colleagues, 
believed that no difference of opinion occurred between him and them 
on this head, and that his death made no difference to the issue of the 
negotiation. Further, with one immaterial exception, the despatches 
sent to Lauderdale after that event deviated neither in matter nor in 
tone from those of March-August 23rd. Moreover, Lauderdale con- 
tinued to make ever)' possible effort to bring about an honourable 
peace, for which since the year 1793 he had consistently striven 2 . He 
remained at Paris until October 6th ; but in vain. On September 24th, 
Napoleon left St Cloud to direct the War to which his insolent treat- 
ment of Prussia had now driven her long-suffering monarch 3 . The 
Instructions left behind for Champagny precluded all hope, either of 
a joint negotiation with Great Britain and Russia or of the retention 
of Sicily by the Neapolitan Bourbons. On September 25th, the French 
Plenipotentiary offered to Great Britain the Cape, Malta, Hanover, 
Tobago and the French settlements in India; but he insisted on the 
cession of Sicily, the Bourbons receiving the Balearic Isles and an 
annuity from the Court of Spain. As these cynical terms were 
Napoleon's ultimatum, the negotiation lapsed. 

Thus, Sicily was the chief cause of the prolongation of the War, 
as Malta had been of its inception. At this point, as at all important 
crises since November, 1792, the Franco-British dispute turned 
essentially on questions of naval strategy. On the surface, there appear 
in 1793, 1797, 1803, 1 806 altercations respecting the Scheldt, Gibraltar, 
Malta, Sicily. What was really at stake was the French control of the 
Dutch Netherlands and mastery of the Mediterranean. A sure instinct 
impelled even peace-loving Ministers to hold out firmly on matters 
that concerned, first, the safety of the East Coast and, finally, the 
communications with India. For the present, Great Britain had to 

1 Ccrr. of C. J. Fox, iv. 476. Sir Robert Adair, Mission to Vienna (Introd.) 
refutes the assertions of Bignon that Fox had offered to cede Sicily ; but the slander 
has been widely accepted. 

2 Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, II. 76-81, 346-52. 

3 The chief cause of the rupture was Hanover (Garden, x. 153). See, too, 
G. Jackson, Diaries, II. 12-14, 501-11. 

23—2 



356 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

acquiesce in French control of Dutch territory ; but she reduced the 
danger by occupying the Cape; and Napoleon's Levantine schemes 
now warned her to hold on both to Malta and Sicily. 

He revenged himself by overthrowing Prussia. So swift were his 
moves that neither Russia nor Great Britain could help her. Austria, 
who could have done so, remembered Prussia's inaction of the year 
before 1 . Consequently, this second phase of the Third Coalition cor- 
responds closely to the first. Prussia takes the place of Austria. Her 
main army having been utterly beaten at Jena-Auerstadt (October 14th), 
the survivors scatter eastwards; not until February, 1807, do the 
Russo-Prussian forces make a determined stand, at Eylau; and not 
until April 26th is the revived Coalition placed on a firm basis by the 
Treaty of Bartenstein between those Powers. To this Treaty Great 
Britain (who had made peace with Prussia) soon acceded, offering a 
subsidy of £1,000,000 on June 27th, a fortnight after the Russians 
were utterly overthrown in the battle of Friedland. So halting had 
been the moves of the Allies, whereby they threw away the few chances 
left open to them by the perfervid genius of Napoleon. 

The sole interest attaching to Great Britain's policy in these gloomy 
months belongs, not to her dilatory diplomacy, but to the develop- 
ment of the elemental struggle between her and Napoleon. On 
November 21st, three weeks after his triumphal entry into Berlin, he 
issued thence his famous Decree, declaring the British Isles in a state of 
blockade, and all commerce and communication with them forbidden, 
all British subjects in French or Allied lands subject to imprisonment 
and all British property good prize , the half of it being used to indemnify 
merchants for the losses inflicted by British cruisers. The preamble 
justifies this measure by a recital of the harsh British customs which 
enjoined the capture of the crews and cargoes of hostile merchant- 
men, the blockade of non-fortified harbours, the practice of nominal 
blockade, even over an entire coast, and, in fine, of all her measures 
calculated to ruin the trade of the Continent. All Napoleon's Allies 
are ordered strictly to carry out this Decree, so that a cordon may be 
drawn against the Islanders, from the Elbe to the south of Italy. The 
King of Holland is urged to great activity in enforcing this Decree — 
"the sole means of striking home at England and compelling her to 
peace" — also, to build 25 sail of the line, so that in four or five years 
Napoleon and his Allies may challenge her maritime supremacy 2 . 

1 Adair, Mission to Vienna, p. 142. 

2 Nap. Corr. 11283, 11377, "378. 



THE BERLIN DECREE: THE UNITED STATES 357 

Such, then, was the Emperor's policy — to utilise the resources of 
all lands under his control, to close them to British commerce, and 
finally to mass their fleets for the utter overthrow of the Island Power. 
The construction of warships which he now pressed on in Dutch, 
French, Spanish and Italian ports furnished a telling commentary on 
this Decree. Commercial war was to prepare for political destruction. 
The programme was merely a gigantic development of ideas set forth 
by the French Jacobins. The Report of January 1st, 1793, to the 
French Convention insisted on the artificiality of the British Empire 
and the facility with which it might be attacked in so many quarters as 
to ensure the ruin of British credit. This notion inspired Bonaparte in 
his Egyptian Expedition. And now, that avenue being closed by the 
British occupation of Malta and Sicily, he expanded the alternative 
scheme, named in his letter of February 23rd, 1798, of seizing the 
north-western coast of Germany, the probable sequel being the in- 
clusion of Prussia and Austria in his "coast-system." 

His plan of commercial warfare against Great Britain having its 
roots far in the past, we need not take very seriously the diatribes 
against her maritime tyranny in the preamble to the Berlin Decree. 
But her proceedings at sea had aroused much discontent among 
neutrals, especially in the United States. Already, President Jefferson, 
in his official Message of December 3rd, 1805, had protested against 
the depredations of privateers on United States and other shipping 
even close to their ports, declaring that he had armed light squadrons 
to capture the offenders and have them tried as pirates. He, also, 
referred to captures made by warships contrary to the Law of Nations, 
and declared that neutrals had as good a right as belligerents to decide 
what was legitimate trade for a neutral to carry on with belligerents. 
Equally obnoxious to him was the custom whereby "a belligerent 
takes to itself a commerce with its own enemy which it denies to a 
neutral." Probably, he was referring either to the Licence system 
then commencing, or to the Rule of 1756, cited above. But his 
charges were vague, Great Britain not being named. He named her, 
however, in his Message of January 17th, 1806, as infringing the terms 
of the Jay Treaty of 1794-5, an< ^ as impressing seamen from United 
States shipping. That practice and the right of search which it involved 
was certainly productive of infinite friction 1 . In April, 1806, Congress 
passed a Non-Importation Act, prohibiting the import of many British 
products. It came into force on November 15th, but, owing to the 

1 See Camb. Mod. Hist., vn. 327-31. 



358 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

clamour against it, was soon withdrawn. Negotiations were then on 
foot between Washington and London, and, in December, Jefferson 
announced that they were "proceeding in a spirit of friendship and 
accommodation which promises a mutual advantage 1 ." The blighting 
of these hopes resulted from the Berlin Decree and the retaliation to 
which the British Government resorted. 

The first retort to that drastic measure took the form of the British 
Order in Council of January 7th, 1807, which, while asserting the 
inherent justice of retaliating by the prohibition of all maritime trade 
with France, such as she threatened to apply to the British Isles, yet 
restricted such punitive measures to vessels trading between any two 
ports whence British ships were excluded. It therefore aimed at 
stopping all trade, even that of neutrals, from harbour to harbour 
(except in Portugal) between Hamburg and Venice. Inasmuch as 
British cruisers now swept the seas, neutral trade probably suffered 
more from the thorough application of this limited measure than from 
the Emperor's brutum fidmen of a blockade of the British Isles. In 
truth, he must have resorted to that bombastic declaration chiefly as 
a means of intimidation and of spurring on his antagonist to reprisals 
certain to arouse the wrath of neutrals. In this, as will shortly appear, 
he succeeded. 

The month of February, 1807, witnessed the failure of the Sea 
Power to help Russia. Driven from Warsaw by the pressure of 
Napoleon's arms, she was now threatened by her secular rivals, the 
Turks. General Sebastiani, French Ambassador at Constantinople, 
having induced the Porte to declare war on Russia (December 24th, 
1806), the British Government ordered a squadron to force the Straits 
and compel the Turks to make peace. Vice- Admiral Sir James Duck- 
worth with seven sail arrived at Princes Islands, near Constantinople, 
on February 20th, 1807. The wind failing, he anchored there and then 
weakly complied with the request of the British Ambassador, Charles 
Arbuthnot, now on board, that he should seek to end the Russo- 
Turkish War by peaceful negotiation. Thereupon, the Turks amused 
him with specious offers, until their preparations were complete 
both on the spot and at the Dardanelles. Then they defied him, and 
he, realising his helplessness, ran for the Straits, passing the repaired 
forts with considerable loss. Subsequently, the Russian squadron 
which should have aided him hove in sight. War with Turkey having 
arisen out of our futile effort to help Russia, the British squadron 

1 Ann. Reg. (1807), p. 679. 



FAILURE OF BRITISH MILITARY POLICY 359 

proceeded to Alexandria, where the operations on land completely 
miscarried 1 . Altogether, the naval and military policy of the Fox- 
Grenville Ministry proved a disastrous failure. From Trafalgar to the 
Dardanelles was a plunge from the sublime to the ridiculous. 

The conviction gained ground that " All the Talents " had frittered 
away the national resources on distant and difficult enterprises, when 
they should have struck at France. Deprived as she was, for seven or 
eight months, of the presence of Napoleon and the Grand Army, then 
in Prussia or Poland, she presented a good target 2 . But the genius of 
Chatham appealed in vain to Grenville, Fox and Howick; and their 
dull, unenterprising regime sensibly contributed to the overthrow of 
the Third Coalition. In March, 1807, Great Britain had, exclusive 
of artillery, 259,000 men under arms. Of these, 93,000 were serving 
abroad, while 165,000 Regulars and Militia were in these islands, 
without reckoning that uncertain factor, the Volunteers. But only 
33 ,000 were deemed ready for foreign service ; and, owing to our diverse 
responsibilities in the Mediterranean, the Cape, and South America, 
it was deemed hazardous to send abroad more than 12,000 men 3 . Pitt 
and Barham had always kept transports ready for the immediate des- 
patch of such a number. But, as their successors discontinued this 
practice, no force could be sent speedily to the help of our Allies. To 
this cause may be ascribed the very discreditable failure to aid Russia 
and Prussia in the spring of 1 807 , when the scales of war were hovering 
in the balance. 

In March, 1807, the Grenville Cabinet fell, owing to its resolve 
to carry Catholic Emancipation and the King's invincible repugnance 
to that measure 4 . The cares of State now fell on the unimpressive Duke 
of Portland, the equally mediocre Hawkesbury (soon to become Earl 
of Liverpool) at the Home Office, the Earl of Chatham at the Ordnance, 
and Perceval at the Exchequer. Far stronger men were Lord Eldon 
as Lord Chancellor, Lord Castlereagh for War and the Colonies, and 
Canning for Foreign Affairs. In this Tory and Old- Whig Ministry, 
George Canning (1770-1827) alone calls for special notice here. His 
conversational and literary gifts had first shone in the brilliant society 
of Fox and Sheridan; but the French Revolution, fretting the rich 

1 F.O. Turkey, 156, 157; Collingwood, Memoirs, pp. 251-67; Pari. Papers, 
March 23rd, 1808 ; E. Driault, La Politique orientale de Napoleon, pp. 85-1 10 ; Adair, 
Mission to Vienna, p. 223. 4 

2 See Plain Facts, or a Review of the Conduct of the late Ministers (Stockdale, 
2nd edit. June, 1807). 

3 Castlereagh Memoirs, vm. 46-8; Temperley, G. Canning, p. 72. 

4 Castlereagh Memoirs, iv. 374-92; Dropmore Papers, ix. 100-20. 



360 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

vein of sentiment in his nature, ranged him with Burke and Windham 
on the side of Pitt. Admiration of Pitt's genius and hatred of French 
Jacobinism were thenceforth the animating motives of his career. As 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1796-9, he displayed equal 
firmness and imagination. Sympathising with his leader on the Catholic 
claims, he retired with him in 1801, but could not be restrained from 
contemptuous sallies on Addington as responsible for the detested 
Peace of Amiens : 

Hail, thou, on whom our State is leaning! 
O Minister of mildest meaning ! 
Head of wisdom, soul of candour 
Happy Britain's guardian gander, 
To rescue from th' invading Gaul 
Her ' commerce, credit, capital ! ' 

Returning with Pitt to office in May, 1804, as Treasurer of the Navy, 
he flung himself with ardour into the struggle against Napoleon, but 
refused to have a part in the gathering of "All the Talents," with 
"no Elijah near." Such was the statesman, versatile but resolute, 
generous but self-willed and intriguing, who, after four months of 
responsibility, was suddenly called on to solve one of the most complex 
and momentous problems of that age. 

Like his father seven years previously, Alexander delighted 
Napoleon and exasperated his Allies by throwing the weight of Russia 
suddenly into the opposite scale. True, he had cause of complaint 
against us. In the spring and early summer of 1807, we had done 
little to help him in the Baltic except by the tardy despatch of a small 
force under General Cathcart to Stralsund. Three British sloops strove 
hard to harass the French besiegers of Danzig. But of what avail were 
three sloops? Danzig surrendered on May 27th ; and its fall set free a 
considerable force for service in the field. Exasperation against the 
British was therefore rife at the Allied headquarters 1 , especially after 
the catastrophe of Friedland (June 14th). Despite the arrival of large 
Russian reinforcements, Alexander soon decided to sue for an armistice ; 
and, in a letter of June 24th, he stated to his Envoy, Prince Lobanoff, 
his desire for a Franco-Russian Alliance, which "alone can guarantee 
the welfare and repose of the world.... An entirely new system ought 
to take the place of that which has existed here, and I flatter myself 
that we shall easily come to an understanding with the Emperor 
Napoleon, provided that we treat without intermediaries 2 ." Probably, 

1 G. Jackson, Diaries, II. 148. 2 Tatischeff, Nouvelle Revue, June 1st, 1890. 



FRANCO-RUSSIAN UNDERSTANDING 361 

this avowal of a desire to break with Prussia and Great Britain became 
known at the Tsar's headquarters at Tilsit. Certain it is that a British 
agent, Mackenzie, who was there on June 23rd~5th, met with a friendly 
reception from the Commander-in-Chief, Bennigsen, and heard him 
exclaim at dinner on the 25th : " The two Emperors have shaken hands. 
Europe has cause to tremble." 

On that day, Napoleon and Alexander met in the friendliest fashion 
on a raft in the middle of the River Niemen at Tilsit ; and the question 
arises — How did the British Government come to know of Alexander's 
volte-face} A fantastic story states that a British spy was on the raft 
and heard all their private converse ; but it is far more probable that 
secrets leaked out through Bennigsen or some other malcontent 
Russian officer. On his way back to London, Mackenzie arrived at 
Memel on June 26th, and brought news of the Armistice and other 
threatening symptoms to a group of British officials, including General 
Sir Robert Wilson, Sir George Jackson, Lord Hutchinson, then on 
a special mission, and the British Ambassador, Lord G. Leveson- 
Gower. 

Nor was this all. Leveson-Gower's earlier despatches to Canning 
had contained warnings that Bernadotte's corps, near the southern 
border of Holstein, might invade that duchy, so as to compel Denmark 
to close the Sound to British ships; and now, on the 26th, he sent off 
by Mackenzie news of the Franco-Russian rapprochement. It reached 
Downing Street on July 16th. Already, our Envoy at Copenhagen, 
Garlike, had reported the Francophil tendencies of that Court. Further, 
the Earl of Pembroke, on proceeding via Copenhagen to take over the 
British Embassy at Vienna, had reported (incorrectly as afterwards 
appeared) considerable activity in the Danish dockyards. Official news 
from Altona also mentioned menacing moves of the French near by. 
Hence, the arrival, on or before July 16th, of very disquieting infor- 
mation from Memel, Copenhagen and Altona aroused intense anxiety 
at the Foreign Office. Were France, Russia and Denmark, possibly 
Prussia also, about to form a League like that of 1 800-1 for the closing 
of the Baltic? On this occasion, the problem confronting the new 
Portland Cabinet was exceptionally complex ; for a Northern League 
would threaten the communications of the British expeditionary force 
cooperating with our Swedish Allies at Stralsund. Further, the Por- 
tuguese and Danish fleets (the latter consisting of 15 sail of the 
line) might easily be seized by the French troops in their vicinity ; and 
the combined Napoleonic fleets, backed by some 20 Russian sail, 



362 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

would form an armada equal, at least on paper, to the 103 British sail 
of the line in commission early in 1807 1 . 

Such was the problem, as it confronted Canning on July 16th. A 
dull and unimaginative man would probably have decided to await 
further developments before making even preliminary preparations. 
But Canning's was an imaginative mind, keenly patriotic and fired with 
intense hatred of Napoleon. Aware of the impressionable nature of 
Alexander, and piecing together the fragments of information from 
Memel, Copenhagen and Altona, he pictured to himself as imminent a 
vast conspiracy for the ruin of Great Britain. Evidently, the Danish 
fleet was the heart of the problem. Very early on the 18th, F.J. Jackson, 
formerly Ambassador at Berlin, was summoned to Downing Street. 
He found Canning in a state of great perplexity, but convinced that 
Napoleon was about to seize that fleet, with a view to the invasion of 
England. On the same day, he framed his resolve. Mulgrave, First 
Lord of the Admiralty, at once issued most urgent orders 2 for the 
immediate preparation for sea of 22 sail of the line, and 29 smaller 
craft, and this, too, in addition to 13 warships, the commission of 
which he had ordered on July 15th. Those ordered on the 18th were 
for a particular service under Admiral Gambier 3 . The purpose of this 
formidable armament appeared in Canning's Instructions of July 16th 
to Brooke Taylor, whom he appointed successor to Garlike at Copen- 
hagen. The new Ambassador was to proceed forthwith to that city 
and declare to the Danish Government that a British fleet was coming 
to support it in repelling all offers from Napoleon. 

On July 2 1 st the arrival of news up to June 25th from Tilsit 
(probably brought by Mackenzie) clinched Canning's determination ; 
and, on the 22nd, he informed Brooke Taylor that Napoleon had 
proposed to the Tsar the framing of a Maritime League, in which 
Denmark would be included. Distinct and satisfactory assurances 
must therefore be required from her that no such demand had been 
made, or that, if so, it had been rejected. Above all, Brooke Taylor 
would demand the deposit of the Danish fleet in British hands, in order 
to remove the object for which Napoleon was striving. Great Britain 
offered to Denmark her Alliance and the yearly payment of £100,000 
during such time as the fleet was held in pledge. It is clear that 

1 See my articles in Transactions of the R. Historical Society (New Series, vol. xx) 
and in Napoleonic Studies, pp. 133-65 ; also, James, Naval Hist. iv. 201 and App. xv ; 
The Athenaeum, September 17th, 1902. 

2 Journals... of Sir T. Byam Martin, 1. 326, 328. 

3 Admiralty {Orders and Instructions), 152. 



THE SEIZURE OF THE DANISH FLEET 363 

Canning offered the Alliance as a device for gilding the pill ; for it was 
extremely unlikely that so spirited a Power would peaceably accept 
terms so humiliating from a State with which its relations were un- 
friendly. Probably, too, he hoped that the arrival of Gambier's 
overwhelming force, finally numbering 25 of the line and many smaller 
craft, would save the honour of Denmark and avert a conflict. If so, 
he was disappointed. The overtures, unskilfully made by Jackson and 
Brooke Taylor, were indignantly rejected, and hostilities ensued, a 
landing force finally on September 7th compelling the surrender of 
Copenhagen and the Danish fleet. The latter, comprising 15 sail of 
the line (mostly very old), as many frigates, and 31 smaller vessels, 
was brought away near the end of October. 

Such was this discreditable episode. In seeking to reach an im- 
partial judgment upon it, the enquirer is first faced with the question : 
Was the information as to the designs of Napoleon on Denmark suffi- 
ciently cogent to warrant action so drastic as that taken by Canning and 
his colleagues ? Search in the British Archives (which, though abundant 
on this topic, may not contain all the documents bearing on it) reveals 
the fact that the evidence before them by July 21st was merely cir- 
cumstantial, and not so complete as to be conclusive. It warranted 
no more than an inference that the seizure by Napoleon of the Danish 
fleet was highly probable. In the ensuing debates on this question, 
Canning referred to sources of information (doubtless those named 
above) and to a British Minister — probably, Leveson-Gower — as 
furnishing the proofs. But his despatches were not decisive on this 
question; and Lord Hutchinson, who had been at Memel, denied in 
the House of Lords, on February 8th, 1808, that there had existed 
proofs sufficient to justify the action taken against Denmark. Castle- 
reagh, also, admitted that, so early as July 19th, 1807, Ministers " took 
His Majesty's pleasure as to the propriety of the expedition 1 ." But 
not until August 8th were even the public articles of the Treaty of 
Tilsit known in London; and they contained nothing derogatory to 
Danish Independence. Further, Canning's despatch of August 4th 
urged Leveson-Gower to find out whether there were any secret 
articles 2 . Now, it was the Secret Treaty of Alliance of July 7th which 
contained the proviso : that, if Great Britain refused the Tsar's offer 
to mediate for peace between her and France, he would then make 
common cause with the latter ; and Russia and France would summon 

1 Hansard (1808), p. 169 et seq. 

2 F.O. Russia, 70. 



364 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

Denmark, Sweden and Portugal to declare war against the Island 
Power 1 . That Canning's keen intuitions divined the beginnings of 
what might have developed into a formidable plan may be granted ; 
but his imagination soared high, when, on September 25th, he wrote 
to Paget that the Copenhagen expedition had prevented "a northern 
confederacy, an invasion of Ireland and the shutting of Russian ports 2 ." 
More probably, it hastened the latter proceeding and its sequel, the 
Tsar's Declaration of War against Great Britain, which was issued so 
soon as he believed two of his squadrons to be secure. On the whole, 
the parliamentary debates of January-March, 1808, on this topic some- 
what shook public confidence in the Ministry. Its harsh treatment of 
Denmark was reprobated by the Duke of Gloucester, Lord Grenville, 
the Duke of Norfolk, Lords Sidmouth, Darnley, Erskine, Moira, 
Hutchinson and Grey, as also by Windham, Ponsonby and Whitbread 
in the House of Commons. 

To pass censorious judgments on Canning and his colleagues, as 
if the problem of July, 1 807, had been a simple one, is unjust. The very 
existence of Great Britain was at stake ; and the evidence which reached 
Downing Street on or before July 21st rendered it very probable that 
Napoleon would coerce Denmark and compel the surrender of her 
fleet. Moreover, Canning's intentions towards the Danes were, as his 
letters and despatches show, friendly. He even hoped for the formation 
of an Anglo- Scandinavian Alliance, which might save the North from 
the grasp of the two Emperors 3 . All this must be admitted. Neverthe- 
less, the information on which hefounded his inference as to Napoleon's 
designs on Denmark amounted, not to proof, but only to a high degree 
of probability; and it is very doubtful whether, on such evidence, 
he was justified in a course of action which might lead to hostilities 
with a weak Power. Would it not have been better to run the risk of 
the addition of 15 Danish sail of the line to the Napoleonic Armada 
than to incur the odium that must result from the seizure of those 
ships? This is the question. The conscience of that age, as of our own, 
has in general answered it in the affirmative. 

In November, 1807, British policy exercised a somewhat stringent 
pressure on Portugal. Since our rupture with the Court of Madrid 
at the end of 1804, her existence had been precarious; and now the 
accord of the two Emperors at Tilsit portended ruin. Early in August, 
1807, the Portuguese Ministers were aware that France and Spain 

1 Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre, 1. 505-7. 2 Paget Papers, II. 363. 

3 Rose, Napoleonic Studies, pp. 146-50 ;Lane-Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, 1.30. 



ARRANGEMENTS WITH PORTUGAL 365 

would force them into war with Great Britain. They therefore begged 
our Government through its Ambassador, Viscount Strangford, to 
put up with a nominal state of war ; but they failed to convince either 
Canning or him of the feasibility of their proposal. The British Govern- 
ment, also, urged resistance to Napoleon's demand for the confiscation 
of British ships and property ; and to such a measure the Prince Regent 
promised never to stoop. By September 27th, however, Napoleon had 
laid his plans for the complete partition of Portugal, and these led up 
to the Franco-Spanish Treaty of Fontainebleau (October 27th), which 
assigned parts of the kingdom to Godoy and the dethroned King of 
Etruria, reserving the major portion for future disposal. French and 
Spanish forces now advanced towards Lisbon, the French being in- 
structed to enter as friends, so as to seize the Portuguese fleet. On 
their near approach, Strangford with some difficulty induced the 
Prince Regent and his Government to retire from Portugal to Brazil 
under escort of the British fleet. Canning, also, signed with Portugal 
a Convention empowering us temporarily to occupy Madeira, as was 
done late in the year 1 . 

Thus, in the year 1807 the Sea and Land Powers bore hard upon 
Denmark and Portugal respectively, our treatment of the former being 
honourable and straightforward by comparison with the vulpine con- 
duct of Napoleon towards Portugal. Yet his moves, equally skilful and 
forceful, pushed successively along the inner arcs of the Continent, 
everywhere prevailed ; while Great Britain, acting without any system 
and with slighter forces at diverse points of the circumference, nearly 
eveiy where failed. In that fatal year, Napoleon riveted the Continental 
System on Russia, Prussia and Spain, gained the Alliance of Denmark, 
annexed Etruria and the Ionian Isles, drove the Swedes from their 
Pomeranian province, and partitioned Portugal. The sole successes of 
the Islanders were the capture of Curacoa and St Thomas, the seizure 
of the Danish fleet and the rescue of the Portuguese fleet from his 
clutches. It would be superfluous here to describe the Russian offer of 
mediation for a general peace. Conceived as it was in a spirit friendly to 
Napoleon, it could not find acceptance at Downing Street. Somewhat 
similar proposals coming from Vienna met with a friendly response 2 . 
But the deep-rooted distrust of Napoleon had increased with every year 
of triumph of his forceful policy ; and the pitilessness with which he 

1 F.O. Portugal, 55; Garden, x. 372; Nap. Corr. nos. 12839, 13235, 13237, 
13243, 13314, and Lettres inedites, nos. 171, 188. Tout discours est bon, pourvu qu'il 
(Junot) s'empare de Vescadre portugaise. 

2 Coquelle, chs. xxi, xxn. 



366 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

trampled upon Prussia and other opponents banished all thought of 
compromise, even in that season of gloom, the winter of 1807-8. 

Yet there was no reason for despair ; and Canning and his colleagues 
never despaired. The failures of the overseas expeditions of the year 
1807 were clearly due to the bad management of the Grenville Adminis- 
tration ; but the nation was united in the resolve not to surrender, and 
was uplifted by the belief that the Napoleonic colossus could not long 
bestride the earth. Meanwhile, Ministers sought to tighten their 
Maritime, as a retort to his Continental, System. The Order in Council 
of November 1 ith, 1807, stated that, whereas the Order of January 7th 
had not had the desired effect of compelling Napoleon to withdraw 
his Berlin Decree or of inducing neutrals to intervene for that purpose, 
Great Britain now considered all French and subject ports to be in 
a state of blockade, and would be justified in treating ships sailing to 
and from such ports as good prize. Nevertheless, certain exceptions 
favourable to neutrals were granted ; but vessels carrying " certificates 
of origin" (viz. that all the goods carried by them were non-British) 
were to be counted good prize. A second Order, of November nth, 
extended the facilities granted in 1803 to neutral importers for storing 
their goods in bond without payment, with a view to reexportation. 
This Order was permissive, not, as has often been represented, com- 
pulsory. A third Order, of the same date, declared illegal the sale of 
enemy vessels to neutrals, a clause designed specially to prevent bogus 
sales which would be cancelled when the said hostile vessels reached 
port. Orders of a fortnight later accorded facilities to neutrals sailing 
between British ports and ports in America or the West Indies, or 
between the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, Gibraltar or Malta, and 
any hostile port not actually in a state of blockade by H.M.'s ships. 
The most rigorous of these Orders was that directed against ships 
carrying " certificates of origin," as ordered by Napoleon for all vessels 
trading with his ports. As he confiscated ships carrying goods of 
British origin, so Great Britain now retaliated by similar treatment of 
ships carrying the products of his or Allied States. Both Decrees were 
highly oppressive and enabled acquisitive captains, especially those of 
privateers, to carry offor hold up ships on the suspicion that part of their 
cargoes consisted of enemy goods. Since nearly all cruisers were 
British, the burden of neutral complaints fell upon us. 

Napoleon's retort to these Orders in Council appeared in the Milan 
Decrees of mid-December, 1807. Declaring that Great Britain was 
about to compel neutral ships to resort to her ports and pay duties, 



TENSION WITH THE UNITED STATES 367 

he now threatened to confiscate all that should so act or should peace- 
fully submit to search ; and all vessels sailing from any British port were 
to count as good prize. Each of the two antagonists, then, justified its 
Decrees as a natural retort to those of its rival ; and the system which 
began early in 1806 with the exclusion of British commerce from 
north-western Germany now, by the end of 1807, covered all civilised 
lands and rendered neutral commerce wellnigh impossible. Sharp 
friction, consequently, resulted with the United States. Our relations 
with them had long been strained, owing partly to their inability to 
understand the necessity for Great Britain of maintaining her maritime 
claims as a counterstroke to Napoleon's Continental System, partly 
to the inefficient statement of the British case at Washington. Such 
was the belief of the Anglophil Gouverneur Morris, who strongly 
urged the despatch of an Ambassador of high rank and great talent 1 . 
The difficulty was to find such a one; for the days of Malmesbury 
were past, and those of Stratford Canning had not yet dawned. So 
exasperating were the restrictions now imposed on neutral commerce 
by both belligerents, and so much friction resulted from our seizures 
of deserters from British warships (notably in the Chesapeake case of 
February, 1807) that war seemed imminent. Seeking to find zvia media, 
Jefferson, in December, by a general Embargo Act reinforced the Non- 
Importation Act of the previous year, and legal trade with all foreign 
countries ceased. North American shippers sought by all possible 
means to evade this legislation, which proved ruinous. Consequently, in 
March, 1809, a change was made, prohibiting trade with Great Britain 
and France and their Allies, until they should revoke their obnoxious 
Decrees. Unsuccessful attempts were made by the British Govern- 
ment, in the spring and summer of that year, to effect a compromise 
with the new President, James Madison ; for the first negotiator, David 
Erskine, exceeded his Instructions, while the second, F. J. Jackson, 
offended American officials by his haughty demeanour 2 . Consequently, 
trade went on only through clandestine channels between Great Britain 
and the United States, to the intense annoyance of manufacturers here 
and shippers there. The Portland Ministry received many petitions 
from Lancashire and Yorkshire to cancel the Orders in Council ; but 
for the present it maintained them, doubtless nerved thereto by the 
masterful will of Canning. 

1 Sparks, Life of G. Morris, II. 245. Auckland strongly disapproved our Orders 
in Council (Dropmore Papers, IX. 158). 

2 E. Canning, The American Nation (1801-11), ch. xvm; H. Adams, Hist, of 
the United States, iv. 387 et seq. v. 90-132. 



368 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

But now, when every month witnessed the diminution of Britain's 
resources and the aggrandisement of her enemy, there occurred an 
event destined to call forth her best energies and to alter the character 
of the struggle. On May 2nd, 1808, Madrid rose in fury against 
its French oppressors, and in a short space of time all the Spanish 
provinces threw off the yoke of Napoleon. It is alike impossible and 
superfluous to describe here the tortuous intrigues whereby he had 
occupied the Spanish strongholds, compassed the ruin of the Spanish 
Bourbons and placed Joseph Bonaparte on the Throne of Spain. By 
the first of May, he seemed to have at his feet the whole of the 
Peninsula, and to be about to marshal its forces for the two enterprises 
foremost in his thoughts, the utter isolation of Great Britain and the 
eventual partition of the Ottoman empire 1 . By the end of the month, 
the Spaniards were in revolt against his usurped authority and three 
provinces were sending to London Envoys begging help from the then 
hostile British Government. The first to arrive were those of Asturias. 
They received a hearty welcome both from the people and from officials, 
Canning entertaining them at his house, and inviting Sir Arthur 
Wellesley to meet them. The honour of first proposing to Parliament 
the offer of aid to Spain fell to an orator who had generally opposed 
warlike measures. Sheridan, on June 1 5th, urged Ministers to seize the 
opportunity as the greatest that had occurred since the French Revolu- 
tion for the rescue of a nation's liberty. "Hitherto" (he exclaimed) 
"Bonaparte has had to contend against princes without dignity and 
Ministers without wisdom. He has fought against countries in which 
the people have been indifferent as to his success. He has yet to learn 
what it is to fight against a country in which the people are animated 
with one spirit to resist him." Canning, thereupon, declared that 
Ministers viewed with admiration the rising of the Spaniards and 
desired to aid them immediately. " Sir " (he exclaimed), " it will never 
occur to us to consider that a state of war exists between Spain and Great 
Britain. We shall proceed upon the principle that any nation of Europe 
that starts up with a determination to oppose a Power which... is the 
common enemy of all nations, becomes instantly our essential Ally 2 ." 

This principle, which was confirmed and extended in the King's 
Speech of July 4th, marked the dawn of a new era in British Foreign 
Policy. The old policy had been based upon Treaties of the traditional 
type with monarchical Governments which were out of touch with 

1 Nap. Corr. February 2nd; April 29th; May ioth, 13th, 17th, 19th, 1808; 
Lettres inedites, no. 275. 2 Hansard, XI. 886-96. 



CHANGE IN OUR METHODS OF FOREIGN POLICY 369 

their peoples. The new policy involved trust in informal, but none the 
less binding, agreements with the peoples themselves. The old was 
always formal, frequently hollow, and not seldom secret. The new, 
springing out of vital sympathies, relied on the fundamental promptings 
of human nature, and therefore needed no very complicated, still less 
secret, stipulations. From the universal experience of mankind it was 
to be expected that the old method would persist long and would often 
invade and vitiate those of the new order. The new methods were 
often discarded amidst the complex arrangements of 1 814-5 an< ^ °f a 
later age; but, when once clearly asserted and shown to be workable, 
they were certain togainground; and theirvitality could not butincrease 
with the quickening of national consciousness and the growth of popular 
education. Thus, the months of May and June, 1808, inaugurate, not 
merely a novel policy, but, what is more important, a fresh spirit, 
destined to influence nations as well as Governments. The latter now 
tend to become the mouthpiece of the former ; and it is significant that 
this development began with two essentially conservative nations. 
Spain and Great Britain led the way in asserting the claims of national 
independence as against the overweening pretensions of the "heir to 
the French Revolution." The wheel had come full circle. France, 
which, in 1793, had summoned all peoples to a crusade for freedom, 
now found embattled against her the primeval instincts of two great 
peoples, whose union was destined to arouse and invigorate other com- 
munities and reduce her to her former level. 

For the present, Canning and Castlereagh sent help in money and 
arms to the juntas which forthwith sprang up in all districts of Spain. 
Canning strongly advised them to form a Central Junta, to which he 
would at once send a duly accredited Minister. Dreading the deep- 
rooted provincialism of the Spaniards, he forthwith urged them to a 
national union ; and his despatches to the first British Envoy, Charles 
Stuart, and afterwards toHookhamFrere, refute the charges of Napier, 
that he lavished money heedlessly on local juntas 1 . Meanwhile, the 
success of the Spaniards at Baylen (July 19th) where more than 20,000 
of Napoleon's troops surrendered, assured the liberation of the south 
and centre; and, a month later, Sir Arthur Wellesley's force, sent out 
by Castlereagh with no very distinct aim in view,overthrewthe French 
Army of Portugal at Vimeira. The arrival of incompetent seniors, 
Burrard and Dalrymple, before the end of the battle, alone saved that 

1 Napier, Peninsular War, I. Bk 2, ch. 1. See my article in American Hist. Rev. 
October, 1906. 



37© THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

army from disaster. Thereupon, at Torres Vedras, the British leaders 
(Wellesley rather reluctantly acceding) signed with General Junot a 
Convention, misnamed that of Cintra, whereby they secured control 
of a Russian fleet sheltering in the Tagus, and allowed the conveyance 
of the French army back to France on British ships. This compact 
has been defended on strictly military grounds; but it erred in not 
preventing the salvage of valuable booty by the French troops, and, 
still more, in not imposing restrictions on their future use in the 
Peninsular War. These omissions exasperated both the plundered 
Portuguese and the Spanish patriots, the latter declaring that, as the 
French veterans would soon again march through the Pyrenees into 
Spain, the British Generals had betrayed Spanish interests. The 
Convention, therefore, aroused the distrust of both Portuguese and 
Spaniards in British Generals, including Sir Arthur Wellesley. He 
and the senior officers were summoned home to face the enquiry which 
public indignation demanded. The King and Canning shared the 
widespread feeling, which was not dispelled by a generally favourable 
official verdict. The affair entailed another unfortunate result. Castle- 
reagh, as was his wont, loyally supported Wellesley, and, after the 
enquiry was over, insisted on his reappointment to the Peninsular 
command. To this Canning objected; and the quarrels between these 
two masterful Ministers became acute. Nevertheless, popular de- 
pression and the naggings of the Opposition failed to bend the Cabinet's 
resolve to persevere with the struggle in the Peninsula; and on 
December 9th, Canning despatched an indignant refusal to the Tsar's 
offer of mediation (agreed on at Erfurt), couched in terms which 
implied the recognition of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain. 

The resolution to support the Spaniards was not shaken by the 
glorious but lamentable failure of Sir John Moore's campaign in 
northern Spain. On January 14th, 1809, a Treaty of Alliance was signed 
with the Central Junta of Seville. Sharp differences with the Spaniards 
and the reverses that were to be sustained during four years of wearing 
conflict failed to break that compact, which led up to the Treaty of 1814 
with the restored Ferdinand VII. This fact alone emphasises the con- 
trast between the Anglo-Spanish union and the artificial Conventions 
which built up the first three essentially fragile Coalitions. Well might 
the prophet of that age say : " In all that regarded the destinies of Spain , 
and her own as connected with them, the voice of Britain had the 
unquestionable sound of inspiration 1 ." 

1 Wordsworth, Convention of Cintra (Oxford edit. 1915, p. no). 



DISUNION OF EUROPE 371 

IV 

In other quarters than the Iberian Peninsula, British policy for the 
present worked ineffectively. To the German national movement, 
which began to make headway early in 1809, Ministers, especially 
Castlereagh, were irresponsive. Yet, after the interview of Napoleon 
and Alexander at Erfurt in September to October, 1808, there were 
clear signs that the French Emperor would fall upon Austria so soon 
as he had defeated the Spanish patriots ; and, at the end of 1808, when 
success had crowned his arms in the Peninsula, he hurried back to 
Paris to prepare for the new conflict. At that time, marked by the 
utter humiliation of Prussia, the hopes of all German patriots centred 
in Vienna. Reforms, both civil and military, were renovating the 
energies of the Habsburg States ; the Tyrolese longed to return to their 
allegiance to the Emperor Francis; and his patriarchal sway was 
regretted by many other South-Germans. For a brief space, there 
appeared a faint hope that Canning might league Great Britain, 
Austria, Turkey and Persia together against Napoleon and the Tsar. 
Such was the scheme which he entrusted to Sir Robert Adair, urging 
him to effect a reconciliation with the Turks. Perceiving that we had 
acted against them early in 1807 solely on behalf of Russia, they were 
by no means loth to make peace ; but oriental pride and lethargy spun 
out the negotiations until January, 1809; and then it was too late to 
frame so extensive a league in time for the War that speedily ensued 1 . 

The dictates of sound policy should have led Prussia to act in con- 
junction with Austria — a course which Hardenberg and Gneisenau 
secretly, but strongly, urged. Indeed, in the spring of 1809, there 
appeared the first signs of a widespread union of the peoples from the 
Tagus to the Niemen. But on their side all was vague, and the advan- 
tages of central position and effective organisation remained with Napo- 
leon. He seemed to have mastered the Spaniards, and his union with 
Alexander was unimpaired. Moreover, Austria's preparations were far 
from complete, and the German patriots, besides being unorganised, 
could not receive from Britain the timely and effective help which her 
fleet could afford to those of Spain and Portugal. These considerations 
and the notorious indecision of Frederick William told against the 
acceptance of requests for help either at Stralsund or on the Hano- 
verian coast. Austria, also, sent lofty demands for pecuniary aid, and 
suggested diversions by us in Spain, Italy and the mouth of the Weser. 

1 Adair, Mission to Constantinople, I. ad fin. 



372 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

Thus, the choice open to Ministers was bewilderingly wide, the pre- 
sence of a French squadron at Flushing also inviting a dash on that 
important post and Antwerp. It is, therefore, not surprising that sharp 
divisions of opinion should have arisen in the Cabinet, accentuating 
the disputes between those temperamental opposites, Castlereagh and 
Canning. The former, however, in March carried his point for the 
despatch of Sir Arthur Wellesley to Portugal for the defence of that 
country and such wider operations as he should judge expedient. The 
sum of £30,000 was accorded to the German patriots, with the promise 
of a British squadron in the Baltic. Lastly, after some initial difficul- 
ties, Liverpool signed an Alliance with Austria (April 24th) 1 . 

All these arrangements were belated ; for, though the Tsar warned 
Austria against action, and Frederick William obstinately clung to 
inaction, she rushed into the fray with the nervous haste that had 
assured her doom in 1805. Now, again, it fell on her quickly. Arch- 
duke Charles invaded Bavaria on April 12th, and, on May 13th, Napoleon 
entered Vienna in triumph. The patriotic risings of Dornberg, Schill 
and the young Duke of Brunswick came to naught in April-May, the 
British squadron in the Baltic being too fully occupied with the 
Russians and Danes to render effective help to the brave Schill in his 
last stand at Stralsund 2 . Signal ill fortune beset all the British plans 
for 1809. In April, an attack by Admiral Gambier with a powerful 
squadron on the French fleet in the Aix roads off Rochefort was a 
failure despite the gallant but unsupported efforts of Cochrane with 
fireships and small craft. Far more costly and disastrous was the 
Walcheren expedition, directed against Antwerp. Knowing the im- 
portance whicti Napoleon attached to that dockyard, on which 66,000,000 
francs had of late been expended, Castlereagh drew up a plan of attack 
so early as July, 1808. In March, and again in May, 1809, he revived 
the scheme, and on the 18th offered the command of the land forces 
to Lord Chatham 3 . He was therefore responsible for what proved 
to be a very unfortunate choice. His nominee, far from having 
adequate experience in war, had displayed, even in civil affairs, a 
tardiness which won him the nickname of the late Lord Chatham. 
Indeed, so soon as Thomas Grenville heard of this appointment to 
the command of " 35,000 of our best and last troops," he foretold the 
failure of the expedition. His forecast was but too true. Chatham 

1 Fortescue, British Army, Bk 13, ch. xxv. 

2 Sir J. Ross, Memoirs o/Adni. Lord de Sanmarez, 11. ch. ix. Journals... of By am 
Martin, II. 67-112. 

3 Castlereagh Memoirs, vi. 247, 256. 



CANNING AND CASTLEREAGH 373 

delayed the sailing of the fleet unnecessarily 1 : it weighed from the 
Downs on July 28th, three weeks after the overthrow of Austria; 
and the local difficulties, added to disagreements with Rear-admiral 
Sir Richard Strachan, marred an enterprise which, if pushed on 
betimes with forceful energy, might have turned the scales of 
war on the Danube. By comparison with this costly failure, 
Wellington's Talavera campaign was successful. He won a decisive 
victory, and, though compelled by the follies and selfishness of the 
Spanish commanders to retreat hastily on Portugal, his advance 
revealed the artificiality of the Napoleonic regime in the Peninsula. 
Three years full of disaster were however needed, in order to teach 
the Spaniards the necessity of close and loyal cooperation with him. 
Meanwhile, the Walcheren fiasco brought to a climax the long 
series of disagreements between Canning and Castlereagh. Inheriting 
the hot temper and self-will of their Anglo-Irish ancestry, they always 
clashed. Even in affairs of high moment which demanded cooperation, 
they held aloof from each other with untoward results. Portland, now 
nearing the end of his ineffective career, utterly failed to maintain har- 
mony. Indeed, his forgetfulness complicated the quarrel between them ; 
and the feud came to an appropriate ending — a duel on Putney Heath, 
in which Canning was slightly wounded, and a partial reconciliation. 
The Portland Cabinet now collapsed. Spencer Perceval, its pedestrian 
but conscientious Chancellor of the Exchequer, sought to refashion 
it, with the addition of Lords Grenville and Grey ; but the King's in- 
vincible repugnance to Catholic Emancipation, which they made a test 
question, deprived the country of their services 2 . The new Perceval 
Cabinet was, therefore, distinctly Tory: five Ministers, Perceval, 
Camden, Eldon, Mulgrave and Chatham retaining their former exe- 
cutive functions, while Liverpool became Secretary for War and the 
Colonies, and Bathurst for Foreign Affairs. The last-named was soon 
succeeded by Marquis Wellesley, who, after a distinguished vice- 
royalty in India (1 798-1 805), had latterly gone to Seville as Envoy to 
the Central Spanish Junta. A novice in diplomacy, he soon fell into the 
adversary's traps, and his inexperience was not made good by assiduity ; 
for young Stratford Canning at the Constantinople Embassy com- 
plained that he only received scanty despatches from him, and at long 
intervals 3 . Nevertheless, Wellesley was well fitted by administrative 

1 Dropmore Papers, ix. 311, 312. 

2 Dropmore Papers, ix. 322 et seq. F. Horner, Memoirs, II. 499. 

3 Lane-Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, 1. 91, 129. 



374 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

experience, and by special knowledge of the peculiar difficulties con- 
fronting his brother in Spain, to forward the most important enterprise 
undertaken by Great Britain since 1792. In the dark years, 1809-11, 
everything turned on the Peninsular War ; and, while some of his 
colleagues at times shrank from the responsibility of continuing that 
apparently hopeless struggle, Wellesley never quailed. To him, 
Perceval and Liverpool is due the credit of persisting in an enterprise 
which elicited the croakings of the Grenvilles, the gibes of Cobbett, 
and the nervous remonstrances of the City of London 1 . 

Meanwhile, difficulties beset us from other quarters. The mad 
obstinacy of Gustavus IV, having foiled our efforts to help him 2 , he 
was constrained to abdicate. His successor, Charles XIII, though 
friendly to Great Britain and supported by her fleet, was fain to come 
to terms with Russia (September, 1809), and, early in the next year, 
with Napoleon. This capitulation involved the entrance of Sweden 
into the Continental System, and consequently war between her and 
Great Britain; but the Admiralty privately instructed Vice-admiral 
Sir James Saumarez, commander in the Baltic, to avoid hostile action ; 
and the tactful manner in which he carried out this difficult duty 
rendered possible the resumption of friendly relations in 1811-12 3 . 
For the present, however, British trade was almost entirely excluded 
from the Baltic. 

Further, the movements of two Franch army corps on Holland 
portended the annexation of that kingdom. Napoleon had long com- 
plained of the softness of his brother Lewis in tempering the severities 
of the Continental System; and he now devised the expedient of a 
threatened annexation, in order to compel Great Britain to make peace 
on his terms. This device he put into effect, partly through King Lewis, 
partly through the Dutch Foreign Minister, Roell. Believing that a 
general peace could alone stave off annexation, they lent themselves 
to the plan; and Roell selected as a go-between Labouchere, a Dutch 
banker of high repute, son-in-law of Sir Francis Baring of London, 
who was a Director of the East India Company. Having reason to 
believe in Wellesley's desire for peace, now that the Spaniards were 
on the verge of disaster, they hoped to induce him and his colleagues 
to mitigate the Orders in Council of 1807 in proof of their pacific 
desires. After the experience of the peace negotiations of 1806, and 

1 Dropmore Papers, IX. 287, 313-21, 370-2; Cobbett's Political Reg. (February 
17th, 1810). 

2 Diary of Sir J. Moore, 11. ch. xxiv. 

3 Sir J. Ross, Memoirs of Saumarez, 11. ch. xi. 



FOUCHfi'S PEACE OVERTURES 375 

even more of Napoleon's offers in the years following, British Ministers 
should have distrusted all such proposals. Nevertheless, early in 18 10 
Wellesley toyed with a peace overture emanating from that arch- 
intriguer, Fouche, Napoleon's Minister of Police. He, on his own 
account, sent an Emigre named Fagan, of Irish extraction, to sound the 
Perceval Cabinet as to possible terms. Since Fouche insisted that 
Spain was now conquered and that France must have Sicily, the over- 
ture was soon at an end. Fouche was not daunted. He next sent over 
Labouchere, accredited from the tottering Dutch Government. On 
February 7th, 1810, Wellesley gave him a cordial reception, but then, 
and on the nth, informed him that the Orders in Council must remain 
in force, unless Napoleon would withdraw his Decrees, to which they 
were a reply. Labouchere, hereupon, pressed him to save the Dutch 
from annexation, an aim with which Wellesley expressed sympathy, 
adding however that in other matters (Spain and Sicily were meant) 
Napoleon evinced no desire for a reasonable compromise. Perceiving 
that he could not bend the British Government, Napoleon ordered the 
military occupation of Holland, and in March, 1810, annexed her 
southern provinces. 

A third overture, made by Fouche on his own responsibility 
through Baring and a speculator, Ouvrard, belongs rather to the 
sphere of Court comedy than of international policy. Purporting to 
come from Napoleon as a kind of wedding gift to the world (he married 
Marie-Louise of Austria on April 2nd, 18 10), it proposed to assign 
Spanish America to Ferdinand VII of Spain, and to effect a partition 
of the United States between Napoleon and George III. On April 
6th and 14th Wellesley discussed this fantastic scheme with Baring, 
even consulting Canning about it, and not until May 8th are there 
signs that he suspected a hoax. Indeed, it was Napoleon who dis- 
covered the secret, whereupon he dismissed and exiled Fouche, and 
arrested Ouvrard. His rage gave full publicity to the affair, thus 
arousing much merriment among the frondeurs both of the Boulevard 
St Germain and of St James's. Wellesley was covered with ridicule; 
and pacific offers from Paris thenceforth seemed mere tricks to weaken 
and divide the Cabinet. Proposals for an exchange of prisoners went 
on until the autumn of 18 10, but thereupon lapsed, probably owing 
to Napoleon's confident belief that Massena's great army would compel 
Wellington to a capitulation 1 . 

1 For a full account of these negotiations, based on new evidence, see Coquelle, 
chs. xxviii-xxxi; also xxxii-xxxvi for the exchange of prisoners. 



376 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

Until October ioth, when the British commander began his 
triumphant defence of the lines of Torres Vedras, the prospects were 
indeed gloomy. At home, the Government, which nervously, but 
faithfully, supported him, was barely warding off the attacks of the 
Opposition leaders, who continued to declaim against the folly and 
expense of the Peninsular War. The Reform movement, championed 
by Sir Francis Burdett, was gathering head owing to notorious adminis- 
trative abuses; and the existing discontent was increased by the decline 
of the export trade and dearness of corn. When work was scarce and 
wheat sold at five guineas the quarter, the demand for peace became 
insistent ; and it required all the firmness of Perceval to stave off a 
national surrender to an antagonist whose power and good fortune 
seemed boundless. On the whole, it appears that the charges of 
timidity and time-serving brought against his Administration in regard 
to the War in Spain are unfounded. True, he and Liverpool, on several 
occasions, warned Wellington that it might become necessary to with- 
draw his army ; and their private intimations sometimes differed in- 
excusably from their official communications. But, in view of the 
weakness of the Cabinet, the strength of the Opposition and the tight- 
ness of the money-market, they seem to have done their best ; and it 
was well to apprise Wellington betimes that evacuation might, on other 
than military grounds, become necessary. He framed his measures 
accordingly 1 . Later, on mature consideration of the difficulties of the 
Government, he exonerated Perceval and Liverpool from the savage 
censures which Napier heaped upon them 2 . His vindication deserves 
to be quoted : 

I have always, in public as in private, declared my obligations to the 
Government for the encouragement and support which they gave me, and 
the confidence with which they treated me. I was not the Government, as 
the Duke of Marlborough was. ...There was a formidable opposition to the 
Government in Parliament, which opposed itself particularly to the opera- 
tions of the war in the Peninsula.... It is quite certain that my opinion alone 
was the cause of the continuance of the war in the Peninsula. My letters 
show that I encouraged, nay forced, the Government to persevere in it. The 
successes of the operations of the army supported them in power. But it is 
not true that they did not, in every way in their power, as individuals, as 
Ministers and as a Government, support me 3 . 

Fortunately, Wellington had faced about at the Lines of Torres 

1 Wellington Despatches, v. 280-2, 343, 426, 470, 481, 542; VI. 6-10, 51, 147, 320, 
370; Suppl. Despatches, vi. 547. 

2 Napier, Peninsular War, Bk xi. ch. x, Bk xiv. ch. 11. 
s Stanhope, Conversations with... Wellington, 82, 83. 



COMPLETION OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 377 

Vedras, before home affairs entered upon an acute crisis. In October, 
1 8 10, George III became insane, and the Opposition hoped that the 
accession of the Prince of Wales as Regent would be fatal to the 
Ministry. Sharp altercations occurred in Parliament as to the Minis- 
terial proposals for restrictions on his authority ; but finally they were 
carried. The Prince made tentative offers to Grenville and Grey for 
the formation of a Cabinet, but in vain, owing to the stringency of 
their conditions; otherwise, it is probable that Wellington and his 
army would have been recalled from the Peninsula. By degrees, the 
Prince drifted away from his Whig advisers; and in February, 1812, 
when a permanent Regency Bill was passed, all risk of such an issue 
was at an end. It is not too much to say that, in the latter half of 18 10, 
the whole burden of the Napoleonic War rested on the shoulders of 
Wellington; and never was a crushing load borne so prudently, so 
manfully, so triumphantly. 

The same months witnessed the completion of the Continental 
System by the annexation of Holland in July, and of the north-western 
districts of Germany in December. Napoleon also tightened the cordon 
against British commerce by the Trianon and Fontainebleau decrees 
of August and October. The former was an involuntary tribute to the 
success of our merchants in importing colonial produce into his lands ; 
for, assuming that all such produce was of British origin, he now 
subjected it to heavy imposts, averaging 50 per cent, ad valorem. Alone 
among his Allies, Alexander I declined to enforce this oppressive 
tariff; but he complied with an imperious missive from Paris requiring 
the confiscation of a very large number of neutral (mostly British) 
ships then in the Baltic 1 . This was the severest blow yet sustained by 
our commerce, and the heavy loss of merchantmen (viz. 619) in that 
year, as well as the sharp decline in exports, doubtless explain the 
prevalence of discontent and the timidity of our foreign policy 2 . 

Lack of information or want of enterprise accounts for the neglect 
in the year 18 10, of a favourable opportunity for coming to a friendly 
understanding with the United States. As has been seen, ineffectual 
efforts were made in the previous year ; but President Madison, though 
originally Francophil, had not been irresponsive. Moreover, Napoleon 
in his conduct towards the States had been both harsh and insincere, 
retorting on their Non-intercourse Act of 1809 by secret measures 

1 Probably many were American. See H. Adams, Hist, of the United States, 
V. 408-19. 

2 Camb. Mod. Hist. ix. 242, 372-4; Eng. Hist. Rev. (Jan. 1903) p. 122. 



378 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

which, in May, 1810, led to the confiscation of American cargoes 
valued at $10,000,000. Further trickery ensued, the result being hot 
indignation against him in the States. Yet, for reasons which it is 
difficult to explain, Wellesley failed to profit by the Franco- American 
friction. Madison, therefore, issued a proclamation on November 2nd, 
stating that, unless Great Britain within three months withdrew her 
Orders in Council, all intercourse with her would absolutely cease. 
Why he acted thus harshly towards Great Britain, and did not retaliate 
against the far severer methods of Napoleon, is far from clear; but it 
seems that the French Foreign Minister, Champagny, Due de Cadore, 
succeeded in humouring him and inducing a belief at Washington that 
reparation would be offered and facilities for trade opened up. The 
whole question, however, is obscure 1 . Certain it is that friction with 
Great Britain continued unabated. But the events which led to the 
War of 181 2 must be detailed in the following Chapter. 

Though British Ministers failed to assign due weight to American 
sentiment and to the personal factor always so important at Washing- 
ton, yet in Europe they were by degrees feeling their way towards 
effective measures. Their policy, necessarily based on sea power, was 
strengthened by the capture of Senegal, Martinique and Cayenne in 
1809; of Guadaloupe, Amboyna and the lie de France (Mauritius) in 
1 810; and of Java in 181 1. Thenceforth, the resources of the tropics 
were wholly at their disposal and cut off from the Napoleonic States, 
except through British agencies. This fact, added to the manufacturing 
superiority of the United Kingdom, rendered the Continent dependent 
on it at the very time when the French Emperor sought to sever all 
connexion between them. In transferring the contest to the economic 
sphere he was unconsciously marshalling on the side of the Islanders 
forces against which the mightiest potentates struggle in vain. The 
severer his Decrees, the severer was the distress inflicted on the French 
people and their Allies, until, as will duly appear, his Continental 
System broke down in the country where it pressed most harshly. 

For Great Britain, then, the best course of action was to attack 
that System from as many sides as possible. This involved ceaseless 
activity at several points of the circumference; and, since Napoleon 
enjoyed the advantage of the central position, the contest, in a strictly 
military sense, seemed hopeless. In an economic sense, it was certain 

1 G. Canning in The American Nation: a History, vol. xn. 246-50; Camb. 
Mod. Hist. vii. 332-4. See new evidence in F. E. Melvin, Napoleon's Navigation 
System (New York, 1919), chs. vi-viii. 



THE BRITISH GARRISON IN SICILY 379 

finally to succeed, provided that the British Government and nation 
possessed enough patience and determination to carry it through. 
Those qualities they displayed to a degree which led him in 18 14 to 
declare them "the most powerful, the most constant, and the most 
generous of my enemies." Constancy was now the characteristic 
needed for methods of warfare certain to be fruitful in disappointments 
and therefore ill-adapted to a parliamentary system. That they suc- 
ceeded, in spite of Ministerial mistakes and Opposition naggings, was 
a riddle utterly incomprehensible to Napoleon's clear-cut Italian genius, 
as also to every Continental autocrat. 

In this circumferential strategy, by far the most important sector 
was that of Spain and Portugal. There, the Sea Power acted with the 
greatest possible advantage from excellent harbours against French 
armies, whose communications straggled across six or seven hundred 
miles of difficult and hostile territory. Furthermore, the Spanish and 
Portuguese Colonies were now opened to British commerce, affording 
a welcome relief to our overcharged industrial system 1 . But the Iberian 
Peninsula was not the only sector of importance. Next came Sicily. 
The urgency of the conquest of that island was a theme inspiring 
scores of letters from Napoleon to Murat, King of Naples; and, as we 
have seen, a sense of its value had induced the Grenville-Fox Cabinet 
to break off the peace negotiations of 1806, which finally turned on its 
surrender. On March 30th, 1808, Drummond, British Envoy at 
Palermo, signed with the Bourbon Government a Convention for 
alliance and mutual support, Great Britain maintaining in Sicily a 
corps of 10,000 men and paying to King Ferdinand a yearly sum of 
.£300,000, while he in return granted commercial and other privileges 2 . 
The British occupation was effective in several ways. The possession 
of Sicily and Malta virtually closed the eastern Mediterranean to a 
French fleet, was a constant menace to Murat, and strengthened all 
the Gallophobe elements in Italy. Further, from Sicily British goods 
were often run in successfully through the close cordon of the Con- 
tinental System. On the whole, then, the maintenance of this large 
garrison in Sicily (about which Wellington sometimes complained) 
was fully justified. 

But the effort was considerable. It was greatly enhanced by the 
haughty temper and frequent intrigues of Queen Maria Carolina. The 
truth about them will perhaps never be fathomed; for her neurotic 

1 Sir F. d'lvernois, Effets du Blocus continental, p. 12. 

2 Koch and Scholl, in. 86. 



380 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

nature and furious likes and dislikes complicated even the plainest 
issues. On the failure of British efforts against Ischia and the Neapolitan 
coast in 1809, she seems to have entered into secret relations with 
Murat's underlings. Certainly , she conceived a violent hatred against the 
British officials in Sicily, as also against its quasi-parliamentary regime. 
Not even the increase of the British subsidy to £400 ,000 a year satisfied 
her extravagance or softened her complaints. Consequently the Sicilians 
and the British drew more closely together, and many were the 
demonstrations in which the islanders shouted Viva il Re Georgio. Our 
Envoys, a Court and Lord Amherst, successively failed to assuage the 
disputes with the Queen ; and, when her autocratic proceedings caused 
a deadlock between her and the Sicilian Constitutionals, the home 
Government despatched as Envoy a man of commanding gifts. Lord 
William Bentinck, formerly Governor of Madras, was more than a 
match for Maria Carolina, who was moved to strong aversion by his 
somewhat hard and ungracious disposition. After reporting at London, 
he returned in December, 181 1 , armed with authority to end the crisis. 
The stoppage of the British subsidy and threats of a British occupation 
of Palermo induced Ferdinand early in 18 12 to transfer his authority 
to the Prince Royal ; but Bentinck deemed it necessary in March, 1812, 
to remove Ferdinand and his Queen into the interior. These high- 
handed proceedings cleared the way for the promulgation by the 
Sicilian Parliament of a Constitution closely modelled on that of Great 
Britain (June, 1812). The abolition of feudal privileges and other 
changes soon produced a slight reaction, of which the Queen sought 
to take advantage. Further disputes ensued, and Bentinck finally 
resolved to procure her departure from the island. When about to 
return, she died in Austria, in September, 18 14. The new regime in 
Sicily soon vanished during the period of reaction which then set in ; 
but, in the gloomy years that followed, it remained the cynosure of all 
Italian patriots; and the events of 1848 and i860 made it clear that, 
of all the influences exerted by Great Britain in these years of strife, 
none was more fruitful than the "English Constitution" of 1812 1 . 

The British occupation of Sicily, as we have seen, helped to cover 
Turkey against Napoleon's schemes of partition, which in 1808 prompt- 
ed his Spanish enterprise. The resumption, early in 1809, of friendly 
relations with the Sultan was of great service, inasmuch as, from 1810 

1 Sir H. Bunbury, The Great War, 278-80, 329, 442, 462, 464; R. M. Johnston, 
The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy, II. ch. vm; Castlereagh Memoirs, vm. 
213-32; Blaquiere, Letters from the Mediterranean (1813). A. Bonnefons (Marie- 
Caroline, ch. xi) gives a more favourable verdict on her. See too infra, p. 455. 



GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION (END OF 1811) 381 

to 1812, his empire was the only neutral State in Europe, and his ports 
opened up trade routes, devious it is true, into its central plain. 
Austria, southern Germany, even France, received the costly trickles 
that found their way in, via Salonica, Belgrade and up the course of the 
Danube. The hostilities between Russia and Turkey never stopped this 
traffic. And so, from the Balkan Peninsula, Sicily, Malta, Gibraltar, 
the Channel Islands, Heligoland and Anholt, the Continental System 
received constant punctures which rendered it largely inoperative. 
The United Kingdom suffered, but on the whole less than the States 
subject to Napoleon ; so that a French Royalist lampoon of the year 
1 8 10 thus pictured the result — 

Votre blocus ne bloque point, 
Et, grace a votre heureuse adresse, 
Ceux que vous affamez sans cesse 
Ne periront que a" embonpoint. 

The general situation towards the end of 181 1 was one of extra- 
ordinary interest. The Continental System, stretched to its utmost, 
showed signs of cracking. Yet Napoleon's power seemed boundless. 
Central and southern Europe obeyed his behests. Only Portugal and 
a few outlying parts of Spain defied the Imperial eagles. The Tsar 
had as yet given no clear sign of political alienation from Napoleon, 
who swayed Europe from Seville to Tilsit. Moreover, the United 
Kingdom suffered seriously from the severer measures imposed by 
Napoleon on his States late in 1810. The value of our exports of 
manufactures fell from £34,061,901 in 18 10 to £22,681,400 in 181 1 ; 
and that of foreign and colonial merchandise reexported, from 
£9,357,435 in 1810 to £6,117,720 in 181 1 1 . This serious decline, 
together with the increase in the cost of the Peninsular War, and the 
outbreak of serious outrages known as the Luddite Riots, gave cause 
for grave concern. Yet there was little thought of surrender. The Tsar, 
while remaining outwardly friendly to Napoleon , had , in January, 1 8 1 1 , 
imposed taxes on certain French products, and so far relaxed the 
Continental System in Russia and Finland, as to throw open his ports 
to all vessels sailing under a neutral flag. This sign of economic in- 
dependence not only annoyed Napoleon, but offered the means of 
surreptitiously introducing British and colonial produce, of which 
Russia stood in dire need. Equally pressing was her need of the export 
trade to the British Isles, which had taken her corn, timber, hemp, 
tar and similar products. She and Sweden stood in vital relations to 

1 Porter, Progress of the Nation, 357. 



382 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

Great Britain, who, besides being their best customer, could then 
alone supply the silks, cotton, dyes, fruits, sugar, tobacco and other 
tropical products, without which life was a long drawn-out discomfort. 
Subtropical lands such as Italy and the southern parts of France and 
Austria could furnish some of these products. The northerners sulked, 
and meditated rebellion against the Continental System. There it was, 
accordingly, that Napoleon's vast experiment of pitting the land 
against the sea first showed signs of collapse. 

A perception of this economic truth probably influenced Marquis 
Wellesley in seeking a reconciliation with Sweden. On October 
9th, 181 1, he issued instructions to Edward Thornton [1766-1852] 
(previously our representative at Hamburg and then at Stock- 
holm) to proceed to H.M.S. Victory, flying the flag of Vice-admiral 
Saumarez off the coast of Sweden, and seek to enter into relations with 
that Government. He was to point out that the present state of 
nominal hostility between the two countries could not continue in- 
definitely, and Sweden must choose between war and peace. We offered 
peace, together with naval support and a good commercial treaty, and 
expressed a hope for Swedish cooperation with any Baltic Power that 
broke with Napoleon; also, more immediately, for Sweden's help in 
reducing the Danish island of Bornholm — another sign of the British 
policy of securing commercial bases opposite hostile coasts. The ardent 
desire of Prince Bernadotte (lately acknowledged by Charles XIII as 
heir to the Swedish Crown) to aggrandise his adopted country by 
wresting Norway from Denmark, was an open secret. Consequently, 
the Instructions proceeded : " The Prince Regent is aware of the views 
of Sweden towards Norway; but H.R.H. cannot authorise any en- 
couragement of those views, until the conduct and intentions of 
Denmark shall be ascertained. If, however, any proposition should 
be made to you on the subject of Norway you will not reject it. ...If 
any proposition should be opened to you for the eventual cession of 
any West Indian colony or possession to Sweden, you will not reject 
the proposal, but will receive it amicably for future discussion 1 ." 
Reaching H.M.S. Victory in Wingo Sound in mid-October, Thornton 
soon procured a secret interview on shore with the Swedish Minister, 
Count Rosen, and found that the Prince Royal and he were resolved 
to secure Norway ; but Thornton suggested as preferable the liberation 
of Norway from the Danes and her future independence. It soon 
appeared that Sweden shrank from a rupture with Napoleon until she 

1 F.O. Sweden, 70. 



CASTLEREAGH AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 383 

had sounded the Russian Court; and, on November 20th, the British 
overture was rejected, first, because the Prince Royal regarded it as 
almost a threat, secondly, because he feared an attack from France, 
Russia and Denmark. The veiled menace in the Instructions was, 
indeed, gratuitous and unwise, unless Wellesley made a definite offer 
of effective protection, which he did not. The overture therefore 
deserved to fail. Thornton expected success only from a definite offer 
made directly to the Prince Royal 1 . Proceeding to London for con- 
sultation with Wellesley, he remained there until March, 1812, when 
a far abler man took command at the Foreign Office. 

Robert Stewart, better known as Viscount Castlereagh, afterwards 
second Marquis of Londonderry [1769-1822] had long displayed 
firmness of will and skill in the management of men and affairs, first 
in Ireland in 1797-1801, then as President of the India Board of 
Control under Addington, and afterwards as War Minister in the Pitt, 
Grenville and Portland Administrations. He must bear his share of 
responsibility for the errors of judgment then committed ; and that 
costly fiasco, the Walcheren expedition, was peculiarly his own, alike in 
the original design and in the choice of Chatham as commander. Yet — 
strange psychological contradiction — the same man who carefully 
selected that portentous misfit, also placed Wellington in the sphere 
peculiarly suited to his indomitable will and consummate prudence. 
To Wellington Castlereagh accorded loyal and wholehearted support, 
both while in office and afterwards by vindicating the general policy 
of the Perceval Cabinet. He was not a good speaker. His circum- 
locutions bored the House, though occasionally a Hibernian pursuit 
of conflicting metaphors afforded passing relief. But his full powers 
were revealed only in his Office and in interviews with Generals or 
Ambassadors. There, he inspired confidence in the Allied cause and 
in himself as its steadfast champion. A pupil of Pitt, he carried on the 
traditions of the European settlement set forth in 1795, 1798 and 1805 ; 
and to the serene hopefulness of the master he added a physical 
strength and a capacity for managing men, which, thanks to the belated 
access of wisdom brought about by two decades of defeats, enabled 
him to build up and maintain a compact Coalition. 

Such was the Minister who now took in hand the negotiation with 
Sweden. Fortunately, that Power, annoyed by the French invasion 
of its Pomeranian Province, had sent to London a proposal, first, 
for peace, and, secondly, for alliance with Great Britain ; provided that 

1 F.O. Sweden, 70. Thornton to Wellesley, November 20th, 181 1. 



384 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

we accorded naval, military and financial succour, transferred a West 
India island to her, and assured her territorial extension, especially 
on the side of Norway. On March 13th, 1812, Castlereagh wrote to 
Thornton (then on his way to Sweden via Leith), welcoming the 
proposal of peace and alliance. He stated that we did not require 
Sweden to declare war on Napoleon, but (subject to the demands of 
the Peninsular War which was our chief concern) we would defend 
her by a fleet in case of a Russian invasion or a Franco-Danish attack 
through Norway. We would consider her request for a West India 
island, and, while deferring a decision respecting Norway, would 
endeavour to meet her wishes for compensation for the loss of Finland 
and Swedish Pomerania. In separate and "secret" letters, he in- 
structed Thornton to see the Prince Royal and sound his intentions ; 
and he added that Mr Liston would at once proceed to Constantinople 
to seek to promote peace between the Sultan and Russia 1 . 

These despatches reveal the combination of foresight and prudence 
characteristic of a statesman. Avoiding the veiled threats that had 
lately given offence, Castlereagh now displays full consideration for 
Sweden in her difficulties, promises to help her if she is attacked by 
France and Denmark, but holds out no unreal hopes either of assistance 
from us or of aggrandisement for her. Thus, the affair was placed on 
a sound footing. A fortnight later, he promises that, when Sweden 
makes peace, the Orders in Council of January, 1807, so far as they 
concern her, will be revoked (a proof that those Orders were in part 
designed to exert diplomatic pressure and that Ministers were begin- 
ning to consider the question of abrogating them). He also points out 
that her ports will then become the depots for British trade in the 
Baltic, and he adds the significant statement that, on the conclusion 
of the hoped-for Russo-Swedish peace, a British officer will be sent to 
discuss the operations to be carried on against the enemy ; and he notes 
Sweden's present proposal "that measures should be adopted to in- 
duce Denmark to join the confederacy against France, and [that] in 
exchange for Norway, to be ceded to Sweden, an extension of territory 
should be given to Denmark on the side of Germany." As to this, 
the Prince Regent declares that such extension must not be at the 
expense of Hanover. It is clear that Castlereagh, remembering the 
flash of Danish pride in August, 1807, had little hope of inducing that 
people by threats of coercion and invasion to side against France ; for, 
on April 14th, he writes to Thornton suggesting the offer to Denmark 

1 F.O. Sweden, 71. (See Appendix for extracts.) 



CASTLEREAGH'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDEN 385 

of Swedish Pomerania and some other German land as a friendly- 
exchange for Norway. On April 24th, he charges Thornton to inform 
the Swedish Government that the Prince Regent had resolutely 
declined Napoleon's offer of recent peace on the basis of the recognition 
of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain. As this implied the abandon- 
ment of the Spanish patriots, the British answer could not be doubtful 1 . 
Though Napoleon's peace overture to Great Britain implied a 
desire to dissolve the nascent Coalition, and was so regarded by the 
negotiators, yet the Anglo- Swedish accord progressed very slowly. 
Sweden required the restoration of peace with Great Britain to be 
accompanied by the framing of a joint concert with Russia. Castle- 
reagh demurred to this proviso, especially since Russia was preparing 
with Sweden a compact, the purport of which she withheld. On the 
ground of our responsibilities to the Spaniards and Portuguese, he 
declined as excessive the Swedish requests for a subsidy of £1,200,000; 
and, as for the acquisition of Norway, he suggested that, preferably, 
Denmark should join the future League and obtain the compensation 
forthe surrenderof Norway, as noted above. While welcoming the news 
of a Russo-Swedish understanding, Castlereagh was evidently puzzled 
by the aloofness of Russia, but, on May 8th, expressed his willingness 
to meet her advances when proffered. It came to this, then: that 
Sweden expected from us a large subsidy and an assumption of wide 
and vague responsibilities, she herself offering nothing very tangible 
in return, but the hitch in the Swedish negotiation was clearly due to 
Bernadotte's resolve not to move against France unless the Allies 
guaranteed Norway to him. This fact, and others of curious import, 
are set forth in the Castlereagh-Thornton despatches 2 , which throw 
light on the schemes of the Prince Royal and Napoleon, proving inter 
alia, that the latter was bidding high for Swedish support. Hence, 
perhaps, the delay on the Swedish side. At Petrograd, the Tsar seems 
to have wished for a speedy peace with Great Britain. As will soon 
appear, she was working at Constantinople on his behalf, and the 
desire to propitiate him, as well as the United States, explains the 
sudden (though belated) abrogation of the Orders in Council on June 
16th, 1812. Nevertheless, up to the end of June his desire for union 
with her was thwarted by his Francophil Minister, Romanzoff, who, 
by various dilatory devices, staved off a decision. 

1 F. O.Sweden, 71. Castlereagh to Thornton, March 25th, 27th; April 14th, 
1812. Nap. Corr. no. 18652. Fain, Manuscrit de 1812, 1. 98-102, with Castlereagh's 
reply. 

2 See Appendix H. 

W.&G.I. 25 



386 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

Meanwhile, as so often happened, Napoleon put an end to these 
lengthy chafferings by a sudden attack. But he had occupied Vilna 
during three weeks and was advancing on Vitebsk, before Russia and 
Sweden signed a Treaty of Peace with Great Britain at Orebro in 
Sweden (July 17th). Thornton at once warned Saumarez to do all 
he could to help our new Allies ; but the delays just noticed prevented 
the timely direction of British naval power against the French heavy 
transport, which was largely carried on by sea from Danzig to their 
line of operations in Lithuania. Later, Saumarez and his captains 
did much to harass that service ; but far more would have been done 
but for the protracted delays in signing the Treaties of Orebro. The 
Russian force, designed to cooperate with Sweden in an attack on 
Copenhagen (now that the Danes remained obdurate) was, also, not 
ready in time. Consequently, that part of the Allied plans of 1812 was 
postponed; and not until the end of the year did Thornton announce 
a definite rupture between Sweden and France 1 . Meanwhile, General 
Lord Cathcart had been deputed by Liverpool (Prime-Minister 
since the assassination of Perceval) to proceed as Ambassador to 
Petrograd. On his arrival early in September, Alexander intimated 
his resolve to place in deposit with Great Britain the Russian Baltic 
fleet, lest, when frozen in at Cronstadt, it should fall into the enemy's 
hands. It is one of the ironies of history that the deposition of the 
Russian fleet for safe keeping with the British Government should 
have been arranged by Cathcart, who took over the Danish fleet in 
1807, with the Sovereign who had fulminated against that measure 
as an act of unpardonable perfidy 2 . 

It is now time to return to our relations with Turkey, which were 
destined largely to influence the course of events near the close of the 
Moscow Campaign. The Alliance of Alexander with Napoleon at 
Tilsit, renewed with some modifications at Erfurt, had involved Russia 
in hostilities, not only with Sweden but with the Turks; and, early 
in 1 8 10, she had captured nearly the whole of the Danubian Provinces. 
The Porte, however, refused to cede them, doubtless relying on the 
probability that plans for the partition of Turkey would lead to 
friction between the two potentates as to the apportionment of the 
spoils. Adair, British Ambassador at Constantinople in 1 808-1 1, pro- 
posed various means for restoring peace between Russia and the Turks, 

1 Castlereagh Memoirs, VIII. 283. 

2 Ibid. Thornton to Castlereagh, July 18th; Cathcart, War in Russia and Ger- 
many, ch. 1 ; Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin, II. 311 ; Life of Saumarez, II. 281-9. 



STRATFORD CANNING 387 

even suggesting to Wellesley, in March, 18 10, the cession to her of one 
of our West India Islands, in order to bring about a conjoint settle- 
ment and an eventual Anglo-Russo-Turkish Union. Nothing resulted 
from his proposals, except that the Porte became convinced of our 
goodwill 1 . Adair, therefore, recommended the adoption of a vigorous 
Mediterranean policy, involving the occupation of Corfu, Cattaro and 
Elba, so as to enclose and throttle the Continental System from the 
south. With that aim in view, the islands of Zante, Cephalonia, and 
Cerigo had been captured from the French in 1809; Sta. Maura was 
taken in 1810; but the French in Corfu held out until after the first 
abdication of Napoleon. It is clear, then (despite the denial of Sir 
Henry Bunbury 2 ) that the British Government had a definite Medi- 
terranean policy. From the Ionian Islands, it threatened the Napoleonic 
States on the Adriatic and also screened Turkey from the attacks, 
which, at and after Tilsit, the French Emperor meditated against her 
from those islands, from Cattaro and from Dalmatia. His inability to 
push on the schemes of partition foremost in his thoughts , also , fomented 
a feeling of annoyance with the Tsar, who, after the conquest of the 
Danubian provinces, was in a position easily to overrun Serbia (then 
in a state of ferment) and even to threaten Roumelia and Constan- 
tinople. This feeling of jealousy played its part in bringing about the 
rupture of 18 12. 

Adair being compelled by illness to return home in June, 1810, 
the honour of furthering British, Turkish, and eventually Russian, 
interests in the impending world-crisis devolved upon his young 
secretary of legation, Stratford Canning, the ambition of whose life it 
had been to serve England in England. Fate willed that he should serve 
her at Constantinople. Before he took his degree at Cambridge, he 
was reluctantly pressed into the diplomatic service, of which he be- 
came the most distinguished ornament during the 19th century. Owing 
to the precarious health of Adair, George Canning in July, 1809, 
appointed his young cousin, provisionally, Minister-plenipotentiary 
in case of the collapse of the Ambassador ; and this duty devolved upon 
him at Midsummer, 18 10. French influence was then unbounded and 
the Porte bowed before it. This youth of twenty-three had to fight 
against it single-handed : for he very rarely received instructions or 
advice from the next Foreign Minister, Marquis Wellesley. Probably 
the negligence of the chief developed the resourcefulness and resolu- 



1 Sir R. Adair, The Peace of the Dardanelles, II. 10-21 , 95, 270. 

2 The Great War vnth France, p. 327. 



25- 



388 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

tion of the young Envoy. Confronted by intrigues at the French 
Embassy and corruption and apathy at the Porte, he did not lose heart. 
From Consul-general David Morier (father of sons destined to high 
repute in the public service), he gained good advice as to dealing with 
orientals: but his native shrewdness and force of character utilised 
every opportunity. He continued Adair's policy of supporting the 
AnglophilAli Pacha, of Jannina(" the Lion of Epirus") whose masterful 
and cruel nature inspired terror among the Greeks and apprehension 
at the Porte. He also seconded the efforts of Sir Gore Ouseley, British 
Envoy at Teheran, to thwart the efforts for a Franco-Persian alliance 
which Napoleon had begun in the spring of 1807. In short, it fell to 
him, without advice or help from Downing Street, to try to foil 
Napoleon's enterprises from the Adriatic to the borders of Afghanistan 1 . 

It is difficult to account for Wellesley's neglect of the Constanti- 
nople embassy ; for, besides being the only important British mission 
on the Continent, it offered a ready means of influencing Levantine, 
Austrian and Russian politics. Furthermore, if (as Adair and Stratford 
Canning urged) a powerful British squadron could have been spared 
for the Black Sea to join the Turks in an attack on Sevastopol, the Tsar 
would, probably, have consented to negotiate for peace with both 
Powers. But, the strain on the British navy being very great, the young 
Minister had to rely on diplomatic means. Here, circumstances 
favoured him . By the autumn of 1 8 1 1 , the young Sultan , Mahmoud 1 1 , 
and his Ministers expressed a desire for the good services of Great 
Britain to end their conflict with Russia, and they declined the media- 
tion of any other Power, although that of France would have been 
more in accord with custom, she being an Ally of the Tsar, while we 
were at war with him. After further Russian successes, an Armistice 
was concluded in November; and at the end of the year the Tsar 
despatched a Plenipotentiary, Italinski, to negotiate for peace with 
Turkey — a sign that he expected a rupture with Napoleon and desired 
to concentrate all his resources upon that struggle. Negotiations, 
accordingly, began at Bukharest. 

Naturally enough, the French sought to thwart them. They 
pointed out that, with the help of the French, Turkey might hope to 
reconquer not only the Danubian Provinces, but also part of the 
Ukraine, and thus renew the glories of Suleiman the Magnificent. 
Ambition and the promptings of Napoleon spurred her on to this 

1 Nap. Corr.no. 12563 ; Gardane, La Mission du Gen. Gardane en Perse; S. Lane- 
Poole, Life 0/ Stratford Canning, 1. 105, 128-39. 



RUSSO-TURKISH PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 389 

adventurous course. Prudence and the advice of Canning counselled 
otherwise. The chaotic condition of the Ottoman realms, the penury 
of their finances, the bad discipline of their troops, the rebellions of 
their Pachas and the restiveness of the native Christians, called aloud 
for a speedy peace as the only means of averting disintegration and 
ruin. On one point, the Divan was irrevocably pledged . " Not an inch 
of land " was the maxim which it opposed to the land-hunger of the 
Muscovites. At times, the clash of Turkish pride and Russian per- 
sistence seemed irremediable. On February 6th, Canning wrote to 
Wellesley that the French Embassy deemed the negotiation at an end. 
Such was the general impression, and it induced in Napoleon, even 
at the end of March, the confident belief that a renewal of the Russo- 
Turkish War would embarrass the Tsar and prevent him braving the 
power of France 1 . Meanwhile, on February 19th, Stratford Canning 
had taken the unusual step of writing (with the approval of the Sultan) 
to the Neapolitan Minister at Petrograd, asking him to use his good 
offices at that Court and to represent the need of moderation in the 
Russian demands and the danger of exasperating the Turks so highly as 
to drive them into the arms of France. On the same day, he wrote to 
the Turkish and Russian negotiators at Bukharest, ending his letter 
to Italinski with these words: "The conclusion of peace between 
Russia and the Porte would be one obstacle the less to peace between 
Russia and England, and consequently to that peace which alone can 
secure the true repose of the universe." To the Turkish negotiator, 
he explained the course of French intrigues for the prolongation of the 
Russo-Turkish War, and in cautious terms he offered the services of 
Great Britain for its settlement 2 . But this was not all. On hearing 
that the Divan was strongly inclined to reject Russia's terms, he (to 
quote his words), "sent to tell the Reis Effendi that I trusted every 
effort consistent with the dignity, and every concession not incom- 
patible with the safety, of the Empire would be made for the restoration 
of peace at the present crisis, and that, in order to give a striking proof 
of H.M.'s sincere regard for the Porte, I was ready to lend every 
assistance in my power towards the accomplishment of so desirable 
an object 3 ." 

How far the actions of Stratford Canning influenced the final issue 
is uncertain. The belligerents knew that his actions were not authorised 

1 Nap. Corf. no. 18622. See Zinkeisen, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs, vn. 
718-29. 

2 Lane-Poole, 1. 16 1-3. 

3 F.O. Turkey (1812). Stratford Canning to Wellesley, February 21st. 



390 THE CONTEST WITH NAPOLEON 

from Downing Street. Indeed, on March i ith, he wrote to Wellesley, 
pointing out the unfortunate results of his long silence on eastern 
affairs, which contrasted with the activity of the French Embassy. But, 
six days later, he reported that the Grand Vizier had now received 
full powers to conclude peace with Russia on the best terms possible — 
a decision due to fear lest Napoleon and Alexander should come to 
an understanding and recur to their policy of partitioning Turkey 1 . 
Moreover, at the end of April, the Tsar, through the medium of the 
Prince Royal of Sweden, had informed the British Government that 
he "had given instructions to make peace at all events with the Porte 
and on any concession of his pretensions, provided only that they 
[i.e. the Turks] would enter into the alliance with England, Russia and 
Sweden 2 ." The Turks declined an offer of offensive alliance which 
would involve hostilities with Napoleon. Indeed, they feared that 
even a peace with Russia might bring on them an attack from his 
Illyrian and Dalmatian Provinces 3 . Their apprehensions were not 
unreal; for he was about to send as Special Ambassador General 
Andreossi, with offers of alliance rich in allurements but not devoid 
of threats. The attitude of his Ally, Austria, was also menacing 4 . On 
the other hand, Sweden sent a mission to reassure the Sultan of her 
support. 

Against diverse difficulties, Stratford Canning struggled manfully. 
Unfortunately, the accession of Castlereagh to the Foreign Secretary- 
ship took place too late to afford official support at Constantinople. 
Liston [i 742-1 836] was appointed Ambassador at that court; but he 
arrived too late to influence the negotiations at Bukharest. Meanwhile, 
Stratford Canning worked with equal diligence and success to persuade 
Russia to reduce her claims and the Turks to abate their pride and their 
suspicion. Finally the Tsar's dread of Napoleon and the Turkish 
fear of a union of Russia, Austria and France for the partition of the 
Ottoman Empire, brought about a settlement in the Peace of Bukharest 
(May 28th, 1812). Turkey thereby ceded Bessarabia to Russia, but 
retained her former frontier in Asia Minor and her military hold on 
Serbia. The Treaty was ratified too late to enable the Russian forces 
in the Danubian Provinces to help in resisting Napoleon's march to 
Moscow ; but that delay contributed to the completion of his mad enter- 
prise, and, at the Beresina, those forces very nearly cut off his retreat. 

1 F.O.Turkey (18 12). Stratford Canning to Wellesley, March nth, 17th, 1812. 

2 F.O. Sweden, 72. Thornton to Castlereagh, May 2nd, 1812. 

3 F.O. Turkey (18 1 2). Stratford Canning's despatch of April 25th. 

4 Zinkeisen, vii. 726; Lane-Poole, 1. 165, 166. 



THE CONSTANCY OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 391 

Thenceforth, the retreat became a pitiable rout which encouraged the 
rally of the Prussian army of General Yorck to the Allied cause. 

On the surface of these events, the eye beholds a vast efflux and 
reflux of armies, whose fate is decided less by the puny efforts of man 
than by the resistless powers of nature. But the trained imagination 
sees far more. It beholds the westward undertow of the Peninsular 
War, the weakening effect of the British naval blockade on all parts of 
Napoleon's empire and the thwarting of his attempts to capture Riga. 
It notes the efforts of British diplomacy to disengage Russia from the 
troublesome hostilities on her flanks and to convert Sweden and Turkey 
into Allies. Further, it recalls the unswerving efforts of Pitt, Grenville, 
Hawkesbury, Canning, Wellesley and Castlereagh to resist the terri- 
torial predominance of the French Revolution and of its heir, 
Napoleon. Those efforts were often unskilful, diffuse and wasteful. 
Their plans of European reconstruction were, also, in large measure 
artificial; for, in general, they were prompted by military considera- 
tions, and often erred in neglecting the interests of the peoples 
concerned. Yet Great Britain's Foreign Policy was honest and dis- 
interested, when compared with that of her great antagonist and of 
her Allies. Externally imposing, his policy was marred by an un- 
bounded selfishness. The conduct of the Central Powers was impaired 
by a petty egoism, a paralysing jealousy, and by half-heartedness that 
faltered at the first great reverse. Hers were at least the virtues of 
constancy and doggedness. Her work was slow but it was sure. 
Finally, her efforts, often failing but ever renewed, enabled the Con- 
tinental monarchs to gain wisdom from bitter experience, and, after 
Napoleon's ambition had overreached itself, to enter into a close union 
such as had formerly been impracticable. As they gathered together 
in the year 1813, they might have ascribed to her the lofty praise with 
which the shade of Anchises hailed the spirit of him who foiled the 
fiery genius of Hannibal : 

Tu Maximus ilk es, 
Unus qui nobis cunctando restituis rem. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

I. FROM THE TREATY OF KALISCH TO THE END 
OF THE YEAR 1813 

DURING the year 1812, Great Britain had been able to do little 
to influence the course of the struggle that was taking place on 
the Continent. What she could do she had, under the guidance of 
the new Cabinet, on the whole done promptly and well. The unre- 
mitting pressure of the Blockade had been continued unrelaxed de- 
spite the opening of the American War. The assistance which had 
been given to Russia in money and material had shown that such 
aid was always at the command of any Power which would attempt 
to throw off Napoleon's ascendancy. British diplomacy had been, 
also, employed to some effect in relieving Russia from the pressure 
of both Turkey and Sweden, and the latter Power was now ready to 
become an active foe of Napoleon. At the extremities of Europe, 
where sea power could give her a footing, Great Britain had main- 
tained her position. The steady improvement in the British and 
Portuguese armies had given solidity to the national resistance 
in the Peninsula, where greater success had been obtained than 
in any previous year. Sicily had, also, been kept free to serve 
as a base for attacks on Italy. But the main current of events was 
entirely outside the control of Great Britain; and she remained a 
mere spectator of the clash of forces on the Continent. 

To some extent, this position is further maintained during the year 
1 81 3. In the great series of military and diplomatic events which 
changed Europe from an inert congeries of French vassals into a 
hostile Alliance whose armies were assembled on the French fron- 
tiers, British policy played only a subordinate part. She was, indeed, 
the paymaster of the Coalition. But a real voice in strategy or diplo- 
macy could not be purchased by money alone. It needed military 
prestige and diplomatic ability of the first order to make use of the 
position which finance and sea power gave to her statesmen, and these 
she was only just beginning to command after long years of fatal 
blundering. Moreover, for most of the year the centre of operations 



THE NEW COALITION AND THE NEW CABINET 393 

was too far away for her statesmen to obtain any control over the be- 
wilderingly rapid changes of situation on the Continent. It was not 
until 1 8 14, when France itself became the scene of action, that the 
skilful diplomacy of Castlereagh was able to secure the position which 
her statesmen and people felt to be due to her proved power of resist- 
ance. Even in 1813, however, she played a more important and more 
successful part than in any previous Coalition against Napoleon, and, 
though she did not fully secure her objects, she prepared the way for 
the overwhelming success of the next year. 

That this was so, was due to the fact that her statesmen had, at 
last, in some measure learnt by bitter experiences how to fight the 
Napoleonic Empire. The situation was, indeed, changed by the fact 
(which her Foreign Minister from the first perceived) that a national 
resistance was now being offered to Napoleon in the north of Europe. 
But his position was still far stronger than it had been in 1801 or in 
1805, and if the forces arrayed against him were not more skilfully 
utilised than on previous occasions, it might be once more the fate of 
Great Britain to see the new Coalition dissolve as others had dissolved 
before. If British strength was again frittered away in useless ex- 
peditions and British diplomacy unable to secure the Coalition against 
the insidious methods which Napoleon knew so well how to employ, 
the result might yet be an Austerlitz and a Friedland, followed by 
a Peace as disastrous as that of Pressburg or Tilsit. 

But the new Cabinet which had come into existence in 18 10 
contained men, mainly the pupils of Pitt, who, while lacking the 
ability or prestige of their master, had yet learnt much from his mis- 
takes and proved themselves far more capable than their prede- 
cessors. Liverpool, who had become Prime-Minister after Perceval's 
assassination in June 1812, was a man of only moderate ability; but 
he possessed two great characteristics — a large experience, including 
nearly every Cabinet office, and an unfailing tact, which kept his 
Cabinet together and left the Opposition powerless. Castlereagh, the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who had succeeded Wellesley 
in 1 81 2, not only led the House of Commons with notable skill, but 
filled the most important office in the Cabinet as a pupil of Pitt, 
not less courageous than he was cautious and self-restrained. For 
this position Canning had been designed by Liverpool; and he 
could have secured it by a very slight exercise of self-subordination. 
But, though Canning would have brought to the Ministry imagina- 
tion and brilliance, he would almost certainly have impaired its unity 



394 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

and hence its efficiency. Bathurst, the Secretary of State for War, 
was completely conversant with his colleague's ideas, and was an ex- 
perienced and energetic administrator. Both Vansittart, the Chan- 
cellor of the Exchequer, and Sidmouth, at the Home Office, were 
dull and self-opinionated ; but they served their turn as strenuous sup- 
porters of the policy of their abler colleagues. Almost all the rest of 
the Cabinet, which included Lords Harrowby as Privy Seal, Eldon 
as Chancellor and Mulgrave at the Ordnance, were men of experience 
who, however mediocre in political ability, not merely gave the 
Ministry weight, but were Ministers who could be trusted to follow 
loyally where they could not lead. There were, also, in the minor 
offices several men of high ability, among them Huskisson and Palmer- 
ston, and the Earl of Clancarty. Certainly, Pitt had never been 
fortunate enough to possess a staff so competent and experienced, 
and, though his commanding genius was lacking, the triumvirate of 
Liverpool, Bathurst and Castlereagh, who controlled the main lines of 
foreign and military policy, included among them some gifts which 
Pitt lacked, while they had learnt from the faults as well as from the 
good qualities of their master 1 . They were thus able to put Pitt's 
ideas into force only too successfully, when at last the opportunity 
came. 

Of these three, Castlereagh was by far the ablest and, from 18 14 
onwards until his death, he obtained over British Foreign Policy a 
supremacy which he shared only with Wellington, who was to be so 
much by his side during the settlement of 1814-15. He won it not 
only by sheer hard work and force of character, but also by a sense of 
reality and a certain broadness of view which few of his Tory con- 
temporaries possessed. He was, of course, blind to many things — as 
blind as Pitt. He accepted all the articles of the Tory creed for which 
the War had secured the active support of three-quarters of the upper 
classes of Great Britain. But he applied it with caution and self- 
restraint to Continental affairs. The ideas which he had inherited 
from Pitt he endeavoured to apply to this new phase of the struggle, 
and he added to them a few expedients of his own. These we shall 
see appearing in the course of this year, and carried into some sort 
of fruition in the settlement that followed in 18 14-15. 

The influence of the Prince Regent himself was not negligible. 

1 All three had held the offices both of Foreign Minister and of Secretary of State 
for War, and the unity of political and military strategy obtained was doubtless 
partly due to this fact. 



CASTLEREAGH AND HIS SUBORDINATES 395 

He gradually obtained a considerable knowledge of men and events, 
and his personal relations with the Sovereigns had some influence 
on events in 1814 and 1815. On the whole, he was entirely amenable 
to the advice of his Cabinet at this period ; but the personal wishes of 
himself and some of his royal brothers on minor points were apt to 
cause inconvenience. The Prince Regent was, also, Sovereign of 
Hanover, and the interests of that country, which had proved so fatal 
to Pitt's schemes in 1805, were still an embarrassing charge upon his 
Ministers. Fortunately, Count Munster, who represented him in 
Hanoverian affairs, was shrewd and moderate in action, though im- 
bued with the most intense reactionary views. He could always, in the 
last resort, be controlled by Castlereagh, who, at the same time, left 
him so far as possible the last word on such matters as the German 
Constitution, in which British Ministers were only indirectly in- 
terested. From Munster and other Hanoverian Ministers, such as 
Count Hardenberg at Vienna and L. von Ompteda, Castlereagh un- 
doubtedly learnt much about Continental affairs which was of great 
use to him. 

Castlereagh was but imperfectly served by his diplomatic sub- 
ordinates. The curse of jobbery still lay heavy on all appointments. 
Castlereagh obeyed the natural instinct of the British aristocracy in 
putting his relations, friends and the friends of his political associates 
into all the good jobs that lay in his patronage. Seniority counted for 
something, good men might possibly be rewarded after many years, 
and actual incompetence was not tolerated; but far too many of 
Castlereagh's subordinates were connexions of himself and his col- 
leagues, who had obtained their position for this reason. Further, 
as always at the close of a great war, military and diplomatic functions 
were not clearly distinguished. Castlereagh's representatives were 
sometimes soldiers who combined a dual function — and soldiers, 
unless they are exceptional men, do not often make good diplomatists. 
From this cause, also, it resulted that Castlereagh was represented 
in Italy at a most critical period of our relations, by a fierce Whig 
like Lord William Bentinck. For years, of course, the profession of 
English diplomacy in Europe had almost been suspended, since 
diplomatic relations had practically ceased to exist with the majority 
of European States. Inferior agents, half-diplomatists, half-spies, 
like King or Horn, were the only links connecting the British Govern- 
ment with Continental Courts. Castlereagh was lucky enough to find 
Sir Henry Wellesley at Cadiz, and Stratford Canning temporarily 



396 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

in charge at Constantinople. For the rest, until Clancarty came to 
help him at Vienna, he had no one but untrained mediocrities in his 
principal missions. Over these he had, however, so far as time and 
distance allowed, a complete control. He had moreover their loyal 
support and complete confidence, and to many of them he could 
write with great intimacy, though he rarely revealed all he was aiming 
at. He handled a difficult team, half-amateurs, with great tact. He 
praised freely and, when he had to censure, he generally knew how to 
gild the pill. On the whole, he was too kind to them; but they repaid 
him with a real devotion which made them sometimes better instru- 
ments of his policy than abler men would have been. At the outset, 
Castlereagh lacked, like all British statesmen, any real knowledge of 
the statesmen of other countries. He and his colleagues had been cut 
off from the Continent, and tne new men that were now rising to 
power were known to them only by gossip and very imperfect reports. 
Aberdeen, so late as the autumn of 1813, had to explain to Castlereagh 
that Metternich was not an old man 1 . It was only because, in 1814 
and 181 5, Castlereagh went himself to the Continent and became 
acquainted with all the principal figures in European diplomacy, that 
he was able to attain to that intimate touch with affairs which he 
afterwards displayed. 

The new situation, brought about by the complete destruction of 
Napoleon's army in Russia, was only gradually understood in England, 
and the events that immediately succeeded were not anticipated. 
British diplomacy, while securing Sweden for an active participation 
in the War on the Continent, had then concentrated on Austria rather 
than Prussia, though little had been expected from what Liverpool 
described as theimperial Government's "abject "policy 2 ! Nor had the 
secret mission of Lord Walpole, Cathcart's Secretary of Embassy at 
Petrograd, to Vienna (December 1812-January 1813) produced any 
result but vague assurances from Metternich ; and the British Ambas- 
sador had to withdraw to the country on Napoleon's discovery of his 
presence there. The Treaty of Kalisch between Russia and Prussia, 
which bound them to prosecute the War until the latter Power was 
restored to a position at least equivalent to that which she had held in 
1805, was made without reference to Great Britain; though Prussia, 
of course, once the die was cast, appealed for pecuniary assistance in 

1 Lord Stanmore, Life of Lord Aberdeen, p. 35. 

2 December 22nd, 18 12. Liverpool to Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, 
vii. 503. 



BRITISH COLONIAL AND MARITIME SUPREMACY 397 

money and material, in both of which she was sorely lacking. The news 
of her action, however, at once opened a prospect of an entire change in 
the European situation ; and Castlereagh had, for the first time since 
his acceptance of office in June, to formulate his principles of action. 

The main lines of policy which he was to follow in these years 
were laid down for him by history and tradition. They comprised, 
first of all, the maintenance of the colonial and maritime supremacy 
of Great Britain which, despite the unexpected rebuffs received by 
her in the American War, was now absolutely established. Not only 
were all the French Colonies now hers, but also the Dutch and 
Danish. In fact, the only overseas possessions not under her control 
were the South-American Colonies of her Allies , Spainand Portugal, and 
with those of the former now in revolt against the mother-country, she 
was rapidly establishing commercial relations — a far wiser and more 
lucrative policy than the schemes, at one time seriously considered, of 
bringing them under her own rule. She thus had in her hands an 
immense dominion, which she could keep as pledge for the Continental 
settlement. It was already clear that those portions of it which were 
regarded as vital to her maritime strategy she intended to retain ; but 
the rest remained as a means at her disposal for securing such a 
Continental peace as she desired, and provided her with a diplomatic 
weapon of great value. Even more sensitive were British statesmen 
as to the "Maritime Rights" of Great Britain. For these, she was, 
even now at the height of her struggle with Napoleon, waging war 
with the United States. The principal champion of Neutral Rights on 
the Continent had been Russia, now her Ally, and it was not difficult 
to see that Napoleon would, if he could, try to bring this matter under 
discussion. It was, therefore, always a cardinal point of British policy 
to exclude any discussion of British rights on this head from the 
negotiations as to the European settlement, and this point was easily 
gained. 

Secondly, Great Britain had obligations to Allies on which she 
must insist if she was to obtain an honourable peace. Most important 
of these were her promises to restore complete freedom to Spain as 
well as to Portugal. Sicily had also been guaranteed to the Neapolitan 
Bourbons, who confidently expected to be restored to Naples by 
British help, and Sweden had received the promise of Norway in 
return for active assistance on the Continent. Throughout the negotia- 
tions of 181 3, these obligations were made a sine qua non of peace 
with France. 



398 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

Thirdly, Great Britain had to consider the political arrangement 
of the Continent. It had been her consistent policy to try to erect a 
barrier to the overwhelming power of France. How far the de- 
struction of the Napoleonic empire would proceed, it was impossible 
to say. Even at this moment in England, there were some who hoped 
to reduce France to her ancient limits 1 . But such a result must depend 
on the resolution and skill of the European Powers, and few hoped 
that they would succeed so far. On this point, therefore, Great 
Britain depended on her Allies. She could not force them to go further 
than they wished. But, throughout, she encouraged them to go as 
far as possible, hoping to use her Colonial conquests as a means to 
drive back the power of France from the centre of Europe. 

Lastly, when the final settlement came to be made, much of 
Castlereagh's energy was to be expended in endeavouring to force 
on the rest of the world the great reform that had been carried in 
Great Britain by the short-lived Whig Ministry — the Abolition of the 
Slave-trade, devotion to which public opinion, inspired by the efforts 
of Wilberforce and Clarkson, now made essential to the popularity, 
and even to the existence of a British Cabinet. 

Bound by these considerations, which were imposed by the 
necessity of the case on all British Cabinets, Castlereagh drew up his 
Instructions at the beginning of April 18 13, on the news of the Treaty 
of Kalisch. They were addressed to Earl Cathcart, special British 
representative at Alexander's headquarters, who had been sent to 
Russia in 1 812. A soldier turned diplomatist, he was entirely un- 
fitted for the important position which he now held. Even in military 
matters, he was unable to obtain satisfactory intelligence, while he 
never understood clearly the political and financial affairs which he 
had to handle. Already over middle age, " le vieux general diplomate" 
as George Jackson called him, lacked energy as well as ability. He 
fell under Alexander's influence, and no one could have been more 
unsuited to the task of interpreting the subtle and rapidly shifting 
diplomacy of 1813 to his distant chief. His rank and courage, and the 
confidence of his bearing, alone enabled him to maintain his position. 
In April, Castlereagh sent out in a similar capacity to Prussian head- 
quarters Lord Stewart, his own half-brother. Like Cathcart, he was a 
soldier and had been Wellington's Adjutant-general. But the Duke, 
while very friendly to him, was far too shrewd a judge of men to accede 
to his fervent wish to command a cavalry division. Stewart had some 
1 Bath Archives, II. 54. 



THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC STAFF 399 

fine qualities. Brave to a fault, he succeeded in being in the thick of 
most of the great actions of 1813, and was wounded at Kulm. He had 
plenty of energy and sent home military intelligence of great value. 
He established close relations with the Prussian military commanders 
and learnt much from them; while his surveillance of the Swedish 
army, which was also one of his duties, was of real importance at 
critical stages in the struggle. But he was pompous, vain and wrong- 
headed, and as he often confessed, without any knowledge of diplo- 
macy. He had been originally intended to be subordinate to Cathcart ; 
but, though Castlereagh's affection (which was very strong, and 
was returned with real devotion and respect) secured for him an 
independent position, he was quite incapable of taking advantage of 
these favours. Thus, although intimate with the Sovereigns and 
statesmen, and present on all great diplomatic occasions, his vanity 
and love of display made him one of the standing jests of the Con- 
tinent at the Congress of Vienna. His subordinate G. Jackson, who 
had been attached to his brother in 1807 in a mission to the Prussian 
Court, was a professional diplomatist of skill and knowledge. But he 
was not adequate to supplying the defects of his chief. With the two 
Ambassadors Extraordinary were, also, a number of British officers 
commissioned to act as intelligence officers. Notable among these 
was Sir Robert Wilson, who enjoyed a high reputation at Russian, 
and subsequently at Austrian, headquarters — an astonishingly brave 
and foolish man. He had a sort of roving commission, which he had 
made for himself in the War of 181 2; and Cathcart's intense distrust 
and suspicion of him were not unjustified, if it is remembered that he 
was a violent Whig and in correspondence with Grenville and Grey 
on the faults of the Tory Government. The diplomatic staff, which 
gradually increased in numbers as the year went on, was largely 
composed of young relations and friends of the Tory Ministers, some 
of whom, as well as some of the Intelligence officers, were not without 
ability. 

To Cathcart and Stewart Castlereagh addressed his Instructions, 
dated April 9th , 1 8 1 3 * . They were empowered to conclude new Treaties 
with Russia and Prussia, granting to both considerable financial 
assistance. Subsidies up to 2| millions were promised, of which sum 
Russia was to have three-quarters; and, further, Great Britain was 
also prepared to guarantee half of a common issue of paper-money of 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart, April 9th, 1813; Oncken, Oest. u. Preussen im Be- 
freiungskriege, II, 687, 



400 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

five millions, not to be redeemed before July 1st, 181 5, or six months 
after a treaty of peace had been signed. In return, Russia was to be 
asked to supply 200,000, and Prussia 100,000, men. Political con- 
siderations were only mentioned in so far as the whole scheme was 
to depend on concessions to Hanover, to which, owing to the pressure 
from the Prince Regent and Miinster, Prussia was now called upon 
to cede the enclaves of Hildesheim, Minden and Ravensberg, as she 
had promised in 1802 1 . The connexion between Hanover and Great 
Britain, which had ruined Pitt's diplomacy in the Third Coalition, 
was still to cause great inconvenience ; but, as will be seen, Castlereagh 
was successful in relegating it to a subordinate place, and even 
derived some advantages from it. Far more anxious was he to obtain 
in the Treaty an Alliance which should be able to withstand the arms 
and diplomacy of Napoleon. "The official assurances," he wrote in 
the Instructions, "already interchanged between Great Britain and 
Russia not to treat for peace except in concert should be reduced into 
a formal shape, Prussia being included, and the three Powers should 
engage to unite their arms and their councils with a view to such 
arrangements as may be best calculated to secure the independency of 
Europe 2 ." Castlereagh did not enter into the details of these arrange- 
ments. We are in no doubt, however, as to the principles on which he 
intended to found his policy for the reconstruction of Europe. In a 
private letter to Cathcart accompanying the despatch, he referred the 
Emperor to Pitt's reply to the Instructions of Novossiltsoff on which 
the Third Coalition was founded. The important paper in which 
Pitt had then replied to Alexander's grandiose schemes for a new 
Europe, in which a reestablished Balance of Power should be pro- 
tected by a specially constructed alliance, was the basis of the policy 
which Castlereagh was now to endeavour to pursue 3 . But he did not 
yet wish to commit himself. 

"The political arrangement of Europe," he wrote, "in a larger sense 
is more difficult at this early moment to decide on. So much depends on 
events, that it is perhaps better not to be too prompt in encountering liti- 
gated questions. The main features we are agreed upon — that, to keep 
France in order, we require great masses— that Prussia, Austria and Russia 
ought to be as great and powerful as they have ever been — and that the 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart, April 9th, 1813; Oncken, op. cit. II. 691; Webster, 
British Diplomacy, 1813-15, p. 2. 

2 Oncken, op. cit. II. 690. 

3 Castlereagh to Cathcart, April 8th, 1813. Castlereagh Correspondence, vm. 356. 
Pitt's despatch is given in the Appendix to British Diplomacy. See also supra, 
Chapter in. pp. 335-37. 



TREATIES OF REICHENBACH 401 

inferior States must be summoned to assist or pay the forfeit of resistance. 
I see many inconveniences in premature conclusions, but we ought not 
to be unprepared." 

Castlereagh was right in not expecting too much on these questions. 
Through the whole of 1813, he was to press for a comprehensive 
alliance, which should give him such a peace as Pitt had outlined in 
1805, an d at the same time contain some permanent guarantee as to 
its continuance. To Castlereagh mere subsidy treaties, negotiated 
with the Powers separately, were not enough. He wished for a treaty 
combining all the Powers at war in a bond which Napoleon would 
be unable to break by a sweeping victory or a subtle piece of diplomacy. 
But, though the Allied armies and the diplomacy of Metternich 
secured the triumph of his cause, throughout 1813 the British 
Ambassadors proved quite unable to secure such a treaty. And, when 
the Allied forces were assembled on the Rhine, the " federal bond," as 
Castlereagh conceived it, was still lacking. 

These Instructions, with which Lord Stewart reached Allied Head- 
quarters in April, resulted in the Treaties of Reichenbach, which 
were not concluded until June 14th, by which time they were already 
out of date. Only three meetings could be held in the days from May 
5th to 24th between the two Ambassadors and the Prussian and 
Russian statesmen, though Lord Stewart, to his great mortification, 
missed the battle of Liitzen by his endeavour to transact a little 
business. Prussia was very stiffnecked as to the cessions to Hanover, 
and it was with great difficulty that Stewart obtained a promise of the 
cession of Hildesheim. Hardenberg had even the audacity to hint 
that he would appeal to public opinion in England, always jealous of 
using British money to promote Hanoverian interests. Prussia, also, 
insisted on a clause guaranteeing her restoration to a position 
equivalent to that which she occupied in 1806, such as she had 
already obtained from Russia in the Treaty of Kalisch. There were 
great difficulties in arranging the methods of payment, both of the 
subsidies and the "Federative paper" (specially guaranteed paper 
money) ; and the exact quota of men each Power should be required 
to furnish caused considerable discussion. Thus, though the two 
Powers were eager to get their money, the Treaties were not signed 
till June 14th. With the exception of a clause that no separate 
negotiations should be entered into with the enemy the stipulations 
as to Prussia and Hanover were the only political points contained 
in them. 

W.&G.I. 26 



4 02 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

Before this, however, the diplomatic situation had completely 
changed. Beaten, but not overwhelmingly so, at Lutzen and Bautzen, 
the Allies had accepted Napoleon's offer of an armistice and secured 
favourable terms at Plaswitz (June 4th, 1813). In concluding this 
Armistice, no reference had been made to the British Ambassadors, and 
no stipulation had been added as to the Spanish War. More serious, 
however, were the negotiations with Austria. Metternich had now 
completed his plans for the offer of armed mediation, which was 
accepted by the Allies as soon as the armistice was signed. The tortuous 
negotiations by which Metternich accomplished the transition from 
Alliance with Napoleon to Alliance with his enemies still remain 
difficult to follow, and their various stages have been much a matter of 
dispute among historians. They were certainly only very imperfectly 
understood by the British Ambassadors, who were only partially 
informed as to events. So soon as it was clear that Russia intended 
to prosecute the War in the centre of Europe, Metternich had perforce 
to choose his line of action. With wonderful skill, he maintained 
negotiations both with Napoleon and the Allies for over six months, 
before he finally declared himself, and so subtly did he ring the changes 
that Napoleon never completely penetrated his designs, while the Allies 
were not sure of him until almost at the moment when the Austrian 
armies joined them. In a sense, Austrian policy remained undecided 
to the last moment, and, though Metternich himself may, as he after- 
wards claimed, have seen clearly that his negotiations could have but 
one end, there is much to be said for the view that he really desired 
a peace, which, while strengthening Austria and Prussia, would leave 
neither France nor Russia, whose designs on Poland he soon dis- 
covered, in a position to overawe the Austrian dominions. 

In any case, it was his policy to elude the proposals of Russia 
and Prussia by proffering his good offices to effect a peace between 
them and Napoleon. This offer he also made to Great Britain, whither 
he despatched Wessenberg in the early months of 18 13. The Austrian 
Envoy was, however, coldly received by the Government, and the 
Press, in publishing the news of his mission, was vehement in its de- 
nunciation of a Power regarded as entirely subservient to Napoleon. 
The Austrian overture which suggested that the British Ministers 
might help to make a Continental peace by offering to give up the 
maritime conquests, though it made no specific proposals as to the main 
lines of such a peace, was, therefore, naturally rejected by them. 
The rejection was made even more certain by a passage in Napoleon's 



THE AUSTRIAN POSITION 403 

speech in the Legislative Assembly, which was intentionally inserted 
for that purpose. The overture was, accordingly, not merely rejected ; 
it was refused with indignation 1 . 

This rebuff was however used by Metternich with great adroit- 
ness. Instead of, as Napoleon had hoped, forcing him to take the 
French side, he used it as an excuse to substitute a policy of armed 
mediation instead of mere peaceful good offices. If Austria was dis- 
regarded, it was necessary for her to make herself respected, to in- 
crease her armaments and to insist upon peace by a threat of force. 
It was difficult for Napoleon, when about to enter on a struggle with 
the joint Prussian and Russian armies, to resent this policy as he 
would have liked to have done. Metternich was, therefore, free to 
increase his military preparations without concealment, while, at the 
same time, he renewed his secret negotiations with Alexander. These 
went so far, under the influence of Stadion, who was head of the anti- 
French party, that on May 16th he obtained from Alexander, through 
that Envoy, his terms for the settlement of Europe, which insisted on 
French withdrawal, not merely .from Germany, but from Italy also. 

The battle of Bautzen (May 22nd) and the acceptance of Napoleon's 
offer of the Armistice (June 4th) made Austria hesitate. The moment 
had now come when she must declare her terms; but she was not 
prepared to go so far as Alexander desired. In the early days of June, 
Metternich and Francis went to Gitschin in Bohemia, to be near the 
Allied headquarters; and here Nesselrode obtained a statement of 
Austria's position. She was prepared to go to war against Napoleon, 
unless he granted four conditions: (1) the dissolution of the Duchy 
of Warsaw; (2) the enlargement of Prussia, including the restoration 
to her of Danzig; (3) the return of the Illyrian provinces to Austria, 
and (4) the freeing of the Hanseatic Towns. Two other points Metter- 
nich was prepared to state that he regarded as of high importance, viz. 
the restoration of Prussia, as far as possible, to her position in 1805, and 
the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine. But he would not 
promise to make these last two conditions absolute. Nevertheless, 
Alexander was so convinced that Austria really meant to come in on 
the Allied side that, on June 14th, he agreed to the Austrian conditions, 
and Metternich was allowed, if he chose, to propose a Mediation to 
Napoleon on these terms. 

Meanwhile, the British Ambassadors had been almost entirely 
ignored in these negotiations. Their Subsidy Treaties had been signed 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart, April 9th, 1813. Castlereagh Correspondence, vm. 359. 

26—2 



4 o 4 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

in draft before they were told of the Armistice, and, though the 
Emperor informed them before the formal completion of the Treaty, 
it was too late for them to express an opinion. Cathcart accepted this 
position easily enough ; but Stewart, though he considered the Armis- 
tice as justifiable, was soon rendered suspicious and indignant at 
the practical exclusion of the British Plenipotentiaries from the im- 
portant negotiations which were in progress. Hardenberg defended the 
negotiation on the ground that, while Prussia had bound herself not 
to make peace except in concert with her Ally, yet she remained at 
liberty to communicate with a neutral the grounds on which she 
would be prepared to sign peace 1 ; and he justified the whole trans- 
action on the ground that Prussia and Russia had no option but to 
accede to Austria's terms. On June 21st, Hardenberg informed Stewart 
that Austria and Prussia had consented to send negotiators to Prague, 
who were however not to deal direct with the French Plenipoten- 
tiaries, but only through Metternich, and tried to reassure him by 
explaining that Metternich 's policy was only to lure Napoleon on to 
expose himself, and that there was no prospect of peace. But, in all 
these transactions, there was no mention of those points to which 
Britain attached the greatest importance; while, though information 
was given to the British representatives after the transaction, no com- 
munication was made in time for any influence on affairs to be exerted 
by them 2 . Stewart, however, despite his pessimism, had no love for 
so tedious a business as the negotiations. He went off to the north, 
to inspect the Swedish troops, leaving Jackson with Cathcart to 
survey and report the course of events. None of the British Envoys 
were, however, informed that the arrangements between Austria and 
the Allies had been put into treaty form by the Treaty of Reichen- 
bach, signed on June 27th after Metternich 's departure. This step 
was kept secret from them at the express desire of Metternich, prob- 
ably because he was anxious that no news of it should leak out, until 
his negotiations with Napoleon were completed. 

1 Stewart to Castlereagh, June i6th, 1813. F.O. Prussia, 87. British Diplomacy, 
p. 67 . Information was sent to Castlereagh also in a despatch to Jacobi dated June 14th. 

2 Cathcart was, however, informed of Nesselrode's mission to Gitschin, and 
he offered to supply the money necessary for any bribes that would help the negotia- 
tions. Cathcart to Castlereagh, June 1st, 1813 ; " Being well assured that no endea- 
vour would be spared by B. P. to draw the councils of Austria to his interest, I 
advised H.I.M. to have recourse to every expedient; and knowing the absolute want 
of means in the Department of Secret Service, I thought it right in giving this 
advice to offer to make good any engagement in that way by which a determination 
to act in concert might be obtained and Count Nesselrode is authorised and in- 
structed accordingly." F.O. Supplementary, 343 ; British Diplomacy, p. 4. 



CASTLEREAGH'S NEW INSTRUCTIONS 405 

Meanwhile, on the news of the attitude of Austria at the end of 
May reaching England, Castlereagh had, for his part, determined to 
press her to declare herself. Cathcart was ordered by an Instruction of 
June 30th to demand an "explicit avowal of her sentiments and de- 
termination," and to offer her a credit of £500,000 immediately for 
her preliminary preparations, if she determined to come in. Before 
this Instruction reached Cathcart, however, Metternich was hurrying 
off to Dresden to meet Napoleon, so that it exercised but little in- 
fluence on the course of events 1 . The news of the Armistice and the 
basis agreed upon by the Allied Powers produced at first no fresh 
Instruction from Castlereagh; for, as he confessed, he was powerless 
to say anything when Spain was deliberately left out of the negotia- 
tions. At the beginning of July, however, news came both to London 
and to the negotiating Powers of the battle of Vittoria and the 
virtual destruction of Napoleon's power in Spain. The news, as 
will be seen, had an important effect on the negotiations at Prague 
and Reichenbach; but it also produced a fresh set of Instructions 
from Castlereagh, dated July 5th 2 . In these, while promising that 
Wellington's army would not relax its efforts, he stated that the 
British Government would leave to the Continental Powers the initia- 
tive in arranging the Continental Peace. On Four Points, however, 
he declared, Great Britain could not compromise because bound by 
Treaty, viz. the independence of Spain, Portugal and Sicily, and the 
British engagements to Sweden. Further, Great Britain was ready, 
"in conjunction with her Allies," to insist "as absolutely necessary 
to lay the foundation of some counterpoise in the centre of Europe," 
on "the restoration of the Austrian and Prussian Monarchies to such 
an extent of power and consequence as may enable them to maintain 
such a counterpoise"; while the independence of Holland and Han- 
over was regarded as equally necessary. Lastly, Castlereagh urged as a 
demand, in his view important, but on which the Allies must decide, 
"the restoration of the rest of Germany, including Switzerland and 
Italy, to an order of things more consonant to the common safety." 
He admitted that the extent to which these matters could be pressed 
depended on whether Austria joined the Alliance, but promised the 
full support of Great Britain to Russia and Prussia, "so long as they 
would stand by each other and the cause of the Continent against 
France." 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart, June 30, 1813. F.O.Russia, 83 ; British Diplomacy, p. 5. 

2 Oncken, op. cit. II. 702. 



406 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

This statement was followed, eight days later, by two other In- 
structions 1 which were undoubtedly meant to conciliate Austria. In 
the first place, the Armed Mediation was formally accepted, and, 
secondly, a statement was made, though in general terms only, of the 
principles on which Great Britain was prepared to surrender her 
Colonial conquests. Of these, Castlereagh said, some must be kept, 
and, while the Dutch Colonies might be restored, if Holland regained 
her independence, and the Danish used to facilitate the Swedish 
arrangements, the French Colonies would only be returned if a satis- 
factory Continental peace was secured, on conditions which, it was 
indicated quite clearly, must be more consonant with British ideas 
than the Four Points which Metternich had consented to make his 
test for declaring war. Castlereagh thus still reserved some control 
over the negotiations ; for he could still refuse to make concessions on 
the Colonial conditions, if an unsatisfactory peace was proposed, while 
Metternich still lacked one weapon indispensable for his becoming 
complete master of the situation, if Napoleon showed himself really 
inclined to treat for peace 2 . 

It is now known that Napoleon had not the slightest intention of 
treating for peace on any terms that could be accepted by the Allies; 
but, for six weeks longer, the issue appeared to hang in the balance, 
and more than once Austrian policy veered towards a pacific settle- 
ment. Metternich had set out for the famous interview at Dresden 
on June 24th, leaving Stadion to sign, on the 27th, the Treaty of 
Reichenbach between Russia and Prussia, which put in treaty form 
the arrangements already agreed upon by the three Powers. At 
Dresden, Metternich produced no terms of peace, but succeeded, 
after two stormy interviews, in inducing Napoleon to accept a meeting 
between French and Allied negotiators at Prague under his mediation 
(June 30th). At the same time, an extension of the Armistice to 
August 10th was agreed upon — an interval which both Metternich 
and Napoleon desired, in order to complete their military prepara- 
tions, and which Russia and Prussia had, therefore, perforce to accept. 

No sooner had this been settled than the news of Vittoria reached 
Dresden and, in a few days, Reichenbach. It did nothing to shake the 
Emperor's resolution; but its effect on Austrian policy was, no doubt, 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart (nos. 45 and 46), July 13th, 1813. F.O. Russia, 83; 
British Diplomacy, pp. 12-13. 

2 As a further concession to Russia, Castlereagh was, also, now ready, though still 
persisting in refusing Russian mediation, to negotiate for peace directly with the 
United States, and Russia was asked to support this offer. See p. 532. 



METTERNICH'S ULTIMATUM TO NAPOLEON 407 

considerable. Jackson had no hesitation in declaring that it was the 
determining factor in Metternich's decisions, while Stewart wrote 
from Stralsund: "Wellington will save Europe yet." They exag- 
gerated. Even after the receipt of this news, it is clear that there still 
existed a large Austrian peace party and that Metternich was not 
uninfluenced by it. He was, perhaps, more moved by the offers which 
Cathcart, after the receipt of Castlereagh's Instructions of July 5th, 
made to him of an immediate sum of money ; for the Austrian finances 
were in a deplorable state. At any rate, by the end of July all reports 
tended to show that Austria would fight, unless Napoleon made im- 
mense concessions. At Trachenberg, as early as July 12th, the Russian 
and Prussian military leaders had already, with the assistance of 
Bernadotte, drawn up a plan of campaign, which involved the co- 
operation of the Austrian army in Bohemia. The so-called Congress 
of Prague, meanwhile, for which the French Envoys, after serious 
delay in arriving, were unable to obtain any Instructions at all from 
their master, gradually revealed the fact that Napoleon had no in- 
tention of treating. On August 7th Metternich put an end to the 
farce by at last producing his peace terms in the form of an ultimatum 
to Napoleon. The fact that he included all the six points agreed upon, 
and not merely the Four Points sinequibusnon of the Reichenbach Treaty, 
showed that he had now fully determined on war. Napoleon was not 
prepared to reply in time ; and, on August 12th, the news was signalled 
to the waiting armies on the Bohemian frontier, that Austria had 
declared war. Yet, even now, Metternich's reply (August 21st) to 
Maret's insulting Note of August 18th, which repeated the offer of a 
Congress, was studiously moderate and left him with the oppor- 
tunity of reopening negotiations with Napoleon at any time that 
suited his own diplomacy. He avoided any specific refusal by pleading 
the necessity of referring to his Allies ; and a copy of the Note was 
sent to London. 

The fact, therefore, that, in this long series of negotiations, British 
interests had played an entirely subordinate part, made no difference 
to the ultimate settlement. How far there was a danger of a "Con- 
tinental" peace, leaving Great Britain to accept the situation, may 
be doubted. The suspicion, certainly, occurred to her representatives 
and was duly reported 1 . Undoubtedly, if Napoleon had possessed 
any sense of the reality of the situation he might have obtained terms 

1 E.g. Jackson to Stewart, August 2nd, 1813. F.O. Prussia, 88 ; British Diplomacy , 
P-74- 



408 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

far more favourable than British statesmen, or even Alexander, de- 
sired. It is true that Russia and Prussia were bound by Treaties to 
Great Britain; but Metternich was free, except for the Four Points, 
and it cannot be gainsaid that the Allies were in no position to with- 
stand the threat of his intervention against them, while even Austrian 
neutrality left them in a very dangerous position. Castlereagh could 
indeed fall back upon the Colonial conquests ; but he would have found 
it difficult to resist a peace, if Metternich had declared it to be one 
which Austria would support. Even now that Austria had joined the 
Alliance, was it so welded together that it could withstand defeat in 
one big battle ? And what guarantee was there that, if Napoleon was 
forced to conclude a peace, it would not be, once more, merely a 
truce until he had recovered his power, and until some incident had 
divided the Eastern Powers ? These were the questions which Castle- 
reagh was asking himself, when he received news, four weeks old, 
of the negotiations at Reichenbach, Prague and Trachenberg. He 
hoped that, at least, the points which he had urged in his despatches 
of July 5th and 13th would have been taken into consideration by the 
Allies, and he pressed urgently that Spain should not be left out of 
sight in laying down the preliminary basis 1 . 

It was, however, now indispensable to come into closer touch 
with Austria. Whether the negotiations continued or hostilities were 
resumed, it was obvious that the key to the position lay at Vienna. 
Accordingly, at the beginning of August, it was determined to send out 
a special Mission to the Austrian Court; and to this important post 
Castlereagh nominated the young Earl of Aberdeen, to whom for 
some time the Tory Ministry had been anxious to give official em- 
ployment. His Instructions, dated August 6th, show how far Castle- 
reagh was prepared to go to win Austria over. As to his general 
attitude towards Continental affairs, Aberdeen was to follow the In- 
structions already sent to Stewart and Cathcart ; but Austria's special 
interests in Italy were dealt with in two separate despatches. In the 
first of these, the importance of concluding a convention with Murat, 
whom Castlereagh thought to be still in Italy, was emphasised, and 
reference was made to the fact that he had already made overtures 
both to Austria and to Great Britain. In this despatch, it was sug- 
gested that Murat should be given compensation in the centre of 
Italy, so that Ferdinand might be restored to his kingdom. In a 
separate despatch, however, Castlereagh agreed that Murat might 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart, August 7th, 1813. Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 39. 



CASTLEREAGH'S NEW IDEA OF ALLIANCE 409 

retain Naples, if he made it a sine qua non, compensation being found 
for Ferdinand, and Aberdeen was authorised to sign a convention to 
that effect sub spe rati. As will be seen, this second Instruction, which 
Castlereagh only intended to be used in the last resort, was to have 
important consequences. On the more general question, likewise, 
Castlereagh made no secret of his anxiety to see Austria "resume its 
preponderance in the North of Italy" including the territory of 
Venice 1 . 

For the rest, Castlereagh let events take their course, until he 
received definite information early in September, that Austria had 
joined the Allies. The risks British interests had run during the recent 
negotiations now determined him to take a step which appears to have 
been in his mind throughout the year, and for which he now thought 
the time was ripe. On September 18th he forwarded new Instructions 
to the Continent, which went deeply into the main issues of the conflict 
and put forward an entirely new view of the Alliance against Napoleon. 
They opened with a review of the nature of the Confederacy arrayed 
against France, which Castlereagh claimed was distinguished from 
all previous combinations, "by the number and magnitude of the 
Powers engaged" not less than "by the national character which 
the war has assumed throughout the respective states. On former 
occasions it was a contest of Sovereigns in some instances perhaps 
against the prevailing sentiment of their subjects. It is now a 
struggle dictated by the feelings of the people of all ranks as well 
as by the necessity of the case." The Sovereigns of Europe, having 
at last learnt the dangers of isolation, were now bound together, for 
the first time, by a consciousness of common danger. Their only 
chance of safety was not to allow any offer of the enemy to divide 
them. The War in Spain and the War in Germany were one, and, if 
the Allies held together and persevered, they must in the long run 
triumph. But, though the Powers had concluded a number of separate 
Treaties with one another, there was as yet no common Instrument, 
and even so essential a point as the independence of Spain had not yet 
been agreed to by the Allies as a whole, though Russia and Prussia 
were morally bound to support that claim, and Austria now pre- 
sumably also, since she had agreed to fight for the objects laid down 
on May 16th, among which Spanish independence was expressly stipu- 

1 Castlereagh to Aberdeen (nos. 2, 3 and separate), August 6th, 1813. F.O. 
Austria, 101 ; British Diplomacy, pp. 94-97. The "most secret and separate" despatch 
appears to have been unknown to historians, and has caused much confusion in 
dealing with the later policy towards Murat. 



410 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

lated. Castlereagh, also, indicated quite clearly that the Congress of 
Prague had occasioned great uneasiness to the British Cabinet, and, 
while professing the fullest confidence that Russia and Prussia had 
not contemplated signing a separate peace, pointed out that, sup- 
posing Napoleon had accepted the Austrian basis, the Armistice must 
have been prolonged, for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the 
British Cabinet, with perhaps disastrous results in the Peninsula. 
Castlereagh therefore pressed for a new Public Treaty, in which the 
Powers bound themselves not to make peace or to conclude any con- 
vention except in common. The Spanish Cortes, Portugal and Sicily, 
the principal Allies of Great Britain, were to be invited to accede to 
it. The ideas of the State Paper of 1805 are, however, specially per- 
ceptible in two clauses designed to make the Treaty a permanent part 
of the Public Law of Europe. They stipulate 

That, after Peace shall be concluded by common consent, there shall 
continue between the said High Contracting Parties a perpetual Defensive 
Alliance for the maintenance of such Peace and for the mutual Protection 
of their respective States ; 

and 

That in case of attack hereafter by France or any one of the said High 
Contracting Parties, the several Powers will support the Party so attacked 
with all their forces if necessary, and see justice done 1 . 

This was the first statement of the policy which Castlereagh was to 
carry through, six months later, at Chaumont. He was aware that 
such a measure necessitated an agreement among the Powers on 
the general principles of the Peace which it was intended to secure. 
He suggested, therefore, that Secret Articles should be attached to 
the Treaty, in which the objects of the Allies should be clearly speci- 
fied, and a suggested draft of these Articles was also enclosed. They 
were based on the Russo-Prussian demands of May 16th, which 
Castlereagh assumed Austria to be now ready to sign ; but he made 
additions to them specially safeguarding the points in which Great 
Britain had a special interest, but which had hitherto been neglected. 
Of these, Norway, Naples (or compensation to Sicily) and the 
restoration of the House of Brunswick were in the zone of the 
demands. But Castlereagh, also, added the provision of an "adequate 
Barrier" for Holland, which meant abandoning the Rhine frontier. 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart, September 18th, 1813. F.O. Russia, 83; British 
Diplomacy, p. 19. 



ALLIED SECRET AGREEMENTS 411 

Otherwise, the Treaty would have left France with her "natural 
limits" of the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees 1 . 

He seems scarcely to have been aware of the difficulty of carrying 
out these Instructions and of the inadequacy of his subordinates for 
securing so important an Instrument. In private letters to Cathcart 2 , 
he urged the importance of pressing the matter forward, so that Parlia- 
ment, which was to meet on November 4th, could be informed and 
the Cabinet take the Treaty into consideration in planning the cam- 
paign of 1 8 14. He anticipated that Austria would be the most likely 
Power to offer opposition, and he devoted a special letter to arguments 
likely to convince Metternich that no adequate peace could be made, 
unless his policy was accepted. Before the Instructions arrived, how- 
ever — and it was two days after the battle of Leipzig that Cathcart 
received them — further negotiations had taken place among the Allied 
Powers. At the headquarters of the main Allied army in Bohemia, 
the two Emperors and the Prussian King, with their Ministers, were 
now assembled, and in the intervals of discussing the Allied strategy 
they drew up new Treaties to regulate their political conduct. They 
were accompanied by Cathcart and Stewart. When the latter returned 
from his northern journey, he discovered the existence of the Treaty 
of Reichenbach of June 27th, and wrote off furious protests to his 
Court. Hardenberg made a great favour of even showing it him, 
and justified the breach of faith by the absolute necessity of agreeing 
to Metternich's conditions at this stage. Jackson was not slow to 
point out that he had suspected the Treaty, but that Hardenberg had 
positively denied it. Stewart drew from the whole transaction con- 
firmation of the suspicions he had repeatedly expressed of Austria's 
conduct during the course of the Armistice, and maintained his con- 
viction that, had Napoleon accepted the Four Points, Austria would 
have brought about a peace substantially on those terms 3 . 

Metternich, who was now the arbiter of the Allied diplomacy, 
nevertheless took pains to put himself on the best terms with the 
British Envoys. In interviews with Stewart and Cathcart, he said 
that he knew himself to be distrusted by the British Cabinet ; but that 
throughout the period of his subserviency to France he had always 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart, September 18th, 1813. F.O. Russia, 83; British 
Diplomacy, p. 25. 

2 Castlereagh to Cathcart, September i8thand 21st, 1813. F.O. Supplementary, 
343; British Diplomacy, pp. 27, 29. 

* Stewart to Castlereagh, August 12th and August 20th, 1813; Jackson to 
Stewart, August 12th; Hardenberg to Stewart, August 20th. F.O. Prussia, 89; 
British Diplomacy, pp. 76-78. 



4 i2 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

had in view the situation in which he now found himself. These 
efforts still left Stewart suspicious, though Cathcart (as ever) was 
fully satisfied. It was for Lord Aberdeen, however, that Metternich 
reserved his greatest efforts, and in a short time he had established a 
commanding influence over the British Plenipotentiary. Aberdeen, 
then only twenty-nine years of age, had been the ward of Dundas and 
of Pitt, in whose house he had often lived. He was a far more able 
and cultured man than either of his colleagues, and the favour that Pitt 
had shown him, as well as his own good qualities and high rank, had 
caused him at a very early age to be marked out by the Tory Ministry 
for office. He had, more than once, refused high diplomatic appoint- 
ments. At last, doubtless partly owing to the death of his wife in 
1812, he acceded to the urgent requests of Castlereagh and other 
Ministers to undertake the mission to the Austrian Court. His shy 
and reserved character, his moderation and breadth of view and the 
Liberal principles and peace-loving disposition which distinguished 
him always from his partisan colleagues and made him at a later stage 
the valued confidant of Peel, might have exercised considerable in- 
fluence on the course of events, had he known more of the pitfalls of 
diplomatic intercourse. But he was absolutely without experience, 
and, though not without knowledge of European politics, he was far 
too academic and unskilled to penetrate the complicated situation 
presented to him. Castlereagh treated him with studied courtesy, 
and kept him by his side till Peace was made. But Aberdeen was ill 
at ease with men like Cathcart and Stewart, and never gave them his 
full confidence. In a very short space of time, admitted daily to the 
Imperial table, and treated with infinite tact by the Austrian Minister, 
he saw only with the eyes of Metternich. Another disturbing factor 
was, that he also fell under the influence of Sir Robert Wilson, who 
was aiming at establishing himself as Military Representative at 
Austrian headquarters, and saw in Aberdeen a means of overthrowing 
the determined hostility of Cathcart. Wilson was, also, flattered by 
the Austrians, and, as he upheld views of a speedy peace which, what- 
ever their ultimate intention, were in direct opposition to those of 
the British Cabinet, the result was to make Aberdeen's arrival a 
source of weakness rather than strength to British diplomacy, and to 
increase the ascendancy of Metternich over the whole course of the 
negotiations. At the same time, it is to be remembered that Aberdeen 
was specially instructed to pursue a line of close confidence in Metter- 
nich. 



METTERNICH AND ABERDEEN 413 

" I am inclined to think," wrote Castlereagh, " it is best to make a Hero 
of him and by giving him a reputation to excite him to sustain it.. . .If 
you deem it useful you may tell him from me, I am perfectly ready to 
adopt him upon his own avowal, and to meet vigorous exertion on his part 
with perfect goodwill and confidence on mine — and that, as long as he 
will wield the great Machine in his hands with determination and spirit, 
I will support him as zealously as I have done the Prince Royal against 
all his calumniators, and I hope not less successfully 1 ." 

One of Aberdeen's first tasks was to communicate to Metternich 
the fact that, during the course of the Armistice, Great Britain had 
accepted Austrian mediation. This had hitherto been studiously con- 
cealed from Austria at the urgent request of Alexander, and the dis- 
closure was now made with sufficient tact to relegate the incident to 
oblivion. Aberdeen's communication of the points of interest to Great 
Britain, in which besides making Spain an absolute condition of policy, 
he urged the independence of Holland and Hanover as absolutely 
necessary, and the freeing of Germany and Italy as very desirable, came 
too late to produce any effect on the Treaty of Toplitz between 
Austria, Russia and Prussia, which was signed four days after his 
arrival at headquarters. 

As to Murat, Aberdeen was surprised to find that he was at 
Dresden in an important command. After Bautzen and Liitzen, 
Murat had, indeed, felt himself no longer able to resist Napoleon's 
summons. But his troops remained in his kingdom and gave no 
assistance to the Viceroy, while neither he nor his Queen ever 
broke off relations with the Austrian Court. In these circumstances, 
Metternich had little difficulty in inducing Aberdeen, not only to 
inform him immediately of the whole of his Instructions, but also to 
furnish him in writing with a statement that he was authorised to 
treat with Murat on the basis of Naples being retained by its de 
facto ruler. 

In the Treaties of Toplitz, which were only communicated to the 
British Envoys a week after they were signed, no mention was made 
either of Spain, Holland, Italy or Norway. The British Ambassadors, 
however, professed themselves as satisfied with explanations that no 
peace would be made without Great Britain's claims being taken into 
account. Metternich went no further in his Subsidy Treaty with 
Great Britain, signed on October 9th, which was confined merely to 
a promise not to make peace except in common. Meanwhile, though 

1 Castlereagh to Aberdeen, September 21st, 181 3. F.O. Austria, 101; British 
Diplomacy, p. 97. 



4H THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

it was apparent that negotiations would only be resumed when the 
issue of the autumn campaign was known, Metternich was building 
up a diplomatic basis by which his own ascendancy over events could 
be preserved. If, indeed, Murat had for the moment returned to his 
old allegiance, Metternich was now tempting Bavaria to desert. This 
" spirit of negotiation," as Castlereagh termed it, on which Aberdeen's 
colleagues were not slow in commenting, caused great uneasiness in 
London. The communication of Maret's note proposing a Congress 
had already provoked a despatch from Castlereagh to Aberdeen on 
September 28th 1 , deprecating the conclusion of any armistice, or the 
entering into any prolonged discussion, with Napoleon, before the 
substance of the Allies' terms had been granted. "When Buonaparte 
proposes a Congress," he wrote, " let him state the principles on which 
he is ready to negotiate, and it will then be in the power of the Allies, 
comparing them with the acknowledged principles which bind them 
together, to judge whether discussion can be advisable on such a 
basis." And, while asserting that Great Britain would always be 
ready to enter into negotiations in conjunction with her Allies, he 
"deprecates illusory discussions which must damp the ardour of the 
Confederacy, and conceives that no steps ought to be taken to assemble 
a Congress, till some satisfactory basis is previously understood." 
And such a basis was, surely, to be found in the Russian proposals 
of May 1 6th, with Castlereagh's additions. 

Aberdeen was, a little later, instructed in a private letter to urge 
Austria to put more faith in the sword and less in diplomacy. His 
rather hasty step as regards Murat was, indeed, immediately approved 
by Castlereagh, though he was cautioned against committing his Court 
to any formal guarantee of Naples to its ruler. It was, moreover, 
to be clearly understood that any engagement to Murat must be con- 
tingent on his active participation in the struggle against France ; and 
it was assumed that Austria would find an indemnity for Ferdinand 2 . 
In the private letter 3 accompanying the despatch, Castlereagh showed 
that he scarcely hoped much from these negotiations, though he 
admitted that the military advantages to be obtained were worth the 
sacrifice. 

" I lose no time," he wrote, "in relieving you from all anxiety upon the 
point of Murat. It is a strong measure, but warranted by the state of Italy, 

1 F.O. Austria, 101 ; British Diplomacy, p. 98. 

2 CastlereaghtoAberdeen,Octoberi5th(no.2i)(Most Secret). F.O.Austria, 101. 

3 Castlereagh to Aberdeen , October 1 5 th (Private and Con fidential) . F.O . Austria , 
1 01 ; British Diplomacy, p. 102. 



CASTLEREAGH AND METTERNICH 415 

of which important portion of Europe, in a military sense, I consider the 
soi-disant King of Naples to be completely Master, for with his army he 
can at once march uninterruptedly to the Tagliamento, and, unless the 
Viceroy evacuates the whole of what is called the Illyrian Provinces, his 
communications and his kingdom of Italy are in equal jeopardy. I own, 
however, I am not sanguine as to the result of the negotiation, because I 
assume Murat to be a mere calculator, and there is a spirit of negotiation 
about Metternich upon which such adventurers will always so far speculate 
as to endeavour to gain time." 

Perhaps it was this distrust of the whole matter that prevented Castle- 
reagh from informing Bentinck of the change in British policy — an 
omission which was to cause much confusion in the ensuing months. 
Castlereagh was, indeed, far from satisfied with Metternich's 
general attitude and the spirit in which he was conducting the War. 
The reply to Maret was termed a "milk-and-water" answer to an 
insulting letter. Let Austria "imitate Prussia," wrote Castlereagh, 
"and make the Austrians an armed people," if she was desirous of 
obtaining peace from Napoleon. 

"If you ever mention to Mr de Metternich my individual sentiments upon 
these subjects," he continued, "you can from your own knowledge assure 
him, that I am not one of those who cannot reconcile themselves to con- 
template the possibility of peace even with Bonaparte, but I am satisfied 
it must be a peace founded upon a principle of authority and not of sub- 
mission. That to obtain and still more to preserve it, we must rouse and 
arm the people we have to conduct, and it is in the earnest desire of peace 
that I wish to see him employed, rather in preparing the nation for sacrifices 
and exertions than in idly flattering them with the notion that peace is at 
hand." 

And the role he designed for Austria in Italy is clearly indicated in 
the phrase "Until a solid organisation of the mass of the population 
is secured, we shall always find them timid as to acquisitions to the 
southwards and avaricious of extensions on their eastern frontier." In 
a postscript, written after perusal of Napoleon's appeals in the 
Moniteur after the breaking of the Armistice, he added one of those 
passionate if uncouth entreaties which moments of emergency some- 
times drew from him. 

I cannot, I own, but consider [them] as a serious and awful summons 
to us all for renewed vigilance concert and exertion. It convinces me that 
Bonaparte has determined to be numerically powerful on all points. This, 
I think, he has the means of doing for a limited period, and upon the con- 
fines of France. Having men under arms in abundance, he can make this 
gigantick array but he cannot sustain it. If confined even for a time to the 



4 i6 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

sphere within which he now moves, it must dissolve ; but the whole military 
history of the Revolution has taught us to dread that the monster once 
engendered on French ground may break loose to seek its sustenance else- 
where. This is the true danger against which the Continent and especially 
Austria has to provide, and she ought not to lose an hour in appealing 
forcibly to the nation. The people are now the only barrier. They are 
against France, and this is the shield above all others that a State should 
determine to interpose for its protection which is so wholly destitute as 
Austria of a defensible frontier. 

But while Castlereagh was penning these lines the Allies had 
triumphed. The insistence of the German Generals, and the impetus 
that Stewart and others had given to the lagging steps of Bernadotte, 
had at last united the three armies in overwhelming force against 
Napoleon at Leipzig, and the issue of the three days' fighting had 
barely left enough troops to win their way to the Rhine past Wrede's 
Bavarians at Hanau. All Germany, except a few northern fortresses, 
including Hamburg was now at the mercy of the Allied armies ; and 
the petty States of the Confederation of the Rhine hastened to make 
their peace with Metternich. To the King of Saxony alone was it 
denied, and his country remained in military occupation of the Allies. 
The others, by a series of Treaties, bought their recognition by trans- 
ferring their military resources to swell the armies of the Alliance. 

Castlereagh 's despatches of September 18th, instructing his Am- 
bassadors to form the common Alliance, reached Cathcart on October 
20th amid the ruins of Napoleon's army. The energetic Stewart and 
Jackson wished to press the negotiation at once; but Cathcart was 
put off by the Emperor, and, as headquarters split up while the Allied 
armies were marching to Frankfort, no opportunity was given to 
broach the matter until the 26th. Nor would Cathcart allow the other 
Ambassadors to approach their respective Sovereigns until Alex- 
ander's views were known 1 . But, before the Tsar's views could be 
ascertained on this subject, another negotiation of considerable im- 
portance had taken place with the enemy — the offer known as the 
"Frankfort Proposals." During the course of the battle of Leipzig, 
Napoleon, having taken the Austrian General Count Merfeldt prisoner, 
had seized the opportunity to attempt to use him as an intermediary 
between himself and the Allies. He had indicated to him, in vague 

1 Stewart to Castlereagh, October 2 1 st, 1813. F.O.Prussia, 90 ; British Diplomacy, 
p. 80; Cathcart to Castlereagh, October 21st. F.O. Supplementary, 343. "I think 
there is nothing proposed which will occasion much difficulty or delay, and if it had 
arrived a day sooner it might perhaps have been signed here. It will be sent home 
as soon as possible." 



METTERNICH AND THE EFFECTS OF LEIPZIG 417 

terms, it is true, and without committing himself in writing, that he was 
now prepared to make great concessions for the sake of peace. He was 
ready to abandon Germany and, in reply to the skilful insinuations of 
Merfeldt, offered some concessions as to Italy also. Only England, he 
said, who wished to reduce the French fleet to thirty ships, was the 
obstacle to negotiation. This overture was faithfully reported to 
Metternich, while the battle was still in progress; and after the great 
victory he determined to make an answer by a similar method, 
choosing for that purpose St Aignan, Napoleon's representative at 
Weimar, who had been taken prisoner by the Allies in the course of 
their advance. The idea was Metternich 's own. The Prussians dis- 
approved of it ; Alexander acquiesced half-heartedly. It was in Aber- 
deen that Metternich was to find his most eager collaborator. On 
October 29th the English Ambassador had been informed, that "in 
consequence of the British answer having been received" {i.e. Castle- 
reagh's despatch on Maret's note) "it has been determined to open a 
communication with Bonaparte, but in such a manner as to give rise 
to as little speculation as possible, and indeed the whole affair is to 
be kept a profound secret." All written communications were to be 
avoided. Aberdeen's colleagues were not informed of the transaction. 
The excuse was the extreme secrecy of the proceedings ; but Metter- 
nich could not but know that Stewart at least was likely to adopt a 
very different tone to Aberdeen's. 

The Austrian Minister was anxious at the situation which the over- 
whelming victory of Leipzig had created He had long been doubtful of 
Russia's designs on Poland. Now, Prussia's claims were disturbing him. 
"Nothing," reported Aberdeen, "would induce Austria to agree to 
the incorporation of Saxony in Prussia 1 ." Metternich was, indeed, 
very doubtful whether Austrian interest would be served by a pro- 
longation of the War. It might now be hoped that a peace could be 
obtained on the basis of the Treaties signed at Toplitz. The Allies 
were ready to offer Napoleon the "natural limits" of France — the 
Pyrenees, the Alps and the Rhine. If he refused them, an instrument 
would be in the hands of the Allies for undermining the national re- 
sistance of the French. If he accepted, on the Throne of France the 
Emperor's son-in-law might then help Austria to save Poland from 
Russia and Saxony from Prussia. But Austria was also bound to Great 

1 Aberdeen to Castlereagh, October 29th, October 30th, 1813. F.O. Austria, 
102. Oncken, "Aus den letzten Monaten des Jahres 1813," Historisches Taschenbuch, 
VI. 2. 

w. &G.I. 27 



4 i8 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

Britain, and, further, without some countenance from Great Britain the 
offer would be open to the same innuendoes that Napoleon had made 
to Merfeldt. Hence, the necessity of including among the negotiators 
Aberdeen, who, like Metternich but for different reasons, was anxious 
to bring about a peace. 

The mise-en-scene was skilfully laid. Metternich saw St Aignan 
alone on the morning of November 8th, and prepared him for a 
further interview. Then, in conjunction with Nesselrode, whom the 
Tsar had with some diffidence allowed to act, and Aberdeen, he 
planned what should be said to him. In this interview, it was Aber- 
deen who combatted Nesselrode 's desire to place the terms of peace 
as high as possible at the outset, and reduce them later in negotiation. 
The protest he made did credit to his honesty. 

I told him that, if the propositions were made with the hope of being 
accepted, common-sense dictated that they should be as palatable to Bona- 
parte as was consistent with the fixed views of the Allies. If the proposi- 
tions were made without any such hope, I deprecated the whole proceeding 
as being most erroneous in principle, and calculated to produce the greatest 
injury to the common cause. I observed that it would be much better to 
defer making any overture at all, if it was not thought that we were in a 
sufficiently commanding situation to make that which we were determined 
to press. 

Metternich acquiesced. It was his own policy, and the "natural 
limits" were offered without restriction, though it was understood 
by Aberdeen that the frontiers of Holland and Piedmont should 
not be considered as irrevocably fixed. He urged the necessity of 
secrecy in the strongest possible manner, and made Metternich 
promise that St Aignan should not see the two Emperors, as had 
been originally intended. In deference, also, to his wishes, the pro- 
clamation to the French people which Metternich had intended to 
issue simultaneously with the opening of the negotiation was deferred 
till its result should be known. The preparations for war were to go 
on with undiminished activity 1 . 

Next morning, when St Aignan again saw Metternich and Nessel- 
rode, Aberdeen joined them "as if by accident." But they had to 
deal with a diplomatist. St Aignan immediately, before Aberdeen's 
entry 2 , reduced to writing the terms that were indicated. The terms 

1 Aberdeen to Castlereagh, November 9th, 1813. F.O. Austria, 102; British 
Diplomacy, p. 107. 

2 According to St Aignan's account ; Aberdeen's despatch reads as if the writing 
had been done in his presence. 



THE FRANKFORT PROPOSALS 419 

of the Continental Powers were sufficiently explicit — the frontiers of 
the Rhine, the Pyrenees and the Alps, and the absolute independence 
of all countries outside of them, except that in Holland the form of 
government and the frontiers were to be left open to discussion. But 
Aberdeen went on to report : 

M. de St Aignan noted also that England was ready to make great 
sacrifices in order to obtain peace for Europe, that she did not interfere 
with the freedom of commerce or with those maritime rights to which 
France could with justice pretend. I particularly cautioned him against 
supposing that any possible consideration could induce Great Britain to 
abandon a particle of what she felt to belong to her maritime code, from 
which in no case could she ever recede, but that with this understanding 
she had no wish to interfere with the reasonable pretensions of France. 
I took this opportunity to contradict the assertion which Bonaparte had 
made to General Merfeldt, of the intention of the British Government to 
limit him to thirty ships of the line, and declared that so far as I knew it 
was a prejudice without any foundation. 

All this was sincerely meant by Aberdeen as a way towards peace. 
But, in the Note which St Aignan subsequently drew up of the inter- 
view, the British Ambassador found himself committed to the propo- 
sition, "que VAngleterre etait prete a faire les plus grands sacrifices pour 
la paix fondde sur ces bases, et a reconnoitre la liber te du commerce et de 
la navigation, a laquelle la France a droit de pretendre." This Note 
he had not received when he drew up the despatch for his Court, 
which, however, shows his anxiety to excuse the step which he had 
taken 1 . In this despatch, he emphasised again his object that "the 
transaction should be conducted with the utmost secrecy and expe- 
dition." In order to secure this secrecy, Cathcart was not taken into 
confidence until after Aberdeen's courier had gone, and Jackson, who 
was acting for Stewart, was not informed officially of the transaction 
until the 1 ith. Cathcart, who was rapidly sinking to a very subordinate 
position, acquiesced. Jackson had, however, learnt, so early as the 
8th, what was going on ; and he agreed with Hardenberg's view, which 
was openly expressed to him, that the offer was a mistake. He warned 
Stewart, in letters which were sent to London, that Austria and Russia 
were anxious for peace. Stewart shared his apprehensions, and Berna- 

1 " I trust your Lordship will not disapprove of the part which I have taken in 
this affair. My great object, if any propositions were made, was to frame them so 
as to afford the greatest probability of success, consistent with the fixed policy of 
the Allies. I hope the communication which has been made will be found to 
embrace the most essential points and to demand as much as our actual situation 
entitles us to expect." Aberdeen to Castlereagh, Nov. oth, 1813. F.O Austria, 103 ; 
British Diplomacy, p. no. 

27—2 



4 20 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

dotte was irritated at having been kept in the dark. It was not, how- 
ever, till Stewart returned to Frankfort that he learnt the contents of 
the note. 

By that time, Napoleon's answer — the last penned by Maret, be- 
fore Caulaincourt superseded him as Foreign Minister — had arrived. 
As Metternich predicted, it contained no acceptance of the basis, but 
merely declared a readiness to treat. St Aignan's minute was, however, 
skilfully used to insinuate that maritime questions would be discussed 
at the Congress. The unofficial and secret conversation had thus been 
made the basis of bringing into the European settlement the question 
of the Freedom of the Seas, which it was a cardinal point in British 
policy to refuse to discuss. Aberdeen had no alternative but to send 
in a minute of protest to Metternich, who returned an acceptable 
answer, which, now that Napoleon had rejected his terms, he had no 
difficulty in sending. His reply to Maret reiterated the necessity of 
accepting the terms before any discussion could take place. Aberdeen 
was satisfied with these proceedings. He explained to Castlereagh in 
a despatch of November 28th that the basis was merely meant to 
indicate the boundaries of France. Thus, no mention had been made 
of Poland, Sicily, Norway and other objects, some of which were of 
vital interest to Great Britain, and he assured him that "both the 
imperial Courts have framed their conduct on their belief of what 
would be most approved of by the British Government 1 ." Stewart, 
however, was now alarmed and indignant. It was only from Maret's 
answer that he learnt the contents of the note, and both he and Jackson 
were naturally angry at being kept in the dark. A despatch was sent 
to London which criticised in the warmest language Aberdeen's con- 
duct 2 . This did not make Stewart any more popular with the Courts 
of Austria and Prussia, and it was soon obvious that he and Aberdeen 
had no confidence in one another, and the latter at Metternich's re- 
quest concealed from his fellow Envoy everything concerning the 
important negotiations. Cathcart in vain tried to make peace between 
them ; but the quarrel broke out openly on the receipt of another reply 
from Napoleon, this time signed by Caulaincourt, whose nomination 
to the Foreign Ministry in place of Maret was a concession to the 
growing peace party at Paris. The arrival of this Note was concealed 
even from Aberdeen, until Pozzo di Borgo, who, as will be seen, was 

1 Aberdeen to Castlereagh, November 28th, 1813. F.O. Austria, 103; British 
Diplomacy, p. 113. 

* Stewart to Castlereagh, November 28th, 1813. F.O. Prussia, 91; British 
Diplomacy, p. 88. 



THE GRAND ALLIANCE PROJECT AT A STANDSTILL 421 

despatched on a special mission to England, could take with him a copy. 
But Stewart was not so easily put off. He succeeded in obtaining a 
copy of this note through a subordinate in Metternich's office, and 
his messenger was able to leave at the same time as the Russian 
General with a letter of protest against the way in which the British 
Envoys were being treated. Pozzo's mission he regarded as an insult 
to himself and his colleagues and hoped that Castlereagh would give 
it no countenance. Neither Cathcart nor, of course, Aberdeen sup- 
ported him. The Note that caused so much distress was an acceptance 
of the Frankfort basis and of the suggestion that a Congress should 
meet at Mannheim as soon as possible. But it was now too late. Stein's 
arrival at Frankfort had made Alexander far less inclined than before 
to stay his armies at the frontier. The Declaration of the Allies, drafted 
by Metternich, had been issued, which, while promising the French 
people the natural frontiers, had announced an invasion, of France. 
Reply was made that the answer of Great Britain must be awaited 
before the negotiation could go forward, and meanwhile all prepara- 
tions were made for the invasion. 

Under such conditions it was not likely that Castlereagh's project 
of a Grand Alliance would make much progress. No answer was given 
to Cathcart, until the St Aignan negotiation had taken place. Then, 
to Cathcart's surprise, it came in the form of adespatch to Lieven which 
suggested that Castlereagh's project was now out of date. Alexander 
proposed that the new Treaty should be connected with the British 
Subsidy engagements for the ensuing year, and he further pressed 
that Great Britain should state in it the cessions of Colonial conquests 
which she was prepared to make in the interests of peace. When 
Cathcart protested, Alexander proposed, instead, merely a renewal of 
the Subsidy Treaty with an engagement as regards Spain; but, when 
urged to add the independence of Holland, with a " Barrier," Switzer- 
land, and Sardinia, he showed great disinclination to anything of 
the kind, stating that "perhaps it was better to avoid binding more 
than was necessary by Treaty, lest in striving to do too much we should 
lose the opportunity of doing anything 1 ." Stewart won the full assent 
of the Prussian Court 2 ; but further negotiations on the 17th only 
revealed the fact that neither Russia nor Austria had any intention of 
going so far as Castlereagh wished. Aberdeen had hopes that Metter- 

1 Cathcart to Castlereagh, December 5th, 1813. F.O. Russia, 87; British 
Diplomacy, p. 48. 

2 Stewart to Castlereagh, November 24th, 1813. F.O. Prussia, 91; British 
Diplomacy, p. 88. 



422 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

nich would carry the matter through, and Cathcart left the negotia- 
tions mainly to him — a device all the more congenial to Austria and 
Russia, as it left Stewart out of the game. But, though Metternich 
was much more encouraging than Alexander, he, in a conference 
with Aberdeen and Nesselrode, backed the Russians in demanding 
that Great Britain should furnish a declaration as to her conquests. 
Aberdeen offered to make a general declaration in vague terms; but 
Metternich used the Tsar's wishes as an excuse for insisting. 

"I see clearly," wrote Aberdeen, "that Prince Metternich, although 
perfectly ready to sign the Treaty himself, is unwilling to follow the example 
of Prussia in separating herself from the Allies, for fear of giving umbrage 
to Russia. He therefore will endeavour if possible to draw Russia with 
him. This may be all very right, but I could not help observing to them 
that they appeared by their conduct almost as anxious to make common 
cause against us as against France 1 ." 

The result was that the negotiation failed. Nothing whatever 
was signed; and, instead, Pozzo di Borgo was sent to London 
with special Instructions for himself and Lieven to conclude a 
treaty with the British Government, in which both next year's Sub- 
sidies and the cession of the Colonial conquests were to be specified. 
In spite of Metternich 's apparent goodwill, there can be no doubt 
that the insistence on this latter point was mainly due to him; 
for it reiterated the demand he had made at the beginning of the year. 
Without it, indeed, he could not have that complete mastery over the 
issue of peace or war, which it was his settled purpose to obtain 
before the Congress, now agreed upon, met. Meanwhile, during the 
month of December, the disunion of the British Ambassadors was 
reflected in the disputes that were appearing amongst the Allies on 
all sides. Bernadotte, now that Leipzig had rendered him far 
less indispensable to his Allies, was being treated with much less 
attention and respect than before, even on military questions. He was 
clearly loath to invade French soil, preferring to attack Denmark, and, 
though Stewart visited his headquarters in December to urge the 
importance of an attack on Holland, whither the British Ministry were 
now despatching an expeditionary force and the Prince of Orange, 
he remained sullenly occupied with his own projects of Swedish 
aggrandisement and the ambitious design on which he had long 
meditated of replacing Napoleon on the Throne of France. 

1 Aberdeen to Castlereagh, December 5th, December 9th, 1813. F.O. Austria, 
103. 



AUSTRO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY 423 

Far more serious was the rivalry that began to appear between 
Austria and Russia. The main reason, ostensibly, was a dispute be- 
tween Alexander and the Austrian Generals as to the necessity of 
passing through Switzerland on the march to France. Under the 
influence of La Harpe and Jomini, Alexander refused to violate the 
neutrality of Switzerland, which Napoleon, who could not but win 
strategic advantage from it, had promised to respect. The dispute was 
only settled by Metternich's skill in arranging for a mild revolution 
in Switzerland, which ensured a welcome for the Allied armies; yet 
the incident did much to embitter his relations with Alexander. 
But there were far graver causes for the prevailing discontent 
among the Allied diplomatists. The Powers were now deeply pre- 
occupied with the future settlement of the territories which had 
come into their possession as a result of the break-up of the 
Napoleonic empire. Metternich had resumed negotiations with Murat 
who had left the remnants of the Grand Army and returned to 
his kingdom, vowing to avenge himself on the Emperor. Aberdeen, 
hereupon, tried to restrain Metternich from offering too much; but 
he had already committed himself, and Metternich had a free hand 
to offer him his kingdom in return for military assistance, if Austrian 
armies found themselves unable to deal with the French under 
Eugene, as was soon seen to be the case. By his Treaties with Bavaria 
and other members of the German Confederation, Metternich had 
already done much to undermine Stein's plan of a consolidated 
Germany. But he was even more closely concerned with the questions 
of Poland and Saxony. Austria was indeed looking for her own com- 
pensation in Italy; but she felt that a revived national Poland under 
Russian control would be a terrible menace to her Eastern frontier. 
Even the entire absorption of Saxony by Prussia would be preferable 
to this. The eyes of the Sovereigns and statesmen were accordingly 
directed towards the Vistula as much as to the Rhine, which their 
armies were preparing to cross. It was only natural, therefore, that 
they should wish to commit themselves as little as possible, and they 
were in no mood to fall in with Castlereagh's comprehensive schemes 
of Alliance. 

Upon these difficult negotiations Castlereagh could exercise little 
influence from London. The advance of the Allied Armies had 
brought headquarters a week nearer to him ; but contrary winds de- 
layed the packets, and it sometimes took six or seven weeks for a 
message to go and return. Before the news of Leipzig reached him, 



424 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

he continued to press the Allies to raise their demands as high as 
possible, and to make the exertions necessary to enforce them ; above 
all he pointed out again and again the necessity of uniting their 
counsels in a common bond. He dwelt persistently on the magnitude 
of French preparations and the certainty that Bonaparte would accept 
no possible peace, unless resisted with perseverance as well as energy 
— facts which, also, furnished "unanswerable arguments in support 
of the system of unqualified union amongst the Powers contending 
against France." He was dissatisfied with the limited extent of the 
Treaties of Toplitz, and especially with the fact that they made no 
mention of Spain ; and he gave Cathcart a tolerably strong hint that 
the absence of any recognition of this essential point might affect the 
Subsidy arrangements for the next year 1 . His formal approval of 
Aberdeen's Subsidy Treaty with Austria at Toplitz was couched in 
a similar strain. 

The question of Holland and the Low Countries now began to 
form one of the principal preoccupations of the British Government. 
The result of the battle of Leipzig had been to bring about an in- 
surrection in Holland, and, on December 2nd, the Prince of Orange 
was received at Amsterdam and placed himself at the head of the 
national movement. This step had been concerted by the British 
Government, and troops were despatched under Sir Thomas Graham. 
But it was not merely Holland that it was now hoped to free from 
French control. So early as November 5th, Castlereagh informed 
Aberdeen that at this point the Rhine could not be a suitable frontier 
for France, and every argument was brought forward that might induce 
the Powers to see their own interests in the complete freedom of Hol- 
land and the necessity of a ' Barrier ' (a term inherited from the struggle 
with Lewis XIV) between Holland proper and France. The British 
Cabinet had come to close agreement with William of Orange, and the 
project of establishing that Prince as ruler not only of Holland, but 
of a considerable portion at least of Belgium and possibly of northern 
Germany, was being actively pursued. Such a kingdom, in conjunction 
with a restored and consolidated Hanover, was regarded as the best 
means to keep French power in check on the north-eastern frontier 2 . 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart, October 14th, 1813. F.O. Supplementary, 343; 
British Diplomacy, p. 34. Castlereagh to Cathcart, October 15th. F.O. Russia, 87. 

2 Castlereagh to Aberdeen, November 5th, 181 3. F.O. Austria, 101 ; British 
Diplomacy, p. 106. One argument for Holland's independence is noticeable. "If 
in no other point of view than as the natural centre of the money transactions of Europe, 
all interested nations are interested in its being again raised to the rank of a free 
and independent state." Castlereagh to Aberdeen, Nov. 5th, 1813. F.O.Austria, 101. 



BRITISH EFFORTS FOR HOLLAND 425 

On November 30th, after the receipt of the news of the success of the 
insurrection, this point was again urged by him in words which have 
been often quoted. "The destruction of that arsenal is essential to 
our safety. To leave it in the hands of France is little short of imposing 
upon Great Britain the charge of a perpetual war establishment 1 " ; 
and he directed Aberdeen in the strongest possible terms to remedy 
the Frankfort proposals on this point. To Cathcart he wrote " I must 
beg of you never to lose sight of Antwerp and its noxious contents, — 
recommend also the Orange cause to the Emperor's warmest pro- 
tection. The popular spirit which has shown itself there I look upon 
as amongst the most fortunate events of the war." Aberdeen sent 
agents and money to the Low Countries. But Metternich was not 
yet ready to agree that the Low Countries should be taken from 
France, and he had, moreover, not completely abandoned the idea 
of creating an independent kingdom there under the Arch-duke Charles, 
if the French were removed. Stewart did his utmost to bring Berna- 
dotte's force into action upon Holland ; but, in spite of letters from the 
King of Prussia and Alexander, the Prince- Royal was not anxious 
to use his Swedes at a point where his own interests would scarcely 
be much served, and preferred instead to move against Holstein, so 
that Denmark would be compelled by this threat to her German 
dominions to cede Norway to him. 

Meanwhile, Castlereagh had to consider the greater questions 
which were raised by the news of the Frankfort proposals and the 
failure of his Ambassadors to obtain the Treaty of Alliance. The 
freeing of Germany, and especially the recovery of Holland, had acted 
like wine on the spirits of the Cabinet and the nation. " It has operated 
here as magical," wrote Castlereagh of this latter event; "there is 
nothing beyond the tone of this country at this, moment 2 ." But, 
though he was urgent to obtain the best possible peace, he remained 
true to his policy of not pressing Great Britain's Allies too far. He 
approved Aberdeen's action at Frankfort on receipt of his first des- 
patches, and accepted the basis, merely trying to interpret the term 
"natural frontiers" so as to secure "protection" for Holland, whose 
cause he again warmly commended . But he indicated , once more , that 
Great Britain's attitude towards her Colonial conquests would depend 
on a satisfactory result on this point. He, also, urged that, if the basis 

1 Castlereagh to Aberdeen, November 30th, 181 3. Castlereagh Correspondence, 
IX. 35. The date there given is 13th, but it seems clear that 30th is more correct. 

2 Castlereagh to Cathcart, November 30th, 1813. F.O. Russia, 83. 



4 26 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

was not at once accepted, the negotiation should be forthwith termi- 
nated. When, however, the British Cabinet had received the text of 
St Aignan's memorandum, they were much alarmed at the form which 
the negotiation on " Maritime Rights " had now assumed. Peremptory 
orders were sent to Aberdeen to make a written protest against the 
assumption that Great Britain could allow any discussion of this 
question in the Peace Congress. The document was also subjected to 
further criticisms. Exception was taken to the word " natural" in the 
phrase "natural limits"; and it was asserted that, if the enemy re- 
jected this basis, he could have no claim to receive the offer again at 
a later date. It was, also, held that the reference in St Aignan's 
minute to the "natural influence" of France over the secondary 
States of Germany was liable to misinterpretation, and might be used 
to prevent the German States from forming "a Federal connexion 
under a constitutional head" to the exclusion of foreign influence. 
Castlereagh did not, however, agree with Stewart's criticism that 
Norway should have been included in the basis, accepting Aberdeen's 
explanation that only the frontiers of France were relevant ; and his 
brother received a snub for the line which he had taken 1 . 

But on the question of the Grand Alliance, Stewart found his 
views more readily accepted, and Castlereagh expressed himself in 
strong terms to Cathcart, when he received the first news of Alex- 
ander's objections. He peremptorily refused to buy the Alliance 
at the price of subsidies and Colonial conquests. "If this species of 
negotiation is persisted in, better at once decline the measure alto- 
gether," he wrote, "and I am yet to learn why Great Britain is more 
interested in cementing the Confederacy than Russia." He noted 
that the principal point of his proposal had obviously been missed 
in these attempts .of the Allies to utilise it for their own ends. "The 
main question is," he insisted, "shall the Confederates by a common 
treaty now identify their cause, and lay the Foundation of a defensive 
alliance against France? " He still hoped, therefore, that the Alliance 
would be carried through. 

When, therefore, he learnt from Lieven the counter-proposals 
of Alexander, emphasising and expanding these demands, he showed 
himself extremely indignant. He refused even to enter into an official 
discussion with Lieven of such terms, but took pains to impress 

1 Castlereagh to Aberdeen, December7th, 1813. F.O. Austria, 101 ; British Diplo- 
macy, p. 116. Castlereagh to Stewart, December 17th. F.O. Prussia, 86; British 
Diplomacy, p. 92. 



BRITISH RESERVATION AS TO THE PEACE 427 

on him, in an informal conversation, the feelings of his Government. 
He was indignant at Alexander's suggestion that the British proposal 
seemed to indicate a distrust towards the Allies. It was not because the 
particular interests of Great Britain stood most in need of the Alliance 
that it had been put forward. Great Britain, he intimated, could look 
after herself better than any Continental Power, and she had ap- 
proached Russia first, as being all but equally invulnerable. The Con- 
federacy, he pointed out, was designed to restrain France — the France 
of Napoleon or the Revolution — in the future as well as up to the 
termination of the War — " not only to procure but to preserve peace." 

"The terms of peace," he said to Lieven, "are no doubt of essential 
moment, and the arrangement of limits indispensable to the common safety. 
Nothing, however, but a defensive League is likely to deter France from 
returning to the old system of progressive encroachment. The proposition 
for such a League, it was conceived, would come with most propriety from 
Great Britain and from Russia, as the Powers least exposed in the first 
instance to French encroachments. It appeared that the example of two 
such leading Powers, ready to lend themselves to a system of common pro- 
tection, would give confidence to the more exposed States, and encourage 
them to lean on such alliance for security, rather than attempt to fall back 
within the circle of French influence. That, whatever might be the hazards 
of a system of this nature, upon every enlarged view of policy it became 
Great Britain and Russia, even with a view to their own separate interests, 
not to shrink from bearing their share in it 1 ." 

He was prepared to make some modifications in his first pro- 
posals, to restrict the Treaty in the first instance to the Great Powers — 
Spain, however, being included — and to stipulate precisely the amount 
of force each should contribute to the Alliance. But he made the 
position quite clear as regards the Colonial conquests of Great Britain. 
She was ready to make, as she had already made, a general promise 
to restore conquests, if a satisfactory Continental peace was assured. 
But she was not ready to bind herself to details and simply hand over 
all the negotiations to her Allies. "The British Government never 
once conceived," he wrote, "that it could be expected that Great 
Britain would by treaty pass this discretion into other hands, and 
confide to its Allies the trust of negotiating for her at a general peace." 
He pointed out that the Allies had not said what they intended to 
do with their conquests, and Great Britain meant to preserve the 
same liberty of action. Finally, he added an appeal which showed 
how far he was removed from the insular position traditional to 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart, December 18th, 1813. F.O. Russia, 83; British 
Diplomacy, p. 59. 



428 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

British statesmen, and how deeply he had been impressed by the 
necessity of her maintaining her role of the protector of the Continent 
against France. 

"Amongst the fluctuating policy of States," he wrote, "which too fre- 
quently varied with the predominance of particular statesmen, it appeared 
to me not less an act of wisdom than of duty to the world, that Great 
Britain and Russia should take this occasion of solemnly binding them- 
selves in conjunction with the more exposed States of the Continent to 
oppose a Barrier hereafter to the oppression of France. The determination 
to take upon themselves this generous and provident task could afford to 
Europe the best, perhaps the only prospect of a durable peace; and when 
the experience of latter times was examined with respect to the policy of 
indifference to the fate of neighbouring States, the most anxious and 
interested politicians would find little to give countenance to an abstracted 
and selfish line of policy." 

While Castlereagh held these views, it was not likely that Pozzo 
di Borgo could add much to Lieven's arguments; and Castlereagh 
refused to carry the negotiation further. It was, at first, his intention 
to request the Allies to send full powers to their Ambassadors at 
London for signing a Treaty of Alliance on the terms he had indicated. 
But the news from the Continent finally decided the Cabinet to take 
a more important step. The dissensions between the Allies were 
growing, and the British Ambassadors, so far from being able to 
prevent them, were themselves at issue and concealing their pro- 
ceedings from one another. Jackson, who had been sent home for 
the purpose by Stewart alter the Frankfort proposals, brought news, 
on the 15th, of Stewart's growing alarms and suspicions. Austria 
and Russia were now reported as on the verge of a rupture, and Berna- 
dotte's conduct was arousing the gravest doubts. In spite of the 
favourable military situation, there appeared to be a real danger that 
a Treaty might be made without obtaining those securities which 
British statesmen thought necessary to the peace of the Continent. 
In these circumstances, it was decided that a member of the Cabinet 
should proceed to the Continent, furnished with specific and com- 
prehensive Instructions, so that he could make decisions on the spot. 
Castlereagh at first thought of sending Harrowby, who had been Pitt's 
agent in the unfortunate negotiations of 1805. But it was clear to his 
colleagues that the Foreign Minister must go himself. If he remained 
in London, as had been proved, affairs changed so rapidly that he 
could obtain no control over events, and he was too far away to judge 
accurately between his rival Ambassadors. 



CASTLEREAGH'S PEACE INSTRUCTIONS 429 

"You have passed from operations so rapidly to negociations," he wrote 
to Cathcart, "that my arrangements have not kept pace with you. Had I 
foreseen that you were likely to open an intercourse at Paris, I should 
have deemed some central authority indispensable and should have at 
least required the three Ministers at Head Quarters to deliberate and decide 
on matters of general interest collectively. As it is, I hope no real mischief 
has occurred and I rely upon finding you all drawing cordially together 1 ." 

II. THE FALL OF NAPOLEON AND THE FIRST PEACE 
OF PARIS 

The Instructions which Castlereagh took with him to the Con- 
tinent were drawn up in the form of a Cabinet Memorandum 2 . This 
important document was prepared by his own hand and approved at 
a full Cabinet meeting, from which Camden was the only Minister 
absent. Before submitting his views to his colleagues, Castlereagh 
had obtained from the Ambassadors of the three Allied Powers 
Memoranda on the wishes of their Governments, and this informa- 
tion had been supplemented by unofficial discussions with Lieven 
and Pozzo di Borgo. Jackson, on his return from Frankfort, must 
also have furnished him with a good deal of that kind of information 
which cannot be conveyed in writing. He was thus fairly well ac- 
quainted with even the less obvious aspects of the situation. The 
effect of the recent discussions at Frankfort can, therefore, be clearly 
discerned in the Cabinet Memorandum ; but the document is singu- 
larly moderate in tone, and evades some of the most controversial 
points. It was intended to deal in detail with only those questions in 
which Great Britain was specially interested, and the general Con- 
tinental settlement is only very briefly considered. Designed as it 
was to enable Castlereagh to make decisions on the spot and so avoid 
the delay and consequent lack of influence which frequent reference to 
his Cabinet would entail, a very great deal was left to his discretion, 
revealing the fact that his colleagues had already great confidence in 
his ability and judgment, though he had not yet completed his second 
year as Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Castlereagh had already received from the three Ambassadors 
satisfactory assurances on the question of Maritime Rights, which the 
Frankfort proposals had brought under discussion. There could be 
no question of compromise on this point, and one of his first tasks 

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart, December 22nd, 1813. F.O. Supplementary, 343; 
British Diplomacy, p. 62. 

2 Dated December 26th, 1813. F.O. Continent. Archives, 1; British Diplomacy, 
p. 123. 



43Q THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

when he arrived at headquarters was to secure a further declaration 
from the principal Ministers to the same effect. But the question of 
the restoration of the Colonial conquests still remained an open one, 
and how much importance was attached by the Allies to an explicit 
declaration on the subject had been seen in the course of the recent 
negotiations concerning the Alliance. This question, therefore, occu- 
pied the principal place in his instructions. Once more it was laid 
down that British concessions were to depend upon the nature of the 
Continental Peace. So far as this fell short of what was considered 
necessary to the security of Holland, Italy and the Peninsula, a greater 
share of the conquests must be retained by Great Britain. Since it 
was now known that the Allies would be prepared to insist at least 
on the "natural limits" of the Alps, the Rhine and the Pyrenees, it 
was really the protection of Holland with which the Cabinet was 
mainly concerned ; and to this point the Instructions recur more than 
once. Antwerp itself and "the absolute exclusion of France from 
any naval establishment on the Scheldt" were made conditions sine 
qua non of any material concessions by Great Britain. But it was 
hoped that more than this would be obtained, and that the whole of 
the Low Countries would be made into a "Barrier" against France. 
Only in that case would the majority of the Dutch and French 
Colonies be returned to Holland and France. It should be noticed 
that the actual union of the Low Countries and Holland was not yet 
finally decided. Metternich's hint that he might, after all, desire to 
set up an Austrian prince there was taken into account, and was to 
be accepted if pressed. It was also understood that part of Belgium 
might have to be left in French hands, if the Allies were not suffi- 
ciently successful, and the extension of the Prince of Orange's 
dominions into Germany was to depend on their consent. But the 
negotiations that Castlereagh had been carrying on with the Prince 
show that he had a clear policy, though he did not wish to bind him- 
self too strictly in his Instructions; and, since the marriage of the 
Prince of Orange with the Princess Charlotte was expressly suggested, 
there could be no doubt as to the intention at this moment to make 
Holland as large as possible, though Castlereagh modified his views 
on this head after his first interviews with the Allied Ministers. 

If Holland were restored in this way, the conquests, except for 
those which were to be considered as absolutely necessary to her 
maritime strategy, were to be regarded as objects of negotiation. But, 
since it was not possible to lay down express conditions as to how many 



CASTLEREAGH'S INSTRUCTIONS AS TO COLONIES 43 1 

Colonies would be returned, the number was to depend on the kind 
of peace secured, and was therefore susceptible to many variations. 
In Castlereagh's 1 " Memorandum on a Maritime Peace " (an unsigned 
and unfinished document which accompanies the Instructions, and 
may be considered as part of them), the principle on which Britain 
was acting is clearly laid down : 

Her object is to see a maritime as well as a military Balance of Power 
established among the Powers of Europe, and as the basis of this arrange- 
ment she desires to see the independence of Spain and Holland as maritime 
Powers effectually provided for. Upon the supposition that these two 
objects shall be obtained in the proposed arrangements, that the limits of 
France shall be reduced within proper bounds, and that the peace of the 
Continent shall be secured by an amicable understanding between the 
Allies, Great Britain will then be prepared also to return within correspon- 
ding limits and to throw her acquisitions into the scale of the general 
interests. As nothing is yet defined with precision either as to the state of 
the enemy's limits or as to that of the Allies, it is impossible to do more 
than state on the part of Great Britain the nature and extent of concession 
she would be prepared to make upon given data as to the continental 
arrangements. The object will best be effected by stating what the maximum 
of concession might be on the part of Great Britain upon assuming the 
reduction of France within her ancient limits, and the Allies having amic- 
ably arranged their own state of possession . . . (the British Government) 
do not desire to retain any of these Colonies for their mere commercial 
value — too happy if by their restoration they can give other states an addi- 
tional motive to cultivate the arts of peace. The only objects to which they 
desire to adhere are those which effect essentially the engagement and 
security of their own dominion. 

It was thus left to Castlereagh's discretion to restore all or none 
of the Colonies placed at his disposal, according as he was satisfied 
or not with the proposals of the Allies ; and it will be seen that this 
power was of great importance to him at moments of crisis. The 
conquests which were to be retained on the plea of strategical ne- 
cessity were few in number. Malta, of course, and the Cape of Good 
Hope, were included, Holland being compensated with £2,000,000 
for the latter possession, which were to be spent in fortifying the 
Barrier. Mauritius, the Isle of Bourbon and Les Saintes were also 
considered necessary to the protection of the route to India. Guade- 
loupe was considered as in pledge to Sweden; but, if France insisted 
on its return, Bourbon could be assigned to Sweden (or some Dutch 
Colony for which Bourbon could be exchanged) in its place. All the 

1 F.O. Continent. Archives, 1 (undated); British Diplomacy, p. 126. 



432 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

remaining West and East Indian Islands that had belonged to France 
or Holland Great Britain was prepared to surrender. 

The Cabinet's views on the Continental settlement, apart from 
Holland, were only briefly indicated. Spain and Portugal were to be 
free, and, it was hoped, guaranteed against attack by the Continental 
Powers. In Italy, it was suggested that the King of Sardinia should 
receive Genoa in exchange for Savoy, as well as the control of the 
new routes over the Alps which the War had opened up. The Pope 
was to be restored ; the centre of Italy left open for discussion. Lastly, 
if Austria made peace with Murat, the Sicilian Bourbons were to 
receive as a compensation Tuscany or Elba. All that was said as to 
Germany was that Great Britain was to offer her mediation. Any con- 
cession to Denmark was to be discussed with Sweden. Castlereagh 
had thus almost complete freedom of action in all the great questions 
that were dividing his Allies. 

He was empowered to offer £5,000,000 in subsidies for the coming 
year to the Continental Powers, if they signed satisfactory engage- 
ments as to the Peninsula and Holland. Only a single short clause was 
inserted on the project of the Treaty of Alliance, which "was not to 
terminate with the War, but to comprise defensive arrangements 
with mutual obligations to support the Powers attacked by France 
with a certain amount of stipulated succours." The casus foederis was 
to be an attack by France on the European dominions of any of the 
Contracting Parties. Castlereagh had thus slightly modified his scheme 
in view of the criticisms of the Allies. The obligations to the Alliance 
were to be definite, instead of the vague phrase in the Instructions of 
September 18th, and the scope of the Alliance was to be restricted to 
Europe. Further, though Spain and Holland were to be contracting 
parties, it was now suggested, in view of the objections raised by 
Alexander and the dubious conduct of Bernadotte himself, that 
Sweden should not be an original signatory of the Treaty. 

Doubtless, this short document was merely a risume of a long dis- 
cussion in the Cabinet, and Castlereagh had verbally gone into matters 
with his colleagues more fully than the Instructions record. The 
omissions cannot be accidental. Already, public opinion in England 
was discussing the policy of "no peace with Bonaparte" and the 
Bourbon Princes were making ready to act. There is nothing in the 
Instructions on this head. Castlereagh's own views, however, were 
clearly revealed in his discussions at headquarters. He was prepared 
to make peace with Napoleon, if a peace such as was implied in the 



CASTLEREAGH AND RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 433 

Instructions could be obtained. Like all the British Ministers, he 
wished the Bourbons to be restored if possible. But to avow such a 
policy was impossible for a Minister of the House of Hanover, and 
Castlereagh was convinced of the folly of attempting to impose the 
Bourbons on France by force of arms. To this policy he adhered, in 
spite of public clamour and opposition in the Cabinet, until the last 
chance of signing peace with Napoleon had vanished. 

Even more significant is the absence in the Memorandum of any 
direction as to the disposition of the conquered territories of Poland 
and Germany. Castlereagh was well aware of the jealousies which 
had already arisen among the Allies on these points. That he con- 
sidered an amicable termination of them of the highest importance 
is seen in the clause quoted above, which makes the Colonial con- 
cessions depend on "the Allies having amicably arranged their own 
state of possession." But he was apparently desirous of having a 
completely free hand on this point, so that he could make his decisions 
only after personal examination of the situation at headquarters. This 
was an important omission, for it is doubtful whether Castlereagh 
could have taken with him Instructions to pursue the line of policy 
which he followed during the next few months. 

Castlereagh had no illusions as to the difficulty of the task before 
him, and he had already conceived the role he was to play in the 
great problem of the reconstruction of Europe. To F. J. Robinson 
(later Viscount Goderich and Earl of Ripon) whom he took with him 
as assistant, he stated in the course of the journey some of his ideas 
as to the situation he was about to meet, and the methods he meant 
to apply to it. 

" In the course of our journey from Frankfort to Basle," wrote Ripon 
in a letter to Castlereagh's brother in 1839, " ne stated to me that one of 
the great difficulties which he expected to encounter in the approaching 
negotiations would arise from the want of an habitual, confidential and free 
intercourse between the ministers of the great Powers as a body ; and that 
many pretensions might be modified, asperities removed, and causes of 
irritation anticipated and met, by bringing the respective parties into un- 
restricted communications common to them all, and embracing in con- 
fidential and united discussions, all the great points in which they were 
severally interested 1 ." 

He had thus already taken upon himself something more than the 
duties of a British Minister anxious to defend British interests. He 

1 The Earl of Ripon to the Marquess of Londonderry, July 6th, 1839. Castle- 
reagh Correspondence, 1, 128. 

W.&G.I. 28 



434 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

was prepared to play the part of Mediator between the statesmen and 
Sovereigns of the Allies whose decisions already threatened to break 
up the Alliance and to wreck the European settlement. It is this 
wide conception of his activities that marks out Castlereagh as the 
most European and the least insular of all British Foreign Ministers 
and, despite his limitations and his failures to appreciate the growing 
strength of the new forces of Liberalism and Nationality on the 
Continent, he had many of the qualities necessary for the task which 
he had set himself. Lord Ripon's comments, though designed to be 
read by an affectionate brother engaged in defending Castlereagh 's 
reputation, have been justified by the researches of historians. 

No man was ever better calculated so to transact business himself, and 
to bring others to act with him in such a manner, than Lord Londonderry. 
The suavity and dignity of his manners, his habitual patience and self- 
command, his considerate tolerance of difference of opinion in others, all 
fitted him for such a task: whilst his firmness, when he knew he was 
right, in no degree detracted from the influence of his conciliatory de- 
meanour 1 . 

Thanks to these qualities, he was able to give to the Alliance a unity 
of view and a firmness of purpose which it sorely lacked, and ulti- 
mately to effect a European settlement which at least brought peace 
for a generation. In so doing he also laid the foundations for a new 
experiment in International Government, which, though it failed for 
the moment, was not the least of the stepping-stones in Europe's pro- 
gress towards International Peace. 

Castlereagh left England on the evening of the New Year, and 
arrived at Bale on January 18th. He passed through the Hague and 
there opened to the Prince of Orange his views on the " Barrier," the 
Dutch Colonies and the marriage with the Princess Charlotte, and 
pressed him to expedite the siege of Antwerp, which Carnot was de- 
fending with all his old skill. At Bale he found Metternich, Stadion 
and Hardenberg, but not Alexander, who had departed for the head- 
quarters of the Allied armies at Langres. He was impatiently expected 
by all. Alexander had left a message with Cathcart, entreating Castle- 
reagh to see him first before any of the statesmen, so much did he 
dread the impression that Metternich might produce in his absence. 
Metternich, as his intimate letters to Hudelist show, built many hopes 
on the effect Castlereagh 's arrival would produce both on Napoleon 
and on his own colleagues. It was indeed time that some new factor 

1 The Earl of Ripon to the Marquess of Londonderry, July 6th, 1839. Castle- 
reagh Correspondence, 1, 128. 



THE QUESTION OF A BOURBON RESTORATION 435 

was introduced into the Allied Councils. For, as Metternich com- 
plained, though the armies had marched beyond the Rhine to the 
confines of the Vosges the Alliance had now no definite object. All 
the agreements that had been made in 18 13 had been by this time 
fulfilled. Napoleon had accepted the proposals put forward at Frank- 
fort, and Caulaincourt was impatiently waiting to begin discussions 
with the Allies, who had, however, spent the interval in mutual re- 
crimination instead of preparing terms with which to meet him. The 
difficulty with regard to Switzerland had caused the first rupture 
between the Tsar and the Austrians. But a more important difference 
had now added to the prevailing dissensions. Alexander had openly 
announced his intention of dethroning Bonaparte, and it was Berna- 
dotte he was suspected of wishing to put in his place. This was the 
first news which Castlereagh heard, not merely from Metternich but 
from his own Ambassadors and many other channels. It was thus 
necessaiy to deal at the outset with this question rather than the terms 
of Peace, for Metternich threatened to withdraw the Austrian forces 
unless the project was abandoned. Castlereagh found little difficulty 
in coming to an agreement with Metternich. By warmly supporting 
his objections to Bernadotte, Castlereagh obtained from the Austrian 
minister an admission that a Regency under the Empress (which Austria 
was suspected of favouring) was equally undesirable. He pressed on 
him the view that, if Bonaparte fell, the Bourbons were the only alter- 
native, but that the issue must depend upon the French themselves. 

" I left the question there," he reported on the 22nd, " having I thought 
done enough when I brought him to admit that there were only two alter- 
natives in fact, Bonaparte or the Bourbons, and that the latter was the most 
desirable, if France took that tone upon it which could alone lead to its 
successful accomplishment accompanied with the good will and favourable 
sentiments of the nation 1 ." 

Thus early was the issue stated which had as yet occurred to few on 
the Continent — though among these were Talleyrand and Napoleon 
himself. 

Once agreement had been reached on this question, Castlereagh 
and Metternich could discuss the question of peace terms. They went 
over the whole field of settlement. Castlereagh found Metternich still 
inclined to offer the Frankfort basis, but was able to report that "his 
geographical notions are improved," and that on the northern frontier 
he was ready to make concessions to the British point of view. 

1 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, vm. 535. 

28—2 



436 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

Metternich had now finally determined to abandon the Austrian 
claims on the Netherlands, and he was, also, prepared to insist on 
depriving France of a portion of the left bank of the Rhine. Castle- 
reagh suggested that the Prussian dominions might be made to in- 
clude territory to the left bank, remembering that "it was a favourite 
scheme of Mr Pitt," and doubting the expediency of extending the 
frontier of Holland too far — a policy in which he was to some extent 
influenced by Miinster, who had no wish to see Holland overshadow 
Hanover and also absorb those compensations by which he hoped to 
improve the Hanoverian frontiers. 

It was, also, necessary to enter into the questions of Poland and 
Saxony and "other questions of delicacy." For Castlereagh was 
strongly opposed to the policy which he found prevailing and which 
Alexander especially was urging, of excluding France from all know- 
ledge of these plans of the Allies, and simply informing Caulaincourt 
of the frontier which the Allies offered to France. Castlereagh saw 
clearly, that France had interests in the disposition of the rest of Europe 
and therefore a right to be informed, at least in outline, of the plans of 
the Allies before Peace was signed. Moreover, he could not but be aware 
that the former course would postpone the Continental settlement, 
which he was anxious to arrange as soon as possible, and in which he 
thought the interests of his own country were involved as well as those 
of France. He had hopes that the Polish and Saxon questions were 
susceptible of an immediate solution. Metternich had already given 
Hardenberg a verbal promise to support his Saxon plans, and Cath- 
cart had reported that Alexander was prepared to make the Vistula 
his frontier 1 . In this Cathcart was completely mistaken; but Castle- 
reagh's first impression was so favourable that he hoped to be able 
to draw up a complete outline of the new Europe to submit to Cau- 
laincourt. His knowledge and moderation made a great impression 
on Metternich. He had expected to find Castlereagh far more in- 
transigeant, and he flattered himself he had made a good impression. 
Herein he was not mistaken, for, though Castlereagh was not blind to 
Metternich 's faults, he found his Austrian colleague by far the most 
congenial personality at headquarters, and alone possessed of that 
spirit of compromise and readiness to face the facts which animated 
himself. He objected to Metternich 's timidity and procrastination; 
but his other merits stood out in contrast to the impetuous and 

1 Cathcart to Castlereagh, January 16th, 1814. Castlereagh Correspondence, IX. 
169. 



COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FORMED AT LANGRES 437 

emotional character of the Tsar, with whom Castlereagh was soon to 
have some stormy interviews. 

The Ministers joined the Tsar at Langres on January 25th, and 
by February 1st the Alliance had compassed its object, and the In- 
structions were drafted for the Conference at Chatillon. Agreement 
was only reached, however, after prolonged discussions. The Austrians, 
both soldiers and diplomatists, were anxious to obtain peace as quickly 
as possible. Alexander, on the other hand, was determined to march 
on Paris and to refuse to treat with Napoleon. He denied, indeed, 
that he favoured Bernadotte ; but he would not listen to any idea of 
the Bourbons, and talked vaguely of allowing the French nation to 
choose a ruler for themselves after Paris had been taken. Castlereagh, 
hereupon, suggested that the Ministers of the Four Powers had better 
discuss all the questions in dispute, and thus a Council was formally set 
up, in which during three days the whole policy of the Alliance was 
reviewed. Castlereagh, from the first, took a leading part in the dis- 
cussions, and was eventually able to harmonise the conflicting views 
of Metternich and the Tsar. The Austrians he persuaded that military 
operations must go on unchecked, while the negotiations proceeded; 
the Tsar, or at least his Ministers, that terms must be offered to 
Napoleon and peace made with him, if he accepted them. As to the 
terms themselves, he succeeded in persuading Metternich to abandon 
formally the Frankfort basis, which, as he claimed, the military suc- 
cesses of the Allies and the Peace recently concluded with Murat had 
now rendered obsolete, and to substitute for them a project which 
practically reduced France to her ancient limits, with some con- 
cessions in Savoy and possibly on the left bank of the Rhine. All the 
Powers further agreed to his demand that Caulaincourt should be 
informed at the outset that the "Maritime Rights" must be left 
entirely out of the discussion. Less satisfactory were the consultations 
as to the outlines of the new Europe to be communicated to Caulain- 
court. Here, only the vaguest formulae could be drawn up, and no 
mention was made of Saxony or Poland. On these points, Castlereagh 
found the Powers full of suspicion and the hopes he had formed at 
Bale quite illusory. Nevertheless, he insisted that France must be 
given some information on this head, and that, Great Britain having 
declared her readiness to conclude peace with Napoleon, the offer 
must be made in such a shape as to render its acceptance possible 1 . 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, January 29th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 2; British 
Diplomacy, p. 141. See Oncken, "Lord Castlereagh und die Ministerconferenz zu 
Langres," Historisches Taschenbuch, VI. 4. p. 5. 



438 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

These conclusions were drawn up in the form of a Protocol, and 
embodied in Instructions to the Allied Plenipotentiaries at Chatillon. 
Here, Russia, Austria and Prussia were represented merely by one 
subordinate each, the principal Ministers remaining at Schwarzen- 
berg's headquarters with their Sovereigns. Castlereagh sent, not only 
Aberdeen, but also Cathcart and Stewart, apparently in order not to 
offend any one of them or the Powers to which they were severally 
accredited; but he also appeared in person, to keep watch 'over the 
proceedings. That he should leave headquarters at this period, showed 
how much importance he attached to the way in which the negotia- 
tions were conducted. It was not that he expected Napoleon to 
accept the terms offered ; but he felt that the cause of the Allies, and 
even more the restoration of the Bourbons, depended on the im- 
pression which the transaction was to make on the public opinion of 
France and Europe ; and, with some reason, he distrusted the capacity 
of the diplomatists sent to Chatillon to carry out their Instructions in 
the spirit in which he at least had drawn them up. 

Events were soon to show how well founded these doubts were. 
At Chatillon, Caulaincourt revealed himself as a sincere patriot and 
eager to obtain peace, for he had no illusions as to the situation. But, 
when confronted with the offer of the "ancient limits," he quite 
naturally pressed for information as to the intentions of the Powers 
with regard to such territories as Saxony and Italy. This was precisely 
the information which the Allied Plenipotentiaries could not give 
him; for they had not settled the matter among themselves. More- 
over, it was soon apparent that RazumofFski, the Russian Pleni- 
potentiary, was anxious to stop the discussions altogether. He had 
indeed, almost immediately, received orders from Alexander to do so, 
for the successes of the Allies in the early days of February had con- 
vinced the Tsar that the War was practically over, and that he could 
march straight to Paris. Castlereagh appears to have shared this view to 
some extent, but he was anxious that there should be no sudden rupture 
on the part of the Allies, and he wished to use Caulaincourt's inter- 
rogatories as a means to settle the points of the Continental settlement 
on which the Allies were at variance. He told the Plenipotentiaries 
frankly at the outset that he would only be prepared to sign away the 
Conquests, after three preliminary conditions had been satisfied. 

"The first was," he said, "that France should submit to retire, if not 
literally, substantially within her ancient limits. Secondly — that Great 
Britain should have an assurance by an amicable arrangement of limits 



DISCUSSIONS AT TROYES 439 

between the three Great Powers, that, having reduced France by their 
union they were not likely to re-establish her authority by differences 
amongst themselves. And thirdly — that we should be satisfied that the 
arrangements in favour of the Powers of whose interests we were especially 
the guardian, were likely to be attended to, and especially those of Holland 
and Sicily — the point of Spain being abandoned by France herself 1 ." 

But at Troyes, now the Allied headquarters, reached after Napo- 
leon's defeat at La Rothiere (February 21st) by Bliicher, Metternich 
found that he could no longer control Alexander. The Tsar was 
urgent that Schwarzenberg should support Bliicher's army and a 
direct march be made on Paris. The Austrians, both soldiers and 
diplomatists, were much alarmed, and Metternich especially so, since 
he feared, with reason, that Alexander had returned to the views he 
had held at Langres. The Tsar, at last, sent a formal order to Razu- 
moffski to suspend negotiations 2 . Castlereagh, therefore, left for 
Troyes on February 10th. There, he found that the Tsar's order had 
been issued on his own authority, so as to prevent any further dis- 
cussions till the Allies should have reached Paris, where he intended 
to summon a Representative Assembly to decide the future Sovereignty 
of France, Napoleon himself not being excluded from candidature. 
The Austrians were indignant and alarmed, especially as it was 
rumoured that Bernadotte was about to place himself at the head of 
the Allied corps nearest Paris. It was Castlereagh's task to convince 
Alexander of the danger of these intentions ; and this he accomplished 
in two stormy interviews. The Tsar was still hostile to the return of the 
Bourbons, particularly of Lewis XVIII himself, and talked of satis- 
fying his Allies by setting up the Duke of Orleans or another member 
of the younger branches of the Family. Castlereagh, in his efforts to 
convince the Tsar, went to the extreme limit of free speech permitted 
from a statesman to a Sovereign. It was the first of many such inter- 
views in the ensuing twelve months. He asked the Tsar how long 
he would keep his troops in France to support a new Sovereign on 
the Throne, after the Allies had refused to make a peace on their own 
terms with Bonaparte. Alexander remained obdurate. He attempted 
to refute Castlereagh by producing a despatch from Lieven of January 
26th, which declared that the Prince Regent and Liverpool wished 
Napoleon to be dethroned and the Bourbons substituted. Castle- 
reagh replied that he was bound by his Instructions, and denied the 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, February 6th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 2; British 
Diplomacy, p. 147. 

2 Fournier, Congress von Chatillon, pp. 313, 372. 



440 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

Tsar's right to question them 1 . He was very indignant at this attempt 
to undermine his authority, and the incident was perhaps a turning- 
point in his relations with the Tsar. For several days, the issue hung 
in the balance. But, in the Council of Ministers, where each Power 
replied in turn to a series of queries drawn up by Metternich, both 
Hardenberg and Castlereagh supported, in the main, the Austrian 
point of view, and Nesselrode was at heart of their opinion. A com- 
promise was at last effected, in which Metternich obtained most of 
what he wanted, though not before he had secretly threatened to 
make a separate peace with Napoleon. He had to submit to a refusal 
of the armistice which Caulaincourt had offered, for on this point 
Castlereagh was strongly against him ; but Alexander had to consent 
that the negotiations at Chatillon should be renewed, and circum- 
stances soon made it clear that the march to Paris was out of the 
question. The Tsar's design had, however, caused a Convention to 
be drawn up by the three Continental Powers, as to the mode of 
occupation of the city. Castlereagh refused to sign this document, 
though he approved its contents, since he thought it advisable not to 
associate himself unnecessarily "in delicate questions relating to the 
interior of France 2 ." 

A new and more detailed document was, also, drawn up to be sub- 
mitted to Caulaincourt. To effect this, Castlereagh had to make con- 
cessions. He now, for the first time, named the Colonies which he was 
prepared to give back to France, subsequently explaining to his Cabinet 
that, " as this is a document upon which, if the negotiation breaks off, 
the appeal [i.e. to public opinion] will be made, I thought it expedient 
to put the British terms forward in a liberal shape." The only French 
Colonies reserved, therefore, were Les Saintes, Tobago, Mauritius and 
Bourbon, and the French were to be allowed to have commercial settle- 
ments on the coast of India. In return, the limits of France were now 
expressly laid down as those of 1792, and, further, Castlereagh was 
allowed to add a clause stipulating that the Slave-trade should be 
abolished in all the Colonies so restored. But he had entirely failed 
to obtain his second point — an amicable arrangement among the 
Allies themselves, which he stipulated as necessary before he signed 
away the Colonies. On the contrary, Austria and Russia were more 
openly at variance than ever, and, in these circumstances, Castlereagh 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, February 16th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 2; British 
Diplomacy, p. 147. 

2 Ibid. 



CONFERENCES AT CHATILLON 441 

could do little either to bring his Allies to an agreement or to complete 
his project of a permanent Alliance. 

But it was the question of the dynasty that had caused the greatest 
alarm, and Castlereagh took immediate steps to deal with it. He sent 
Robinson home to prevent any repetition of Lieven's intrigues, and 
naturally obtained Liverpool's full support. In spite of the opposition 
of one or two members of the Cabinet, a definite Instruction was sent 
to Castlereagh, that peace might be concluded with Napoleon if he 
accepted the Allied terms. At the same time, the Cabinet could not be 
deaf to the growing insistence of public opinion in England on the de- 
thronement of Bonaparte. The Times and other papers were now 
vehement against him, and it was obvious that a peace with him, 
however satisfactory the terms, would be very unpopular. The 
Cabinet, therefore, urged that, if the terms were not at once accepted, 
an appeal should be made to the French nation to get rid of their 
ruler, and that, without attempting to prescribe to them their new 
sovereign, it should be suggested to them that only the Bourbons 
could bring them peace 1 . 

Castlereagh returned to Chatillon on February 16th, and the new 
projet was handed to Caulaincourt on the 17th. But, while these dis- 
cussions had been in progress, the military situation had entirely 
changed ; and, indeed, this had been one of the factors which had at 
last produced agreement. Napoleon had thoroughly beaten Bliicher's 
troops in a series of battles in February, and then, turning on Schwar- 
zenberg's army, had forced it to retreat in disorder. Thus it was now 
Caulaincourt and not the Allies who delayed ; for Napoleon had with- 
drawn the permission to accept the terms previously given to his 
Envoy, who could now do nothing but refer to his master for new 
Instructions. Meanwhile, at the Allied headquarters, something like 
panic reigned, and the decision was taken to ask for an armistice. 
When this news reached Chatillon in a letter from Metternich, urging 
the necessity of expediting peace, Castlereagh immediately replied in 
an indignant letter, and entreated the Allies in passionate words not 
"to descend from the substance of your peace 2 ." The letter betrays 
the emotion he felt; and, full of anxiety, he returned to headquarters, 
which had now retired to Bar-sur-Aube, so soon as the negotiations 
at Chatillon had been suspended. There, he found the greatest des- 

1 Bathurst to Castlereagh, February 27th, 1814. F.O. Continent. Archives, 2; 
British Diplomacy, p. 161. 

2 Castlereagh to Metternich, February 18th, 1814. F.O. Continent. Archives, 2; 
British Diplomacy, p. 158. 



442 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

pondency. It was Alexander who had given the orders as to the 
armistice offer, and he was now almost as urgent for peace as Austria. 
The soldiers and diplomatists of both Powers were full of bitter re- 
criminations. Each suspected the other of saving its army, while the 
threatened appearance of Czartoryski and Radziwill at Alexander's 
side renewed all Metternich's apprehensions about Poland. Castle- 
reagh 's patience was almost worn out. The Allies, by their previous 
hesitation, had let slip the opportunity of signing a peace on the basis 
of the old limits, and now they appeared to be ready to grant any con- 
cessions. "Nothing keeps either Power firm," he wrote, "but the 
consciousness that without Great Britain the peace cannot be made 1 ." 
His own position, however, he made quite clear. He would refuse to 
conclude any peace except that which had been agreed on at Troyes, 
and, since it was unlikely that Napoleon would sign without assurances 
from Great Britain as to the Colonies, without Castlereagh peace 
could not be made. By this means, with some assistance from the 
Prussians, he succeeded in reestablishing confidence. At the same 
time, he played an important part in the military councils of the 
Allies, where some timid spirits were already pressing for a retreat 
to the Rhine. It was urgent to reinforce Bliicher's beaten army, 
against which Napoleon had once more turned after driving back 
Schwarzenberg. The only means of obtaining these troops was to 
detach from Bernadotte's command the corps of Biilow and Wintzin- 
gerode, which were now advancing from the Belgian frontier. When 
the Allies hesitated lest such a step should offend Bernadotte, Castle- 
reagh insisted that the order should be sent, and took upon himself 
the responsibility of soothing the Crown-prince. These troops reached 
Blucher just in time to save him at the battle of Laon, and Napoleon's 
failure in that battle marked the beginning of the end 2 . 

For the moment, the situation was saved. Instructions were sent 
to Chatillon to demand a definite answer within a reasonable time 
from Caulaincourt to the projei previously given him, and, urged by 
Castlereagh, Metternich sent a sufficiently warlike reply from the 
Emperor of Austria to a letter recently addressed to his father-in -law by 
Napoleon. Castlereagh did not return to Chatillon. The negotiations 
there now depended more on the firmness of headquarters and their 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, February 26th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 3; British 
Diplomacy, p. 160. 

2 Cf. the Earl of Ripon's account, Castlereagh Correspondence, 1. 129. Bernadotte 
was conciliated by being given nominal command of all the troops besieging the 
French fortresses. 



TREATY OF CHAUMONT 443 

military and political energy than on what was said to Caulaincourt, 
and, above all, Castlereagh was anxious to use the financial necessities 
of his Allies to construct the Treaty of Alliance which recent events 
showed to be so urgently needed. He had kept this project in view, 
ever since he had joined the Allied Ministers. But the successive 
crises prevented him from doing more than discuss the question in- 
formally with his colleagues, as opportunity offered. So early as the 
middle of February, he had prepared a project of a Treaty based on 
his Instructions, and had secured the general approval of the Ministers 
of the three Powers. Even Alexander now gave his consent to the 
Treaty, stating that the restriction of the casus foederis to the European 
dominions of the Powers had removed his principal objection. The 
real motive of the Allies was, however, their anxiety to obtain Sub- 
sidies for the campaign ; for Castlereagh refused to sign any Treaty 
on this subject, unless the larger question of the Alliance was likewise 
included. He had thus been forced to abandon the position which he 
had taken up in December, when approached by Lieven. This was, 
however, only a minor matter. Far more serious was it, that he had, 
also, to abandon his plan of making the Treaty contribute to the 
settlement of the outstanding questions between the Allies. His first 
weapon, the Colonial conquests, he was obliged to abandon, in order 
to obtain a suitable offer to Caulaincourt. Now, he had to promise the 
Subsidies without achieving his purpose. The truth was gradually 
becoming manifest, that the Allies were so divided as to render any 
result hopeless until after a long series of discussions. Castlereagh 
had, therefore, to be content with merely including in the Treaty the 
Articles already- delivered to Caulaincourt at Chatillon, which, al- 
though they provided specifically for Holland, contained only vague 
references to the future of Germany, and made no mention of Poland 
or Saxony. 

The Treaty of Alliance had a double object. First, to provide 
the means for ending the War then in progress. For this purpose, 
each Power agreed to keep 150,000 men in the field. The share 
of Great Britain was, however, a double one. For she not only bound 
herself to subsidise the armies of the other three Powers with five 
millions per annum, but she, also, agreed to provide 150,000 men 
herself. She was allowed, indeed, to employ the troops of the smaller 
Powers in the army for which she was responsible, and, as Castlereagh 
pointed out, the three other Powers had to raise considerably more than 
150,000 men, for the Subsidies were based on the active strength of 



444 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

the troops. Still, even Castlereagh felt it was a bold offer on the part 
of Great Britain, which had scarcely been considered a great military 
Power. But since the Allies pressed him, he felt that Wellington's 
successes had justified him in accepting the challenge, and he was 
convinced that, if his country wished to have real influence on the 
Continent, she must be ready to assume military as well as naval 
responsibilities. "There can be no reason," he wrote, "why Great 
Britain should not assume that station in Europe as one of the great 
military powers which the exploits of her armies and the scale of her 
resources have so justly entitled her to claim 1 "; and, in a private 
letter, " My modesty would have prevented me from offering it; but, 
as they choose to make us a military power, I was determined not to 
play second fiddle 2 ." 

This agreement, which contained the usual clauses not to make 
peace except in common, was, however, only a continuation of the 
usual Subsidy engagements. The novel part of the Treaty, which was 
entirely due to Castlereagh, was to provide for the continuance of 
the Alliance in peacetime. In order that the Peace, when won, might 
be guaranteed, the Four Powers bound themselves to protect one 
another against France for a period of twenty years — but, in this case, 
the stipulated force was to be only 60,000 men. This is the origin of 
the Quadruple Alliance, which after some vicissitudes was to be re- 
vived again at Vienna and at Paris. It was Castlereagh 's great scheme 
for preserving Europe from a repetition of the evils of the last twenty 
years. There can be no doubt that, if he had been able, he would 
have phrased it differently, and made it an Alliance, not merely 
against France, but against whatever Power broke the Peace. But, 
after all, it was France which, in the eyes of British statesmen, was 
most likely to cause a war in the future, and the equilibrium which the 
Treaty was to ensure was mainly to be obtained by balancing the rest 
of Europe against France. At least, so Castlereagh thought at the 
moment. He reserved the wider guarantee foreshadowed in Pitt's 
despatch of 1805, until the Allies should have settled their disputes. 
For it was not possible to broaden the scope of the Treaty, so long as 
it was uncertain what shape the New Europe would assume. 

The Treaty was signed only by the Four Great Powers. Even 
Sweden was only asked to accede, and it marks the beginning of that 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March ioth, 1814. F.O. Continent. Archives, 3; 
British Diplomacy, p. 165. 

- Castlereagh to Hamilton, March ioth, 1814. Castlereagh Correspondence, IX. 
335- 



TREATY OF CHAUMONT 445 

formal ascendancy of the Great Powers which was to be the charac- 
teristic of the nineteenth century. Spain, Portugal and Holland were 
also to be invited to place themselves under the protection of the 
Treaty, the minor German Powers not being included, because it 
was possible that they would shortly be welded together in a Federa- 
tion which would be able to act for them all. 

Castlereagh had thus accomplished only a part of the task which 
he had set himself, when he took his departure for the Continent. The 
Powers had shown themselves so undecided in their attitude towards 
the enemy, and so jealous of each other's claims, that no other course 
was possible. The European settlement had perforce to be left in a 
condition of uncertainty. But security against France, at least, had 
been won, and, with Napoleon still in the field, this had to override 
all other considerations. Even as it is, the Treaty, which was accepted 
by the Cabinet without alteration, and greeted with a chorus of 
praise by Castlereagh 's subordinates, who knew how difficult the task 
had been, remains as, perhaps, his greatest achievement. At any rate, 
it symbolised the fact that, but for his intervention in 18 14, the 
Coalition against France would almost certainly have been forced by 
its own dissensions to make a peace which, sooner or later, would have 
left Europe again at the mercy of Napoleon. 

The Treaty of Chaumont, though dated March 1st, was not 
signed till March 9th, by which date the time limit for Caulaincourt's 
reply to the ultimatum of February 28th, had expired. During that 
period, Napoleon almost crushed Bliicher's armies, but was foiled 
at Laon (March 9th) in a repulse which was equivalent to a heavy 
defeat; for Bliicher, now reinforced by Billow's and Wintzingerode's 
corps, was quite able to resume the offensive. But, in the meantime, 
Napoleon had entertained high hopes, and, up to March 9th, had sent 
no answer to Caulaincourt. The interval at Chatillon was passed in 
disputes as to the phrasing of the Protocol ; but the information that 
reached the Plenipotentiaries made Caulaincourt even more anxious 
for peace — if this had been possible. Schwarzenberg's army won 
some minor successes, and from the south came the news (by way of 
London), that Wellington had resumed the offensive, defeated Soult 
at Orthez (February 27th) and was marching on Toulouse. On 
March 10th Caulaincourt sent an answer on his own initiative which 
evaded the direct question. Still, the Allied Plenipotentiaries did not 
break off negotiations, but referred the answer to headquarters; so 
that, as Stadion pointed out to Metternich, it was still possible to 



446 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

prolong the discussion almost indefinitely if he wished. Caulaincourt 
explored every possible channel, especially in the direction of Austria, 
by which he might obtain concessions, and thus perhaps secure a peace 
which his master would sign. But the Chaumont Treaty had been 
concluded, and the reply that came back from headquarters was an 
order to enforce the ultimatum. Even then, so anxious was each side 
to throw on the other the odium of refusing peace, that the rupture 
did not ensue till March 19th. The Declaration to the People of 
France, which made Napoleon responsible for the miseries the War 
was inflicting upon them, had been drawn up long before at head- 
quarters, not without considerable discussion; but it was not issued 
till March 25th, owing to the necessity of obtaining the Tsar's express 
approval before it was published. 

By this time, however, the last act of the drama had begun. The 
Emperor, after the bloody battles of Craonne and Laon, which at 
least gave him a few days breathing space, turned once more against 
Schwarzenberg's army. Even now, he had no intention of sending to 
Caulaincourt the word that could alone bring peace. Checked at 
Arcis-sur-Aube, he formed the idea, which had long been in his mind, 
of throwing himself on the Allied line of communications, relieving his 
besieged fortresses in the east, joining forces with Augereau and com- 
pelling his enemies to retreat, in order to escape destruction. But, 
before this audacious plan could be put into operation, the Allied 
armies had reached his capital and made it certain that he would lose, 
not only the campaign, but his Throne. 

The series of events that led to the Restoration of the Bourbons 
are intricate and obscure. As has been seen, Castlereagh had through- 
out the negotiations with Napoleon insisted that the Allies were bound 
to conclude peace with him, if he would agree to it. But he made it 
clear that, if another dynasty was to take the place of Napoleon, it 
could only be the Bourbons. The British Cabinet was, from the first, 
by no means united as to the possibility of making peace with Napo- 
leon. Harrowby and Eldon, and even Bathurst, were, as early as 
January , against such a conclusion. Sidmouth and Vansittart supported 
Liverpool in backing up Castlereagh's policy ; but the Prime Minister 
found increasing difficulty in making head against the strong pre- 
dilection of the Prince Regent, which Miinster's despatches must have 
intensified, and the ever increasing clamour of the Press. The 
Marquis Wellesley had also expressed himself strongly on the Bourbon 
side, and was reported to be gaining in favour with the Prince; and, 



BRITISH POLICY AND THE BOURBONS 447 

deprived of Castlereagh's assistance, the Ministry was losing ground 
everywhere 1 . 

On March 19th, the news of the prolongation of the Chatillon 
Conference caused the Cabinet to send a strong protest to Castle- 
reagh, who was ordered to inform the Allies that, unless the negotia- 
tions were brought to a speedy close, the British offers as to the 
Colonial conquests would be withdrawn 2 . At last, when the news 
came that Bordeaux had declared for the Bourbons, the firmness of 
the Cabinet broke down. On March 22nd, Instructions were sent to 
Castlereagh that no peace must be signed with Bonaparte 3 ; he was 
also told that, if one had already been signed, it would not be ratified 
until the Cabinet were convinced that the Emperor still possessed the 
allegiance of the French people. Neither of these Instructions, how- 
ever, had any influence on the course of events. Before they reached 
their destination, the wishes of the Cabinet had already been ful- 
filled. 

Throughout the campaign in the north, no signs had been given 
by the French people that they wished for the return of the Bourbons. 
Monsieur (Charles X) had taken up residence at Vesoul; but his 
emissaries had exercised no effect. On the contrary, the exasperation 
of the French peasants at the brutality of the Allied troops had, as 
Castlereagh noted, made them look to Bonaparte once more as a pro- 
tector. In the south, however, where Wellington's army paid for all 
it took, and where plundering was repressed by an iron discipline, 
the people showed a very different spirit. To the south the Due 
d'Angouleme had been allowed to proceed ; but Wellington, though 
he was desirous of his success, gave him no open countenance. The 
Bourbon Prince was, however, able to get in touch with his supporters, 
much more numerous in the south, and, on March 12th, Bordeaux 
raised the white flag. Though an intrigue of an emissary of Bernadotte's 
confused the issue for a moment, this example was soon followed by 
other towns. 

The real intrigue, however, took place in the north. Throughout 
the negotiations with Napoleon, the conduct of the Allies was 
studiously correct. Alexander indeed, as has been seen, had no desire 
to help the Bourbons, and Metternich,to the last possible moment, pre- 

1 See C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 28. 

2 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 19th, 18 14. F.O. Continent. 1; British 
Diplomacy, p. 166. 

3 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd, 1814. F.O. Continent. 1 ; British Diplo- 
macy, p. 171. 



448 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

ferred a peace with his Emperor's son-in-law. But, once the Chatillon 
Conference was broken up, events moved quickly. Metternich had 
now to guard against what action Alexander might take if he found 
himself at Paris with a free hand. The Bourbon cause had there been 
slowly winning adherents, and Talleyrand, with Dalberg and others, 
were preparing the ground. No communication, however, as Castle- 
reagh reported with surprise to the Cabinet, had been entered into 
with the Allies until the middle of March. Yet Baron Vitrolles, 
who then appeared at headquarters, was not received by the Allied 
Ministers, until the rupture with Napoleon was announced. Then, 
under Metternich's presidency, a formal meeting was held, and it was 
determined to support the Bourbon cause. The Bourbons were 
promised by the Continental Powers the immediate administration 
of any districts that declared in their favour. Castlereagh, for his 
part, offered funds, which, however, he wished to furnish through his 
Allies, "as not only the most prudential in a financial point of view, 
as rendering the expense definite on our part, but as relieving the 
question of much of the political difficulty, which must always attend, 
in a Government like ours, the voting a sum of money for effectuating 
a change in the Government of France." In fact, Castlereagh, while 
now determined to bring the Bourbons back, was anxious to take no 
step which would enable the Opposition to accuse the Government of 
not allowing the French to choose their own Sovereign. In the same 
way, he hoped that events at Paris, towards which the Allied armies 
were now making progress, would be regulated by the Convention 
drawn up at Troyes, to which he had refused his signature, so as 
to effect "the object I have in view, which is, to bring Great 
Britain forward, in whatever may regard the interior of France, rather 
as the Ally and auxiliary of the continental powers than as charging 
herself in chief 1 ." 

Alexander's consent was assumed, but not obtained, to these nego- 
tiations ; for the Tsar was marching with the King of Prussia on Paris. 
Napoleon, on discovering their intentions, hesitated, and, before he 
could strike a blow, Marmont and Mortier had been defeated, and 
Paris capitulated. Castlereagh and Metternich, meanwhile, remained 
at Dijon with the Emperor of Austria, who, like Castlereagh, was 
anxious to avoid the final scene. There, on March 25th, the cause of 
the Bourbons was publicly toasted, Castlereagh joining in with the 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd, 1814. F.O. Continent. 3; British 
Diplomacy, p. 168. 



THE ALLIES AT PARIS. TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU 449 

rest, and an Austrian agent was despatched to Monsieur, to urge him 
to raise the country, when the Allies would support him. Metter- 
nich's messenger to Paris was captured ; but Castlereagh established 
communication by a letter to a friend in that city which brought a 
new agent to Dijon. When, therefore, on April 4th, Castlereagh and 
Metternich learnt that the Allies were in Paris, they knew that 
Talleyrand was assured of their support and that the Bourbon cause 
was in safe hands. Thus, though they were somewhat perturbed at 
the Tsar's pledge to guarantee a Constitution 1 , yet they were quite 
easy in their minds on the question of the dynasty, in spite of the fact 
that Alexander's declaration merely excluded Napoleon himself from 
the Throne. Bernadotte's intrigues with Joseph and others, which 
were known through intercepted letters, had quite put him out of 
court, and Nesselrode had secretly reassured his colleagues on this 
head. Alexander at Paris had thus no real alternative to the Bourbons. 
He was easily persuaded, therefore, by the ingenious Talleyrand to 
take the necessary steps for their recall in a manner which ensured 
some show of popular approval, and the entreaties of the Marshals 
and Caulaincourt for a Regency were of no avail. That the Tsar had 
found it necessary to support Lewis XVIII, whom he regarded as 
absolutely unfit for the Throne, was due to causes over which no states- 
man had any control. But the steps that Castlereagh and Metternich 
took in the last days of March certainly contributed much to the 
course of events, and, but for the British statesman's intervention, the 
differences between Austria and Russia might have led to serious 
results. Alexander, however, was able by his solitary action to secure a 
Constitution for the French people — a step of sound wisdom, on which 
he would certainly have found it difficult to insist, if Castlereagh and 
Metternich had been on the spot. For, as will appear, with all his 
desire for a peaceful and contented Europe, Castlereagh had no wish 
to help the cause of Constitutional liberty on the Continent. Nor was 
he, when he arrived on April 10th, satisfied with the Treaty of 
Fontainebleau, which Alexander was on the point of signing with the 
dethroned Emperor. To this Treaty, which guaranteed the Emperor 
the full sovereignty of Elba, recognised his titles, assigned the duchies 
of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla to the Empress, with succession 
to her son, and made ample financial provision for Napoleon and all 
his family, Castlereagh raised many objections; but he was persuaded 
by Talleyrand that the situation made its acceptance inevitable. He 
1 "Without knowing what it is," reported Castlereagh. 
w.&g.i. 29 



45Q THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

refused, however, to sign it, and only acceded to it so far as the 
territorial arrangements were concerned. Thus, Great Britain per- 
sisted to the end in refusing to recognise the Imperial title, and 
Napoleon remained, for her, "General Bonaparte" to the end of the 
chapter. 

Like some others, Castlereagh was not happy at the choice of 
Elba; but no other less objectionable alternative could be found. "I 
did not feel," he wrote to his Cabinet, "that I could encourage the 
alternative which Caulaincourt assured me Bonaparte repeatedly men- 
tioned, namely, an asylum in England 1 ." 

The Treaty of Peace had now to be made with a Bourbon Govern- 
ment, and it was nearly two months before it was concluded. The 
necessity of consolidating the power of the new monarchy and arranging 
for the withdrawal of the Allied armies and the surrender of the 
French fortresses, occupied most of the month of April. The Treaty 
was, moreover, delayed by the attempt of Talleyrand to obtain for the 
Bourbons an extension of the frontiers of 1792, while the disposition 
of the conquered territories had still to be determined. These dis- 
cussions kept Castlereagh in Paris till the end of May, in spite of the 
desire of his Government that he should return to their assistance. 
He was occupied there, not merely with the Peace with France, but 
also with attempting to compose the differences between the Allies; 
while the War had left problems of importance all over Europe, in 
some of which, notably in those concerning Norway, Sicily, Spain 
and Holland, British interests were especially concerned. One of 
Castlereagh's first actions on arriving at Paris was to offer the post of 
Ambassador to Wellington, who accepted it with the same cheerful 
readiness to undertake any duty which he displayed throughout all 
these years. But Wellington could not come to Paris at this time; 
and, meanwhile, Castlereagh, with no one of high calibre to assist 
him, was unable to expedite matters, though he claimed to work as hard 
as it was possible for a man to do in a city like Paris. 

In the Peace with France, Castlereagh was prepared to make con- 
cessions to the new monarchy, provided that they did not interfere 
with his plans for the Netherlands. He urged his Cabinet to be as 
liberal on Colonial questions as possible. France, he pointed out, 
was weak, and any Colonies returned to her could be easily reduced 
if a new war broke out. He was prepared, therefore, to limit his 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Apri 13th, 1814. F.O. Continent. Archives, 4; 
British Diplomacy, p. 176. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS 451 

demands to Mauritius and Tobago, retaining also, of course, Malta 
and the Cape, and confining the French in India to commercial 
occupation. He thus abandoned Les Saintes, but after pressure from 
the Admiralty added St Lucia in its place. He was even more anxious 
not to annex Dutch Colonies. "lam sure our reputation on the Con- 
tinent," he wrote to Liverpool, "as a feature of strength, power and 
confidence, is of more real moment to us than an acquisition thus 
made 1 ." Castlereagh was, therefore, all the more indignant when he 
found that in his Counter-project delivered in the middle of May 
(which was shown to him unofficially before presentation), Talleyrand 
had refused to cede St Lucia and Tobago, demanded compensation 
for Mauritius and, worst of all, said nothing about the Slave-trade. 
His protests recalled Talleyrand to a sense of reality. But the most 
difficult question was the Slave-trade. Both Castlereagh and his 
Cabinet knew that it was necessary to satisfy public opinion in England 
on this point. The Abolitionists were well organised, and had cap- 
tured the imagination of the nation. From this time onwards, not 
merely the British Ministers, but the Allied Sovereigns, were im- 
portuned by letters, memoranda and appeals of all kinds, in order to 
carry through universal abolition. The French, perhaps naturally, 
suspected this zeal on the part of a nation that had only recently been 
converted to the Abolitionists' views. They hinted that the British 
statesmen were utilising public opinion to prevent the French Colonies 
from rivalling the British in prosperity. In this they erred, for there 
is not the slightest doubt that both the nation and Ministers were 
perfectly sincere on this question — a fact of which the sacrifices which 
they were prepared to make during the succeeding years are sufficient 
evidence. But Castlereagh recognised the difficulties of the case. 
"My feeling is," he wrote, "that on grounds of general policy we 
ought not to attempt to tie France too tight on this question. If we 
do, it will make the Abolition odious in France, and we shall be con- 
sidered as influenced by a secret view to prevent the revival of her 
colonial interests." He pressed, therefore, the advantage of concilia- 
ting French public opinion, rather than imposing by force concessions 
which France would do her best to defeat in practice 2 . 

Talleyrand, also, tried to obtain substantial concessions on the 
Netherlands frontier. This, again, Castlereagh peremptorily refused 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, April 19th, 1814. Castlereagh Correspondence, ix. 474. 

2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, May 19th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 4; British Diplu- 
?nacy, p. 183. 

29 — 2 



452 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

to allow, telling Talleyrand that, if he wished for a lasting peace, he 
must extinguish "in the minds of the army, this false notion of 
Flanders being necessary to France." It was only a threat to transfer 
the negotiations to London that produced a settlement by May 30th, 
thus saving a month's Subsidies to the Exchequer. 

In its final form, the Treaty gave Castlereagh almost everything 
that was essential to British interests. Her maritime position in the 
Mediterranean was secured by Malta and the protection of the long 
route to India by the Cape, Mauritius, St Lucia and Tobago. Holland 
was compensated for the cession of the Cape with two millions of 
money, which, however, she was to expend on constructing a " Barrier " 
against France. Holland's extension in the Netherlands was, also, 
especially mentioned in one of the Secret Articles of the Treaty ; for 
Castlereagh felt it of the first importance not to leave this point open 
until the Congress. The mouth of the Scheldt was thus placed in the 
hands of a Power which it was hoped would be sufficiently strong to 
protect Antwerp, and, moreover, would be closely united to Great 
Britain by the marriage between the Prince of Orange and Princess 
Charlotte, to which all the Powers had agreed. France had been 
reduced to the frontiers of 1792, with some small concessions at 
Landau and Saarlouis, and in Savoy. No indemnities had, however, 
been imposed; for Castlereagh, like the Russian and Austrian states- 
men, had declined to agree to Prussian demands on this point. This 
liberal concession, as well as the refusal to insist on the return of the 
art treasures accumulated at Paris, which had been either extorted by 
Treaty or frankly carried off as plunder, was due to the desire on the 
part of the Allies to be as lenient to the new Bourbon dynasty as 
possible. When the brutal exactions of France during the Napoleonic 
Wars are remembered, this decision deserves to rank as one of the 
most notable examples of political moderation in modern history. 
Alexander and Castlereagh were the main instruments in bringing 
it about, but the final word lay with the British, who saw France left 
without a National Debt, while their own had mounted to over seven 
hundred millions in the effort to overthrow her domination of Europe. 
It must be remembered also that the Subsidies had been given, not 
lent, and, save for a small loan to Austria which dated from 1796 
and one or two other small sums, Great Britain had nothing to recover 
from her Allies in mitigation of her huge debt, which was causing 
her the most serious anxiety. 

From Castlereagh's point of view, the settlement was, however, 



CASTLEREAGH AND THE PEACE OF PARIS 453 

marred by the failure once again to determine the reconstruction of 
Europe. At the opening of the negotiations, he had the idea of settling 
with France quickly and then completing the European arrangements 
in London. But, as he reported on May 5th, "the desire felt by 
Prussia and Austria to bring both Russia and France to some under- 
standing upon the main principles of the Continental arrangements, 
in a secret article or otherwise, previously to our stipulating away 
our conquests, had led to a very tedious and elaborate examination 
of this very complicated question 1 ." Of the precise part played by 
Castlereagh in these discussions there is no complete record, for he 
wrote very little to his Cabinet about it. But Miinster's despatches 
and other evidence leave no doubt that he took a strong line on the 
Polish question, even at Paris. His support was given wholly to 
Austria in refusing Alexander's demands, which included Cracow 
and Thorn, and he began the policy, which he was to follow at the 
Congress of Vienna, of trying to unite Austria and Prussia against the 
Tsar by securing Austria's consent to the annexation of the whole 
of Saxony to Prussia. In other German questions, and especially in 
the form to be taken by the Federation, he showed less interest, 
leaving them to Miinster, unless some vital point arose. Though great 
efforts were made to settle all these questions, they were without 
avail, and the only express stipulations which the Treaty with France 
contained, besides the settlement of the Netherlands frontier, were 
the extension of the Austrian possessions to the Mincio, and the 
incorporation of Genoa in Sardinia. As to the rest, they were to be 
settled at a Congress to be held at Vienna in August, to which all 
the Powers of Europe, great or small, who had taken part in the War 
were to be invited. The Allied Powers, however, by a Secret Clause, 
reserved to themselves the right to determine the disposition of the 
conquered territories, and bound France to agree to their decisions. 
The Tsar and the King of Prussia, with Metternich and the other 
principal statesmen, had accepted the Prince Regent's invitation 
to London. Castlereagh and Metternich, therefore, hoped that all 
matters could be settled there, where the Poles would have less 
influence than at Paris. No one, at this time, regarded the coming 
Congress as anything more than an opportunity for communicating 
the decisions of the Great Powers to the rest of Europe and for ad- 
justing minor points. They could not foresee that their discussions 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, May 5th, 1814. F.O. Continent Archives, 4; 
British Diplomacy, p. 180. 



454 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

would bring Europe to the verge of war, and that over twelve months 
would be required before a final settlement could be effected. 

These difficulties, in any case, did not loom large in the eyes of 
the British people, who cared little for the rest of the Continental 
settlement, if France was rendered impotent. The absence of vindictive 
conditions in the Treaty, such as France had inflicted so often on other 
countries, indeed, caused a great deal of discontent. "No Murders, 
No Torture, No Conflagration, — how ill the pretty Women of London 
bear it?" 1 wrote Whitbread; but he was himself delighted with the 
Treaty and honestly said so. 

Castlereagh's return was something of a triumph, and the House 
of Commons rose to receive him when he entered it. The Treaty was 
approved without a division. Castlereagh's most serious difficulties, 
indeed, were in connexion with the events subsidiary to the settlement, 
some of which met with considerable criticism both in the House and 
at the Court. In the first place, the Norwegians, though their country 
had been ceded to Bernadotte by Denmark in the Treaty of Kiel in 
January, refused to submit and organised a national resistance. Dis- 
gusted as the Allies were with Bernadotte 's conduct in 1814, they could 
not see their way to breaking with him completely. Thus Great Britain, 
in compliance with her Treaty engagements, was forced to assist in 
the subjection of Norway by a naval blockade — an odious necessity 
which Ministers had to defend against hot attacks from the Opposi- 
tion. Spanish questions, also, caused great difficulty. Ferdinand, on 
his restoration, had straightway abolished the Spanish Cortes and 
returned to the ideals of the Middle Ages. The British had to see 
patriots with whom they had fought against Napoleon subjected to 
imprisonment and persecution. The abolition of the impracticable 
Constitution of 1812 caused little uneasiness to Castlereagh; but he 
protested vigorously, though without avail, against Ferdinand's in- 
creasing tyranny. The question of the Spanish Colonies was also a 
difficult one, in which we had a great interest, for our trade with them 
was growing by leaps and bounds. Nevertheless, the Treaty signed 
with Spain contained a clause binding Great Britain to strict neutrality 
in the struggle between Spain and her over-seas possessions. In the 
same Instrument, however, there was secured a stipulation which, like 
the " Barrier," went back to the 18th century ; for, by a Secret Article, 
Ferdinand engaged not to renew the "Family Compact." 

Most difficult of all the questions with which Castlereagh had to 

1 Creevy Papers, I. 191. 



LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 455 

deal was the situation in Italy, where an extraordinary situation had 
arisen during the spring campaign, which had already caused him 
much uneasiness, and was to lead to much equivocal diplomacy before 
it was finally settled. Fortified by Aberdeen's consent, Metternich 
had hastened to conclude a treaty with Murat so early as January 3rd, 
18 14. It was urgently needed, if Austrian arms were to be imme- 
diately successful in Italy. For the Viceroy, with his small army of 
conscripts, successfully withstood all the attacks of Bellegarde's much 
larger forces. Murat was, therefore, not only recognised as King of 
Naples, but was promised some increase of territory and Austria's 
good offices to obtain his recognition by Great Britain and Austria's 
other Allies, as well as by the Sicilian Bourbons, who were to be given 
compensation elsewhere. But Murat was threatened from the south 
by the Anglo- Sicilian army of Bentinck, who was virtual Governor 
of the island, where he professed to cherish, as an instrument for the 
regeneration of the Italian people, the remarkable Constitution estab- 
lished by him in 181 2. 

Lord William Bentinck 1 is one of the most curious figures of this 
time. A military career of considerable success had made this in- 
transigeant Whig a Lieutenant- General at the age of 38 and the 
representative of a Tory Ministry in one of the most important posts 
in Europe. From Sicily, aided by sea power, Bentinck could strike a 
will at Spain or Naples, or further afield, if events proved propitious. 
To a man of his unmeasured ambition, masterful character and ultra- 
Whig views the temptations were immense. During the earlier part of 
the year 1813, he carried on in person tentative negotiations with 
Murat at Ponza, soon put aside to engage in a campaign in Catalonia 
which (at least not wholly by his fault) ended in failure. The close 
of the year found him back in Sicily, evolving great schemes for the 
liberation of the Italians by appealing to their sense of nationality, 
and endowing them with the institutions he had set up in Sicily. 
To these views, which, of course, were in direct opposition to those 
of his Government, he perhaps added others, even more extravagant, 
for the retention of Sicily as a British possession, and a model of 
Constitutional liberty to the oppressed Mediterranean peoples. Castle- 
reagh appears to have left hirn completely in the dark as to the 
Instructions which he had given to Aberdeen. He perhaps dis- 
trusted Bentinck's discretion. When, therefore, the latter received 
from Aberdeen Instructions to support Neipperg and Mier, the 
Austrian Envoys at Naples, and to conclude a treaty with Murat 

1 See supra, p. 380. 



456 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

similar to that of Austria, he flatly refused. In spite of the vehement 
entreaties of the Austrians, he refused all cooperation with Murat, 
and it was only on February 3rd that he concluded an Armistice, 
which entirely ignored political considerations and merely suspended 
hostilities between the two forces. In this, he was only acting pru- 
dently, for he could not accept Instructions from Aberdeen on so 
vital a point 1 . For his later conduct there can, however, be no excuse. 
He had his own plans for the Italian campaign, and absolutely refused 
to subordinate them to the necessities of the situation. On March 8th, 
he landed at Leghorn, but, instead of cooperating with Murat, he 
began an embittered controversy as to the control of Tuscany, which 
provided the King of Naples with an excellent pretext for not 
attacking the Viceroy and carrying out his obligations under the 
Austrian Treaty. The Hereditary Prince was allowed to address a 
proclamation to the Anglo- Sicilian army, which denounced Murat as 
a usurper. Even Sir Robert Wilson, Bentinck's fellow Whig, could 
find no excuses for this strange conduct, which is only to be explained 
by Bentinck's personal dislike of Murat and his rage at the complete 
overthrow of the plans that had long been fermenting in his own 
brain. 

Meanwhile, Castlereagh and Metternich, engaged in the final 
struggle against Napoleon, had had scant leisure to deal with the 
Italian deadlock. Complaints against Bentinck, however, began to 
pour in at headquarters, and Castlereagh at last awoke to the situa- 
tion. He approved Bentinck's conduct in merely signing an armistice ; 
for, as has been seen, the offer to Murat had never been really to his 
liking, and Aberdeen had committed himself far too rashly. Metter- 
nich himself was dissatisfied with the Treaty, and made some altera- 
tions in its language. Castlereagh, however, had no alternative but to 
accept the situation, and he admitted that, at the moment when the 
Treaty was made, "it was both wise and necessary," while at the 
same time he urged a full indemnity for Ferdinand. On February 21st, 
he wrote to Bentinck that "The British Government are perfectly 
ready to act up to the spirit of the Austrian Treaty and to acknowledge 
Murat upon a peace upon two conditions: 1st That he exerts himself 
honourably in the war ; and 2nd that a reasonable indemnity (it cannot 
be an equivalent) is found for the King of Sicily." When it gradually 
became clear that no headway was being made in Italy, Castlereagh 

1 See R. M. Johnston's article "Lord William Bentinck and Murat," in The 
English Historical Review, April 1904. But while Mr Johnston successfully estab- 
lishes this point against M. Weil, he is in error in thinking that Aberdeen had no 
authority to sign. See above, p. 409. 



BENTINCK'S ACTION IN SICILY REPUDIATED 457 

grew all the more indignant. It was some time before he credited all 
the reports against Bentinck, and his just indignation was levied more 
against Murat himself and the Austrian Commander-in-Chief 1 . But, 
by the end of March, the situation had become clear, and Bentinck 
was severely reproved in letters which Castlereagh wrote to him on 
April 2nd, which he made all the more incisive, inasmuch as the 
Sicilian Court had communicated direct to London the insinuations 
which, they asserted, Bentinck had allowed himself as to Great 
Britain becoming Sovereign of Sicily — a subject on which he was 
ordered at once to enlighten them as to the true views of the 
British Government. Castlereagh had, in fact, now determined to get 
rid of Bentinck as soon as possible, and William A'Court, a shrewd 
and moderate diplomatist of the true Tory creed, was nominated as 
his substitute at Palermo, while Bentinck was told that he might take 
leave of absence as soon as convenient. Before he departed, however, 
Bentinck was to involve Castlereagh in further embarrassments. On 
April 26th he issued a proclamation which promised the Genoese 
their independence. Castlereagh had already agreed, as has been 
seen, to assign Genoa to Sardinia. He at once repudiated Bentinck's 
action, and to a deputation from Genoa and Lombardy who came to 
Paris to plead for independence he was inflexible. He listened patiently, 
but could only advise them to make the best of their new Sovereigns 2 . 
Bentinck's attempts to encourage Italian independence were all the 
more distasteful to Castlereagh, since it was associated with the idea 
of setting up new Constitutions in Italy on the model of that in Sicily, 
which in his opinion — and the facts bore him out— had been a com- 
plete failure. The experience of these doctrinaire Instruments, set up 
in Spain and Sicily, had, indeed, not been encouraging. That Castle- 
reagh had judged accurately the main cause of their impotence is seen 
by a letter to Henry Wellesley (afterwards Lord Cowley) on May 10th. 
I hope, if we are to encounter the hazards of a new constitutional 
experiment in Spain in addition to the many others now in progress in 
Europe, that the persons charged with the work will not fall into the 
inconceivable absurdity of banishing from the legislature the Ministers of 
the Crown ; to which error, more perhaps than any other, may be attributed 
the incapacity which has distinguished the march of every one of these 
systems which has placed the main authorities of the Constitution in 
hostility instead of alliance with each other 3 . 

1 Castlereagh to Bentinck, February 4th, 15th, 21st, 1814. Castlereagh Corres- 
pondence, ix. 235, 237, 286, 362. 

2 Hansard, xxx. 391. 

3 Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 26. 



458 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

To Bentinck he wrote even more strongly — perhaps more strongly 
than he felt, since it was necessary to put a stop to the policy which 
might ruin Castlereagh's schemes at Paris. 

" It is impossible not to perceive," he wrote on May 7th, " a great moral 
change coming on in Europe, and that the principles of freedom are in full 
operation. The danger is that the transition may be too sudden to ripen into 
anything likely to make the world better or happier. We have new 
Constitutions launched in France, Spain, Holland, and Sicily. Let us see 
the result before we encourage further attempts. The attempts maybe made 
and we must abide the consequences, but I am sure it is better to retard 
than accelerate the operation of this most hazardous principle which 
is abroad. 

"In Italy it is now the more necessary to abstain if we wish to act in 
concert with Austria and Sardinia. Whilst we had to drive the French out 
of Italy we were justified in running all risks ; and with a view to general 
peace and tranquillity, I should prefer seeing the Italians await the insensible 
influence of what is going on elsewhere, than hazard their own internal 
quiet by an effort at this moment 1 ." 

In this there is much truth, and the same common-sense is shown 
in Castlereagh's conversation with the Italians in Paris. But his hos- 
tility to Constitutional liberty was not merely one of form. On no 
single occasion in these years is Castlereagh found giving it any en- 
couragement or sacrificing to it the cardinal point of his policy ; union 
with Austria against Russia. His deliberate plan for perpetuating 
Austrian influence in the Peninsula he had inherited from Pitt, and 
he applied the prescription only too well when the opportunity came 2 . 
It was a fundamental part of his policy to the end of his career; and, 
indeed, it was, in a sense, part of the Tory creed until Italy won her 
independence. At the same time, it must be remembered that Castle- 
reagh's policy was itself a necessary element in the struggle against 
Napoleon, and that Bentinck's wild-cat schemes, which had little real 
support among the Italians themselves, would have only produced 
chaos and civil war — whereby ultimately the Coalition's main objects 
might have been lost. 

Bentinck had, however, saved Castlereagh from the recognition 
of Murat as King of Naples. It might, indeed, be claimed that Great 

1 Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 18. 

a There is, of course, no truth whatever in the story first put forward by Bianchi, 
that as early as July, 1813, Castlereagh had concluded a Secret Treaty with Metter- 
nich concerning Italy, the existence of which is based on a supposed letter from 
Metternich to Castlereagh, dated May 26th, 1814. Fournier and others have proved 
the impossibility of the document, which would refute itself, even if examination of 
the British and Austrian Archives had not shown it to be a forgery. 



PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS 459 

Britain was morally bound to support him; but, meanwhile, his 
relations to her were only defined by the Armistice. Castlereagh 
had thus, to some extent, a free hand, and already there were 
signs that the interests of the Sicilian Bourbons had not been for- 
gotten by the British Government. In June, the Duke of Orleans 
pleaded Ferdinand's cause at Paris and London, and the Prince 
Regent did not hesitate to promise him his support, while Liverpool 
did not conceal his hostility to Murat, and even Castlereagh, though 
cautiously, gave the Bourbons some hope 1 . This interview was, of 
course, a profound secret, but even publicly in the House Castlereagh 
had spoken of the Neapolitan Questionasnot yet decided 2 . Thegreatest 
obstacle was indeed the folly of Ferdinand himself. In July, Ben- 
tinck's last act had been to allow the King to resume power in Sicily, 
though he had carefully safeguarded the Constitution on which he 
had built such extravagant hopes. But it was not long before A'Court 
reported that King Ferdinand was breaking his promises, and, how- 
ever hostile to the Constitutional regime, the British Government 
could not immediately betray those whom they had put in power, and 
protected for so long. It remained to be seen whether Murat could 
utilise these difficulties, so as to win his recognition from the British 
Government at the coming Congress. Meanwhile, in the north of 
Italy Austrian influence was dominant and Lord Burghersh, who had 
been appointed British Minister to the Grand-duke of Tuscany, was 
well-fitted for cooperating with the Austrians, and for removing the 
ideas which Bentinck and Sir Robert Wilson had spread of Great 
Britain's interest in Constitutional liberty. 

III. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 
The numerous negotiations made imperative by the close of the 
War had not prevented the questions reserved for settlement at the 
coming Congress from being attentively considered. Castlereagh was, 
however, disappointed in his hope that affairs could be brought nearer 
to a solution during the visit of the Sovereigns and statesmen to 
England. On the main questions, indeed, no progress at all was made. 
The lavish and warm, if not very refined, hospitality offered to the Tsar 
and the King of Prussia took up most of their time. The four Ministers 
managed to meet for business; the stubbornness of the Russians, 
however, prevented anything being done, though a good deal of dis- 

1 Weil, Murat, I. 127 ff. 

2 Hansard, xxvm. 464. (In response to a remark of Canning's in favour of the 
Bourbons. Cf. Weil, op. cit. 1. 167.) 



460 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

cussion took place. Of the actual details of these discussions, little is 
known, except that a serious attempt was made to come to some agree- 
ment. It would appear that Castlereagh was anxious to avoid a 
rupture with the Tsar in London ; for Metternich complained of his 
lack of support to Austrian policy. Alexander, indeed, seemed to 
look beyond the Prince Regent and his Ministers for support. He had 
long been in touch with the Whigs through Sir Robert Wilson and 
others. Now, like his strange and unconventional sister Catharine, 
who had preceded him to England, the Tsar seemed to go out of his 
way to show marked attention to the Ministry's opponents. More than 
this, the Grand-duchess was with difficulty prevented from recogni- 
sing the unhappy wife of the Prince Regent, whose rupture with her 
husband was now complete. The Grand-duchess saw much of the 
Princess Charlotte, and to her influence and that of Princess Lieven was 
attributed the uncompromising refusal given to the suit of the Prince 
of Orange. The result was that Alexander mortally offended the 
Prince Regent, and made a very bad impression on his Ministers. 
The Cabinet as a whole, and particularly Liverpool, had been scarcely 
content with Castlereagh 's policy of support to Austria. A more 
diplomatic behaviour on the part of Alexander might have done much 
to smooth his path to his Polish Kingdom. But when Czartoryski 
and Radziwill were seen in close conference with the Whigs, the Tory 
Ministry naturally became suspicious. Alexander attributed his failure 
to the intrigues of Metternich and Count von Merveldt, the Austrian 
Ambassador, who doubtless let slip no opportunity of increasing these 
suspicions. But the Tsar had only himself to blame for conduct 
apparently dictated, partly by a personal dislike to the Prince Regent, 
which may perhaps be pardoned, and partly by a conviction that the 
unpopularity of the Prince and some of his Ministers with the London 
mob indicated that a change of Government would soon take place. 
The result was a capital blunder, which rendered of no avail later 
efforts on the part of Russia to influence the British Cabinet against 
Castlereagh. 

In these circumstances, the only decisions of importance to be 
recorded were the approval by the Allies of the Constitution of the 
new Netherlands kingdom, to which the Belgian Provinces were now 
provisionally assigned (though the frontiers of the new State with 
Germany still waited on other arrangements) and the signing of a 
Protocol, by which the Four Powers agreed to keep at least 75,000 
troops on a war footing until the Congress closed. It was, also, soon 



CASTLEREAGH AND TALLEYRAND 461 

found that the Congress could not meet in August, as had been in- 
tended. Castlereagh could not finish his parliamentary business in 
time, and the Tsar therefore insisted on a postponement to a still 
later date, in order that he might return to Russia. The opening was 
accordingly arranged for the beginning of October; but the four 
Ministers agreed to meet at an earlier date before the arrival of the 
Sovereigns, so that the procedure of the Congress might be arranged 
among themselves. P'or, although they had made no progress in their 
disputes, yet they were still firmly resolved not to allow the settlement 
to go out of their hands. 

The interval of July and August was spent by Castlereagh in 
winding up parliamentary affairs and in the transactions narrated at 
the close of our last section. But correspondence was also carried on 
between Castlereagh, Metternich and Hardenberg on the Polish- 
Saxon question. The former two Ministers endeavoured to convince 
Hardenberg, now that he was away from Russian influence, of the 
dangers of Alexander's Polish plans. Hardenberg's reply to Castle- 
reagh, which entered at length into all his plans for Germany, showed 
little sign of breaking with the Tsar, and displayed considerable 
jealousy and suspicion of both Austria and Bavaria. It was evident 
how difficult it would prove to persuade the German Powers to resist 
Alexander's Polish plans, which every intelligence from Petrograd 
and Warsaw showed to be more intently pursued than ever 1 . 

Castlereagh had also, throughout this period, been in close touch 
with Talleyrand. That experienced diplomatist, who was already en- 
gaged in planning the disruption of the Chaumont Alliance, was at 
the same time the Minister of a Bourbon King. The old French con- 
nexion with Poland did, indeed, pledge him to some exertion on her 
behalf; but his real interests, and those of Lewis XVIII, which he 
was forced to consider equally with those of France, lay elsewhere. 
To save Saxony from Prussia and drive Murat from Naples were the 
main objects for which he invented the doctrine of legitimacy, on 
which his famous Instructions were founded. Both Alexander and 
Metternich had made overtures at Paris, but it was to Great Britain 
that Talleyrand looked for support. When, therefore, Castlereagh 
gave him an opportunity by communicating the Convention of June 
29th with some courteous explanations, he made every endeavour to 
establish a connexion with him. Throughout July and August, he 

1 Castlereagh to Hardenberg, August 8th, 1814; Hardenberg to Castlereagh, 
May 27th, 1814. F.O. Continent. Archives, 20; British Diplomacy, p. 190. 



462 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

emphasised to Sir Charles Stuart, and later to Wellington, the coinci- 
dence of French and British interests and the necessity of the two 
"Constitutional" Powers of Europe acting together. To these over- 
tures Castlereagh replied by a cautious but unmistakable response. 
He made it clear that he had no intention of separating from his 
Allies ; but he encouraged Talleyrand to develop his views and pro- 
mised to visit Paris on his way to Vienna. His main object was to 
secure the support of Lewis XVIII and Talleyrand to his policy of 
resisting Alexander's Polish plans. This support was actually offered 
with an embarrassing readiness, and Castlereagh had to point out 
that "the Four" still intended to settle matters in accordance with 
the Secret Article of the Treaty of Paris. But he promised to do his 
best to harmonise the views of the Allies with those of the French 
Government, and, with this understanding, preceded Talleyrand to 
Vienna, where the Ministers of the Four Powers proposed by a pre- 
liminary discussion to settle the procedure and constitution of the 
Congress, before the representatives of the other States assembled 1 . 
Castlereagh arrived in Vienna on September 13th. Stewart and 
Cathcart accompanied him as Plenipotentiaries, and the former (now 
made a Baron in his own right) was Ambassador to the Austrian 
Court. Aberdeen had declined further employment, and it may be 
imagined that Castlereagh did not press him. In his stead, he brought 
the Earl of Clancarty, a member of the Ministry and recently, since 
the return of the Prince of Orange, British representative at the Hague, 
where he had already obtained a very commanding position. Stewart 
owed his position entirely to his brother's affection, and scarcely any- 
one approved of his appointment. He played a subordinate part, 
though his relations with the Prussian military chiefs were not without 
importance. His egregious vanity and love of display, which obtained 
for him the nickname of "Lord Pumpernickel," made him one of 
the standing jests of the Congress. Cathcart was far less in evidence, 
and was only nominated lest Alexander should be offended. It was 
on Clancarty alone that Castlereagh could rely for really hard work 
and business capacity. The stiffest of Tories, and not too subtle or 
quick-minded, he was a conscientious and consistent subordinate, 
who could be trusted to carry out his chief's ideas. Throughout, he 
did much valuable work, and, after Wellington left, he handled the 
complicated diplomacy connected with the closing of the Congress 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, September 3rd, 1S14. F.O. Continent. 7; British 
Diplomacy, p. 191. 



THE BRITISH STAFF AT VIENNA 463 

with considerable skill. Edward Cooke, a permanent official of great 
experience, was the principal member of Castlereagh's staff. He 
stood in the most confidential relations not only to Castlereagh but 
also to the Prime-Minister, with whom he corresponded in private 
letters which retailed much cynical gossip. The rest of the staff, 
besides Castlereagh's discreet Private Secretary, Planta, was com- 
posed of four young sprigs of the nobility and five commoners from 
the Foreign Office. Six of these remained during the whole period. 
Wellington brought over three more of them during his stay, and 
Clancarty two, and one other at the close. This small staff, which 
was overworked throughout the whole period, was one of the most 
zealous and discreet of those at Vienna. Lady Castlereagh accompanied 
her husband, and the conjugal bliss of the British Ambassador caused 
much amusement to Vienna society. The fourteen rooms taken in 
the Auge-Gottes were not sufficiently imposing for this establishment, 
which was removed to the Minoritenplatz. There, a grave and de- 
corous hospitality was dispensed by Lady Castlereagh, which the 
Viennese found extraordinarily dull. Many wits were inspired by 
the fact that she wore her husband's Garter as a hair ornament. 
Divine service was held every Sunday at Lord Stewart's residence 
for all the English in Vienna, and, in deference to their susceptibilities, 
the first performance of Beethoven's new concerto was postponed to 
a weekday. But, however deficient in some of the arts which charac- 
terised the Congress in general, Castlereagh's establishment was one of 
the most zealous and discreet, and the Secret Police entirely failed to 
penetrate its secrets 1 . 

From his Government at home Castlereagh only received a single 
definite official Instruction during the whole of his stay at Vienna ; and 
this he deliberately ignored. He reported to his colleagues, however, 
at fairly frequent intervals, and maintained with Liverpool a private 
correspondence of considerable length. The Prime-Minister conveyed 
to him the sense of the Cabinet on the large general questions which 
arose at Vienna, as well as the state of public opinion in England, and 
thus undoubtedly influenced him on certain points. But Vienna was 
too far away for much to be accomplished in this way. The despatches 
often took a fortnight to reach their destination, and, before they could 
be answered, events had changed. The Cabinet, in truth, displayed 
only a moderate interest in the settlement since the main points of 
British policy were already secured. It was essential, for the sake of 

1 See C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna. 



464 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

public opinion at home, that every effort should be made to secure the 
Abolition of the Slave-trade ; but in other matters it was not thought 
that Great Britain ought to play a very decided part. Events, however, 
forced Castleresgh's colleagues to pay more attention to questions of 
foreign policy than they wished. The Opposition, which under Whit- 
bread's influence had been studiously moderate during the crisis of 
1 8 14, saw in the embarrassing prolongation of the Congress a means 
of harassing the Ministry. The propaganda of Talleyrand and others 
had some effect in London. Thus Bragge, Bathurst, Robinson and 
Vansittart found themselves persistently attacked by Whitbread, Pon- 
sonby and others, especially on the questions of Genoa, Saxony and 
Naples ; and they found it exceedingly difficult to return convincing 
replies. They took refuge, for the most part, in an obstinate refusal to 
furnish any information whatever about the course of the negotiations, 
while Liverpool pressed Castlereagh to return as soon as possible to 
their assistance. Neither this nor the alarm produced by various de- 
velopments of the Saxon Question had, however, very much influence 
on the course of events at Vienna, where, from the first, Castlereagh 
took a prominent part in all the leading Questions, and whence he 
refused to return until all danger of a rupture was at an end. 

For Castlereagh had gone to the Congress, not only with fixed 
principles, but with a plan for carrying them out, and a conviction 
that upon his own efforts, more than upon anything else, depended 
the reconstruction of Europe. Unlike his colleagues, he regarded Great 
Britain as part of the Continent, and he saw clearly how difficult it 
would be for her to keep clear of any conflict, if a peaceful settlement 
was not obtainable. Thus, he was prepared to play his part in the 
forefront of the battle, not merely on such questions as the Nether- 
lands, in which all recognised that his country had a special interest, 
but in the more difficult and even more important, if more remote, 
disputes as to Poland and Saxony, on the solution of which the whole 
reconstruction of Central Europe depended. More clearly than any 
of his colleagues, he looked on the problem as a whole, and, con- 
tinuing the ideas put forward in Pitt's paper in 1805 1 , he wished to 
establish a Balance of Power in Europe, which should prevent any 
one State from threatening the rest. The First Peace of Paris had 
allayed for the moment the fear of France, to whose Government 
Castlereagh was already looking for assistance in the prosecution of 
his plans, and this fear was partly replaced by that of Russia, whose 

1 See above, p. 400. 



THE BALANCE OF POWER 465 

expansion had caused Pitt so much anxiety in the period immediately 
preceding the Revolution. It must also be allowed that, blind as he 
was to the importance of recognising national and Liberal forces, 
which he regarded as mere survivals of the dangerous influence of the 
French Revolution, yet he had ideals of a new system of government 
for Europe which might perchance prevent the recurrence of a period 
of warfare such as had been lately experienced. 

To produce a Balance of Power — the "just equilibrium," as it is 
so often called in despatches and documents of this period — Castle- 
reagh endeavoured to strengthen by all the means at his disposal the 
two principal States of the Centre. During the Napoleonic period, 
Austria, and even more completely Prussia, had been reduced in 
extent, while not only France but also Russia had secured great 
acquisitions of territory. France had now been driven back to her old 
frontiers, though it was thought that she might again become dan- 
gerous to the liberties of the small States which fringed them. 
Russia had obtained Finland, a large portion of Polish territory and 
acquisitions in the south, particularly Bessarabia, and she was now 
aiming at absorbing (though under a separate Constitution) almost 
the whole of Poland. To protect Europe against both French and 
Russian preponderance, it was imperative that the Centre should be 
made sufficiently strong to resist them. Castlereagh perceived that 
this object could not be obtained merely by a territorial redistribution, 
but necessitated the establishment of cordial relations between Prussia 
and Austria, and an amicable settlement of the disputes still dividing 
them. By helping forward such an agreement, he hoped to produce 
a combination which would prevent the Tsar from carrying out his 
Polish plans. A strong Federal Germany would also be the natural 
result of the union of the two Powers, and an impenetrable barrier 
might thus be erected both on the Rhine and the Vistula. As for 
Italy, he had long regarded that peninsula as the natural sphere of 
Austrian influence. The domination of Austria would prevent that 
of France, which might threaten British sea-power in the Mediter- 
ranean, and it has been seen that, so early as August 181 3, he found 
it necessary to encourage Austrian expansion in this direction, with a 
view to preventing her from looking for compensation at the expense 
of the Turkish Empire. 

Such principles were, no doubt, laid down in the Instructions which 
he, apparently, took with him, but which unfortunately have not been 
preserved. At any rate, they were the principles on which he founded 

w. &g. 1. 30 



466 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

his reports to his timid and reluctant Cabinet in the course of his 
stay at Vienna. No doubt, also, there were added covering phrases 
as to the advantages of the restoration of a completely independent 
Poland, if circumstances permitted. But Castlereagh had no illusions 
on this subject. He knew that the three Eastern Powers would never 
consent to give up their spoils, and, though he was careful to make, 
at the outset, and subsequently as the occasion required, official 
representations as to the desire of his Cabinet for the reestablishment 
of Polish Independence, such declarations were merely intended to 
safeguard his Government against possible attacks in Parliament. 
For, from so early a date as February 18 14, Castlereagh had announced 
to the Austrian statesmen that he would not tolerate any separate 
Polish Kingdom, whether openly declared or created in some in- 
direct manner, and since then all his efforts had been directed to 
combining Prussia and Austria in a refusal to give up any part of their 
shares of the Polish Partitions to Russia. In order to detach Prussia 
from the influence of the Tsar, it had been necessary to promise her 
the bribe which Alexander had already offered her at Kalisch — the 
whole of the kingdom of Saxony. Metternich had, very reluctantly, 
made a verbal promise to this effect so long ago as January 18 14, and 
Castlereagh had accepted this arrangement as the basis of the agree- 
ment between the two Powers. In the discussions at Paris and Lon- 
don, and subsequently, though other points of difference had arisen, 
particularly as regards Mainz, which Austria wished Bavaria to 
acquire, so as to facilitate her own acquisition of Salzburg from that 
Power, this arrangement had been maintained by Metternich, without 
any written agreement having been exchanged. There was, however, 
in Austria a strong party opposed to it. This feeling was naturally 
shared by the smaller German Powers, who were in effect guilty of 
all the offences of which Saxony was accused, while the preservation 
of Saxony was the principal point in the Instructions which Talleyrand 
had drawn up for himself, and even took precedence of his desire to 
dethrone Murat. Nevertheless, Castlereagh founded his whole plan 
of campaign on Austria's consent to the absorption of all Saxony by 
Prussia. 

It was with issues of such magnitude impending that Metternich, 
Castlereagh, Hardenberg and Nesselrode began their preliminary dis- 
cussions, on September 15th. Their first task was to make a plan for 
the deliberations of the Congress ; and none of them appear at the 
outset to have quite understood how difficult this task was. In these 



THE POLISH AND SAXON QUESTIONS 467 

discussions, Castlereagh took up a slightly different attitude to that 
of his colleagues. He agreed that "the Four" must preserve the 
"initiative" granted to them by the Secret Article of the Treaty of 
Paris, and arrange all matters between themselves before they were 
discussed with other Powers. But he carried out his promise to 
Talleyrand to do his best to make the position of France as little 
derogatory as was possible under the circumstances. He acquiesced 
in the strongly expressed wish of his colleagues to exclude her from 
the preliminary discussions, but entered a protest in the Protocol 
of September 22nd, against this decision being too bluntly laid down. 
Similarly, he was anxious that the decision of the Great Powers to 
keep matters in their own hands should be made as palatable as 
possible to the smaller Powers, and that they should maintain their 
control "without openly assuming authority 1 ." He failed, however, 
to convince his colleagues, and, when Talleyrand appeared at Vienna, 
he found no difficulty in preventing the acceptance of the schemes of 
"the Four," with the result that the opening of the Congress was 
postponed, while the points at issue began to be discussed amongst 
the Plenipotentiaries of the Four in an informal way, but with the 
fixed intention of producing some settlement, before either France 
or the smaller Powers were allowed any opportunity to put forward 
their views in any formal manner. 

In the discussions on the Polish and Saxon questions thus opened, 
Castlereagh played a prominent and, in some respects, a dominant 
role. The formal agreement between Austria and Prussia as to Saxony 
still hung fire, and, until this was reached, neither Hardenberg nor 
Metternich could assume too bold an attitude towards the Tsar. It 
was on Castlereagh, therefore, that the main burden fell of arguing 
the case, and endeavouring to make the Tsar understand that his 
plans for a kingdom of Poland under the Russian Crown were opposed 
by all his three Allies. A diplomatic duel thus began of extreme 
bitterness, which very nearly indeed produced a European war. If 
Castlereagh suffered some heavy defeats, he managed at last to pro- 
duce a settlement which he could conscientiously defend, and the 
courage and address with which he managed his attack have rarely 
been excelled by a British statesman. 

Though Nesselrode retained his position of principal Minister, 
Alexander kept the control of affairs in his own hands, and was 

1 For details on these points of organisation see C. K. Webster, The Congress of 
Vienna, Part n. 

30 — 2 



468 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

advised by a group of foreigners of whom Czartoryski, Capodistrias, 
Stein and Anstett had the most influence. Castlereagh's negotiations 
during this first period were, therefore, conducted with the Tsar 
himself, and it was only when Alexander had completely failed to 
overcome the stubborn resistance offered to his plans that he asked 
for the employment of the regular diplomatic channels. The dis- 
cussions began with two interviews at the end of September ; and, from 
the outset, it was apparent that there was little hope of agreement. 
Alexander, doubtless with much sincerity, defended his policy as one 
dictated by a wish to help Poland, and not merely by Russian interests 
or personal ambition. He hinted, however, that he was prepared to 
modify his views as to the erection of a Polish kingdom, and he had 
already, in deference to the loudly expressed wishes of his Russian 
advisers, abandoned the idea of including in it Lithuania and White 
Russia. Castlereagh, with great frankness, insisted that the Tsar's 
plans ran counter to the wishes of all his Allies as well as of his own 
Russian subjects. He said that, so far as England was concerned, 
the creation of an independent Poland would be welcomed, and he 
secured an admission at the outset that this course was rendered im- 
possible by the attitude of all the Three Eastern Powers. He refused 
to admit, therefore, Alexander's plea of a moral duty towards the 
Poles. So long as Russia denied them full independence, she could 
only rely on the Treaties concluded between the three Powers to 
justify herself, and these precluded the granting of a Constitution 
(which, as Castlereagh held, would cause grave discontent among 
those Poles who were left under Prussian and Austrian rule), and bound 
Russia to an equitable Partition with her Allies. At the end of a second 
interview, the discussion grew warm, and Alexander hinted, though 
in a less menacing tone than he was employing towards Metternich 
and Talleyrand, that he was in possession, and meant to remain so. 
To this threat Castlereagh returned an answer which he was to make 
on more than one occasion during the course of the Congress ; that 
only the recognition by Europe could enable a Power to enjoy new 
possessions with tranquillity 1 . 

Meanwhile, Castlereagh was working hard to cement the tenta- 
tive Alliance already formed between Austria and Prussia. Both 
Metternich and Hardenberg were anxious to come to an agreement, 
but both had, throughout the Congress, to reckon with forces in 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, October 2nd, October 9th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 7 ; 
British Diplomacy, pp. 197, 201. 



THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN AGREEMENT 469 

their own country which made a decided course of action difficult. 
Hardenberg's principal obstacle was his King, who, in his heartfelt 
gratitude to the Tsar, found it almost impossible to oppose his wishes. 
There was, also, a strong military party to reckon with in Prussia, who 
were not only determined to secure all Saxony, but were passionately 
opposed to allowing Mainz, which they regarded as the key to southern 
Germany, to remain in Bavarian hands. Metternich was himself 
ready to yield Saxony to Prussia. But Stadion, Starhemberg and 
others were urgent against such a course, and, if he was to satisfy them, 
it was necessary that the loss of Saxony should be compensated by 
large concessions to Austrian interests, not only in Poland, but on 
the whole of the German Questions, including not only Mainz but 
the form of the Confederation, which was now being tentatively dis- 
cussed in a Special Committee. 

Castlereagh could do little to strengthen the infirm will of the 
King of Prussia, though he early made the attempt; but he succeeded 
in bringing the two Ministers to an arrangement, which, though it 
did not completely satisfy either of them, would, he hoped, prove a 
stable Alliance. The initiative came from him, and without his inter- 
vention the experiment could hardly have been tried. It was he who 
drew up a Memorandum as to the method by which the negotiation 
should be handled, for it was imperative that his Allies should not 
use arguments which, as a Constitutional Minister, he could not 
defend. He wished the offer of an entirely independent Poland to be 
put forward at the outset by the two Powers, being convinced that 
Alexander could not accept it: so that the arguments for Partition 
might be more strongly supported by Great Britain and France. He 
was anxious, also, that the negotiations should be begun as soon as 
possible, for Alexander was every day committing himself more deeply 
in private conversations to the plan which he had laid down for him- 
self. Hardenberg, however, told his Allies that he would take no step 
in the Polish question until he was fully assured of the possession of 
Saxony. On October 9th, he addressed letters to Castlereagh and 
Metternich categorically demanding an answer in writing to his de- 
mand. Castlereagh's answer of October nth was explicit. He gave 
formal consent to the total absorption of Saxony by Prussia and, 
provided she loyally supported his Polish plans, offered no objections 
to her immediately taking over the provisional administration of the 
country from Prince Repnin, the Russian governor. He also denied 
the King of Saxony's right to any indemnity, for he had no desire to 



47o THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

complicate the rest of the settlement by the necessity of finding 
another realm for Frederick Augustus. Metternich's answer was more 
difficult to obtain ; but he at last yielded to Hardenberg's pressure. His 
answer, on October 22nd, gave a reluctant consent to the annexation 
of Saxony, but only on the express condition that Prussia should, in 
her turn, consent to arrangements satisfactory to Austria in the rest 
of Germany. This was scarcely an Alliance, and Castlereagh only 
secured the consent of both Hardenberg and Metternich to joint 
action after a long and stormy interview. Even then, some of the 
points in dispute between them were merely waived for the moment. 
They, however, agreed to follow the plan of action drawn up by 
Castlereagh himself, and thus the formal offer of an independent Poland 
was made. But the real intention was to confine Russia to the eastern 
bank of the Vistula 1 . 

Meanwhile, the original controversy between Alexander and 
Castlereagh had been continued by an exchange of formal notes. 
Castlereagh had sent the Emperor, for his information, the Memo- 
randum which he had drawn up as a basis of joint action between the 
Powers. He was embarrassed at receiving from the Emperor a 
vigorous reply, of which Czartoryski was the author, though Alex- 
ander assumed personal responsibility for it. Nevertheless, Castlereagh 
felt compelled to return an answer in which he adroitly ascribed the 
Russian Memorandum to Alexander's advisers, and thus was able to re- 
state his case with the utmost possible firmness 2 . Even then, this rather 
futile method of negotiation was not brought to a close, for a final 
answer was returned by Alexander, together with a cold note asking that 
the negotiations should henceforth be carried on by the regular 
channels of communication. Neither party to the dispute had yielded in 
the slightest degree, and Castlereagh was confirmed in his opinion that 
it was not by this method that the Tsar would be made to give way. 
Only a united demand by the Three Powers could, he thought, force 
the Tsar to a compromise 3 . 

But the Alliance, the making of which had occupied all the month 
of October, fell to pieces almost before it was put into force. Advan- 
tage was taken of a visit of the three Sovereigns to Buda-Pesth to make 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, October 24th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 7; British 
Diplomacy, p. 212. 

2 Cooke was suspected of having drawn up this and some others of Castlereagh's 
notes; but it was not Castlereagh's habit to entrust such important work to sub- 
ordinates, however competent and trustworthy. 

3 Castlereagh to Liverpool, November 5th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 8; British 
Diplomacy, p. 222. 



FAILURE OF CASTLEREAGH'S PLAN 471 

the onset on the Tsar, Castlereagh purposely leaving the affair in the 
hands of Metternich and Hardenberg. Alexander was furious and 
heaped bitter reproaches on the two Ministers in the presence of 
their masters. Frederick William was not proof against the charge of 
ingratitude, and withdrew his support from Hardenberg. Castle- 
reagh's scheme thus completely failed. Hardenberg refused to follow 
up the first attempt, and suggested compromises which Metternich 
could not accept. Nor could he give any guarantee that he would 
join with Austria in enforcing these conditions, if the Tsar refused 
to accept them, as he surely would. The situation which Castlereagh 
had been dreading and which it had been his object to avoid, even 
more than the increase in Russian power, had now been brought 
about. If Austria could not obtain a Polish frontier, she refused to 
consent to the incorporation of Saxony in Prussia ; which meant that 
the two German Powers would become completely estranged. This 
Castlereagh had foreseen, as he explained to his Cabinet in narrating 
his failure, and he clearly perceived the consequences that might ensue. 

"I deemed it," he reported on November nth 1 , "of great importance 
to contribute as far as depended upon me to this concert ; considering the 
establishment of Russia in the heart of Germany not only as constituting 
a great danger in itself, but as calculated to establish a most pernicious in- 
fluence both in the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets; and I also foresaw, 
that if these two Powers, from distrust of each other, gave up the Polish 
point as desperate, the contest in negotiation would then turn upon Saxony, 
Mayence and other German points, and through the contention of Austria 
and Prussia, the supremacy of Russia would be established in all directions, 
and upon every question : whereas an understanding previously established 
on German affairs gave some chance of ameliorating the Polish arrangement, 
and, in case of its failure, afforded the best if not the only means of coun- 
teracting the Russian influence in the other European arrangements.. . ." 

This was his defence for agreeing to the annexation of Saxony by 
Prussia, which he knew could not be palatable to his colleagues, and at 
the same time he explained somewhat anxiously how he came to assume 
so prominent a part in the negotiations. Though the Polish question 
was remote, he contended that all British interests, even her interests 
in the Netherlands, were ultimately bound up in securing a pacific 
settlement. 

" I have certainly been led from circumstances," he continued, " to take 
a more active share in the discussions on this question than I should have 
permitted myself to do if it had been any part of my policy to push the 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, November nth, 1814. F.O. Continent. 8; British 
Diplomacy, p. 229. 



472 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

Polish point to a hostile issue. In preparing for so serious an alternative, 
I should have felt the propriety, as a British Minister, of preserving a 
greater degree of reserve : it being the province of Great Britain to support 
rather than lead, on such occasions. But in proportion as I felt that an 
effort ought to be made successively, by conciliation, by moderation, by 
persuasion, by pressure of argument, and ultimately if necessary by an 
imposing negotiation, uniting the general sentiments of Europe upon sound 
and popular grounds, and not by armies, I felt the less precluded from 
taking a forward part. Some advantages have perhaps resulted from my 
being the person to do so, as the same arguments, had they been urged by 
the parties most interested, might have rendered accommodation more 
difficult " 

In requesting approval of this line of conduct he laid down for 
the benefit of the Cabinet the principles on which he conceived it 
was founded. 

In the first place, so to conduct the arrangements to be framed for the 
Congress, as to make the establishment of a just equilibrium in Europe the 
first object of my attention, and to consider the assertion of minor points 
of interest as subordinate to this great end. Secondly, to use my best 
endeavours to support the Powers who had contributed to save Europe by 
their exertions, in their just pretensions to be liberally re-established upon 
the scale to which their treaties entitled them to lay claim, and not to be 
deterred from doing so by the necessity of adopting, for this end, measures 
which, although not unjust, are nevertheless painful and unpopular in them- 
selves. And, thirdly, to endeavour to combine this latter duty to our friends 
and Allies with as much mildness and indulgence even to the offending 
states, as circumstances would permit. 

It was for these objects, he said, that he had combatted Russia's 
plans so warmly. But he was convinced that a milder policy would 
have produced worse results, and he was not hopeful of the future. 

"Your Lordship may rest assured," he concluded, "that no effort on 
my part shall be omitted to prevent disunion and still more war ; but I am 
confident I speak the universal sentiment, when I declare my perfect con- 
viction, that, unless the Emperor of Russia can be brought to a more moderate 
and sound course of public conduct, the peace, which we have dearly 
purchased, will be but of short duration." 

The Cabinet had need of these explanations and admonitions ; for 
the proceedings at the Congress were now beginning to be the cause 
of public alarm throughout all Europe. Talleyrand's opposition had 
prevented any plan being accepted for the formal opening of the 
Congress, and he had skilfully fomented the jealousy of all the small 
Powers at their exclusion from any important business. While all the 
energies of the Four Powers were directed to the Polish-Saxon 



DISSATISFACTION OF THE CABINET 473 

question, but little progress could be made on any of the other points 
of dispute. So long as Austria and Prussia were at enmity, the German 
Committee could come to no conclusion, and its meetings soon ceased 
altogether. Of Italian Questions, only the incorporation of Genoa in 
Piedmont, which had already been settled by the Treaty of Paris, could 
be formally considered. Though public opinion in England was not 
seriously interested in the main Questions in dispute at Vienna, yet 
the attitude of the Opposition in the House of Commons was very 
different from what it had been during Castlereagh's absence in the 
early part of the year. The conclusion of peace had liberated them 
from all such restraints as they had at that time felt, and, as 
the rumours of dissensions at Vienna grew more and more preva- 
lent, they began a vigorous and concerted attack. Talleyrand and 
others made it their business to convey to the public as much informa- 
tion as possible, and it was not long before tolerably authentic news 
of Castlereagh's note on Saxony reached London. Whitbread took 
the first opportunity to uphold the cause of the Saxon King, while 
the Whigs also defended Alexander, declaring that he wished to 
restore the independence of Poland. The Ministers, in the face of 
Castlereagh's pessimistic despatches, found great difficulty in coping 
with these attacks ; and their task was all the more uncongenial, since 
none of them were sincerely convinced of the necessity or wisdom 
of Castlereagh's conduct. They cared little about the Continent, 
except to keep out of trouble; and the prominent part that their 
Plenipotentiary was playing in the thorny questions of Saxony and 
Poland gradually began to create a real feeling of alarm. This was 
expressed in Liverpool's private letters to Vienna, which, without 
giving any specific Instructions, dwelt continually on the difficulties 
of the Ministry in Parliament, and urged a cautious line of policy. 
At the end of October, Vansittart (who was much embarrassed by the 
financial questions which had arisen on the conclusion of peace) 
attacked Castlereagh's Polish policy in a Memorandum which was 
duly forwarded to Vienna; and these warnings were repeated in 
November 1 . 

Yet at the Congress, after a short interval, Castlereagh continued 
his policy of active mediation. He .was far too much involved in the 
negotiations to play a passive role there, and he never wavered in his 
belief that it was only by his own active participation in the negotiations 

1 Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th, 1814, November 2nd, November 
18th. Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, IX. 382, 401, 438. 



474 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

that a rupture could be averted, which, if it took place, must involve all 
Europe and ultimately, therefore, Great Britain, in war. Throughout 
November, the relations between the three Powers grew steadily 
worse. Hardenberg made some pretence of endeavouring to induce 
Alexander to yield, and after his failure still insisted on the retention 
of Saxony. Since he could no longer obtain it from Metternich, he 
went over completely to the Russian side, and it was not long before 
the chances of war were openly discussed at Vienna. On November 
8th, Prince Repnin, the Russian Governor of Saxony, handed over 
the administration to the Prussians, with, as he declared in his procla- 
mation, the consent of Austria and Great Britain. This act, designed 
by Alexander to foment the differences between Austria and Prussia, 
produced exactly the effect which he had anticipated, and caused, 
moreover, great discussion throughout Europe and a special debate 
in the British Parliament. For some time, Castlereagh kept away from 
these discussions, which were prolonged by an illness of Alexander; 
but, by the beginning of December, affairs had assumed so alarming 
an aspect that he was approached on all sides for help in order to 
arrive at a settlement, and he took up once more his role of Mediator. 
He had now, however, to pursue a different plan. A Polish settle- 
ment such as he had desired, he felt to be now impossible, since 
Prussia had refused to combine with Austria to extort it from Alex- 
ander. The great question now was that of Saxony, and as to this Castle- 
reagh threw his whole weight on the side of Austria. His change of 
attitude was attributed by public gossip at the Congress, which later 
found expression in the House of Commons, to a change of In- 
structions from home. This was, however, not a true statement of 
the case. Liverpool did, indeed, suggest to Castlereagh in his letters, 
that the total extinction of Saxony was not popular in England. 

" I ought to apprise you," he wrote on November 18th, "that there is a 
strong feeling in this country respecting Saxony. The case against the King 
appears to me, I confess, to be complete, if it is expedient to act upon it; 
but the objection is to the annihilation of the whole of Saxony as an inde- 
pendent Power, particularly considering the part which the Saxon troops 
took in the operations on the Elbe. Considering the prominent part which 
Saxony has always taken in the affairs of Germany, it would certainly be 
very desirable that a noyau of it at least should be preserved, even if it were 
under some other branch of the Saxon family ; and I am fully convinced that 
the King of Prussia would gain more in character and influence by agreeing 
to such an arrangement than he would lose by any reasonable sacrifice 1 ." 

1 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, ix. 438. 



CASTLEREAGH AND THE SAXON COMPROMISE 475 

There was, however, no vehement feeling in Great Britain on this 
subject, in spite of the efforts of various diplomatic agents to foment 
it, and The Times, which attached far more importance to the estab- 
lishment of Polish independence than to the preservation of the Saxon 
monarchy, probably represented the views of those sufficiently in- 
terested in the affairs of the Congress to have any opinion at all. 

Castlereagh's change of front, in fact, though approved and com- 
mended by the Cabinet, was the natural result of his own actions, 
and not dictated from home. He sought, indeed, not the preservation 
of the whole of Saxony, but a compromise which would enable Austria 
and Prussia to come together once more and free the latter from 
Russian influence; and, as will be seen, after a two months' struggle 
he was successful in bringing his plan to fruition. 

Until the beginning of December, Castlereagh made no attempt 
to reopen the negotiations. When, however, Alexander had per- 
emptorily rejected the suggestions which Hardenberg had hesita- 
tingly put forward as a means of "saving his face," and Metternich 
had intimated that, in such circumstances, Austria withdrew her 
consent to the Prussian annexation of Saxony, it was imperative that 
he should declare his attitude, before an open rupture of relations 
between the two German Powers took place. Hardenberg's Notes 
had begun to assume a menacing tone, and Castlereagh was thus 
induced to seek an interview with him in the first days of December, 
in order to make it clear that, in the new aspect of affairs which had 
arisen as a consequence of the failure to oppose Alexander, he sup- 
ported the Austrian case. He took with him the extract from Liver- 
pool's private letter of November 18th, quoted above, in order to 
show that his change of view was in accordance with the wishes of 
his Government. Hardenberg met him with menacing words, de- 
claring that he "would run all risks rather than return home under 
such an humiliation." Castlereagh's answer was the same as he had 
given to Alexander when he used similar language with regard to 
Poland. 

" I represented," he reported, "that this was not a case of war, that he 
was in occupation of Saxony, and that I apprehended no one would think 
of removing him hostilely from thence ; but that he could not regard an 
unacknowledged claim as constituting a good title, and that he never could, 
in conscience or honour, advise his sovereign to make the mere refusal of a 
recognition cause of war against other states: That Prussia would then 
remain in a state of disquietude and doubt, compelled to remain armed, 
and that his return to Berlin would, under such circumstances, be more 



476 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

painful than if he brought back the accession of all the Powers of Europe 
to an equal extent of dominion, though differently constituted 1 ." 

Such language was not without effect. Hardenberg promised at 
least to consider any proposal which Austria might make, and Castle- 
reagh hastened to Metternich to endeavour to make this as conciliatory 
as possible. But the omens were not favourable, and in a private letter 
Castlereagh directed the attention of his Cabinet to the chances of 
war and to the necessity of his interference, if it was to be prevented. It 
was impossible, he pointed out, for Great Britain to keep out of such 
a war for any length of time; her engagements to the Netherlands, if 
nothing else, would bring her in. He suggested, therefore, that the 
only chance of peace was an Armed Mediation between the three 
Eastern Powers, and that, in order to make this effective, France should 
be asked to join Great Britain in such action. By this means, she 
would be prevented from fishing in troubled waters, while the united 
force of the two Powers might be sufficient to prevent the threatened 
explosion 2 . 

The course of the negotiations showed how wellfounded Castle- 
reagh's fears were. Austria's Memorandum was far from conciliatory. 
There was an open quarrel between Hardenberg and Metternich, in 
which all their private correspondence concerning Poland was be- 
trayed to the Tsar. Alexander himself, after vainly attempting to 
obtain Metternich's dismissal, showed some signs of willingness to 
compromise, and offered the Tarnopol district to Austria; but there 
appeared to be no possibility of agreement on the Saxon point. 

Meanwhile, the Cabinet had been growing more and more alarmed. 
On November 25th an attack had been made by the Opposition in 
the House of Commons, pressing for information on the rumours of 
dissensions concerning Naples, Saxony and Poland, to which Ministers 
found the greatest difficulty in returning an effective reply. A meeting 
of the Cabinet was held and an official Instruction was sent to Castle- 
reagh — the only important one received by him during the whole course 
of the Congress — which, while approving of his attitude as regards 
Poland, expressed the greatest alarm at the general state of Europe, 
and concluded: "It is unnecessary for me to point out to you the 
impossibility of His Royal Highness consenting to involve this country 
in hostilities at this time for any of the objects which have hitherto been 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool. December 7th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 8; British 
Diplomacy, p. 255. 

2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, December 5th, 18 14. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 463. 



CASTLEREAGH AS MEDIATOR 477 

under discussion at Vienna 1 ." How little attention Castlereagh was 
to pay to this communication will be seen. The Cabinet, on receipt of 
his despatches of December 5th and 7th, moved further in his direction. 
Liverpool agreed that an Alliance with France was desirable, and that, 
to obtain it, some concession to her on the question of Murat was 
expedient. Any settlement of Poland, Germany and Italy was, he 
said, to be preferred to war, of which, however, he admitted Great 
Britain could not indefinitely remain a mere spectator. He renewed, at 
the same time, his warning against committing this country to hostilities, 
and intimated that the Cabinet could not sanction such a course, 
until they were in possession of all the circumstances of the rupture 2 . 
But these warnings had little effect on the negotiations at Vienna. 
Castlereagh had made up his mind as to the course to be taken, and, 
during three weeks of ever-increasing strain, he persisted steadily in 
a line of action which, if it had not been successful in its object, must 
have resulted in an immediate outbreak of hostilities. The boldness 
of his action was justified by the result: peace was preserved, and it is 
difficult to see how it could have been preserved in any other way. 
But no Foreign Minister has ever taken upon himself a greater 
responsibility than Castlereagh assumed in the negotiations at Vienna, 
and, however his action may be criticised in its final results, due re- 
cognition must always be given to the courage and energy with which 
he acted at this all-important moment in the history of Europe. 

He had, first, to make sure of Talleyrand ; and this task proved far 
less difficult than might have been expected. Talleyrand had been 
successful in preventing the formal opening of the Congress ; but, until 
the Powers came to almost open rupture, he had exercised little in- 
fluence on their discussions. As a result of the interview in Paris, his re- 
lations with Castlereagh had been closer than with the other Ministers. 
His insistence on the interests of Saxony, rather than of Poland, had 
indeed, caused some discontent; but Castlereagh 's influence had held 
back any direct step on his part, and through Wellington he had 
impressed his views on the French Court. At one time, there had 
been a suspicion that Talleyrand might make a bargain with Alex- 
ander; but his Instructions and the wishes of Lewis XVIII really 
left him no alternative. When, therefore, Castlereagh, and subse- 
quently Metternich, began to make overtures to him, he showed every 

1 Bathurst to Castlereagh, November 27th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 6; British 
Diplomacy, p. 247. 

2 Liverpool to Castlereagh, December 23rd, 18 14. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, IX. 497. 



478 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

disposition to meet them. Castlereagh throughout treated him with 
regard, though he never gave him his full confidence until the moment 
of crisis came. Through Castlereagh's influence, the issue of the 
French Note on Saxony was postponed until the first plan had been 
shown to be impossible, and, when the Prussian demands grew more 
menacing, Castlereagh, as has been seen, began to look forward to a 
French Alliance. Talleyrand's only condition was the expulsion of 
Murat, which Lewis XVIII regarded as of equal importance to the 
preservation of the King of Saxony. As will be seen, Castlereagh had 
himself long desired the same end, if it could be obtained without an 
actual breach of faith. Though he could not give Talleyrand definite 
assurances on this point, he put forward a plan by which Murat was 
to be offered a pecuniary indemnity as a preliminary to his expulsion, 
and urged Talleyrand to have the French archives searched for 
proofs of Murat's treachery in 18 14, so that public opinion in England 
and Europe might be satisfied. With these assurances, though Metter- 
nich was far less explicit, Talleyrand was content, and pressed eagerly 
for a treaty, from which, however, Castlereagh held back until the 
very last minute. For, though he desired the French Alliance, if a 
rupture seemed inevitable, he was anxious not to force it prematurely, 
lest it should give an excuse for the outbreak which it was meant to 
prevent 1 . 

In the latter half of December, Castlereagh made a final effort to 
settle the matters in dispute. The Three Powers all pressed him to 
accept the office of Mediator, and with this end in view he consented 
to fresh interviews with the Prussians. They now brought forward 
a new plan by which the King of Saxony was to receive, as compensa- 
tion for his kingdom, a large part of the left bank of the Rhine; but 
Castlereagh peremptorily refused to have anything to do with this 
scheme. Such a State would, he thought, fall entirely under the 
influence of France, and the safety of the Netherlands would be com- 
promised. It was now impossible, he said, for Prussia to obtain the 
whole of Saxony. She must look for compensation elsewhere; and, 
in order that the whole matter might be discussed without the con- 
stant disputes as to the figures of population of the various territories 
concerned, he proposed that a Statistical Commission should be set 
up, composed of representatives of the Four Powers, to ascertain 
from the best information at hand the numbers of " souls " which the 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, December 18th, 1814. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 485. 



THE CRISIS AT VIENNA 479 

Powers had severally at their disposal. Though Prussia as yet showed no 
signs of compromise on the Saxon Question, she assented to this pro- 
position, and the Committee, which proved of great service in settling 
the disputed points, was set up on December 24th. It contained a 
French representative, for Talleyrand had threatened to leave the 
Congress, if admission were refused him. Castlereagh, therefore, 
though he had not intended to expose his hand so soon, pressed for 
his inclusion, and Prussia and Russia gave way. On December 25th 
he went further, and in a letter to Talleyrand assured him, though in 
vague terms, that British policy, with regard not only to Saxony, but 
also to Naples, was aiming at the same ends as that of France 1 . 

The final crisis was now at hand. The Tsar, now that he felt 
assured of obtaining almost all his Polish demands, was anxious for 
peace. But Hardenberg, urged on by the Prussian military leaders, 
refused all compromise, and Metternich, who was supported by almost 
all the small States, showed himself equally unyielding. Matters were 
brought to a head by the Tsar's demand for a formal Conference to 
settle the Polish question. When this met, on December 29th, it was 
inevitable that Saxony must be discussed as well as Poland. Castle- 
reagh and Metternich, therefore, refused all formal discussion until a 
French Plenipotentiary should have been admitted. Hardenberg 
vehemently objected, for such a course, in view of Talleyrand's zeal 
for Saxony, was equivalent to accepting defeat. The Prussians en- 
deavoured to carry their point by a show of force before it was too 
late, and Hardenberg, in unguarded words, threatened war, unless 
the Prussian claims on Saxony were immediately recognised. His 
language rid Castlereagh of his last hesitations, and he went straight 
from the Conference to Talleyrand and Metternich, with the project 
of a Secret Treaty, which he had himself drafted. The Treaty was an 
application of the provisions of Chaumont to the new situation. 
France, Austria and Great Britain were each to contribute 150,000 
men, if attacked by Prussia. Bavaria, Hanover and the Netherlands 
were to be asked to accede so soon as it was signed. Metternich, of 
course, accepted it, while Talleyrand was no less ready, and made no 
objection to a Clause which bound France to respect in any event the 
stipulations of the Treaty of Paris. He was content that " the Coalition 
was dissolved," and the French redaction which he drew up at 
Castlereagh's request only made one or two insignificant alterations 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, December 18th, December 24th, 1914. F.O. Con- 
tinent. 9; British Diplomacy, pp. 260, 268. 



480 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

in the original draft. Even in the matter of Saxony, he showed himself 
accommodating, for Castlereagh informed both him and Metternich, 
before they signed, that he did not intend to refuse Prussia some 
increase of territory in that quarter 1 . 

The Treaty meant war, if Prussia persisted in her demands ; and 
Castlereagh's decision, which was made in direct opposition to the 
Instructions of his Cabinet, was, therefore, of the greatest possible 
moment. But, as he told Liverpool, Great Britain was bound to be 
drawn into the war in any case, and it was far better to enter into it 
with such a Treaty than to let events take their course. By safe- 
guarding the Treaty of Paris, British interests in the Netherlands were 
protected and no temptation was offered to France to try to win back her 
conquests. The decision was at once accepted by the Prime-Minister, 
as Castlereagh had anticipated. In fact, before information of it had 
arrived, Liverpool had already indicated, in a letter of December 23rd 2 , 
that the Cabinet were prepared for the French Alliance. But this 
despatch had not reached Castlereagh when he signed the Treaty; 
nor can it be said that the news of the signature of the Treaty of Ghent 
with the United States, which reached him on the morning of 
January 1st, was a deciding factor in the decision. His policy had long 
been leading up to such an event. The occasion was provided by the 
threats of Prussia, which gave sufficient excuse. Castlereagh per- 
ceived that the psychological moment had come when the final battle 
must be fought over Saxony, and the Treaty was therefore only a 
precautionary measure and was justified by its success. 

In a few days, however, all danger of war was over. In the second 
and third meetings of "the Four," Metternich and Castlereagh, em- 
boldened by their Treaty, persisted in their demand for the inclusion 
of France, and Hardenberg, after a vain struggle, yielded. Another 
attempt was made by the Prussians to press the scheme of compensa- 
ting the King of Saxony by a territory on the left bank of the Rhine. 
Castlereagh countered this by a special interview with Razumoffski, 
the Russian representative, which was followed by one with the Tsar 
himself. There could be no doubt of Alexander's desire for peace. 
He had heard something of the Secret Treaty, and challenged Castle- 
reagh pointblank on the subject. The reply which he received must 
have left him in no doubt that some formal bond existed, and he 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, January ist, 1815 (nos. 43, 44, 45). F.O. Con- 
tinent. 10; British Diplomacy, pp. 276-279. 

2 See supra, p. 477. 



CASTLEREAGH AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT 481 

showed great alacrity in accepting the scheme for the reconstruction 
of Prussia which Castlereagh had drawn up 1 . 

Thus, when the Council of Five met on January 10th, the main 
issue on the Saxon question had already been decided. Prussia knew 
that she must give way, and it only remained to settle how much of 
Saxony was to be given her, and how her other losses in Poland were 
to be compensated. But the settlement occupied another five weeks 
of arduous discussions, before it was finally concluded. In these dis- 
cussions, Castlereagh throughout acted as a real Mediator, and fully 
redeemed his promise to Hardenberg, that he intended to make a 
large and powerful Prussia. From the first, he had great difficulties 
with his Allies. Both Metternich and Talleyrand were anxious to 
exploit their victory to the utmost, and to exclude Prussia from 
obtaining any considerable portion of Saxony. In these circumstances, 
Castlereagh had himself to take the initiative and to force concessions 
on Prussia's behalf, speaking to the Emperor Francis in person, when 
Metternich confessed himself unable to cope with the demands of 
the Austrian military party. He did not, indeed, obtain anything 
like enough to satisfy the pretensions of the Prussians, who insisted 
for a long time on the retention of Leipzig. A complete deadlock arose 
on this head, which threatened to wreck the negotiations completely, 
and, after long and painful interviews with Hardenberg and the King 
of Prussia, Castlereagh was unable to bring them to accept the last 
Austrian offer. It was only by inducing Alexander to cede the fortress 
of Thorn to Prussia that he was at last able to wring a reluctant con- 
sent from Hardenberg to relinquishing Leipzig. Finally, after repeated 
interviews with the Ministers and their Sovereigns, he secured a 
scheme to which all parties consented 2 . 

In this rearrangement, the whole German and Polish settlement 
was concluded; and, except on one or two minor points, all the 
boundaries of Europe north of the Alps were thus settled before 
Castlereagh left Vienna. In order to satisfy the Allies and to obtain 
more territory for the purpose of Prussian reconstruction, he cut down 
to the lowest possible limit the claims of the Netherlands and Hanover. 
In the last resort, both these States depended on Great Britain's 
goodwill, and Castlereagh was able to use his influence with them for 



1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, January 8th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 10; British 
Diplomacy, p. 283. 

2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, January nth, 22nd, 29th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 1 1 ; 
British Diplomacy, pp. 287, 292, 294. 

W.&G.i. 3I 



482 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

the advantage of the general settlement. The final result satisfied his 
expectations, so far as the centre of Europe was concerned. The Prince 
of Orange, now King of the Netherlands, was master of what was 
thought to be a solid and compact State, and Luxemburg was also under 
his sovereignty, though it remained part of the German Confedera- 
tion. Prussia received the left bank of the Rhine and was thus at 
hand to protect the Netherlands, as Pitt had planned in 1805. Hanover, 
strengthened by the absorption of East Frisia in its territory, reached 
the mouth of the Ems, and thus, as Castlereagh hoped, a solid bloc 
was made on the north-eastern frontier of France, where she had 
always gained such signal successes. Prussia received nearly two- 
fifths of Saxony in which Castlereagh had insisted on including, 
much to Austria's annoyance, the Elbe fortresses of Torgau and 
Erfurt. Even more important, however, than the actual details of the 
Saxon compromise was that it again made possible good relations 
between Austria and Prussia, and prepared the way for a renewal of 
the negotiations on the subject of a German Confederation, to which, 
as a means to solidify and strengthen central Europe, Castlereagh 
attached the highest importance. 

In the Polish matter, Castlereagh had to be content with such 
concessions as Alexander would grant. Almost the whole of the 
duchy of Warsaw remained in Russian hands, and out of this Alexander 
created a separate kingdom of Poland. The cession of Thorn to Prussia 
and the establishment of Cracow as a Free Town implied a certain 
concession to the Central Powers, but the whole result was regarded 
as a menace to their peace. Before the settlement was completed, 
Castlereagh made a special declaration of the wish of Great Britain 
for an independent Poland, had such a result been possible. In this 
he was quite consistent, for he had at the outset of the negotiations 
declared himself in the same sense. But, as has been seen, he had 
never intended it seriously, and the declaration now made was merely 
to satisfy public opinion in England, which had throughout con- 
sistently advocated Polish independence, and had even accused Castle- 
reagh of thwarting Alexander's good intentions on the subject. In 
this point, he only anticipated the wishes of his Cabinet, for Liverpool 
wrote specially a few days later to urge its importance 1 . More sincere, 
perhaps, were his solemn injunctions to the three Eastern Powers 
to grant the Poles special privileges. 

1 Liverpool to Castlereagh, January 16th, 1815. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 539. 



CASTLEREAGH AND POLISH NATIONALITY 483 

"Experience has proved," wrote Castlereagh, "that it is not by coun- 
teracting all their habits and usages as a people, that either the happiness 
of the Poles or the peace of that important portion of Europe can be pre- 
served. A fruitless attempt so long persevered in by institutions foreign 
to their manners and sentiments, to make them forget their existence and 
even language as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed. It has 
only tended to excite a sentiment of discontent and self-degradation, and 
can never operate otherwise than to provoke commotion and to awaken 
them to a recollection of past misfortunes. 

"The Undersigned, for these reasons, and in cordial concurrence with 
the suggestions which have been thrown out, and which appear to have 
been favourably received by the respective Cabinets in the course of the 
present Conferences, ardently desires that the illustrious Monarchs, to 
whom the destinies of the Polish nation are confided, may be induced, 
before they depart from Vienna, to take an engagement with each other, 
to treat as Poles, under whatever form of political institution they may 
think fit to govern them, the portion of that nation that may be placed 
under their respective sovereignties 1 ." 

It may be doubted if Castlereagh, who had from the first aimed 
at a partition of the duchy of Warsaw between the Three Powers, had 
any right to make such a protest, at any rate to Alexander, who, among 
all the statesmen at Vienna, was alone really desirous of making 
any concession to Polish nationality. But the Tsar did not resent it, 
and, as a result of it, the Treaty of Vienna contained a guarantee to 
the Poles of a separate administration and institutions which at least 
served as a legal basis for the protests which were to be made on their 
behalf by Great Britain and France during the nineteenth century 2 . 

The main territorial settlement north of the Alps had thus been 
settled before Castlereagh left Vienna. Such was, however , not the case 
with Italy, where some problems had been postponed until the great 
dispute was settled. Nevertheless, Italian Questions, and particularly 
the position of Murat, played a by no means inconsiderable part in 
the diplomacy that led to the Treaty of January 3rd; and, throughout, 
the Powers were fully aware that this difficulty had to be dealt with 
before the peace of Europe could be assured. Metternich had suc- 
ceeded in preventing any formal discussion on Italian problems, 
except that of Genoa, which was already decided by the Peace of 
Paris, until he should have settled matters with the Tsar. He had 
naturally no wish to raise difficulties in Italy which would weaken 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, II. 642. 

2 The Poles approached Wellington after Castlereagh's departure for further 
action in their favour, which he declined to take. Wellington to Castlereagh, 
February 18th, 25th, 1815. Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, ix. 571, 579. 

31—2 



484 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

his position in his negotiations concerning Poland and Saxony. Thus, 
neither Talleyrand nor Labrador was able to open formally the 
Question of Naples during the period of crisis. It was, however, often 
referred to in the negotiations, and Alexander no less than Metternich 
and Castlereagh endeavoured to use it as a means to influence Talley- 
rand's policy, which was, however, as has been seen, determined by 
other considerations. Nevertheless, Talleyrand had to be satisfied on 
the head of Naples, and, before the final crisis, he had received assur- 
ances, from Castlereagh at least, that the Bourbon claim to overthrow 
Murat would be met in some way or other. The means by which this 
promise was carried out led to one of the most obscure and intricate 
diplomatic incidents of the period 1 . None of the parties to the 
discussion dare act openly, and the exact processes by which the 
final result was brought about are still to some extent unknown. 

As has been seen, Castlereagh, in spite of his acquiescence in the 
Treaty between Austria and Murat, had attempted to keep his hands 
free. Of his personal desire to restore the Bourbons there can be no 
doubt, though he in no way committed himself towards the Duke of 
Orleans before he set out for Vienna. From the first, he showed 
himself cold and reserved towards Murat's able representatives at 
Vienna, the Due de Campochiaro and Prince Cariati. These Envoys, 
from the opening of the Congress onwards, never ceased to press for 
the formal recognition of Murat, which, they claimed, had been 
promised at the time of the Armistice. Castlereagh eluded all these 
attempts, and gradually felt his way towards a solution. The task was 
not an easy one. Unless Murat could be shown to have broken his 
engagements, Great Britain, if not so deeply committed as Austria, 
had yet virtually agreed to his retention of his kingdom. It remained 
to be seen whether a way could be found to break this agreement 
without too open a breach of faith. Castlereagh and Metternich 
proved equal to the problem, but they were immensely assisted by 
Murat's own lack of judgment and control, while the return of 
Napoleon made the final denouement very different from what had been 
anticipated, and obscured the fact that Murat's deposition had already 
been decided when Castlereagh left Vienna. The first act of Campo- 
chiaro was to present to Castlereagh and other statesmen a Memoire 
Historique, defending Murat's conduct during the period between the 

1 The most complete account is given in Commandant M. H. Weil's Joachim 
Murat (1909-10) which is based on extensive researches in Italian, Austrian, French 
and British archives, and furnishes an immense collection of documents. 



ITALIAN QUESTIONS 485 

Battle of Leipzig and the conclusion of the First Peace of Paris. Murat 
had become alarmed, and justly so, at the hostility displayed against 
him in so many quarters. France and Spain were openly and fiercely 
supporting the claims which Ferdinand IV had never abandoned. 
The Papacy, though under the distinguished influence of Consalvi, it 
was, at this time, by no means disposed to acquiesce in Austrian domi- 
nation of the peninsula, yet was disputing with Murat the control of 
the Marches and refused him recognition. From the Northern Powers 
he could expect nothing. He had therefore to rely on his Treaty with 
Austria and the self-commitments of Great Britain. The support of this 
latter Power was, indeed, most vital of all, for she still virtually con- 
trolled Sicily, which her troops still occupied and her subsidies fur- 
nished with revenue, while her sea power prevented such an attack 
as France and Spain might be disposed to contemplate. The Memoire 
Historique was intended to force Castlereagh's hand. It merely, how- 
ever, gave an opportunity to Bentinck and Nugent , the Austrian General , 
to whom it was referred for observations when the right moment came, 
to repeat all their accusations against Murat, and left matters exactly 
as they were. In his interviews with Campochiaro, Castlereagh replied 
coldly and cautiously to all attempts to ascertain his views. He told 
the Envoy, frankly, that he considered the Question an open one 
while at the same time he tried to prevent Murat from taking any 
action by pointing out that the Armistice could only be denounced 
with three months' notice. Meanwhile, he asked A'Court to find out 
how far the Bourbons could look for support in Naples itself 1 . 

The death of Maria Carolina, Bentinck's constant foe, on Septem- 
ber 7th, removed one possible obstacle to a Bourbon Restoration, which 
events at Vienna made more and more necessary, and Murat's relations 
with the Tory Government were not made easier by the visit of the 
Princess of Wales to Naples and her openly expressed admiration for 
the King, while such English friends as Lord Oxford, who was arrested 
at Paris when on a secret mission from Murat, did him more harm 
than good. 

Meanwhile, at Vienna, Talleyrand and Labrador had been pressing 
not only the dethronement of Murat, but also the restoration to the 
Spanish Bourbons of the Parma duchies, assigned to Marie-Louise and 
her son by the Treaty of Fontainebleau. These overtures had no 
immediate result, and it was only the incorporation of Genoa in 
Piedmont which was formally agreed to at this time. This cession 

1 Castlereagh to A'Court, October 2nd, 1814. Castlereagh Correspondence^. 145. 



486 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

provoked considerable criticism in the British Parliament; for the 
Whigs, instructed by Bentinck, seized on this point as a means of 
embarrassing the Ministry. Nor was it long before the attention of 
the Opposition was turned to Naples. They were well informed by 
Murat's agents of the actual situation and, in a debate on November 
25th, Castlereagh was accused of bad faith by Whitbread and Horner. 
These attacks had, however, little influence on Castlereagh, though 
they may have contributed to Murat's fall by making him imagine 
that his cause had powerful supporters in England. On the con- 
trary, as the dispute over Saxony grew hotter, Castlereagh drew closer 
to Talleyrand, and this necessarily meant some agreement on the 
Neapolitan Question. He was, perhaps, influenced to some extent by 
Wellington's opinion, freely communicated from Paris, that the Peace 
of Europe could not be considered secure while Murat was on the 
Throne of Naples. Gradually, therefore, Castlereagh came to a de- 
cision; and when, on December 13th, Talleyrand in a formal Note 
proposed that all the Powers should recognise Ferdinand as King of 
Naples and that Murat should be deposed by a maritime expedition, 
so as to avoid the sending of French troops through Italy, he promised 
to seek Instructions from London. This he did in a long letter to 
Liverpool on December 18th, in which he went further than he had 
indicated to Talleyrand 1 . It was clear, he wrote, that Murat had not 
fulfilled his engagements, and that, therefore, Great Britain was free 
to act in favour of the Sicilian Bourbons. He proposed, accordingly, 
that a definite offer should be made of a pecuniary compensation to 
Murat himself and his heirs, together with a solemn guarantee to the 
Neapolitans of an amnesty and "such rights and privileges . . . as may be 
just and reasonable." If Murat refused this offer,then the future course 
must be decided accordingto events ; but itwas obvious that Castlereagh 
did not anticipate much difficulty in overthrowing him by force, and 
that Austria would not offer much objection. Metternich had, indeed, 
as yet not committed himself; but, so early as the middle of November, 
direct negotiations had been opened between him and Blacas at Paris 
without the knowledge of Talleyrand, which were to play an im- 
portant part in the solution of the whole question. By the end of 
December, these had developed into a proposition to settle the Nea- 
politan question at Paris, and, by the middle of January, these pour- 
parlers had carried the matter considerably further. Meanwhile, how- 

Castlereagh to Liverpool, December 18th, 1814. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 485. 



MURAT THROWN OVER 487 

ever, Castlereagh's letter, backed by the strong support of Wellington 1 , 
who made out the military problem to be one easily solved, had won 
over Liverpool. In a letter of January nth, the Prime-Minister agreed 
to Castlereagh's scheme, provided Great Britain took no active part, 
and Castlereagh was therefore able to give Talleyrand a definite 
promise that action would be taken against Murat, and thus win his 
French colleague's consent to all the compromises necessary to settle 
the German Questions 2 . 

The final stages by which the deposition was to be carried out 
were, however, arranged between Castlereagh and Metternich with- 
out Talleyrand's knowledge. Metternich appears to have made up 
his mind by the middle of January, that Murat must be abandoned. 
He wished, however, to ensure that Bourbon influence should not 
disturb the Habsburg control of Italy, and he accordingly deter- 
mined to make his consent depend on the French acceptance of 
Austrian plans for the centre of the peninsula, and in particular of the 
establishment of Marie-Louise and her son in the Parma duchies, in 
accordance with the Treaty of Fontainebleau. He took Castlereagh 
fully into his confidence, and a project was drawn up for the final 
settlement of Italy, which Castlereagh was to present at Paris on his 
way home from the Congress. In this paper the whole outline of the 
proposed settlement was sketched out and the hope was expressed that, 
in return for the overthrow of Murat, Lewis XVIII would agree to 
all the rest. Castlereagh made some reservations of his own as to this 
plan, especially as regards the Duchies, but in substance he was pre- 
pared to back Metternich. At Paris on February 27th he had a long 
interview with Lewis XVIII, followed by one with Vincent, Metter- 
nich's Envoy, and when he left on March 1st he had won Lewis' 
consent to the whole scheme, except the succession in the Duchies of 
the young Napoleon, a change which Castlereagh himself had recom- 
mended as desirable 3 . At the same time, he took back with him to 
England a number of documents which Blacas, in response to re- 
quests from Vienna, had collected as proofs of Murat's "treachery" 

1 Sorel's observation (L'Europe et la Revolution j ran raise, vm. 412) on Wellington 
" qui poursuivait dans Murat le dernier lieutenant de Napoleon," is altogether beside 
the mark. No one was less susceptible to such a motive. Wellington was, un- 
doubtedly, genuinely convinced that Murat was a menace to the Peace of Europe. 

2 On January 18th, Murat addressed a letter to the Prince Regent, professing 
his devotion to Great Britain ; but Liverpool merely referred Gallo to Vienna, where 
he knew the case would be already decided against Murat. 

3 Castlereagh to Wellington, Paris, February 28th. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 583. 



488 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

in 1814. Meanwhile, at Vienna, Metternich had prepared the way for 
a rupture by responding to yet another demand for recognition on 
the part of Campochiaro in a Note which was almost an ultimatum ; 
and the Austrian forces were steadily growing stronger in northern 
Italy. The stage was thus set for the final scene, when the whole 
situation was altered by the return of Napoleon from Elba. 

For the moment the return of Napoleon made no difference to 
Castlereagh's policy. The fear of cooperation between Murat and 
Napoleon, and the reports that a correspondence existed between 
them, had indeed been one of the motives which induced Castlereagh 
to desire Murat's removal. The papers sent from Paris and the reports 
of Murat's recent conduct sent by Wellington from Vienna appear to 
have overcome all hesitation on the part of the Cabinet, and, on 
March 12th, an Instruction was sent to Wellington authorising him 
to enter into engagements for the removal of Murat from the Throne 
of Naples. 

"As there will be some nicety," wrote Castlereagh, "in giving to our 
line on this question the form most likely to prove satisfactory to Parliament, 
it might be desirable that we should accede, according to our own form, 
to the Treaty previously agreed to by Austria and France, in the negotiation 
of which you will assist with a view of rendering the details as little ob- 
jectionable as possible 1 ." 

When this Instruction was sent, the full extent of Napoleon's success 
was not understood. But when it was seen that a new struggle had to 
be entered upon, the issue of which was doubtful, Castlereagh became 
less certain of the expediency of attacking Murat, who was indeed in 
no sense an ally of Napoleon's, and had offered to place his forces on 
the side of the Allies. The Chevalier Toco, Murat's representative in 
London, though he had no official character, presented a Memoran- 
dum to the British Government on the part of his master, which 
asserted in the strongest possible terms his desire to act with the 
Allies against Napoleon. In referring this communication to Vienna 
on March 24th, Castlereagh authorised Wellington to conclude a 
Treaty with Murat, so as to liberate the Austrian forces to fight 
against France 2 . But in Italy events were moving too quickly towards 
a rupture for this Instruction to have any effect. Though, so late as 
March 23 rd, Wellington had been doubtful whether it was expedient for 

1 Castlereagh to Wellington, March 12th, 1815. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 592. Memorandum enclosed. F.O. Continent. Archives, 7. 

2 Castlereagh to Wellington, March 24th, 1815. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 609. 



CASTLEREAGH AND MURAT 489 

Austria to attack, the hasty conduct of Murat,who, perhaps judiciously, 
in the end decided that his one chance for security lay in summoning 
all Italy to arms while the Allies were still occupied with Napoleon, 
brought matters to a head, and by the beginning of April he had 
virtually begun hostilities 1 . Bentinck, who had returned to Genoa 
during the winter, was authorised by Wellington to attack Murat, 
if he moved against the Austrians, and Great Britain was thus at 
once brought into the War. In any case, it may be doubted whether 
the issue could long have been postponed; for Wellington assured 
Castlereagh that, if Murat had not been attacked, the plan for his 
deposition originally agreed upon would have been put into force 
before the Congress dispersed. When, therefore, Clancarty, who had 
been fully instructed by Wellington as to the plan of operations, on 
April 8th received Castlereagh's suggestion of March 24th, he took 
no action on it, and did not even communicate it to Metternich, 
allowing events to run their course 2 . On April 10th, Austria, in spite 
of the continued protests of Campochiaro and Cariati, declared war. 
Though Bentinck again quarrelled with his Allies, the issue was not 
long in doubt, and before the orders for Bentinck's recall could be 
issued, Murat had been defeated and driven out of his kingdom. 

Castlereagh had, of course, to defend his actions against vehement 
attacks in the House of Commons. Much of the correspondence of 
the spring had become public property, and the Opposition were 
able to support a charge of breach of faith with quotations from the 
documents which had passed between Castlereagh and Bentinck. But, 
in such circumstances, when only part of the facts are known, the 
position of a Minister of the Crown is a strong one. Castlereagh was 
able to make a convincing and effective reply which he supported by 
laying before the House numerous despatches to prove his case. 
These were carefully chosen, and included the documents supplied 
by Blacas as well as the comments of Bentinck and Nugent on the 
Memoire Historique. Though Wellington admitted that Blacas' docu- 
ments failed to convict Murat of a breach of faith, the evidence of 
Bentinck and Nugent did to a certain extent show him to have failed 
to carry out the promise on which the Treaty with Austria had been 
made, and in which Castlereagh had consented to recognise the 
Armistice. Castlereagh made skilful use of this evidence, while the 

1 Wellington to Burghersh, March 23rd, 1815. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 604. 

2 Clancarty to Castlereagh, April 8th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 17; British Diplo- 
macy, p. 321. 



49© THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

French documents were employed to prejudice Murat's character. 
Of the secret negotiations of January and February, no mention was, 
of course, made, and Castlereagh, though he mentioned Murat's offer 
transmitted by Chevalier Toco, carefully concealed the fact that he 
had been quite ready to accede to it at the time 1 . The case against 
the Government, therefore, completely collapsed ; nor did Bentinck, 
though he protested hotly against his dismissal, care to raise Neapoli- 
tan matters at a later stage, for on the question of Murat he had gone 
even further than his Government. Murat's second expedition, which 
resulted in his capture and execution, finally disposed of the question 
of dynasty. Castlereagh was thus free to lend his support to all 
Metternich's measures for establishing Austrian control over Italy. 
In Sicily, thanks to Bentinck, Ferdinand was a Constitutional monarch, 
and Metternich was not prepared to risk Parliamentary institutions 
being set up in the peninsula itself. As the price of his restoration, 
Ferdinand signed, on June 12th, a Treaty with Austria, by which, in 
a Secret Article, he pledged himself not to allow a Constitution to 
be set up in Naples. The Treaty was communicated to A'Court, who, 
though he considered formal approval almost unnecessary since "the 
unfortunate experiment which has been made in Sicily has sufficiently 
disgusted His Majesty with innovations of every description," yet 
had no hesitation in saying that anything which contributed to con- 
solidate the good understanding now prevailing between Austria and 
Naples could not but prove extremely satisfactory to the British 
Government 2 . Castlereagh quite approved of this attitude; but of 
this dubious transaction, naturally, the Opposition knew nothing. 

Castlereagh, before he left Vienna, had thus established, as he 
thought, a new arrangement of the European States which he hoped 
would safeguard the peace of Europe. He had, also, however, another 
expedient by which the Peace so hardly won might be specially pre- 
served from attack. Immediately before his departure, he produced 
a scheme by which the new order of things was to be specially guaran- 
teed by all the Powers of Europe. The idea of some special machinery 
for the preservation of peace was in the air. Castlereagh's scheme, 
however, undoubtedly dates back to the discussions between Pitt and 
Alexander in 1804 and 1805. In the letter to the Russian Ambassador, 
Pitt, after laying down the plan of the New Europe (a plan which 

1 Hansard, xxx. cols. 3-154, where the 19 documents placed before the House 
are printed. 

2 A'Court to Castlereagh, July 18th, 1815. F.O. Sicily, 70. 



CASTLEREAGH'S PLAN OF GUARANTEE 491 

Castlereagh might now claim to have brought into being, almost to 
the smallest details), had dealt with Alexander's proposal to "form 
at the restoration of peace a general agreement and guarantee for the 
mutual protection and security of different Powers, and for reestab- 
lishing a general system of public law in Europe." On this point, 
Pitt (with, it will be remembered, Castlereagh's assistance), had 
replied : 

It seems necessary at the period of a general pacification, to form a 
Treaty to which all the principal Powers of Europe should be parties, by 
which their respective rights and possessions, as they shall then have been 
established, shall be fixed and recognised. And they should all bind them- 
selves mutually to protect and support each other, against any attempt 
to infringe them: — It should re-establish a general and comprehensive 
system of public law in Europe, and provide, as far as possible, for re- 
pressing future attempts to disturb the general tranquillity; and above all, 
for restraining any projects of aggrandizement and ambition similar to 
those which have produced all the calamities inflicted on Europe since the 
disastrous aera of the French Revolution. 

It was this scheme which Castlereagh now endeavoured to put 
into operation 1 . He was the more anxious to do so since he was being 
pressed by Alexander to renew the Quadruple Alliance, while Talley- 
rand and Metternich were hinting that further secret engagements on 
the model of that of January 3rd would be to their liking. Castlereagh, 
of course, considered the Treaty of Chaumont as one of the safeguards 
of the European Peace. But he was naturally not anxious at this 
moment to emphasise that Instrument, while he was also unwilling 
to increase his secret engagements with other Powers, now that the 
settlement had been peacefully arranged. Accordingly, he avoided 
these special engagements by producing a proposal that the Powers 
should publicly declare "their determination to uphold and support 
the arrangements agreed upon; and, further, their determination to 
unite their influence, and if necessary their arms, against the power 
that should attempt to disturb it." Alexander welcomed the idea with 
enthusiasm, and Gentz drew up a declaration which in elaborate and 
highflown language expressed Pitt's idea. It might, perhaps, have 
been signed immediately; but Castlereagh, going further than Pitt, 
wished to include the Turkish dominions among the territories thus 
guaranteed. Even to this proposal Alexander agreed, on condition 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, February 13th, 1815; British Diplomacy, p. 303. 
For the details see also C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 83 and 85, and 
also an article in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3rd Series, vol. vi. 
November 16th, 191 1. 



492 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

that his disputes with the Porte should be first arranged. The Sultan, 
however, refused to take advantage of this offer, and, meanwhile, the 
return of Napoleon had caused the original scheme to be dropped. 
The project had thus no immediate result ; but it marks the direction 
of Castlereagh's thoughts, while it was this scheme which suggested 
to Alexander the idea of the Holy Alliance. 

After Castlereagh's departure, British influence at Vienna was 
never a determining factor in affairs. Though Wellington's prestige 
stood even now extraordinarily high , and he was treated with the greatest 
respect by the Congress, yet his energies were soon almost entirely 
absorbed in organising Europe to resist Napoleon. Moreover, almost 
all affairs of firstclass importance had been settled before Castlereagh 
left; so that neither Wellington nor Clancarty, who succeeded him, 
had more to do than fill in the details of the arrangements their pre- 
decessor had concluded. The disposal of Murat has been narrated 
above. In one other part of the Italian settlement, however, British 
diplomacy exerted considerable influence. The arrangement which 
Castlereagh concluded with Lewis XVIII as to the exclusion of the 
young Napoleon from the succession to the Parma duchies was never 
finally accepted by Metternich 1 . The return of Napoleon reduced the 
French influence to a negligible quantity, and Metternich was not 
anxious to see another Bourbon family established in the peninsula. 
When therefore, Alexander, with his usual chivalry, pressed for the 
enforcement of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, even though Napoleon 
had freed the Powers from all obligations under it, Metternich refused 
to insist on the arrangement to which he had previously agreed. Had 
it not been for the vigorous opposition of Clancarty, who was now in 
charge, the young Napoleon would have been recognised as the heir 
to the duchies in the Vienna Final Act. The spirit in which Clancarty 
approached the subject is illustrated by a phrase in one of his private 
letters to Castlereagh : "Will you seta precedent of placing Bonaparte's 
bastard on the Throne 2 ?" His fierce opposition was sufficient to 
prevent any recognition of the young Napoleon's rights in the Treaty, 

1 Castlereagh himself, however, admitted, so late as April 12th, that he had 
been wrong in agreeing at his Paris interview that the young Napoleon should be 
excluded from the Succession. He pointed out that his rights under the Treaty of 
Fontainebleau were explicitly guarded, and Marie- Louise had no power to deprive 
him of them. If they were taken away, therefore, it must be on the plea that 
Napoleon's return had abrogated the Treaty of Fontainebleau. If Napoleon had 
remained at Elba, his son would almost certainly have been recognised as heir to 
the Duchies. Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 306. 

2 Clancarty to Castlereagh, May 19th, 1815. Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 355. 



THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION 493 

where the succession was left open. Unknown to him, however, a 
Secret Protocol was signed between Austria, Prussia and Russia re- 
cognising these claims, which was to cause Metternich much em- 
barrassment when Castlereagh discovered it in 181 7. 

Another subject bound up in the fate of Italy was the settlement 
of the Ionian Islands. Castlereagh had been much exercised as to how 
to dispose of them in such a way as to exclude both French and 
Russian influence. At one time, they had been considered as a possible 
indemnity for Ferdinand IV; but, when he recovered Naples, Castle- 
reagh recognised that Austria could not allow both sides of the Adriatic 
Gulf to be held by the same Power. He would himself have been 
ready to hand them over to Austria; but this was vetoed by Russia, 
Capodistrias taking a special interest in the fate of his native country, 
and having been entrusted by Alexander with all his authority on this 
question. It was eventually owing to him that Great Britain retained 
control of the Islands as Protector, by the Treaty concluded between 
the Four Powers at Paris on November 5th, 1815 1 . 

In other minor arrangements, the British influence was exerted 
almost always on the side of Austria. In these, as in the more im- 
portant questions of the reconstruction of the German and Swiss 
Confederations, her diplomatists played only a subordinate part. 
From the first, Castlereagh had determined to have as little to do as 
possible with the details of the thorny and intricate problem of the 
new Constitution of Germany. He was, indeed, anxious that the 
German States should be combined in an effective Constitution, so 
that they should be able to hold their own against Russia and France. 
His own wishes would probably have led him to support Stein's pro- 
posals for a strong central government, with real control over the 
several States. He was especially anxious for the creation of a Federal 
army, and these ideas he supported in the period subsequent to the 
Congress. But he was aware of the difficulties of the situation, and 
does not appear to have attempted to exert any direct influence on the 
tortuous negotiations which eventually resulted in the eleven articles 
which formed part of the Final Act. In the Commission set up to 
consider this question, Great Britain was not directly represented 
and Munster was allowed an almost entirely free hand. While more 
"Austrian" than "Prussian," he was yet sufficiently moderate in 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, ill. 250. The suggestion made by Bavaria 
that the islands should be given to Prince Eugene de Beauharnais in compensation 
for his claims under the Treaty of Fontainebleau was immediately rejected by 
Wellington. Supplementary Despatches, ix. 570. 



494 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

his views to act as a mediator between rival parties, which was all 
that Castlereagh could desire. However, therefore, he may be blamed 
for supporting Metternich in later years in the equivocal proceedings 
which resulted in the Carlsbad Decrees and the Vienna Final Act, 
Castlereagh was in no way responsible for the halting solution reached 
at the Congress of Vienna itself. 

As to the Swiss Confederation, he laid down for his subordinates 
a similar policy. Nevertheless, the young Stratford Canning, who 
assisted Lord Stewart in this matter, was too able and energetic a 
diplomatist to be content with a passive role, and he played a consider- 
able part in the series of negotiations which eventually adapted the 
Constitution of 1803 to the altered circumstances of the time, and 
finally succeeded in composing the differences among both the Swiss 
and the Allies. He was, for example, not satisfied with Capodistrias' 
drafting of the Protocols, and was tactfully allowed to draw them up 
himself. He supported the policy of allowing the wishes of the Diet 
to prevail, and successfully opposed Capodistrias' rather sweeping 
proposals. He, also, tried to save the Valtelline from Austria without 
success. None of the Powers seem to have understood the importance 
of their Declaration guaranteeing the neutrality of Switzerland, which 
was not finally executed until the Second Peace of Paris, and there 
is no sign that British statesmen took a special interest in this question. 
They were, indeed, more concerned in bringing Switzerland into the 
Coalition against Napoleon and inducing her to allow the Allied troops 
to move across her territory, than in arranging the details of the new 
policy, which was to form a precedent of great value, and prove of 
enormous advantage to Switzerland in the coming century. 

The Abolition of the Slave-trade was made one of the principal 
questions of the Congress, solely through the agency of the British 
Ministers. They had indeed no alternative. On this Question, public 
opinion in England was stirred to the uttermost, and was, moreover, 
concentrated and organised so that it could exert its full force on the 
Legislature and the Executive. The Additional Article of the Treaty 
of Paris had by no means satisfied the recognised spokesmen of this 
subject in the country. The concession to France, that she might 
continue to bring slaves for five years to the Colonies, was considered 
a betrayal of the cause. It was in vain that Castlereagh pleaded that 
France must be treated as an independent nation, and that the cause 
would ultimately be better served by her agreement than by her sub- 
mission. He was held to have thrown away a unique opportunity for 



THE SLAVE TRADE 495 

abolishing the detested traffic. "What could be done when your own 
Ambassador gave way ? " Alexander asked Wilberforce, doubtless not 
unwilling to make things difficult for the Tories. But Wilberforce 
was himself a good Tory, and, though he would have sacrificed his 
party if any advantage could be secured for the cause, he saw clearly 
that it was useless to press the Ministry too far. The motion, therefore, 
which he moved on June 27th, in a speech that was a severe rebuke, 
was one which could be accepted by Castlereagh, whose defence was 
"that France could not be taught morality at the point of the 
bayonet." Motions by Grenville in the Upper House and Horner in 
the Commons calling for papers the Ministry were able to meet ; but 
it was obvious that they had disappointed the country. 

The efforts of the Government as well as those of the leaders of 
the agitation were immediately redoubled in view of the possibilities 
of the approaching Congress. Eight hundred petitions, containing 
nearly a million signatures, were presented to the House of Commons. 
Wilberforce prepared a mass of pamphlets, including an open letter 
to Talleyrand, in order to convert the Continental Sovereigns and 
statesmen. The Government, meanwhile, made the cause of Abolition 
a first charge in their endeavours. Orders were sent to Wellington at 
Paris and to Wellesley at Madrid to prepare the way for the efforts to 
be made at the Congress itself. In neither country, however, could much 
headway be made. All that Wellesley had been able to obtain in the 
Treaty of Alliance, signed on July 14th, was a promise by Spain to 
limit the traffic to ships of her own subjects. He was now authorised 
by Castlereagh to offer considerable subsidies, amounting to two 
million pounds, if Spain would limit the trade to the south of the line 
and promise to abolish it in five years, to which offer that of a loan 
on British credit for ten million dollars was added, if the Abolition 
was made immediate. But both these offers were rejected, and nothing 
had been accomplished by the time the Congress opened. 

In France, the Abolitionists exerted their utmost efforts, and sent 
over Clarkson on a special mission. But French public opinion was 
vehement against concessions, and the support of the notorious Abbe 
Gregoire did not assist their cause. Extensive slaving expeditions 
were being prepared in French ports, and it was suggested that here, as 
in Spain, British capital was finding employment. Talleyrand, how- 
ever, hinted to Lord Holland that France might grant immediate 
abolition in return for a Colony; and, on the conversation being re- 
ported, Wellington was permitted by Liverpool to sound the French 



496 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

as to whether a money compensation would suffice, though both Am- 
bassador and Prime-Minister were agreed as to the impolicy of barter. 
When Wilberforce and the Whigs heard of the proposal from Clarkson, 
they took it up so warmly as to render it obvious that some such offer 
must be made, if only to avoid disastrous criticism at home. By this 
time, however, the Congress had assembled, and the negotiation was, 
by Wellington's wish, transferred to Vienna. On October 8th, there- 
fore, Castlereagh addressed an official Note to Talleyrand, making the 
definite offer to France of a West Indian island or a sum of money as 
compensation, if immediate Abolition were granted. This action was 
admittedly forced on the Government by fear of public opinion, and 
neither Liverpool, Wellington nor Castlereagh himself believed it to 
be a wise step . Castlereagh , indeed , considered that the whole agitation 
in England was doing more harm than good. 

"The more I have occasion to observe the temper of foreign Powers 
on the question of Abolition," he wrote to Liverpool, "the more strongly 
impressed I am with the sense of prejudice that results, not only to the 
interests of the question itself but of our foreign relations generally, from 
the display of popular impatience which has been excited and is kept up 
in England on this subject. It is impossible to persuade foreign nations 
that this sentiment is unmixed with views of Colonial policy, and their 
Cabinets, who can better estimate the real and virtuous motives which 
guide us on this question, see in the very impatience of the nation a power- 
ful instrument through which they expect to force at a convenient moment 
the British Government upon some favourite object of policy. 

" I am conscious that we have done an act of indispensable duty, under 
the circumstances in which we have been placed, in making to the French 
and Spanish Governments the propositions we have done, but I am still 
more firmly persuaded that we should be at this moment in fact nearer our 
object, if the Government had been permitted to pursue this object with 
its ordinary means of influence and persuasion, instead of being expected 
to purchase concessions on this point almost at any sacrifice 1 ." 

Talleyrand delayed his answer till November 5th, and when it 
came it was a refusal, as Castlereagh and Wellington had anticipated. 
Nevertheless, the Note was by no means uncompromising, partly, as 
Castlereagh thought, because the recovery of San Domingo by the 
French was now abandoned. In these circumstances, he avoided 
bringing the subject officially before the Congress, merely circulating 
documents and memoranda, and adding to the circulars of the Aboli- 
tionists others prepared by his own Office, which appealed to the 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, October 25th, 1814. F.O. Continent. 7; British 
Diplomacy, p. 215. 



THE SLAVE TRADE: SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 497 

commercial and financial interests of the Powers concerned. Wellesley 
had, at last, induced the Spanish Government to offer to abolish the 
Trade in eight years, and immediately up to io° on either side of the 
line; and the Portuguese Plenipotentiaries at Vienna were prepared 
to go rather further. It was Castlereagh's opinion, therefore, that, 
instead of concentration on attempts to obtain immediate Abolition, 
France should be induced to reduce her period to three years, after 
which coercive measures should be employed against Spain and 
Portugal by a refusal to admit their Colonial commerce to the markets 
of other countries, until the Trade was completely abolished. He, also, 
proposed to set up a permanent Commission in London and Paris 
to watch over the effectual execution of the regulations ; for he was 
well aware, as events proved to be the case, how difficult in practice 
it would be to enforce worldwide Abolition. He hinted that exercise 
of the right of search and the treatment of offenders as pirates might 
be necessary to put a stop to the traffic — questions which were to 
occupy the attention of the British Government throughout the 
nineteenth century. These ideas were submitted to the Government 
in a special Memorandum on November 21st 1 . Liverpool's reply, on 
December 9th 2 , approved of the plan and urged that five years 
should be the extreme limit allowed to Spain and Portugal. By the 
beginning of December, however, when Castlereagh endeavoured to 
have the matter formally taken up, he was met with the determined 
opposition of these two Powers to the establishment of a special Com- 
mission of the Eight Powers for consideration of the subject, though 
Talleyrand, who was anxious at this time to win Castlereagh's favour 
for other reasons, supported him loyally. For the moment, therefore, 
Castlereagh dropped the formal negotiations, which the extreme 
tension then existing in the Congress made it difficult to pursue 3 . 
He succeeded, during the interval, by the offer of money and many 
other concessions, including the abrogation of some of the more 
onerous Clauses of the Treaty of Alliance between Portugal and Great 
Britain, in inducing the Portuguese Plenipotentiaries to sign a Treaty 
abolishing the traffic north of the line. Similar efforts with Spain 
were however of no avail. 

At last, early in the new year, the formal consideration of the subject 
was again taken up. By personal interviews with the three Allied 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, November 21st. F.O. Continent. 8; British Diplo- 
macy, p. 233. 

2 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, ix. 469. 

3 Castlereagh to Liverpool, December 18th, 18 14. F.O. Continent. 9. 

W.&G.I. 32 



498 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

Sovereigns, Castlereagh procured the full support of their Ministers 1 
for all his proposals, Alexander showing himself especially zealous. 
He knew, also, that Talleyrand would go as far as he dared. On 
January 16th, therefore, he was able to obtain the establishment of a 
" Conference " of the Eight Powers to consider the subject, which was 
distinguished in name only from a formal Commission. This Com- 
mittee held four meetings between January 20th and February 8th, 
in which all Castlereagh's proposals were formally considered. He 
was able to confront the Spanish and Portuguese Plenipotentiaries 
with the united efforts of all the Great Powers, and to place the former 
in an exceedingly difficult position. Though Labrador and Palmella 
maintained a determined front, a record was thus obtained of the 
public feeling of all Governments which bore some immediate fruit, 
and certainly made easier the task of completing and making effective 
the work of Abolition in the succeeding years. A formal Declaration 
that the Slave-trade was against the laws of humanity was easily 
obtained, since it committed no Power to any express measure, and 
this Declaration subsequently became part of the Final Act signed in 
Vienna. An effort to induce Talleyrand to reduce the French term to 
three years having failed, as Castlereagh knew must be the case, he 
concentrated his efforts on obtaining Abolition north of the line and 
complete Abolition in five years. From Portugal, he obtained the 
former concession, and the latter from all the Powers except Portugal 
and Spain. Castlereagh then opened his plans for setting up special 
machinery in the form of Ambassadorial Conferences at London and 
Paris, to supervise the regulations as to Abolition. Spain and Portugal 
protested against this, wishing the Colonial Powers to be alone admitted ; 
but Castlereagh refused to give way, since the whole essence of his 
plan lay in associating with Great Britain the Continental nations, 
who had no direct interests in the maintenance of the Trade, in order 
to put pressure on the other Maritime Powers. He, also, adumbrated 
plans for mutual right of search, and sketched his idea of excluding 
from the ports of all civilised nations the Colonial produce of any 
Power who refused to agree to complete Abolition after a lapse of 
time. This last proposition much alarmed Palmella, who placed a 
special protest on the Protocol, but Castlereagh was able to obtain a 
general approval of it 2 . 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, January ist, 1815; British Diplomacy, p. 274. 

2 It was turned against him, in 1817, by Alexander in the question of the 
Spanish Colonies. 



THE SLAVE TRADE. RESULTS 499 

On the whole, Castlereagh thought that Parliament and public 
opinion ought to be satisfied with the result of his efforts. 

" I hope," he wrote on January 26th, "that essential progress has been 
made at least upon one branch of the question, I mean the liberation of the 
Northern parts of Africa from the miseries of this Trade ; the foundation 
has also been laid for an entire cessation of the evil at a definite period, with 
the prospect that the auspicious epoch may be accelerated by future 
exertion ; and what I consider of great importance is that the attention of 
the Ministers here has been awakened to this important subject in a degree 
much beyond what I could have hoped for, considering the multiplicity 
of their avocations and their former ignorance of the question 1 ." 

The claim was justified. By obtaining a general Declaration 
against the Trade in the Treaty, by awakening public opinion among 
the statesmen by the discussions of the final Conference, and by initia- 
ting practical measures to ensure that Abolition, once obtained, should 
be faithfully carried out, Castlereagh had done an immense amount 
to bring this odious practice to an end. He was to add further services 
to the cause in the next two or three years. Nevertheless, in spite of 
his strictures on the vehement manifestations of public opinion in 
England, it is obvious that, without the unceasing efforts of Wilber- 
force and his friends, Castlereagh and his Government would have 
accomplished but little. Their goodwill cannot of course be doubted; 
but they needed a spur to make them sufficiently active when other 
matters were pressing on their attention. By forcing Ministers to 
initiate a policy of sacrifice, Wilberforce may sometimes have caused 
the Continental Powers to raise their price for acquiescence in a 
measure which their interests as well as their conscience should have 
forced them to adopt immediately. But, though a cynical construction 
was put upon the agitation by statesmen at the time and by many 
foreign historians since, it cannot be doubted that it was as sincere as 
it was ultimately effectual, and that, without the sustained and eager 
insistence of an organised public opinionin this country, the responsible 
statesmen would have allowed the iniquitous traffic to continue under 
the pretext that it was impossible to do otherwise. 

Even as it was, the Government found it hard to convince the 
country that they had done all that was possible. Fortunately for the 
Ministry, the return of Napoleon, as will be seen, led to immediate 
Abolition by France, so that they were able thenceforth to concen- 
trate their efforts on the Peninsular Powers. 

With regard to another important Question at the Congress, 
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, January 26th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 10. 

32—2 



5 oo THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

Clancarty represented Great Britain on the Commission which was 
established to regulate International Rivers. Great Britain does not 
seem to have exerted much influence on these discussions, in which, 
naturally, the Continental Powers were much more nearly interested. 
This Commission was, however, used by Castlereagh to draw up the 
regulations on one question in which his country had a special in- 
terest — the destruction of the fortifications of Antwerp, which by the 
Treaty of Paris of 18 14 it had been agreed to make a commercial port. 
In the regulations drawn up by the Commission on the rank of 
diplomatic representatives Castlereagh took little interest, declaring 
that they would raise as many problems as they solved, though he 
acquiesced in the wishes of the majority. An attempt was made to 
raise the question of naval salutes at this Commission — a sly hit at 
some extravagant British pretensions — but the objections of the 
Admiralty prevailed and the matter was not formally considered. 

IV. THE RETURN OF NAPOLEON AND THE SECOND 
PEACE OF PARIS 

As has been seen above, Castlereagh was by no means satisfied with 
the Treaty of Fontainebleau, by which Napoleon was made Imperial 
Sovereign of Elba. But though he (and still more strongly, Lord 
Stewart) saw much reason for alarm in the establishment of Napoleon 
at Elba, yet he could, at the moment, suggest no other suitable destina- 
tion for him, and consequently accepted the Treaty so far as the 
territorial arrangements for Napoleon and his family were concerned. 
Naturally , the surveillance of Napoleon was a considerable anxiety to the 
British Government during his stay on Elba. The British Commissary, 
Sir Neil Campbell, was provided with a naval force expressly for the 
supervision of the Emperor, and Lord Burghersh at Florence was 
specially ordered to supervise from Tuscany any attempts to enter into 
correspondence with him. But Napoleon was still a Sovereign Prince, 
and his actions could not be controlled, unless they amounted to an in- 
fringement of the Treaty ; and though the archives of all the Powers 
are full of reports on his activities, nothing definite was known as to 
his designs. Metternich's secret police watched all the channels into 
Italy, and Talleyrand had his own spies. But, though some of the 
reports were alarmist, they came from discreditable sources. Castle- 
reagh appears to have been chiefly disturbed by the possibility of 
collusion between Murat and Napoleon; but their intercourse was 
carried on through confidential agents, and there was no definite 



NAPOLEON'S ESCAPE FROM ELBA 501 

proof of any plot. Thus, short of instituting a complete naval blockade 
of the Mediterranean, the British Government had no alternative 
but to trust to Campbell's watchfulness to prevent an escape. 

There was, indeed, some talk at Vienna of removing Napoleon 
to a more remote and more easily guarded situation. The point is 
mentioned in one of the first papers laid by Prussia before the other 
three Allies 1 . But such a plan was never seriously considered, and 
there can be no doubt that Alexander, and almost certainly Castle- 
reagh and Metternich as well, would have vetoed any such proposi- 
tion. Talleyrand was reduced to dally with designs for the kid- 
napping of Napoleon, and, as some think, even assassination was 
contemplated by the Bourbons, if no seriously planned scheme was 
ever set on foot. Lewis XVIII, however, refused to carry out the 
financial terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, by which two million 
francs were to have been paid to Napoleon. Castlereagh, more than 
once, warned Talleyrand of the danger of this infringement of the 
Treaty, and spoke strongly to Lewis XVIII about it on his passage 
through Paris. His words were not heeded ; but Talleyrand may have 
remembered them when he was reduced to begging for money from 
Wellington, after his own supplies from Paris had been cut off by 
the return of the Emperor 2 . 

During his stay at Elba, Napoleon concealed with supreme skill 
his intention of returning, which he must have contemplated almost 
from the beginning of his exile. He professed, indeed, alarm at the 
rumours that he was to be deported to St Helena or elsewhere, as 
well as at the danger of an attack by Barbary pirates; he, also, com- 
plained bitterly of being deprived of his wife and son, and of the 
financial straits to which he was reduced. But Campbell, no less than 
all Napoleon's visitors, many of whom were English, was completely 
deceived by the resigned attitude which he affected. The resolution at 
which he arrived to take advantage of Campbell's absence in Tuscany 
for a few days appears to have been the result of intuition rather than 
of calculation, but it was welltimed so far as France was concerned. So 
easily was the escape made that for long it was widely believed in Europe 
to have been effected with the connivance of the British Government. 
Though Castlereagh generously took the responsibility, and demon- 
strated to the House of Commons the impossibility of blockading 

1 See The Congress of Vienna, p. 160. 

2 No credence should be attached to Talleyrand's assertion that Castlereagh 
listened with approval to a suggestion that Napoleon should be removed to the 
Azores. 



5 02 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

effectively the island of Elba, it may be questioned whether Campbell 
was sufficiently alive to the risks of his position. 

However, the mischief was done, and Europe was soon faced with 
the fact that France had accepted Napoleon's return almost without 
opposition. At Vienna, the first step taken was the memorable Decla- 
ration of March 13th, which delivered Napoleon to the vengeance of 
the nations. No mention was made in this document of supporting 
the Bourbons, for it was drawn up before the full extent of Napoleon's 
success was known. When the extent of the disaster was clear, there 
was but one voice among the Allies. The Treaty of Chaumont had 
been concluded expressly to guard against this danger. By March 
25th, with hardly any alterations in the original text, the Four Powers 
had renewed their agreement, and six hundred thousand men were, 
on paper at least, in arms against France. Nor, so far as Napoleon 
was concerned, was this anything less than the expression of the 
Sovereigns' deep emotions and those of their peoples against the man 
who had so often triumphed over them. There was never at any time 
any sign of defection. When Napoleon found the Secret Treaty of 
January 3rd in his archives and sent it to Alexander, it told the latter 
little more than he already knew, and, though Castlereagh had a 
moment of anxiety, the revelation produced no effect. The Tsar 
indeed, aware of his own responsibility for the catastrophe, was almost 
too zealous, and it needed the blunt opposition of Wellington to make 
him understand that he could not be the generalissimo of the new- 
Coalition 1 . Wellington himself approached nearer to that role, and 
with the Allied military authorities at Vienna produced a plan of 
campaign which would ultimately bring a million soldiers into the field 
against the French. At the end of March, he set out for Brussels to 
take command of the army which England was assembling in the 
Netherlands, of which, however, only 30,000 were British troops. 

But, though united against Napoleon, the Powers were no more 
agreed as to who should take his place than they had been in 18 14. 
Metternich's intrigues with Fouche were doubtless, as he said, a mere 
ruse de guerre. But his attitude was at least doubtful, while Alexander 
spoke even more bitterly against the Bourbons than he had in 18 14; 
for they had now added to their other faults ingratitude to himself. 
Talleyrand himself kept a free hand so far as possible, and refused 
to leave Vienna for the King's Court at Ghent. Indeed, at Vienna 

1 Wellington to Castlereagh, March 12th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 14; British 
Diplomacy, p. 312. 



ATTITUDE OF GREAT BRITAIN 503 

Clancarty was by far the best friend of the Bourbons, and, when it was 
proposed to issue another Declaration, now that Napoleon had assumed 
the Crown once more, it was his insistence that obtained the insertion 
in it of some words of a friendly nature towards Lewis XVIII, while, in 
a long interview with Alexander, he discouraged the Tsar's predilections 
for Orleans or even a Republic 1 . So difficult was it to obtain agreement 
on the question at Vienna, that the Declaration originally drawn up 
on April 1 ith, was not formally inserted on the Protocol until May 12th. 
Meanwhile, though the British Government were entirely at one 
with the Allies as regards Napoleon, there was a period of uncer- 
tainty before the War with France became irrevocable. Nearly all 
the "Mountain" and many of the Whigs were against the War, and 
almost until the outbreak of hostilities in Belgium protested against it. 
Castlereagh had to defend against hot attacks in the Commons not only 
the Vienna Settlement, so far as it was already known, but also the 
policy of the Allied Powers with regard to the Treaty of Fontainebleau . 
In the Lords, Wellesley as well as Grey protested against the War, 
though the Grenville party held coldly aloof. In these circumstances, 
the Ministry, though determined on war, in which they were sup- 
ported by the mass of the nation, could do nothing openly for the 
Bourbons. Their sentiments were, indeed, unanimous in desiring 
Lewis' return, and throughout they were faithful to the confession 
which Liverpool had made on February 20th, "The keystone of all 
my external policy is the preservation of the Bourbons on the 
Throne 2 ." But, though on March 12th, when the news of Napoleon's 
flight first reached him, Castlereagh wrote to Wellington urging the 
Powers to support Lewis XVIII, by the 14th he had to supplement 
this despatch by another urging caution. "We can often do more 
than we can say 3 ," he wrote; and this sums up the policy of his 
Government. Thus, though the Declaration of the 13th was defended 
against the attacks of the Opposition, who described it as an incentive 
to assassination, the Treaty of March 25th was only accepted subject 
to a declaration that it was not intended to impose any particular 
dynasty on France, and Clancarty was cautioned against committing 
his Government in any way to the cause of the Bourbons. 

1 Clancarty to Castlereagh, April 15th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 17; British 
Diplomacy, p. 325. 

2 Liverpool to Castlereagh, February 20th, 1815. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 573. 

3 Castlereagh to Wellington, March 12th, 14th, 16th. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 592, 595, 597. 



5o 4 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

And, though Napoleon's letter to the Prince Regent was returned 
unopened, the Address moved in the House of Commons on April 
17th 1 , while urging preparation for war and concert with the Allies, 
did not, as Castlereagh expressly allowed, mean immediate war. But 
the temper of the nation gradually showed that Ministers had the whole 
country behind them. Whitbread could only muster 37 votes against 
220 for his amendment to the Address, and of the London Press only 
The Morning Chronicle supported a peace policy. Napoleon's bid for 
British public opinion by decreeing the complete Abolition of the 
Slave-trade produced no effect. When the Treaty of March 25th 
became known and had to be avowed, another furious attack was 
made by the Opposition, who taunted Castlereagh with the futility 
of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, as well as with the bad faith shown in 
carryingit out. But this attackwas almost as easily repulsed as the other, 
though the wisdom of the British reservation was made clear. Mean- 
while, the blockade had been established and French merchantmen 
seized ; preparations were made to foment insurrection in the Vendee, 
and the army was being rapidly organised in Belgium. The Duke of 
Wellington was entrusted with the task of making Subsidy Treaties 
with the smaller Powers, so that Great Britain could supply her quota 
as laid down by the Treaty, and through his agency gradually all the 
petty States were summoned to join in the fray. Sir Charles Stuart 
was instructed to represent the British Government at the stately, if 
penurious, Court which Lewis kept up at Ghent, where also all the 
other Great Powers were represented. Money, munitions and clothing 
were sent to the King. 

After Waterloo, the Duke became the arbiter of the destinies of 
France. Bliicher was no politician, and was too fully occupied with 
revenge and spoliation to play any important part in the series of 
events that ensued on Napoleon's abdication in favour of his son. 
Lewis was, therefore, able to take Wellington's advice and follow 
closely the victorious Allied armies, and all northern France declared 
for him before Paris fell. It scarcely needed, therefore, the dexterous 
intrigues of Fouche to smooth the way for the Second Restoration, 
which was accomplished before the Sovereigns and their Ministers 
had time to intervene, even if they had wished. Alexander had thus, 
for a second time, to accept the despised Bourbons, and soon accom- 
modated himself to the position. So swiftly and easily did all this 

1 A very accurate summary of the Debate is given in The Dynasts, Part III. 
Act v, Scene v. 



SURRENDER OF NAPOLEON 505 

take place, that the wish of the British Government was accomplished 
without either Castlereagh or Wellington being compromised. 

Napoleon fled to the coast ; but British ships prevented the accom- 
plishment of his plan of escaping to America. Had he succeeded, 
Alexander wished the Allies to address a Note to the President to 
surrender him ; but Castlereagh himself had no expectation that much 
advantage would be derived from such a measure. However, Napoleon 
had really no alternative but to surrender to Captain Maitland, and, 
in any case, he could not, and probably did not, expect much mercy, 
in spite of his famous appeal to the generosity of the British nation. 
Wellington protested against Blucher's resolve to shoot Napoleon if 
he caught him; but our Ministers would have welcomed such an 
escape from an intolerable responsibility. The Allies were only too 
ready to leave to the British the ignominy of guarding the Emperor, 
though, since Castlereagh from the first insisted on it against the 
wishes of the Cabinet, they, by means of Commissaries at St Helena, 
shared the responsibility of his detention. Castlereagh, who, while still 
ignorant of Napoleon's surrender, had lamented that the King of 
France had not the will or the power to execute him as a traitor, 
wrote to Liverpool on hearing of his capture, "After fighting him 
for 20 years, as a trophy he seems to belong to us 1 ." Since measures 
were soon on foot by his friends in England to use the machinery of 
English law to embarrass the Government, he was quickly hurried 
off to St Helena — a captive, and denied, now as ever, by the British 
Government the Imperial title and the attributes of royalty. 

Their Emperor captive and the Bourbons restored, the French 
nation had now to be dealt with. So early as March 26th, Castlereagh 
had written to Wellington that though "France must pay the price 
of her own deliverance," yet it was imperative that war should not 
degenerate into "an indiscriminate and destructive pillage," as it had 
in 1814 2 . Wellington himself was most anxious to avoid measures 
which, in the previous campaign, had impaired the efficiency of every 
army but his own and rallied the French nation against the invaders. 
Accordingly he arranged with Lewis XVIII that Commissaries should 
be appointed to accompany the Allied armies to regulate their rela- 
tions with the inhabitants and arrange for their subsistence. But, 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, July 17th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 21 ; British Diplo- 
macy, p. 350. 

2 Castlereagh to Wellington, March 26th, 1815. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 623. See also Sir Charles Stuart's Despatches in Malet's Louis XVIII 
d Gand, vol. II. 



5 o6 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

though he was able to carry out this measure effectively with his own 
army, he could not control the others. The Prussians paid scant 
attention to the royal nominees. Nor did the annihilation of Napoleon's 
army arrest the march of the Allied troops. On the contrary, so soon 
as all danger was over, every country was anxious to feed its troops 
at the French expense, while it continued to earn the British subsidies ; 
and, before long, nearly a million soldiers had entered France. The 
Prussians who were only prevented by Wellington's influence from 
the destruction of the Pont de Jena at Paris levied vast contribu- 
tions. Castlereagh had foreseen this danger, and took instant steps 
to mitigate it and regularise the exactions of the Allies so far as 
possible; while Wellington declared that "the Allies will in a short 
time find themselves circumstanced in France as the French were in 
Spain, if the system pursued by the Prussians and now imitated by 
the Bavarians shall not be effectively checked 1 ." 

Castlereagh had, also, to formulate the views of his Government on 
the Question of the treatment to be meted out to those who had aban- 
doned Lewis's service for that of Napoleon in 1815. On this subject 
the British Cabinet was vehement. In an Instruction dated June 30th, 
Liverpool urged that a severe example should be made, not only of 
commanding officers of garrisons and corps who had deserted to Bona- 
parte, but also of civil functionaries who had gone over. He called 
for the penalties of High Treason to be inflicted and a severe 
example to be made 2 . This opinion was reiterated, in letter after 
letter, in the early days of July, and there can be no doubt that 
Liverpool was expressing not merely his own views but those of 
nearly the whole nation. Castlereagh and Wellington to some extent 
shared these views. Wellington, it is true, in the Convention which he 
drew up with Fouche, granted a general amnesty; yet he was careful 
to point out in the later discussions that arose as to Ney's position, 
that he had no authority to speak for the French King, but only for 
the Allied Commanders. He does not, however, appear to have taken 
much part in these early discussions. It was Castlereagh who urged 
on Talleyrand on July 13th "the importance of adequately vindica- 
ting the King's authority," and who, on the 17th, brought the matter 
before the Allied Ministers. Talleyrand agreed with the principle, 
or said he did ; but how was a Government which contained Fouche 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, July 14th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 21; British 
Diplomacy, p. 343. 

2 Yonge, Life of Liverpool, 11. 184. 



EXECUTION OF NEY 507 

to condemn traitors? Castlereagh reported that "there is a great re- 
pugnance to shed blood, the result in a great measure of fear and 
party compromise." In another interview, on the 17th, he pressed 
the matter on Talleyrand and Fouche 1 . The Minister of Police saw 
that some concession must be made to popular vengeance; but the 
Decree in which the punishment was announced contained the names 
of those against whom it was to be applied, and their arrest.was delayed 
after this judicious advertisement. Unfortunately, Ney and one or two 
others omitted to escape in time, with the result that they alone 
suffered. Many efforts were made to save Ney, especially by Lord 
Holland. But Liverpool and the Prince Regent were naturally ap- 
pealed to in vain. Wellington also refused to interfere — an act for 
which he has been much criticised, inasmuch as he signed the Con- 
vention with Fouche. But his defence holds true, and while Welling- 
ton, to whom duty was the watchword of life, had not a spark of 
revengeful spirit in him, he was the last man in the world to palliate 
what he could not but consider as a betrayal. On the Civil Ministers 
and Sovereigns of all the Allied Powers must rest the responsibility 
for an act as impolitic as it was unjust, since the worst traitors, if they 
were to be considered such, escaped; while Castlereagh must bear 
his share of it, though there are signs that he would never have pressed 
the question so strongly if he had not been hounded on by his Cabinet 
and his country. 

Of far greater importance, however, than the fate of Ney or even 
that of Napoleon himself, was the punishment that France herself was 
to suffer. She could not expect the moderate treatment that she had, 
on the whole, received in 1814. It is true that the Allies had pro- 
claimed war on Napoleon, and not on the French people. But the 
Emperor had received the support of practically the whole of the 
nation, and France herself was, in the eyes of all Europe, responsible 
for the contest which had once more called all Europe to arms. On 
this Question, the British Cabinet and to a large extent the British 
nation were influenced by the passions of the moment. They were 
quite ready to join those Continental Powers who wished, not merely 
to bleed France white, but to deprive her of large portions of territory, 
so as to render her defenceless and impotent for the future. From the 
first, however, Castlereagh (and he had throughout the sincere sup- 
port of Wellington) took an entirely opposite view. He did not deny 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, July 14th, 17th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 21 ; British 
Diplomacy, pp. 344, 347. 



5 o8 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

that the Allies were entitled to exact an indemnity from France, and 
he was concerned to establish some means of security for the imme- 
diate future. But, from the first, he saw clearly the folly of depriving 
France of the conquests of the eighteenth century, and of placing her 
in such a situation as to make her despair of her future. For six weeks, 
supported only by Alexander, he fought a hard battle with his Cabinet 
and the Allies, till, in the end, his commonsense and irresistible logic 
triumphed, and the terms actually offered to France were almost 
exactly what he had proposed in the first instance. Nor, in the con- 
cessions finally made to the French when Richelieu succeeded Talley- 
rand, did he play a backward part. His despatches at this period are 
among the best papers which he ever wrote, and scarcely ever has a 
statesman better served his country and Europe. He stood entirely 
unmoved by the outburst of emotion which swayed his colleagues and 
most of his countrymen, and with rare statesmanship carried out 
coolly, and with infinite tact as well as unbending resolution, a policy 
which events completely justified. He risked much, for he had 
nothing to gain as a party leader (as St John had in 171 3). He was 
immensely helped by Wellington, whose papers are models of sound 
reasoning ; but only a Foreign Minister who had obtained a complete 
ascendancy over his Cabinet and was utterly indifferent to the passing 
storms of popular passion could have carried such a policy to a 
triumphant conclusion. Throughout, he made no appeal to senti- 
ment. His despatches are based entirely on an enlightened view of 
British interests ; and their overwhelming commonsense made it im- 
possible to his colleagues ultimately to resist his conclusions. 

The opinion of the Cabinet and the country on this point was 
conveyed to him by Liverpool in a series of letters, which, if less im- 
peratively phrased than those on the French " traitors," were yet clear 
and strong enough. 

"The more I consider the present internal state of France," wrote 
Liverpool on July 10th, " and the little chance there is of security to Europe 
from the character and strength of the French Government, the more I am 
satisfied that we must look for security on the frontier, and in really 
weakening the power of France. This opinion is rapidly gaining ground in 
this country, and I think, even if Bonaparte was dead, there would now be 
considerable disappointment at any peace which left France as she was 
left by the Treaty of Paris, or even as she was before the Revolution 1 ." 

On the 15th, when some news arrived of how things stood at Paris, 
Liverpool wrote, after a long sitting of the Cabinet, that the prevalent 

1 Yonge, Life of Liverpool, II. 190. 



TEMPORARY OCCUPATION OF FRENCH TERRITORY 509 

idea in the country was that "we are fairly entitled to avail our- 
selves of the present moment to take back from France the principal 
conquests of Lewis XIV 1 ." Castlereagh was ordered to sound the 
Allies on this point; but at the same time he was authorised, if the 
Allies objected to such strong measures, to agree to a temporary occu- 
pation of the northern barrier of France until a line of fortresses had 
been built in the Netherlands at the French expense. Nothing would 
have better pleased the majority of Castlereagh's colleagues at Paris than 
to have had placed before them the extreme view of the Cabinet. Of the 
Allies the Emperor of Russia was alone disposed to adopt a lenient 
policy — more lenient indeed than what Castlereagh himself advocated, 
for he would have been content to waive even a temporary occupation. 
Austria was inclined to go considerably further than Castlereagh in 
depriving France of territory, while Prussia and the smaller German 
Powers were demanding extensive acquisitions, including Alsace and 
Lorraine and the northern French fortresses. Both the Tsar and Castle- 
reagh admitted that France must pay an indemnity. They wished 
this, however, to be a reasonable sum, to be settled in accordance with 
the ability of France to pay it within a fairly short time. Austria, 
Prussia and the minor German States were simply determined to 
bleed France, and they had already begun the process by inordinate 
extortions while they were in occupation. Talleyrand, meanwhile, 
let it be known that the King and his Ministers would not consent 
to sacrifice the slightest portion of French territory. In these circum- 
stances, Castlereagh determined to come to an agreement with the 
Tsar. In an interview with him, he persuaded him to accept the 
British proposal for temporary occupation ; and so close an agreement 
was established that the Tsar was induced to press on Austria and 
Prussia a paper that had been drawn up by Castlereagh and Welling- 
ton in conjunction with the Russian Ministers 2 . Four days later, 
Castlereagh was able to forward home a plan of temporary occupa- 
tion, drawn up by Wellington, which paid due heed to the suscepti- 
bilities of France, exempting Lille andStrassburg 3 . Neither the Cabinet 
nor the Allies were pleased with these suggestions. Castlereagh 
appears to have kept back from the former for two days the Austrian 
and Prussian answers, in order that his own arguments might have 

1 Liverpool to Castlereagh, July 15th, 181 5. Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 431. 

2 But the paper was in reality almost entirely inspired by the British Ministers. 
Sbornik of the Imperial Russian Historical Society, cxn. 297. 

3 Castlereagh to Liverpool, August 3rd, 1815. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, xi. 123. 



5 io THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

time to sink in, and, though his colleagues offered a good many 
criticisms, it was not easy for them to argue against Wellington on 
specific points. Their opinion, however, is clearly seen in a final para- 
graph of Liverpool's letter of August nth: 

As we have not yet seen the Austrian and Prussian projects, we do not 
know the extent of the views of these Governments, but we are informed 
that they propose to a certain degree the principle of permanent cessions 
by France, at least as far as regards the external line of fortresses. We ought 
not to forget that these Governments have more of common interest with 
us in the whole of this question than the Government of Russia ; and, though 
we must all have deeply at heart the consolidation of the legitimate Govern- 
ment in France, we should consider that our success in this object must 
necessarily be very uncertain, and that the security of the neighbouring 
countries against France may be much more easily attained than the 
rendering France orderly and pacific 1 . 

The Austrian and Prussian replies put forward schemes founded 
on the same ideas as those of the British Cabinet. The Austrian paper 
was indeed fairly moderate, merely asking for a strip of French 
Flanders and smaller cessions on the eastern frontier. The Prussian 
paper, which was prepared by their Army leaders (for Hardenberg, who 
secretly agreed with Castlereagh and told him so, was no longer able 
to control the Prussian policy), would have deprived France of every 
first-class fortress which she possessed. Such demands it was im- 
possible, in Castlereagh's opinion, for the French Government to 
accept. In forwarding these Memoranda on August 12th, Castlereagh 
also sent one by Wellington which he had already given to the Allies 
at Paris and which was a conclusive exposure of the injustice as well 
as the inexpediency of these propositions. Wellington, though he 
admitted that France was still too strong for the security of Europe, 
asserted, in direct opposition to the opinion of the Cabinet, that the 
Declarations of the Allies to the French people prevented them from 
making any material alteration of the French frontier. At the same 
time, he showed that justice coincided with the true interests of the 
Allies, because a policy of dismemberment would necessarily make 
France think only of revenge, and result in a state of affairs in Europe 
little less harmful than actual war, and he defended the policy of 
temporary occupation with great skill. These ideas were pressed home 
by Castlereagh in a series of letters to which the ruthless behaviour 
of Prussia and the smaller German Powers added force and fire. He, 
also, claimed that, by his policy, he had prevented the Emperor of 

1 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XI. 126. 



CASTLEREAGH AND FRENCH CESSIONS 511 

Russia from taking a line of his own and becoming the " exclusive 
protector of France." 

As to Austria and Prussia, he said, both these Courts require to be 
narrowly watched ... in order that we may not be involved in a course of 
policy in which Great Britain has no interest but rather the reverse .... 
No doubt the prevailing sentiment in Germany is in favour of territorially 
reducing France. After all the people have suffered and with the ordinary 
inducements of some fresh acquisitions, it is not wonderful it should be 
so, but it is one thing to wish the thing done and another to maintain it 
when done 1 . 

Further, he pointed out that France might be a necessary and valuable 
factor in the Balance of Power, if the Cabinet's views of Russia were 
justified. Castlereagh was especially impressed by the outrageous 
nature of the demands of the Prussian military faction, who, he de- 
clared, were as bad Jacobins as the French, and he pressed this point 
on the Cabinet in order to awaken them to the character of the party 
with which they wished him to associate his country. But the main 
argument on which he relied was that there was no alternative be- 
tween absolutely destroying France or leaving her substantially intact. 

"We must make up our minds," he wrote, "whether to play a game 
with any portion of France or against France collectively ; if the former, as 
much security need only be demanded as is compatible with that object; 
on the contrary, if the other, in order to gratify what I have no doubt is 
the prevailing temper in England as well as in Germany, the Cabinet ought 
to instruct the Duke of Wellington and myself not to secure a fortified 
town the more or the less, but to confer with the other Allies how France 
may be effectually disqualified for any future attempt to assault Europe. 
I have no doubt that the middle line would be attended with the most 
eclat; but it is not our business to collect trophies but to bring back the 
world to peaceful habits. 

"The more I reflect upon it the more I deprecate this system of 
scratching such a Power. We may hold her down and pare her nails so 
that many years shall pass away before she can again wound us . . . but this 
system of being pledged to a continental war for objects that France may 
any day reclaim from the particular states that hold them, without pushing 
her demands beyond what she would contend was due to her own honour, 
is, I am sure, a bad British policy." 

His words finally carried conviction or at least assent, though it 
was not till the end of August that he won over the Cabinet. In order 
to effect this and to make some concessions to the Continental Powers, 
he put forward the scheme of reducing the limits of France to those 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, August 17th, 18 15. Castlereagh Correspondence, 
x.485. 



5 i2 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

of the year 1790. This meant taking away from her Landau, the Saar 
valley, and part of Savoy, while leaving to her Avignon and other 
small territories, which had in 1789 been enclaves in her dominions. 
By the middle of August, Castlereagh was able to announce that 
Alexander was ready to support this scheme. On the 24th, he sent 
what was almost an ultimatum to his Cabinet, together with a long 
memorandum which reiterated all the arguments previously em- 
ployed, and Lord Stewart was sent over with the documents to 
support by word of mouth the arguments of his brother 1 . But the 
Cabinet had already given way. On the 23rd, Liverpool had already 
sent a reluctant consent. He and his colleagues now professed them- 
selves entirely convinced, and Castlereagh was assured that he would 
be "most cordially and zealously supported and upheld by all your 
colleagues in this country 2 ." He was thus able to turn his artillery 
without reserve on the recalcitrant Allies. On August 31st, he sent 
an impressive memorandum in reply to the Austrian and Prussian 
notes, supported by a paper drawn up by Wellington, which con- 
tained a vigorous and indeed unanswerable defence of the principle 
of temporary occupation, and which also put forward a practical 
scheme for carrying it out. Metternich was easily won over. In fact, 
he had from the beginning been in sympathy with Castlereagh's 
policy, but had found it necessary to put forward stronger views in 
deference to German public opinion. The Prussians put up a more 
determined fight, but they could not succeed when thus isolated. As 
for the smaller Powers, Castlereagh did not mince matters with them. 
To Gagern, who was carrying on an intrigue to transfer Luxemburg 
to Prussia and compensate the Netherlands with a large slice of French 
territory, he announced that such a course would mean the loss of the 
British guarantee. " This view of the question," reported Castlereagh, 
"appeared altogether to damp His Excellency's appetite for such 
acquisitions 3 ." By this means, and by raising the indemnity from 
six to eight hundred millions, he at last succeeded in producing agree- 
ment among the Allies. 

The terms were presented to the Talleyrand Ministry on Sep- 
tember 1 6th. Talleyrand refused to consent to the losses of territory, 
and sent in an answer couched in very strong terms ; but the discussions 

1 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XI. 137. 

2 Liverpool to Castlereagh, August 28th, 1815. Castlereagh Correspondence, 
X. 506. 

3 Castlereagh to Liverpool, September 4th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 26; British 
Diplomacy, p. 376. 



FRENCH CESSIONS AND INDEMNITY SETTLED 513 

were suspended by the dismissal of his Ministry. The Ministers had, 
indeed, been subjected to ever increasing attacks from the Ultras during 
their whole period of office. Reaction was now everywhere dominant 
in France, and the White Terror reigned in some parts, Monsieur 
and the Due d'Angouleme placing themselves at the head of the 
Opposition. Castlereagh regarded the Ultra party with the greatest 
distrust. "At present it is," he wrote, "a mere rope of sand, 
without leaders habituated to office, without any fixed system, but 
with an inordinate infusion of passion, resentment and spirit of in- 
version 1 ." He preferred even Fouche to such a Government. The 
dismissal of Talleyrand by the King at this moment he considered as 
especially impolitic, since it threw on the new Ministry the odium of 
accepting terms which their predecessors had rejected. Fortunately 
for France, at this grave crisis she found in the Due de Richelieu one 
of the most admirable Ministers who ever represented her. He was 
singularly free from the baser elements of statesmanship, while his 
friendship for Alexander ensured the support of the Tsar. Castlereagh 
was, indeed, somewhat alarmed at the increase of Russian influence 
over the French Government, but he loyally accepted the situation. 
He told the king bluntly, however, that he must abandon the line 
which Talleyrand had taken up, and in the course of a long interview 
succeeded in convincing him of the necessities of the case 2 . 

With Richelieu, therefore, the negotiations proceeded swiftly. The 
Allies reduced their indemnity to seven hundred millions of francs, the 
temporary occupation was reduced to five or possibly three years, and 
the dismantling of some of the fortresses was waived. The result 
was to impose a heavy punishment on France, but one not out of 
proportion to her situation, and which need not, and in fact did not, 
drive her to a policy of revenge and despair. She lost the territories 
of Landau, Saarlouis, Mariembourg, Philippeville and certain parts of 
Savoy, and had to rase the fortifications of Huningen. Out of the 
sum fixed for her indemnity, 200 millions of francs, including the 
whole of Great Britain's share, were to be spent in the erection of 
fortresses on the north-eastern frontier. Moreover, a separate Con- 
vention laid on her the duty of compensating private claims against 
France, the exact amount of which was not specified. The Prussians 
were, at a later stage, to found enormous claims on this Article, but 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, September nth, 1815. F.O. Continent. 27; British 
Diplomacy, p. 377. 

2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, September 25th, 1815. F.O. Continent. 28; British 
Diplomacy, p. 379. 

W.&G.I. 33 



514 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

were prevented by Great Britain and Russia from insisting on them, 
and the total amount was only 240 millions of francs. France had 
already been forced to allow a large number of the works of art, of 
which she had plundered Europe during the Revolution and Napoleonic 
Wars, to be returned to their previous owners. Castlereagh had 
strongly supported the measure. He had, however, refused to accede 
to the monstrous suggestion, which the Prime Minister made at the 
express order of the Prince Regent, that some of these works of art 
should be brought to London. They were removed, not as a punish- 
ment, but as a tardy measure of justice to their original owners, and, 
as a matter of fact, the British Government helped some of the poorer 
claimants, including the Pope, to defray the heavy charges of their 
transference to their old homes. Lastly, Castlereagh obtained from 
Lewis XVIII, though even now only after much hesitation, the com- 
plete Abolition of the Slave-trade which Napoleon had already granted, 
and his consent to the establishment of a Commission at London, 
such as had been proposed at Vienna. He might, therefore, fairly 
claim that he had brought home a Peace which meant security for at 
least a period, and the infliction of a considerable punishment on 
France for her acquiescence in the return of Napoleon. It was, 
however, far from fully expressing the sentiments of the nation, and 
met with severe criticism when it was discussed in Parliament. 

Though the outlines of the Treaty had been laid down by October 
1 st, the details of the Conventions on the occupation and the financial 
questions, which accompanied it, necessitated a series of detailed 
negotiations, and it was not signed until November 20th. 

On this date too was signed another Treaty between the Four 
Great Powers — a renewal of that concluded at Chaumont, which, 
however, now contained new stipulations of great importance. Castle- 
reagh had, from the first, intended to make the exclusion of Napoleon 
and his family from the Throne of France "part of the permanent 
law of Europe." 

"There can be no doubt," he wrote so early as July 17th, "that, before 
we retire, the nation will have felt deeply what it is to be invaded by all 
Europe. If we make a European invasion the inevitable and immediate 
consequence of Bonaparte's succession or that of any of his race to power 
in France, I am confident after the experience they have had of his im- 
potence against such a confederacy and their own sufferings, that there is 
not a class in France, not excepting even the army, that will venture to 
adhere to him at the hazard of being again over-run by the armies of 
Europe, with the certainty of being dismembered and loaded with contribu- 



THE HOLY ALLIANCE 515 

tions. We committed a great error when last at Paris in not opposing the 
barrier of such a stipulation against his return, for there is no doubt he 
had address enough to make both the nation and the army believe that he 
might be restored and peace nevertheless preserved 1 ." 

Such a policy was in his mind throughout all the negotiations of 
the Treaty of Peace, and his belief that security against a revival of 
French aggression would be better provided by its means was one of 
the reasons why he rejected all the plans of spoliation and dismem- 
berment brought forward by the Allies. Before, however, this idea 
could be worked out in formal discussions, Alexander startled the 
Sovereigns and statesmen by the proposal which is known as the 
Holy Alliance. The idea of this extraordinary document had been 
suggested to him by Castlereagh's abortive proposal for a general 
guarantee made at the Congress of Vienna. But, in the Tsar's emo- 
tional mind, which was now passing through an acute religious crisis, 
it had assumed an entirely different shape. The document, which was 
to be personal to the Monarchs concerned, contained no express 
obligations, except that they would regulate their conduct according 
to the doctrines of the Christian religion. Both Castlereagh and 
Metternich regarded the proposal as a ludicrous one ; but they could 
not afford to offend the Tsar. Castlereagh told Liverpool very 
frankly, that Alexander was not quite right in his head and must be 
humoured 2 . Thus, though the forms of the British Constitution did 
not allow the Prince Regent to append his signature to the Treaty, 
he sent a personal letter expressing his agreement with its principles, 
which satisfied the expectations of the Tsar. All the other Sovereigns 
of Europe signed it, except the Sultan and the Pope, who were not 
invited ; and the fact that the terms of the Treaty made it impossible 
for the former to add his name was by many regarded as a sinister 
design on the part of the Tsar. He had, indeed, significantly avoided 
raising the issue of Turkey on which Castlereagh's proposal had 
foundered; but there is little doubt of his sincerity. Nevertheless, 
this Treaty, which Castlereagh was soon forced to produce in the 
British Parliament, caused infinite embarrassment in later years, and, 
despite the fact that it was in design one of the most innocent 
documents ever issued, became the symbol of Reaction in the mouths 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, July 17th. F.O. Continent. 21 ; British Diplomacy, 

P- 349- 

2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, September 28th, 18 15. Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, XI. 175. 

33—2 



5 i6 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

of the Liberals of all countries, and a specially powerful weapon in 
the hands of the Opposition in England. 

The Treaty of November 20th — the Treaty of the Quadruple 
Alliance — which expressed Castlereagh's own views, was of a very 
different nature. Hehadalreadyindicateditsscope in the Memorandum 
sent home by Lord Stewart, which had finally won the approval of 
the Cabinet to his policy. Alexander had immediately expressed his 
particular approbation of the proposal. He had, indeed, hastened to 
anticipate Castlereagh by producing a draft of such a Treaty, before 
the British Minister had himself prepared one. To this draft Castle- 
reagh took immediate exception. It was drawn up, he said, in too 
vague and indefinite shape. It bore on the face of it " too strong and 
undisguised a complexion of interference on the part of the Allied 
Sovereigns in the internal affairs of France, without sufficiently con- 
necting such interference with the policy which a due attention to the 
immediate security of their own dominions prescribed 1 "; for Alex- 
ander had proposed that the Allies should guarantee both Lewis XVIII 
and the Charte. Castlereagh's project endeavoured to avoid these 
pitfalls. With the exception of the Sixth Article, it confined itself to a 
promise to observe the Treaty quite recently concluded with France, 
and to a renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont in terms which more 
expressly excluded the return of Bonaparte or any of his family to the 
throne of France. The only reference to Lewis XVIII was a promise 
to adopt this necessary measure "in concert amongst themselves and 
with his Most Christian Majesty 2 ." Except for a few verbal altera- 
tions, the draft, as Castlereagh presented it, was accepted by the 
Cabinet and by his Allies, and it was this Treaty to which he refers 
whenever he speaks of the Alliance. It was simply a more explicit 
statement, in the light of the experience of the Hundred Days, of the 
policy for which he had been contending ever since 181 3 — the pro- 
tection of Europe by special treaty against any renewal of aggressive 
war by France, the return of the Bonaparte family being accepted as 
implying the immediate renewal of such aggression. 

But the Sixth Article actually introduced into the Treaty a new 
element of great importance, and its presence there appears to have 
been due to Castlereagh's own express desire. It reveals the fact that 

1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, October 15th, 181 5. F.O. Continent. 29; British 
Diplomacy, p. 386. 

2 Castlereagh had written in his draft "roi legitime," but this phrase was aban- 
doned in deference to Liverpool's criticism that it would cause discussions in 
Parliament. 



ARTICLE VI OF THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE TREATY 517 

Castlereagh proposed to institute a new system of diplomacy by 
Conference, which he considered as essential to the preservation of 
the peace of Europe. Article VI in its final shape runs as follows: 

To facilitate and to secure the execution of the present Treaty, and to 
consolidate the connexions which at the present so closely unite the Four 
Sovereigns for the happiness of the World, the High Contracting Parties 
have agreed to renew their Meetings at fixed periods, either under the 
immediate auspices of the Sovereigns themselves, or by their respective 
Ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and 
for the consideration of the measures which at each of these periods shall 
be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations, 
and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe. 

This Article stands exactly as it was drawn up by Castlereagh in his 
draft. In Alexander's original proposal, the meetings had been merely 
intended to supervise the execution of the provisions in the Treaty 
dealing with France. It was Castlereagh who added the words which 
founded the so-called " Congress System" — periodic meetings of the 
statesmen to discuss the affairs of Europe round a table rather than by 
the old medium of notes and documents interchanged between the 
Courts through the medium of Ambassadors. The application, there- 
fore, to a period of peace of the idea of diplomacy by Conference, 
gradually brought into being in the closing stages of the War, was due 
to Castlereagh more than to anyone else. There can be no doubt that 
he attached the highest importance to it, and regarded it as a piece of 
machinery highly essential for the maintenance of the peace of Europe. 
The Alliance constructed to protect Europe against French domination 
was clearly thought by him capable of extension into a system of in- 
formal Conferences, which, while leaving the Great Powers absolutely 
free to decide every case on its own merits, would enable them to con- 
tinue the intimate relations established by these among themselves 
during the War. The time was indeed not yet ripe for the institution of 
a formal system of European Conferences, which alone could have 
rendered permanent so great a conception. The institutions of the 
various nations and the ideals of their rulers were too dissimilar for 
such a system to maintain itself, especially since no attempt was made to 
support it by the public opinion of the nations concerned. Yet, in de- 
vising it and stedfastly supporting it throughout his career, in spite of 
the opposition of his colleagues, Castlereagh showed himself, in a sense, 
the most enlightened statesman of his time. Blind as he was to the great 
movements which were to dominate the nineteenth century, he was 
yet far in advance of all his own countrymen in his recognition of the 



518 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

fact that new methods of diplomacy were necessary, if Europe was 
to be preserved from the scourge of war. Nor was "the Concert of 
Europe," the main result of the system which he advocated, without 
its successes in the century that followed 1 . 



The reputation of Castlereagh as a Foreign Minister has changed 
a great deal in recent years. The attitude which Lord Salisbury took 
up in 1862 and Lord Morley and Mr Balfour were inclined to follow 
in 1 89 1, has on the whole been justified by the researches of his- 
torians since the diplomatic papers of the time have been more 
closely studied. There is some danger perhaps of the reaction going 
too far in an age painfully conscious of the difficulty of such work 
as Castlereagh tried to accomplish. Yet the courage and common- 
sense of his diplomacy during the Pacification of Europe are such as 
to compel admiration even from those who detest many of the prin- 
ciples for which he stood. Rarely has a statesman been able to carry 
out his policy with such consistency and success. If we compare 
the legacy, which Pitt left to his pupil, with the results actually 
obtained, we see that, throughout these critical years, Castlereagh 
was aiming at a definite and complete scheme of reorganisation — 
nine-tenths of which he successfully accomplished. Much of this 
was of course in the nature of things, and Castlereagh happened to 
take office just as the tide of fortune turned. He reaped where other 
men had sown — Pitt, of course, and Canning in his earliest and 
possibly most brilliant period. Nevertheless, his own share in 
bringing about the new order of things was no small one, and the 
persistence with which he followed a definite line of policy to its 
logical conclusion is almost without parallel among diplomatists, who 
are, speaking generally, opportunists. 

Castlereagh was, in fact, successful because his policy was dictated 
by principles which he thoroughly understood and believed in. Of 
his complete success in obtaining all the main objects for which his 
countrymen had fought for twenty years there can be no doubt. The 
maritime and colonial supremacy of Great Britain was completely 
established. That the Peace of Paris, no less than the Peace of Utrecht, 
might have been used to amass a few more possessions than were 
actually obtained is of course obvious. But who will deny that 

1 See C. K.Webster, " Castlereagh et le Systeme des Congres ?" Revue des Etudes 
N apoleoniennes , Jan.-Feb. 1919. 



CASTLEREAGH'S EUROPEAN POLICY 519 

Castlereagh's moderation in dealing with the French and Dutch 
Colonies was anything but wise statesmanship? By the acquisition 
of the Cape, Malta, and the Mauritius Great Britain completed her 
strategic control of the trade routes of her Empire ; while sane policy 
forbade her to aim at a monopoly of colonial possession. Moreover, 
Antwerp, Genoa, and the Ionian Islands were all rendered innocuous 
for the future ; and, so far as human knowledge and foresight could 
be expected to reach, the strategic supremacy of Great Britain was 
made complete in every sea. 

How mistaken some of Castlereagh's European plans were, the 
history of the nineteenth century has revealed! But it may be 
doubted whether any others would have served the needs of the 
moment so well. If the idea of the Balance of Power was merely the 
application of an outworn theory to an entirely fresh set of circum- 
stances, yet it still had much in it which was necessary to the stability 
of Europe. When Castlereagh insisted that the centre of Europe 
must, at all costs, be strengthened against the dangers which threaten 
it from France and Russia, he was merely asserting a truth which 
experience has abundantly confirmed. That he sacrificed to it com- 
pletely the national claims of Poland, Italy and Belgium was regrettable, 
but in the circumstances of the time, inevitable. Nor were any of these 
three peoples prepared to take advantage of national independence 
if it had been then offered to them. Of German unity, so far as his 
influence extended, Castlereagh was, of course, a consistent supporter. 

Castlereagh's cardinal error, indeed, was, not that he ignored the 
principle of Nationality, which was not ready for recognition, but 
that he placed no faith in popular institutions. Had he made any 
attempt to help the new States to retain or establish some form of 
Constitutional government, there would have been some prospect of 
the gradual adaptation of the old system to the new forces. But 
Castlereagh's influence was everywhere on the side of autocracy. He 
seems sincerely to have believed that there was no alternative to such 
democracy as the French Revolution had taught the aristocrats of 
his generation to dread. He was indisputably in the right when he 
distrusted the absurd Constitutions which had been erected in the 
south of Europe. But Bentinck, with all his crudities and extrava- 
gances, was in closer touch with reality when he attempted to associate 
the people in the work of making the new Europe. 

Yet Castlereagh was not without his own schemes for the main- 
tenance of his work. Against the greatest danger of all — Revolu- 
tionary and Napoleonic France — he hoped that the Chaumont Treaty 



5 20 THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1813-1815 

would prove an adequate safeguard; and he proved right in the issue. 
This was his special contribution to the problem, and how much 
preferable to the wild schemes of plunder and spoliation which 
France's victims would have liked to put into force! French his- 
torians have of recent years acknowledged their debt to the magna- 
nimity of Alexander ; but they have scarcely given due credit to the 
services rendered to France by the commonsense and diplomatic skill 
of Castlereagh. Had he followed the popular line, France would 
undoubtedly have been deprived of ancient provinces and laden with 
crushing indemnities, and might easily have been driven to a policy of 
despair. For in these matters, and especially in the financial question, 
it was the voice of Great Britain, her most consistent and dangerous 
enemy, that counted for most — and it was only Castlereagh 's com- 
manding influence in the counsels of his countrymen which ensured 
that Great Britain should speak for justice and even mercy, rather than 
for revenge and national greed. If France was left with the frontier of 
the Ancien Regime, a fleet, some Colonies and a debt incomparably 
lighter than that of Britain herself, it was Castlereagh 's wisdom and 
strength of character that was largely responsible for the result. 

Castlereagh's larger schemes for the maintenance of the European 
Peace will be considered further in the second volume of this work. 
As has been pointed out, the Congress system was due more to him 
than to any other man. That it was devised mainly to give per- 
manence to the new condition of affairs is probably true. The ideas 
of statesmen had not yet reached beyond a static Europe. Yet Castle- 
reagh, more than any other statesman of his time, had learnt the 
lesson that the old system of diplomacy had proved to be hopelessly 
inadequate. His substitute of diplomacy by Conference was an appli- 
cation of his experiences of 18 14-15, and revealed the weakness as 
well as the strength of his intelligence. He was a diplomatist par 
excellence. The informal Conferences, by which he had helped to solve 
the appallingly difficult problems of the settlement, he regarded as a 
new device of immense value. What he failed to see was that such inven- 
tions must prove to be unstable and unsuccessful, if they depended 
merely on the personal relations which two years of close intercourse 
with Continental statesmen had enabled him to establish. He failed, 
therefore (and the task was indeed at that time an impossible one), 
to give to the new ideas either the stability of formal interpretation 
or the driving force of public opinion. For the latter task, indeed, 
no one could have been less suitable than he; for he despised and 
ignored, so far as possible, the public opinion of his countrymen. He 



THE HEIGHT OF CASTLEREAGH'S ACHIEVEMENTS 521 

was bound to fail, therefore, in the attempt which he made to conquer 
their insularity and show them that their own peace and happiness 
was bound up with that of Europe. Nevertheless, he made an experi- 
ment of the greatest value to posterity which, also, redeemed the 
statesmanship of the Pacifications of something of the reproach that 
it had learnt none of the lessons of its times. 

Like all successful men of action, however, Castlereagh was apt 
to place too much trust in his own contribution to human progress. 
He was acutely aware that he stood almost alone in England in 
possessing a knowledge of Continental affairs. It was thus natural 
that he should exaggerate the importance of the Foreign Office and 
distrust the share which Parliament or public opinion might play in 
International policy. He was not above intrigue, as the affair of Murat 
and one or two later passages in his life reveal, and he had the natural 
predilection of an expert for methods, which he had been able to 
employ with success and credit to himself. The weakness of the 
Opposition which he had to face in the House of Commons doubtless 
helped to exaggerate these defects. Had Canning gone over to the 
other side, instead of weakly accepting a place under the Government 
during these critical years, Castlereagh might have been forced to 
take a different line. As it was, he was never able to make any im- 
pression on the best minds of his generation. 

By the end of 1815, in fact, the greatest period of his career was 
closed. He had controlled the policy of his country at an all-important 
moment in her history with a firmness of purpose and consistency 
of aim almost without parallel. He had seen to it that her vital 
interests had everywhere been protected and maintained. He had 
by new and ingenious expedients attempted to associate her per- 
manently with the European System. He had established his own 
position among European statesmen and was a power in their 
Councils which could not be ignored. But he was the last man to 
cope intelligently with the new forces which had grown up in his 
own country during the years of war; indeed, few statesmen are, 
who conduct a great struggle to its conclusion. Though he was some- 
thing more than a skilled diplomatist — namely, a Foreign Minister 
with principles of action — he could do nothing to teach these prin- 
ciples to others. Thus, he died a few years later, the most lonely and 
friendless of all the great Ministers of England — so hated and con- 
temned that it has been reserved for a later generation to do justice 
to the great qualities which he undoubtedly possessed. 



CHAPTER V 

THE AMERICAN WAR AND THE TREATY 
OF GHENT, 1814 

I 

THROUGHOUT the period subsequent to the Peace of Amiens 
the relations between the United States and Great Britain were 
strained almost to breaking-point. This condition of affairs was due, 
very largely, to the attitude which Great Britain assumed as a 
belligerent Power, though there were also other causes of dispute 
between the two peoples of a serious nature which would have 
arisen even if Europe had remained at peace. Two reasons alone 
had prevented the War which at last broke out in June 1812 from 
beginning at a far earlier date — the wrongs which France had inflicted 
on America, and the weakness of the United States against the over- 
whelming maritime power of Great Britain. Indeed, had British 
statesmen shown themselves but a little more prescient in the years 
1 809-1 81 2, they could almost certainly have delayed the outbreak, 
until the course of events in Europe would of itself have prevented 
it. As it was, the successes of the later stages of the Napoleonic Wars 
were embittered by the course of a futile and inconclusive struggle 
between Great Britain and America, which in itself settled none of 
the points at issue. Rarely has there been in history a war fought with 
such bitterness and determination, if with singular incapacity on both 
sides, which has terminated without a single one of the original 
causes of the war appearing in the Treaty of Peace. This result was of 
course due to the fact that the War was a by-product of the European 
War, and the causes that produced it ceased at the European Peace. 
Nevertheless, men do not easily give up principles for which they have 
been ready to shed their blood. Fortunately, in this case Great Britain, 
the stronger Power, had never insisted on a formal recognition of her 
rights. She was content if she was able to refuse to surrender them 
formally. Moreover, though public opinion vehemently supported the 
War while it was being waged and there was a far greater bitterness 
displayed in its course than during the Revolution, yet for Great 
Britain the War was after all a minor affair. Her main energies had 



CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN WAR 523 

been concentrated on Europe, where she had won a more complete 
triumph than her people had ever hoped to attain. She could accept, 
not, indeed, without some considerable sacrifice of pride, the humilia- 
tions and failures of the American War ; and the consciousness that 
they had been able to inflict these on the British Empire, flushed with 
victory, compensated the Americans for the failure to establish the 
principles for which they had fought. 

The two main causes of the War were the impressment of American 
sailors by British ships of War, and the losses imposed upon American 
trade by the British regulations as to neutral commerce. Both were 
considered by the British people absolutely necessary to their success 
against Napoleon; and, in actual fact, their view was to a large extent 
a correct one. So long as the methods then in vogue for maintaining 
the naval power of Great Britain continued, it was essential that no 
easy refuge should be found from the dangers and trials of that 
service. By 1812, indeed, the main danger of the maritime war had 
disappeared, and great concessions could undoubtedly have been 
made to America without endangering British sea power. Neverthe- 
less the extent of the War and the future demands on the fleet could 
not be foreseen, and one concession might lead to another. Interference 
with neutral commerce was, also, in some form essential to the winning 
of the war. Had Napoleon been able to use a neutral fleet, he could 
almost certainly have successfully defied the maritime power of Great 
Britain, while irreparable injury would have been inflicted on British 
commerce. Yet Great Britain was able, in June 1 812, to relax to some 
extent restrictions, which had grown more severe with every year of 
war, though too late to avert the struggle with the United States. 

The long diplomatic struggle that had been carried on between 
the two Powers has been narrated in the previous Chapter of this 
Volume. It dated in a sense, as Mahan points out, from before the 
War and, in one aspect, was a continuation of the War of Independence. 
But, from the outbreak of the War, the effort which the United States 
was making to obtain a due share of the carrying trade and colonial 
commerce of the world took upon itself a new significance. A com- 
petition, which in peace time was indeed resented by Britain and 
France alike, became a vital factor in the decision of the struggle in 
Europe. Since 1794, when the Senate refused to accept the few con- 
cessions which Jay had secured as in any way adequate to satisfy 
the pretensions of the United States, dispute had succeeded dispute, 
and incident incident. The Americans gradually found that their 



524 AMERICAN WAR AND TREATY OF GHENT, 1814 

position as a neutral was almost as difficult as if they had been a 
belligerent. Every expedient was tried, even the practical abandon- 
ment of their over-seas commerce, to find an issue from the position 
in which they were placed. But the European War still went on, and, 
as it broadened and grew yearly more intense, the restrictions to 
which the Americans had to submit grew more and more irksome. 

Most insulting of all to national pride was the exercise of the 
British right of search. The British navy was recruited by impress- 
ment, and it was only natural that many British sailors should seek 
a freer and more lucrative career in American ships. But Great 
Britain peremptorily refused to allow any such transference of alle- 
giance, and, alike in British and Colonial ports and on the high seas, 
they exerted their right to force their sailors to return to British ships. 
No period of naturalisation was regarded as sufficient to relieve a 
British sailor from his obligations to his country; and, since the dis- 
tinction between Britishers and Americans was not great, and many 
British sailors posed as Americans in order to escape impressment, it 
was inevitable that many Americans should be forcibly taken from 
ships of their own country and made to serve in British vessels. The 
right was exerted with the greatest brutality by the British fleet, and 
in 1807 the attack on the American frigate ' Chesapeake' appeared to 
denote that not even American men-of-war were to be exempt and 
all but led to an immediate outbreak of hostilities. The British 
Government did not, indeed, defend the action of its subordinates 
in this case; but it refused, then as always, to discuss the general 
question of impressment. The right of search, it was claimed, had 
been exercised from earliest times by Great Britain. No expedient 
could be devised to distinguish accurately between Americans and 
British. It must be, therefore, left to the British naval officers to 
exercise their discretion as to how and when they applied the 
undoubted maritime rights of their country. The claim to search 
American vessels of war was, indeed, abandoned, and offers of 
compensation for the 'Chesapeake' affair were made. But these 
were not such as to satisfy the American Government. Erskine's 
conciliatory policy was rejected by the British Cabinet. F.J.Jackson, 
who succeeded him, carried out his Instructions in so uncompromising 
a fashion that the American Government refused to negotiate further 
with him, and from the beginning of 18 10 to June 181 1 Great Britain 
was only represented by a Charge d'affaires at Washington. A. J. 
Foster was then sent by the British Government, and the ' Chesapeake ' 



CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN WAR 525 

affair was closed by an offer of reparation which was accepted. The 
main question still remained open. The British Government in- 
creased American bitterness by attempting to prove that British sea- 
men were detained against their will on American warships. At 
last, the humiliation could no longer be borne by the people of the 
United States ; and perhaps the main cause of the War which was de- 
clared on June 18th was the hopelessness of obtaining any relief on 
this question except by declaring it. At any rate, even when the news 
of the abandonment of the Orders in Council reached America after 
the Declaration of War, the United States was prepared to continue 
hostilities because of this question alone. 

More serious, however, to the national interests of the United 
States was the second cause of the War — the interference by the Belli- 
gerent Powers inEuropewith her commerce. The destruction of French 
maritime commerce by the British fleet had thrown open to the 
United States the carrying trade between France and her Colonies, 
which had hitherto been as jealously guarded as that of the British 
Empire. But, by the exercise of a right which had first been applied 
in the Seven Years' War and hence was called the "Rule of 1756," 
Britain forbade the United States from taking advantage of the oppor- 
tunity thus offered to her. Such trade was regarded not as a neutral 
service but as active assistance to the enemy, and was, therefore, met 
with the full exercise of the belligerent right of capture. When Spain 
and Holland became part of the French system, the rule was extended 
to their Colonies likewise. The Americans, at first, endeavoured 
to get over the restriction by breaking their journey to Europe at 
ports of the United States ; but the application by the British Govern- 
ment in 1799 of the doctrine of "continuous voyage" defeated this 
expedient. 

If great loss was inflicted on their commerce by this rule, yet it 
was true that the Americans had not, for the most part, enjoyed the 
privileges of this trade in peace time. But it was not long before they 
began, also, to be prevented from carrying on the trade between their 
own country and Europe, which they had maintained before the War. 
By the practice of "blockade " Great Britain, so early as 1799, forbade 
all trading with ports controlled by France, and rendered all ships 
sailing to them subject to capture. After the peace of Amiens, as 
Napoleon obtained control over all Europe the area of such" blockade " 
was extended. That such measures, in part at least, were merely re- 
taliatory to the paper "blockades" established by Napoleon himself, 



526 AMERICAN WAR AND TREATY OF GHENT, 1814 

made no difference to the extent of the injuries inflicted on the 
United States. The Berlin and Milan Decrees and the Orders in 
Council of 1807 and 1809, which followed them, all but excluded 
American ships from European ports, and since Great Britain com- 
manded the sea, it was Great Britain who appeared to be mainly 
responsible for the injuries inflicted upon them. The expedients of 
the Non-Intercourse and Embargo Acts, devised by the Jefferson and 
Madison Cabinets in 1806 and 1808 to meet this situation, injured 
the United States far more than any other country. Gradually, 
therefore, all classes of the nation were drawn into a common hos- 
tility. Nevertheless, the measures of the British Government were 
just as strongly approved by public opinion in England. Canning 
was but expressing the feelings of most of his countrymen when he 
said that Great Britain could not consent to "buy off that hostility 
which America ought not to have extended to her 1 ." Various expe- 
dients were suggested for mitigating the rigour of the Orders but 
almost all were rejected by the British Government. The situation 
was made more serious by Napoleon's pretence to suspend the Milan 
and Berlin Decrees in 18 10. The British Government with truth held 
that no such repeal had really been made, and Foster offered to repeal 
the Orders in Council, if the French Decrees could be shown to be 
wholly removed. But this could not be done, as the President himself 
was very well aware. Nevertheless, on June 23rd, 1812, the Orders 
in Council were annulled so far as American vessels were concerned. 
The cessation of the American trade had inflicted great injury on 
British commerce, and it was this motive that induced the Government 
to give way rather than any fear of hostilities. The repeal, however, 
came too late to influence the decision of the American Government, 
who had declared war on June 18th. 

The outbreak of the War was due, almost entirely, to the two causes 
which have been discussed. There were, however, other causes opera- 
ting to produce friction between the countries, though not of such 
a nature as to rank with the other two. The purchase by the United 
States of Louisiana, which Napoleon had forced Spain to transfer to 
him, had caused much resentment in England, and, in the dispute 
which subsequently broke out between the United States and Spain 

1 Canning to Pinkney, September 23rd, 1808; F. A. Updyke, The Diplomacy of 
the War of 1812, Baltimore, 1915, p. 99. This work is founded on a very complete 
survey of both the American and British State Papers, as well as on researches in 
the diplomatic documents preserved at Washington and the Record Office, and the 
writer is very largely indebted to it in this portion of his work. 



AMERICAN OPINION AND THE WAR 527 

as to the Floridas British sympathies were entirely on the side of the 
latter country. It was becoming clear that the United States was 
aiming at extending her power to the Pacific, and in such a case 
British possessions in Canada and the West Indies might be en- 
dangered. To some minds, a war appeared necessary to check the 
growth of the new nation whose future could not be foreseen. These 
were, however, a very small minority, and, though the boundaries 
between Canada and the United States were ill-defined and the 
fishing rights granted to the Americans by the Treaty of 1783 ex- 
ceedingly unpopular among their Newfoundland competitors, yet 
these were not in any way acute grievances. On the American side, 
there was a party which both hated and feared the power of Great 
Britain and was only too ready to take advantage of her embarrass- 
ments. But this antipathy was kept in check by the still more powerful 
interests which had commercial ties with Britain. 

The final stages of the diplomatic struggle were much influenced 
by the fact that the United States had no Minister at London. 
Jonathan Russell, the Charge d'affaires, was quite incapable of appre- 
ciating all the issues involved, or of keeping his own Government 
accurately informed of the course of events. That war had been de- 
layed so long, was due, not to the diplomacy of either side, which was 
almost always as stiff and uncompromising as possible, but to two other 
causes. In the first place, the United States had almost as great a 
grievance against France as against Great Britain, and to declare war 
against Great Britain was, in effect, to support Napoleon. There were 
indeed in the United States a considerable number of people who 
remembered the indebtedness of their country to France. But, if the 
French Republic had only succeeded in alienating almost completely 
American sympathy, it was not likely that an Emperor, who expressed 
in himself the antithesis of the ideals of the United States, would 
secure their support. War with England had therefore to be carefully 
distinguished from even the semblance of an alliance with Napoleon, 
and, as a matter of fact, throughout the struggle this attitude was 
maintained with scrupulous care. The question of war or peace was, 
also, to a certain extent a party issue in the United States. The 
Democrats advocated the war while the Federalists opposed it. 
The division was largely a geographical one. The commercial States, 
who had most to lose from the War, were mainly Federalist, and 
were, moreover, bound to England by greater ties of affection and 
community of outlook than the other portions of the United States. 



528 AMERICAN WAR AND TREATY OF GHENT, 1814 

But the Democrats rightly thought that the events of 181 1 had made 
it impossible for their opponents to resist the strong feeling which 
was manifest everywhere in the United States. They were proved 
right by the issue. The case that was presented to Congress was an 
overwhelming one to American eyes; and, though in States like 
Massachusetts and Connecticut, opposition went as far as passive 
resistance to the measures of the Central Administration, yet, on the 
whole, the mass of the nation was behind the Government in their 
struggle, however tardily they came to understand the responsibili- 
ties which it threw on them. 

In England also the War was popular. The commercial interests 
were, indeed, dismayed, but the governing classes were united in re- 
garding the American Declaration of War as a treacherous attack on 
a country that was contending for the liberties of the world. The 
Whigs, naturally, endeavoured to throw as much blame on the Govern- 
ment as possible ; but they dared not deny the necessity of the exercise 
of the British rights which were the cause of the War. Among the 
mass of the people there was an intense bitterness, and they demanded, 
not merely the maintenance of British rights, but the punishment of 
the Americans for their attack on Great Britain at the crisis of her 
struggle with Napoleon. The confiscation of all American ships in 
British ports, immediately the news of the American Declaration of 
War was received, was an index of the manner in which the struggle 
would be carried on. 

Nevertheless, an attempt was made on both sides to put an end 
to the War almost as soon as it was begun. Neither side had accurately 
gauged the stubbornness and passion with which their opponents 
would hold to their own view of the case. Castlereagh, however, who 
had just come into office when the War broke out, while rigorously 
maintaining the British case, was from the first as conciliatory in 
manner as possible in all American questions. The British Govern- 
ment were under the impression that the United States would not 
continue the War for impressment alone, now that the Orders in 
Council were removed. Accordingly, Admiral Warren, who was sent 
out in command of the naval operations against America, was ordered 
to offer an armistice with a view to a termination of hostilities. No 
concessions were, however, offered — merely a threat that the Orders 
in Council would be reinforced if peace were not made. Monroe, 
Madison's Secretary of State, however, insisted on the right of im- 
pressment being given up even before an armistice could be con- 



FAILURE OF ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS 529 

eluded, and refused to treat on any other terms than that this practice 
should be open to negotiation 1 . 

Previously to this, Russell had made an offer in London by 
order of his Government. The Americans had hoped that Great 
Britain would shrink from a new war while they were so deeply 
involved in the European struggle. Russell was instructed to offer a 
law against employing British seamen in American vessels, in return 
for the cessation of impressment. But the inability of the Government 
of the United States to enforce any such measure had been all along 
asserted, and with truth, by the British Government. Castlereagh 
therefore rejected this overture, though he was careful to add that, 
if any practical expedient could be found to prevent British sailors 
being employed on American ships, he would be glad to discuss it. 
Further negotiations for an armistice by Russell were also without 
any result, except that the issues, which divided the two countries, 
were restated in their most uncompromising form 2 . 

The War was thus continued ; but it bore a very different aspect 
in the two countries concerned. For America, it became the one vital 
question on which all others must depend. Her party issues, the 
relations of the States to the Central Government, the ambitions of her 
politicians, the whole future and prosperity of the country, depended 
on the result. For Great Britain, dangerous and detrimental to her 
interests as the War was, it was yet completely subordinate to the far 
vaster struggle with Napoleon, and the reconstruction of Europe that 
followed. Not until the middle of 18 14 was she able to direct her 
full military and naval strength towards it, and, even then, her states- 
men were more preoccupied with European problems than with 
America. Nevertheless, she was able to inflict far more damage on 
the United States than she received. Her defeats at sea and on the 
Lakes, and the depredations of American privateers on British com- 
merce, were, in themselves, serious additions to the exhaustion and 
strain of a long war. But they were injuries that could be easily borne 
by an empire that held the carrying trade of the world in its hands. The 
United States on the contrary was practically cut off from commerce 
with the rest of the world. Indeed, as time went on, communications 
between the several States which largely depended on the sea were 
seriously impaired. The injuries went so far that, towards the end of 
the struggle, there was at least a possibility that some of the States 



1 British and Foreign State Papers, i. 1492. 

2 British and Foreign State Papers, 1. 1473. 



34 



530 AMERICAN WAR AND TREATY OF GHENT, 1814 

would break away from the Federation and conclude a separate peace. 
Nor, without allies, could the United States hope ultimately to force 
her adversary to give in, if events in Europe did not bring about her 
submission. But, in Europe, the situation grew daily more favourable 
to Great Britain almost from the moment that the War broke out. It 
was not long therefore before the statesmen of the United States 
were more ready for peace than those of Britain. 

The first attempt to secure peace came through the mediation of 
Russia. In 18 12 Russia had become the Ally of England, and had 
therefore an interest in endeavouring to put an end to a conflict which 
lessened the ability of Great Britain to help her against Napoleon. 
By British influence, Russia had been able to negotiate agreements 
with Turkey and Sweden at the critical moment of her struggle with 
Napoleon. She might now hope to render similar services in return. 
Moreover, it was but likely that the United States would be disposed 
to view favourably an offer of mediation from Russia, since the latter 
Power had been a devoted champion of Neutral Rights. There was, 
indeed, in Russia a party which viewed the alliance with Great Britain 
with great dislike, and Count Romantzoff, who was chief of it, held 
the office of Chancellor until the end of 1813, though he remained 
at Petrograd deprived of all real power. At the Russian capital, the 
United States was represented by one of the most brilliant of her 
statesmen, John Quincy Adams, later the author of the Monroe 
doctrine and President of the United States. Though he deplored the 
war, yet he hated and distrusted Great Britain. "The English talk," 
he noted in his diary in 1812, "much about their honor and national 
morality — sometimes without meaning, but generally with a mixture 
of hypocrisy and self delusion in about equal proportions. Dr John- 
son, in one of his poems, honestly avows that in his lifetime English 
honor had become a standing jest; and it has assuredly not since then 
improved 1 ." Adams was also fond of comparing impressment, which 
Britain was so determined to maintain, with the Slave Trade, which 
she was anxious to abolish. Count Romantzoff thus found him a 
congenial companion, and Adams was easily able to convince the Chan- 
cellor that the United States had no desire for any connexion with 
France. The result was an offer, in September, of the mediation of 
Russia to settle the dispute. This offer did not reach Washington till 
the beginning of March 181 3, when the American Government 
showed the greatest eagerness to accept it 2 . Despite some notable 

1 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, II. 400. 

2 British and Foreign State Papers, I. 1533. 



RUSSIAN MEDIATION REJECTED 531 

victories at sea, the Americans had failed lamentably in Canada, and 
events in Europe were not propitious. The offer was therefore imme- 
diately accepted and Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
and Bayard, a Senator of experience, were dispatched forthwith to 
Petrograd to join Adams in negotiating a peace through the mediation 
of Russia . Bayard was a man of but moderate parts and moreover 
disliked Adams, but Gallatin was an especially suitable appointment. 
Of Swiss origin, he was able to combine a devotion to America with 
an understanding of the European point of view. He had great charm 
of manner as well as great abilities and he possessed many friends in 
England. Ultimately it was more due to his wisdom and ingenuity 
than to any other cause that peace was concluded. The Instructions 
which the Plenipotentiaries received, however, insisted on the 
American view of impressment, blockade and other matters in dis- 
pute, and showed little signs of concession. But the mediation had 
already been rejected by Great Britain before the American Envoys 
arrived in Europe. 

It was, indeed, impossible on many grounds for such an offer to 
be accepted. A dispute with America was still regarded as an almost 
domestic question in which Foreign Powers could have no concern. 
To begin negotiations for peace under Russian mediation might per- 
haps provide an opportunity to bring British maritime rights into 
the general discussions — and, as has been seen, British statesmen were 
determined to exclude them completely. Nor could Russia be re- 
garded as a suitable mediator, since she had herself previously shown 
that she agreed with the position which the United States had taken 
up. The mediation was therefore rejected, and Instructions to that 
effect were sent to Cathcart. Since, however, Alexander had ceased 
to correspond with Romantzoff on public affairs and was anxious to 
force him to resign, no official notification was sent to Petrograd. 
The American Commissioners were thus placed in a peculiarly per- 
plexing and humiliating position, though Romantzoff endeavoured to 
conceal his own impotence by an attempt to make a second offer 
through Lieven, which that Ambassador refused to deliver. Gallatin's 
position was made still more difficult by the fact that the Senate re- 
fused to ratify his appointment, because he still retained his post as 
Secretary of the Treasury. Gallatin had, however, not been idle. 
He got in touch with friends in Europe to whom he wrote conciliatory 
letters, and, in particular, with Alexander Baring of the famous 
banking house in London. Baring, in a very frank letter, explained the 



532 AMERICAN WAR AND TREATY OF GHENT, 1814 

views of the British Government on mediation 1 . At the same time 
he suggested that a direct negotiation at London might be substituted 
with success, provided that the American view of impressment was 
not finally insisted upon. These were, in substance, Gallatin's own 
opinions and he hastened to urge them on his Government at the 
same time making preparations for a journey to London. 

Meanwhile, Castlereagh had been taking steps to bring forward a 
similar proposal. He pressed on Cathcart the necessity of excluding, 
the American War and all maritime questions from Continental affairs. 
But he was anxious for direct negotiations at London or elsewhere ; 
and he asked the Emperor to press this view on the Americans 2 . In 
September, as a result of conversations with Lieven, he returned to 
the question even more warmly. There had been rumours, which 
had seriously alarmed the British Government, that Napoleon in- 
tended to press for the introduction of American Commissioners to 
the Prague Conferences. The subject might well be used to sow dis- 
sensions between Great Britain and her Allies ; and Castlereagh was 
determined to rule the matter out of discussion at once. 

"The whole question with America...," he wrote to Cathcart on 
September 27th 3 , " is one not of principle but of practice, the oppressions 
alleged to be committed in impressing Americans as British subjects 
[arise] from the impossibility of discrimination. To this the British Govern- 
ment has always professed their willingness to apply a remedy so far as 
they could do so without essential prejudice to their naval service and to 
the Right itself — but this cannot by any possibility be a point of difficulty 
with other nations, and it is one which Great Britain and America are alone 
competent to settle. 

I have been induced to say thus much on this point, as there prevails 
much misconception and prejudice on this subject, from which I think 
the Count de Lieven is himself not altogether exempt. I am confident that 
he has no wish to revive any of those questions which have been happily 
settled with the Northern Powers. It is only an impatience of the war 
going on with America to the inconvenience of general commerce which 
weighs with him ; but if this should be the case let America who chooses to 
stir these questions answer for the consequences. We stand on our long 
established practice from which we never deviated till the decrees of France 
led to the adoption of the retaliating Orders in Council, and by which 
ancient practice we propose to consider ourselves at all times implicitly 
bound, except towards a Power that renounces all principles of law for the 
purpose of attempting our destruction." 

1 A Great Peace Maker. The Diary of James Gallatin, ed. by Count Gallatin, 
1914, Appendix I. 

2 Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 5th, 1813. F.O.Russia, 83. British Diplomacy, p. 6. 

3 F.O. Supplementary, 343. British Diplomacy, p. 33. 



BRITISH OFFER OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 533 

It was the wish to avoid embarrassment in the Continental diplo- 
macy that led Castlereagh to make a direct offer to the United States. 
Gallatin's letters to Baring had, however, revealed the fact that the 
American Commissioners were unable to open direct negotiations 
without new Instructions from their Government. In order, therefore, 
to allow a negotiation to begin as soon as possible and thus prevent 
any attempt to associate it with the European Peace, Castlereagh 
himself on November 4th, 181 3, made an offer to the American 
Government to enter into direct negotiations 1 . Though the Note 
showed no sign of yielding on the points of issue, the offer was accepted 
by Madison and new Instructions were despatched. To the two Com- 
missioners already in Europe were added Henry Clay, a young and 
brilliant representative of Kentucky, and Russell, who had been Charge 
d'affaires at London on the outbreak of the war. Gallatin was subse- 
quently added to the Commission, when it was found that he had re- 
mained in Europe — no objection being now offered to his nomination, 
as he had resigned his post on the Administration. His presence was 
extremely fortunate ; for, though two at least of the four Americans 
were men of the highest capacity, none of them possessed the know- 
ledge of European habits of mind or the faculty for compromise which 
Gallatin had in the highest measure. They were, moreover, all jealous 
and suspicious of one another, as well as of their enemy. The Com- 
missioners were not allowed to conduct the negotiations in London 
as the British Government had desired. Gothenburg was accordingly 
designated as the place of meeting. But a long delay ensued before 
the Commissioners could come together; and, meanwhile, the aspect 
of affairs on the Continent had completely changed. 

It was April before Clay and Russell arrived from America, and 
Adams did not reach Stockholm until May 25th. Meanwhile, Gallatin 
and Bayard had proceeded by way of Amsterdam to London. There 
theyfound theWarwith France concluded and the British Government 
occupied with the European negotiations. The omens for peace were 
not favourable. It was thought that, now the Continental War was over, 
Britain might direct all her efforts against America and inflict a severe 
punishment upon her. The naval forces were increased and prepara- 
tions immediately made to ship Wellington's veterans to America. 
Nevertheless, the commercial classes were beginning to be tired of the 
War, and the affairs of the Continent were not yet decided. But the 
Government showed no anxiety for the negotiations to begin. They 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, I. 1543. 



534 AMERICAN WAR AND TREATY OF GHENT, 1814 

considered that the reinforcements despatched to America must im- 
prove their position there and thus exercise a favourable effect on the 
discussions. Gallatin was pressed to consent to a removal of the place 
of meeting to Ghent, as being nearer London ; and he succeeded in 
obtaining Clay's consent to this proposal before Adams arrived. The 
American Commissioners, therefore, gradually assembled at Ghent in 
June and the early days of July. Even then the British Commissioners, 
who were not appointed until May 27th, were slow to put in an appear- 
ance. The Government was, indeed, occupied with the visits of the 
Continental Sovereigns and statesmen and the preparations for the 
coming Congress ; but the delay was not altogether accidental. Gallatin 
stayed at London long enough to obtain an interview with Alexander, 
who, however, told him he could give no help. "England will not 
admit a third party to interfere in her disputes with you," and he in- 
timated that this was on account of "the former Colonial relations." 
Gallatin , therefore , set offf or Ghent without very high hopes of success * . 
The personnel of the British Commissioners was so inferior to 
that of the American, that it appeared as if the British Government 
did not attach much importance to the negotiations and wished them to 
fail. The first Plenipotentiary was Lord Gambier, a sailor of no great 
capacity and entirely ignorant of the matter which he had now to 
discuss. The real head of the mission was Henry Goulburn,the Under- 
secretary of State for War and Colonies, who was later to be Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in two Administrations. He was, however, a man 
of but small reputation at this time, and, though not without a certain 
capacity, was pedantic and narrow minded and entirely incapable of 
appreciating the great issues which were about to be discussed. The 
third member of the Commission was William Adams, a lawyer who 
had a deep knowledge of maritime law, but was in no sense a diplo- 
matist. Such men could not compare with Gallatin and Adams, or 
even with Clay and Bayard. They had not, of course, to bear the same 
responsibility as the Americans, since they could easily be furnished 
with the Instructions of the Government. They became, indeed, 
for the most part little more than messengers, through whom the 
Cabinet's decisions could be conveyed to the American Commissioners. 
They did not arrive at Ghent until August 6th, having kept the 
Americans waiting a month. The interval had not improved the 
temper of men like Adams and Clay, and neither side appeared to 
expect a successful issue of the discussion. 

1 Diary of James Gallatin, p. 25. 



PEACE CONFERENCE OPENED AT GHENT 535 

II 

As has been stated in the previous section the negotiations which 
began at Ghent on August 6th were not viewed hopefully by either 
side. The Americans were dismayed at the long delay in opening the 
Conferences, and the personnel of the British Mission appeared so 
inferior to their own that they could scarcely believe the British 
Government to intend serious discussion. Goulburn, on the other 
hand, immediately detected in the American Commissioners an ob- 
stinate adherence to their own point of view, which ill became the 
representatives of a weaker nation in its transactions with the British 
Empire. The negotiations were also, from the outset, rendered difficult 
by the fact that the Instructions with which the two Missions were 
severally furnished for the most part dealt with quite different subjects. 

The British Instructions, dated July 28th, 1814 1 , were drawn up 
under the influence of the great successes in Europe. They show that 
the British Government considered itself now so much stronger 
than the Americans that it could dictate terms. These went far 
beyond the causes of the War, and seized the opportunity to place 
British power in North America in a far stronger position than in 
1812. The Instructions were divided into four main heads. In the 
first place, no concessions whatever were to be made on the questions 
of British maritime rights — whether impressment, or the "Rule of 
1756." Secondly, under the pretence of protecting our Indian allies 
a large Indian zone was to be removed from the sovereignty of the 
United States and made into a sort of " buffer" State. Thirdly, exten- 
sive rectifications of frontier were demanded, which were urged as 
necessary on the grounds of the acquisition of Louisiana and part of 
the Floridas by the United States and their intention, made manifest 
during the war, of conquering Canada. Last, the special rights given to 
the United States in the Newfoundland Fisheries by the Treaty of 1783 
were declared to be abrogated by the war. Nevertheless, the strategy 
of the British Government was not ill-conceived, however unskilful 
were its tactics. They were in fact determined to exploit the military 
advantages which they considered the European Peace had given them. 
They were disappointed in their hopes ; but the Peace which they even- 
tually secured was no worse than what they could have obtained at the 
outset, though it was only secured at the expense of a diplomatic defeat. 

1 Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 67. An earlier draft, as well as some corre- 
spondence between the Commissioners and Castlereagh, was published by Mr Ford 
in the Transactions of the Massachusetts Historical Society, December 19 14 — January 
1915, pp. 138-164. 



536 AMERICAN WAR AND TREATY OF GHENT, 1814 

The British could of course refer to their Court and, as a matter 
of fact, did so on every occasion before they committed themselves; 
but the Americans could only obtain further Instructions after a long 
lapse of time. This inability was not altogether a disadvantage in the 
manoeuvring for position which formed the first part of the nego- 
tiations. Throughout the negotiations, the case of the Americans was 
handled with far greater skill than that of the British. The stiff and 
pedantic Goulburn was no match for men like Gallatin and Adams, 
and was betrayed into admissions which were used with great effect 
in America. The Government were indeed responsible for large claims 
made by Britain at the outset of the negotiations; but Goulburn 
throughout let slip no opportunity of stating his case in as harsh and 
uncompromising a manner as possible, and his inept diplomacy was 
to have considerable effect on the public opinion of both countries, 
when Madison published the first series of Notes exchanged. 
Neither he nor his Government grasped the difficulty of negotiating 
with a country like the United States, where the Executive Power 
was to so great an extent controlled in its conduct of foreign relations, 
not only by public opinion but by the Constitution itself. The British 
Commissioners were, also, less well informed as to the legal and 
historical aspects of their case than the American, with results some- 
times unfortunate for our side. 

The original American Instructions had been drawn up for the 
negotiation under the mediation of Russia, and were dated April 15th, 
1813. They, naturally, dwelt mainly upon the subject of impressment 
and made satisfaction on that point a sine qua non of the Peace. The 
American view of other neutral rights, such as a definition of Blockade 
and the "Rule of 1756," was also urged, but these were treated as 
subordinate points, which could be waived, if necessary. To all other 
matters the principle of status quo antea was to be applied. These 
Instructions were supplemented by various letters to the Commis- 
sioners, in which the same high tone was maintained until June 25th 
and 27th, when, the news of the European Peace having reached 
America, Instructions were addressed to the Commissioners which 
allowed them, as a last resource, to allow the subject of impressment 
to be entirely omitted from the Treaty 1 . 

The Americans, on the whole, handled their case exceedingly well. 
They drew from the British Commissioners their extremest demands 
and then proceeded to reply to them in Notes, which were written for 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, I. 1552. 



THE BRITISH DEMANDS 537 

publication at home, and produced exactly the impression which was 
desired. By this means, the negotiation was made to serve important 
political ends. The chief weakness of the American Delegation lay in 
their distrust and dislike of one another. But Gallatin gradually 
obtained something like an ascendancy over his colleagues, and Adams 
was too patriotic and high-minded not to submit to him. In the end, 
Gallatin, by judicious conciliation at critical moments, was always able 
to prevent the negotiations from being broken off; and the Peace must 
be considered as largely due to his unremitting efforts. 

The first meeting at the house of the British Mission — (a circum- 
stance which caused the Americans, always more sensitive as to their 
dignity than representatives of monarchical States, much searching 
of heart) — resulted in the British opening their demands 1 . The 
Americans were dismayed at their extent, and replied at a second 
meeting that their Instructions did not permit them to discuss the 
questions of the Indians or the Fisheries, while asking for more 
explicit information as to the British intentions. These were given 
them in a third meeting on August 19th. The British then demanded 
that the Americans should be entirely excluded from maintaining 
any naval force on the Lakes, the natural frontier between Canada 
and the United States, and that they should grant to the British 
a direct route from Halifax to Quebec, which meant extensive cessions 
of territory, and also access to the Mississippi from Lake Superior. 
The Indian stipulations had already been made a sine qua non of 
peace by the British Commissioners, in accordance with their In- 
structions, and they supplied such phrasing to their territorial 
demands as to make them seem "equally necessary" to the con- 
clusion of peace. In this, they went much further than the Cabinet, 
or at any rate Liverpool and Castlereagh, had intended. Castle- 
reagh visited Ghent on his way to the Vienna Congress. He did 
not interfere in the negotiations; but, though Goulburn assured 
him that the Americans were disposed both to treat and sign the 
proposed frontier and Indian arrangements, he disapproved of the 
peremptory tone adopted in the British Notes 2 . Stated, however, as 
they were, they gave a fine opportunity to the American Com- 
missioners. Even Gallatin now despaired of peace. "Great Britain 
wants war in order to cripple us," he wrote to Monroe, "she wants 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, I. 1578. 

2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, August 28th, 18 14; Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 192. 



538 AMERICAN WAR AND TREATY OF GHENT, 1814 

aggrandisement at our expense. I do not expect to be longer than 
three months in Europe 1 ." Gallatin, indeed, softened the answer of 
the Commission somewhat, for he had no wish to break off relations 
until the British had thoroughly exposed their hand. But the American 
Note, despatched on August 25th, was sufficiently explicit to awaken 
Goulburn to the real state of affairs and to impress Castlereagh and 
Liverpool. Goulburn now wrote that "the rupture has in effect 
taken place." Castlereagh saw, however, that the American Note was 
"evidently intended to rouse their people upon the question of their 
independence," and pressed for an effective answer, while Liverpool 
admitted that the British Commissioners " had taken a very erroneous 
view of our policy," and that it was imperative to avoid breaking off 
negotiations at this stage 2 . He was anxious, on the contrary, to throw 
the responsibility for the rupture on the Americans. Nevertheless, 
the British Government still had high hopes of military success, and 
the answer, which was despatched on September 4th, therefore still 
insisted on acquisition of territory. It endeavoured to compare the 
United States to Revolutionary France, in its character of a Power 
which was prepared to advance its own frontiers — as the expansion 
in the South and the attack on Canada had shown — but in whose 
eyes its own territory was inviolable. The Americans were, however, 
far too wary to break off negotiations at this stage. Their reply, of 
September 9th, pointed out that the Indians would be restored to the 
same condition as before the War, and that boundary lines which 
could be shown to be undefined might be discussed. Further dis- 
cussion was thus necessary. The Cabinet, when faced with the position 
of continuing the war for the creation of an Indian "Barrier" 
recoiled. In further Notes of September 19th, the sine qua non as 
regards the Indians was restated in a form which really amounted 
to little more than the status quo, and the Americans, influenced 
perhaps by the news of the capture of Washington, which reached 
England on September 27th, were able to accept an article of this 
nature. 

On the other points, however, both parties were as uncompromising 
as ever. Goulburn had done everything in his power to bring matters 
to a head ; but the Cabinet kept a firm check on him, and all the British 
Notes were drafted in London. Such alterations as the Commis- 

1 Diary of James Gallatin, p. 29. 

2 Liverpool to Castlereagh, September 2nd, 18 14; Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 214. 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 539 

sioners were allowed to make were invariably in the direction of 
stiffening the terms. Even Goulburn, however, succumbed to the 
fascination of Gallatin, who, he said, was not in the least like an 
American. The Prime-Minister, moreover, was anxious for peace. 
The discussions at the Congress of Vienna were now beginning to 
cause the Cabinet anxiety and henceforward exercised an increasing 
influence in the direction of peace. Nevertheless, the Cabinet could not 
ignore the fact of the British successes. Accordingly, on October 21st 
a new turn was given to the negotiations by an attempt to make the 
principle of uti possidetis the basis of the territorial settlement 1 . The 
Cabinet hoped thus to profit largely from the expected British 
advance on the Northern frontier. The British view of the Fisheries 
question was also insisted upon. The American answer (October 24th) 
which refused the acceptance of this basis as beyond their powers, 
made Liverpool abandon hope of concluding peace, though he was 
still anxious for the discussions to proceed 2 . To this decision he was 
urged by the first news of the defeat of the British on the Lakes which 
arrived about this time. Accordingly, the Americans were asked to 
put forward a contreprojet (October 31st). 

The Americans took ten days to prepare their answer, which was 
delayed by lengthy discussions and recriminations among them- 
selves ; and, meanwhile, the opinion of the Cabinet underwent a very 
important change. Preparations were being made for the despatch of 
further reinforcements to America. It also occurred to the Cabinet 
that, if Wellington were sent out in command, not only would there 
be more chance of military success, but any peace that might be made 
would be protected by his prestige and authority. They, accordingly, 
offered Wellington the command as an alternative to his relieving 
Castlereagh at Vienna; for rumours of plots to assassinate him in- 
creased their wish to move him away from Paris. Wellington's sense of 
duty never allowed him to refuse to serve his country in any position, 
however unwelcome. But his letters left no doubt as to how distasteful 
the command would be to him, and he seized the opportunity to review 
the strategic position for the benefit of the Cabinet. His opinion, 
stated without reservation, that the military position was by no means 
sufficient to justify the claims that had been put forward at Ghent 
awakened the Cabinet to a sense of reality, and they were thus ready 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, I. 1633. 

2 Liverpool to Wellington, October 28th, 1814; Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, ix. 384. 



54© AMERICAN WAR AND TREATY OF GHENT, 1814 

to consider the American counter-project in a far more yielding 
spirit than had seemed possible 1 

The American Projet (November 10th) was the result of a violent 
discussion ; but it was, in the main, the work of Gallatin and, therefore, 
while it stated the American case strongly, avoided needless offence and 
made one or two suggestions towards compromise. The basis of uti possi- 
detis was again refused and that of the status quo offered ; but boundary 
commissions were suggested as a means to settle the main territorial 
points in dispute. Access to the Mississipi was, also, offered in ex- 
change for British acquiescence in the new Louisiana boundaries. The 
American attitude on the Fisheries question was maintained. Articles 
were also suggested on impressment and blockade. Indemnities were 
demanded for the irregular captures of American ships before the out- 
break of War, and for the acts contrary to International Law committed 
during its course. This last article was an attempt to obtain damages 
for the destruction of the Government buildings at Washington. 

Goulburn's comments on the Projet amounted to a refusal of 
almost the whole of it ; but the Cabinet viewed the matter in a different 
light. The unsatisfactory state of the negotiations at Vienna and 
Wellington's letter had determined them to abandon all claims for 
increase of territory 2 . The publication of the first part of the negotia- 
tions by Madison was, also, a diplomatic stroke of great value. It 
roused the spirit of the American nation, Federalists and Democrats 
alike indignantly rejecting the idea of cession of territory, while it 
also caused strong criticism in Great Britain. Alexander Baring gave 
expression to these sentiments in a debate in the House on November 
21st, and the Government were forced to declare that they had never 
meant to make territorial cessions a sine qua non of peace. The reply, 
therefore, which the Cabinet sent to Ghent on November 22nd was 
meant, if possible, to obtain agreement. The basis of uti possidetis 
and the control of the Lakes were completely abandoned and the 
way to peace thus opened, much to the dismay of Goulburn. That 
most of the other American demands were refused was of small conse- 
quence, since on none of these were the Americans prepared to break 
off negotiations. The proposals as to boundary commissions was 
accepted, while access to the Courts of either country was suggested 

1 Liverpool to Castlereagh, November 4th, 18 14; Liverpool to Wellington, 
November 4th, 1814; Wellington to Liverpool, November 7th, 9th, 18th, 1814; 
Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, rx. 405, 406, 422, 424, 436. 

2 Liverpool to Castlereagh, November 18th, 1814; Wellington, Supplementary 
Despatches, IX. 438. 



THE TREATY OF GHENT SIGNED 541 

instead of indemnities for damages. An article for the payment of 
the expenses of prisoners of war was also added, and it was further 
suggested that the hostilities should cease only on the ratification of 
the Treaty. Possibly, this last stipulation was made in order to give 
time for the expedition preparing against New Orleans to obtain its 
objective, but, considering the part played by the Senate in Foreign 
Affairs, it was not one to which the American Commissioners could 
object. On the receipt of this Note, Gallatin felt that peace was really 
in sight and did his utmost to get his colleagues to meet the British 
demands as far as possible. The Americans, therefore, now withdrew 
their demands as to impressment, leaving the matter open. Gallatin 
even succeeded in obtaining the consent of the majority of his 
colleagues to granting access to the Mississipi on condition of the 
American view of the Fishery rights being accepted. At the same 
time, the Americans asked for a conference and the Commissioners 
thus met again officially after an interval of almost three months. Now 
that verbal discussions could be substituted for written communica- 
tions, affairs went on much more quickly and smoothly. Where 
deadlocks occurred, the matter could generally be solved by omitting 
altogether the question in dispute. In this way, eventually, both the 
Mississipi Claims and the Fisheries question were removed from the 
Treaty and reserved for future discussions. The possession of some 
insignificant islands in Passamaquoddy Bay was adjusted by a 
judicious compromise by which neither side gave up any substantial 
claim. The Americans accepted an article condemning the Slave Trade. 
These discussions occupied another three weeks. They were con- 
ducted with the utmost secrecy ; for, when the Americans saw that 
peace was really to be obtained they were anxious that nothing should 
interrupt the harmony of the proceedings. At last, on December 24th, 
the Treaty was signed with more expressions of mutual goodwill 
than had at one time seemed possible. The document is a curious com- 
mentary on the four months' discussions. Scarcely any of the subjects 
about which there had been such violent controversy were mentioned 
in it. Since these include the points for which the United States had 
gone to war, the Treaty was, in a sense, a victory for Great Britain, 
who never demanded that other countries should recognise her mari- 
time rights in theory but only insisted on them in practice. But, since 
the War was now over, the Americans could claim that it was no 
longer necessary to continue to fight against abuses which had ceased 
to exist. All that was now left of the British demands brought 



542 AMERICAN WAR AND TREATY OF GHENT, 1814 

forward in August was an innocuous clause restoring peace to the 
Indians. In the same way, the Americans had had to abandon their 
claims for damages. Apart from the clause on the Abolition of the 
Slave Trade, which was put in the most general way, the rest of the 
Treaty merely consisted of clauses referring all the disputed boundary 
questions to special commissioners. 

The British Commissioners had added at the last moment a clause 
that the Ratifications must be made without any change or reserva- 
tion, if peace was to result. For this they were criticised by the Govern- 
ment; but the result showed that they were right. In the United 
States the ratification was hastened so that Peace might ensue. It did 
not, however, take place in time to prevent the Americans from 
defeating the British expedition to New Orleans. On the whole, the 
Treaty was very well received in the United States, and the American 
Commissioners were welcomed home as men who had conducted a 
difficult negotiation to the credit of their country. Despite the fact 
that they had obtained no satisfaction for any of the grievances to 
avenge which they had fought the War, the American people in- 
stinctively felt that they had escaped a great danger by successfully 
resisting without Allies the might of the British Empire at the height 
of its power and prestige. 

In England opinions were less favourable. The old Tory school 
was incensed that no castigation had been inflicted for the treacherous 
attack which, they considered, had been made on them at the crisis of 
the Great War. But the feeling did not go very deep. The commercial 
interests were delighted, and other critics might reflect that the 
maritime principles which had produced the defeat of France had 
been preserved. The return of Napoleon diverted the thoughts of 
the nation to other dangers in the midst of which it could not but be 
thankful that peace had been concluded with America. On the whole, 
while the jealousy and bitterness roused by the War lasted for genera- 
tions, there was immediately a very powerful body of opinion in both 
countries which was determined that it should not recur. A high Tory 
like Alison could indeed write even as late as 1842: "Little doubt 
remains that out of premature and uncomplete pacification the germs 
of a future and calamitous war between the two countries will spring 1 ." 
Yet, before a century had elapsed, every subject in dispute at Ghent 
had either been relegated to oblivion or amicably settled by mutual 
concessions. 

1 Alison, History of Europe, x. 749. 



Appendixes to Chapters II — III 

APPENDIX A 

THE CAUSES OF THE RUPTURE WITH FRANCE 

F.O. Holland, 41. GRENVILLE to AUCKLAND. 

Whitehall, Nov. 23, 1792. 
H.M.'s satisfaction at the effect of the British Declaration to the Estates 
of Holland. Auckland is to keep up their resolution. "I am strongly 
inclined to believe that it is the present intention of the prevailing party 
in France to respect the rights of this country and of the [Dutch] Republic ; 
but it will undoubtedly be necessary that the strictest attention should be 
given to any circumstances which may seem to indicate a change in this 
respect 1 ." 

Ibid. Nagel to Grenville. 

Londres, Nov. 29, 1792. 

" La situation critique ou se trouve la Republique des Provinces Unies, 
non seulement depuis l'invasion et la conquete que M. Dumourier vient 
de faire des Pays Bas Autrichiens, mais aussi par la Resolution que le 
Conseil Executif de France vient de prendre le 16 du courant relative a 
la navigation libre de 1'Escaut et de la Meuse, m'impose le devoir de 
rappeller sans cesse la sollicitude de Votre Excellence sur le danger pressant 
qui menace un Allie fidele; et sans vouloir anticiper sur les ordres que 
je pourrai recevoir de mes Maitres, je croirois n'avoir point satisfait a la 
fidelite que je Leur dois, ni a la confiance dont lis m'ont honore, si je ne 
priois pas Votre Excellence d 'observer: 

"1. Que le General Dumourier, en voulant ouvrir le passage de 
1'Escaut, veut violer le territoire de la Republique, intention que Leurs 
Hautes Puissances etoient parfaitement d'accord avec S.M.B. de nullement 
attribuer a aucune des Puissances Belligerentes, comme il (constate ?) par 
leur reponse a la Declaration faite le 16 du courant par Son Excellence My 
Lord Auckland. 

"2. Que le Conseil Executif de France par sa Declaration du 16 du 
courant a manifeste ouvertement ses desseins contre les Interets de la 
Republique, tout en brisant les obligations les plus sacrees que la France 
avoit contractees par le Traite de Fontainebleau en date du 8 Novembre 
1785. . . . Ces observations, My Lord, je n'en doute pas, ont deja ete faites 
par les Ministres de S.M. et je ne saurais non plus envisager comme 

1 Grenville had not then heard of the French Decrees of November 16th, 19th. 
For other letters between Auckland and Grenville see Dropmore Papers, vol. II. and 
Journal... of Lord Auckland, vol. 11. 



544 CAUSES OF THE RUPTURE WITH FRANCE 

problematiques les bonnes intentions de la Grande Bretagne, vis-a-vis de 
son plus ancien Allie, pour lequel Elle a non seulement fait les efforts les 
plus genereux, mais encore a qui Elle a garanti sa tranquillite interieure et 
exterieure. Ainsi je ne puis craindre qu'il puisse paroitre indiscret de ma 
Part de renouveller les instances, faites et Jeudi et Dimanche passes, aupres 
de Votre Excellence pour qu'il plaise a S.M.B. de faire veiller tres-exacte- 
ment sur ce qui se passe dans les Ports d'Ostende et de Dunkerque; et si 
a cette Bonte Elle vouloit ajouter le rassemblement d'une escadre aux 
Dunes ou a Gravesend, qui put se porter directement vers la Hollande, en 
cas de besoin, les Etats Generaux en seroient justement reconnoissants, 
ceux qui veulent Leur nuire seroient peut-etre contenus, et la tranquillite 
publique ainsi heureusement conservee.. . ." 

Ibid. Auckland to Grenville. 

Hague, Nov. 30, 1792. 
". . .The Dutch Ministers are anxious to learn the sentiments of the 
King and of his Ministers. It is their object in the meantime to temporize 
as far as may be practicable without essential disgrace or detriment; and 
the Grand Pensionary assures me that great activity continues to be used 
in preparing two or three frigates, with gun-boats and floating batteries." 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

Hague, Dec. 25, 1792. 
He advises the issue of a British Declaration stating our love of peace 
and order, and our resolve both to support Holland (if attacked) and to aid 
other peoples to maintain "their religion, constitution, property and inde- 
pendence." 

Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,446. 

Grenville to Auckland. 

Whitehall, Dec. 29, 1792. 
He sends his despatches for Whitworth and Stratton under flying seal, 
so that Auckland may peruse them and inform the Dutch Ministers of 
their contents. "H.M.'s Ministers are sensible that much doubt may be 
entertained respecting the real views of the Court of Petersburg in the 
overture they have made. But it has been felt that these could in no manner 
so well be ascertained as by acceding to the proposal in the manner now 
adopted. If either the original intention or the effect of this step on our 
part induces the Empress to take an active share in a war which seems so 
little likely to be avoided, a great advantage will be derived from it to the 
common cause. If she withdraws the sort of overture she has made, no 
inconvenience can result from the measure taken by the King at all to be 
put in comparison with the benefit of success. It appears probable that, 
either on the result of my answer to M. Chauvelin or of the answer to be 
given in Holland to the French agent there, or perhaps by actual aggression 
against the [Dutch] Republic, the present situation will be brought to its 
crisis before the answer from the different Courts can be received. In 



APPENDIX A 545 

that event it would be of the utmost importance that we should be enabled 
to bring forward to the public view without delay the papers alluded to 
in Your Excellency's last despatch 1 , so as to prove to this country that, 
at the very moment when M. Chauvelin was giving here fresh assurances 
respecting the neutrality of the Republic, and was endeavouring to repre- 
sent the Scheldt as the only cause of war, the French agents in Holland, 
and even the ostensible Minister of the soi-disant Republic of France, were 
forming plans of attack and urging the French general to execute them 
without delay." 

F.O. Prussia ; 27. EDEN to GRENVILLE. 

Berlin, Jan. 1, 1793. 

General Mollendorf will soon proceed to the East to take command of 
the Prussian expedition against Poland. "This business is no longer a 
mystery here, and it is publicly said that the four bailiwicks of which he is 
to take possession in Great Poland were the promised price of H.P.M.'s 
interference in the affairs of France, and that he has now exacted the 
discharge of the promise with threats of otherwise making a separate peace 
with France. Russia, it is added, consents with reluctance, induced prin- 
cipally by fear of the Turks. I mention this as the public report. Having 
more than once represented to the Prussian Ministers the extreme in- 
justice of this measure, and even impolicy at this awful crisis, and having 
been answered only by miserable elusions, it appears unnecessary to say 
anything further on the subject." 

Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,446. 

Grenville to Auckland. 

Whitehall, Jan. 4, 1793. 
".. .There is still the strongest reason to apprehend a disposition in 
France to proceed to every extremity rather than to give to this country 
and to Holland the satisfaction which we have a right to expect on the 
different points in question between us. No account has yet been received 
here of the light in which my answer to M. Chauvelin has been considered 
or of the effect it has produced." He believes that Dumouriez's journey 
to Paris has been "to pursue his plan against the Dutch Republic, about 
which the Executive Council had expressed hesitation." 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

Whitehall, Jan. 5, 1793. 

"Having this day received the enclosed extract of a communication 
made to the National Convention by M. Le Brun, I lose no time in trans- 
mitting it to Your Excellency in order that the Dutch Government may 
be informed without delay (supposing they have not received this account 
directly from Paris) of the great probability which this circumstance affords 
of an immediate rupture with France." In no case must the Dutch supply 
naval stores to the French. 

1 See Dropmore Papers, 11. 360. 

w.&G. 1. 35 



546 CAUSES OF THE RUPTURE WITH FRANCE 

F.O. Prussia, 27. 

Eden to Grenville. 

[Cypher.] Berlin, Jan. 5, 1793. 

"The Allies mean to continue the war and persevere in the Resolution 
set forth in the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto, of restoring the monarchical 
form of government in France under such limitations as may be prescribed 
by a free Assembly of the States, and re-instating the German Princes in 
their rights, and, what has not hitherto been openly avowed, declaring 
that they mean to require a compensation for the expences of the war. 
A firm hope is expressed that H.M. will become a party in the war." 

F.O. Sardinia, n. 

Grenville to Trevor (at Turin). 

Whitehall, Jan. 10, 1793. 

". . .H.M.'s conduct in abstaining from all interference in the internal 
affairs of France, and the neutrality which H.M. had observed in the 
present War, have not had the effect which the King was so justly entitled 
to expect. The present rulers in France have, notwithstanding those cir- 
cumstances, adopted measures likely to excite in H.M.'s mind the strongest 
jealousy and uneasiness. Their conduct has been such as to indicate a 
fixed design of hostility against H.M. and his Allies, and views of aggression 
and aggrandisement utterly inconsistent with the general tranquillity and 
security of Europe. Under these circumstances H.M. feels himself called 
upon by the most important interests of his subjects to adopt such measures 
as may be necessary for the security of his own dominions and those of 
his Allies and for the general interests of Europe. And H.M. is desirous, 
as far as possible, to adopt a system of concert with the different Powers 
who have a common interest with H.M. on this subject or who are still 
more strongly concerned in opposing a barrier to the progress of French 
arms and French principles. 

"At the time when the conduct of France had already been judged by 
H.M. to be such as to call for vigorous preparations on his part, H.M. 
received from the Court of Petersburg an overture expressive of the sense 
which the Empress entertained of the danger with which all Europe was 
threatened from the designs openly avowed by France and from the recent 
progress of the French arms, and conveying to H.M. the wish of H.I.M. 
that a concert might be established on this subject between the Courts of 
London and Petersburg with a view to provide for the general security of 
Europe. H.M. was pleased to direct that in answer to this overture I should 
assure the Minister of H.I.M. that the sentiments and wishes of the King 
were conformable to those of the Empress, and that H.M. was disposed 
to enter into such a concert, confining it to the object of opposing the views 
of aggression and aggrandisement entertained by France, without any 
view to an interference in the internal affairs of that country. And I ex- 
pressed H.M.'s wish that some person here might be fully instructed and 
authorized by the Empress to arrange the detail both of the objects to be 
pursued and of the measures to be adopted for their attainment. Com- 



APPENDIX A 547 

munications of a similar tendency have been made to the two Courts of 
Vienna and Berlin; and it is H.M.'s pleasure that you should state to the 
Sardinian Ministers the purport of what I have already mentioned and 
express H.M.'s wish that the fullest instructions and powers may be given 
to such person here as H.S.M. shall be pleased to chuse for that purpose, 
in order that, if occasion should arise, the King may be enabled to concert 
with H.S.M. either with respect to terms of pacification or as to operations 
of war, if the continuance and extension of hostilities should become un- 
avoidable. H.M. wishes in the present moment not to make to H.S.M. any 
specific proposal with respect to either of these two points, because he is 
sensible that the determination of H.S.M. with respect to them must in 
a great degree depend on a concert with those Powers with whom he is 
joined in the war. . . . 

"The general outline of such a plan would be that the Powers now at 
war with France should enable the neutral Powers engaged in this concert 
to propose to France terms of accommodation and peace. That the basis 
of such pacification should be, that France should withdraw her troops 
within the limits of her own territory, should annul all acts injurious to 
the rights or governments of other countries, and should give some un- 
equivocal pledge and security of her determination to abstain from fomenting 
troubles in any other country or from intermeddling in any manner in the 
internal affairs of other Governments. In return for this, the Powers at 
war with France might consent on their part to disavow expressly and 
unequivocally any interference in the internal government of France, and 
might even consent to establish in the usual mode a correspondence and 
intercourse with such Power in France with whom they might conclude 
such an agreement.. . ." 

F.O. France, 41. CHAUVELIN to GRENVILLE. 

Londres, Jan. n, 1793. 
"...La Republique Francaise ne peut considerer la conduite du Gou- 
vernement Anglais [on the Aliens Bill] que comme une infraction manifeste 
au Traite de Commerce conclu ; qu'en consequence elle cesse de se croire 
elle-meme obligee par ce Traite, et qu'elle le regarde des a present comme 
rompu et annulle." 

F.O. Prussia, 27. 

Unsigned draft in Grenville's writing. 

[Whitehall], Jan. 12, 1793. 
" In the conversations which I had this day with Count Stadion and 
Baron Jacobi, they both, after delivering the written answers of their two 
Courts, informed me that they had a further communication to make, but 
that they had agreed to do it verbally only, and in such a manner that my 
reply to it (if I made any) might not form part of the official answer to be 
given to their written communications. They then explained that they had 
received information from their respective Courts that, with a view to 
indemnifying them for the expenses of the war, a project had been brought 

35—2 



548 CAUSES OF THE RUPTURE WITH FRANCE 

forward by which Prussia was to obtain an arrondissement on the side of 
Poland, and in return was to withdraw any opposition to the exchange 
formerly proposed of the Low Countries and Bavaria. Count Stadion 
read me a paper which contained only reasonings on this subject to prove 
that the acquisition was beneficial to Austria only as an arrondissement, 
and that it would be a sacrifice in point of revenue, while such an arrange- 
ment would on the other hand better answer the views of the Maritime 
Powers with respect to a barrier against France. Baron Jacobi read out 
a despatch to him in which this plan was stated, but as a project which still 
required discussing (particularly with Russia) to ripen it, and on which 
therefore H.P.M. trusted the King and his Ministers would observe the 
most profound secrecy. 

"I told them both that I was glad they had mentioned this project in 
the form they had chosen ; that I was much better satisfied not to be obliged 
to enter into any formal or official discussion on the subject of Poland. 
But that I thought it due to that open communication which I wished to 
be established between our respective Courts not to omit saying at once 
and distinctly that the King would never be a party in any concert or plan, 
one part of which was the gaining a compensation for the expenses of the 
war from a neutral and unoffending nation. That the King was bound by 
no engagement of any sort with Poland, but that neither would H.M.'s 
sentiments suffer him to participate in measures directed to such an object, 
nor could he hope for the concurrence or support of his people in such a 
system. 

"With respect to indemnification I explained to them the outlines of 
the plan which Mr Whitworth, Mr Stratton and Sir Jas. Murray are in- 
structed to propose, and added that, if such an offer were made to France 
and refused by her, it did not seem unreasonable that, in the further 
prosecution of the war, which would then avowedly be ascribeable only 
to views of aggrandisement on the part of France, some compensation 
should be looked to by the Powers engaged in it...." 

Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,447. 

Grenville to Sir James Murray. 

Whitehall, Jan. 20, 1793. 
Expects that rupture will come with France as the French Government 
insists on terms entirely inconsistent with the Government of this country 
and H.M.'s dignity and honour. H.M. is making strenuous preparations 
and hopes to concert plans with Prussia and Austria. 

F.O. France, 41. LEBRUN to GRENVILLE. 

Paris, Jan. 25, 1793. 
"Le citoyen Chauvelin, Ministre Plenipotentiaire de la Republique 
Frangaise, ayant regu l'ordre de se rendre a Paris 1 , j'ai l'honneur de pre- 

1 This proves that Lebrun recalled Chauvelin before he heard of the British 
order for his withdrawal ; also, that Maret in his so-called mission had no official 
authorisation to touch on la haute politique. 



APPENDIX B 549 

venir Votre Excellence que le citoyen Maret, qui aura celui de lui remettre 
cette Lettre, se rend a Londres pour veiller aux papiers de la Legation et 
de les mettre en ordre. Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien lui accorder 
son appui et sa bienveillance dans les circonstances ou il croira necessaire 
de les reclamer." 



APPENDIX B 

BRITISH WAR POLICY 

{February 1793 to April 1795) 

Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,447. 

Minute of the East India Company. 

Jan. 28, 1793. 
The French islands in the Indian Ocean depend almost entirely on 
the Cape for provisions. Fear that the Cape may be taken by the French 
owing to dissensions there. Some means must be taken for its security 
and that of St Helena. Mauritius and Bourbon should be taken, as the 
best means of safeguarding India. 

Ibid. 34,448. Auckland to Grenville. 

Hague, Feb. 8, 1793. 
The Dutch army equalled nearly 50,000 men, but was wholly inex- 
perienced. The chief ruler is lethargic. 

F.O. Prussia, 27. Grenville to Eden (at Berlin). 

Whitehall, Feb. 5, 1793. 

"...Since M. Chauvelin's departure, an overture has been received 
by Lord Auckland from M. Dumouriez, with a proposal for an interview 
between them as likely to afford the means of maintaining peace. Many 
difficulties were felt in the way of this proposal, especially as an embargo 
has now actually taken place on our vessels in the French ports. It was 
however on the whole thought right to consent to the proposed interview, 
as it might afford the means of knowing the utmost extent to which France 
is disposed to go in facilitating an accommodation, and as the delay would 
at all events be in many respects advantageous to us, and particularly with 
reference to the defence of the Dutch territory." 

An objection to the plan was that it might cause jealousy to those with 
whom we wished to frame a concert (which perhaps might be the cause 
of the proposal). Eden will explain at Vienna that H.M. will not be 
led "to depart from the views and principles stated in the correspondence 
with M. Chauvelin": and will seek to restore a general peace "on such 
terms as the Emperor may justly expect." H.M. is ready to frame a formal 
engagement with Austria and Prussia on the principles which have been 
opened to those Powers. He will not conclude peace unless France abandons 



550 BRITISH WAR POLICY 

all her conquests, and renounces "all views of interference on her part in 
the interior of other countries and all measures of aggression or hostility 
against them ; provided that the Emperor shall on his part engage that, if 
France shall within the space of two months from this time agree to make 
peace on the terms above stated, adding to them stipulations for the per- 
sonal security of Her Most Christian Majesty and her family, the Emperor 
will consent to such a peace." 

Also that if the war continues, both Sovereigns will not make peace 
save by common consent, "on any terms short of the abandonment of all 
conquests which France has made or shall hereafter make," and of renun- 
ciation of all policy of interference in affairs of other States. A similar 
proposal will be made to Prussia. H.B.M. objects strongly to the proposals 
concerning Poland, but will not oppose them by force. 

Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,448. 

Grenville to Auckland. 

Whitehall, Feb. 13, 1793. 
As war had been declared by France, H.M. orders that "you should 
confine yourself to the hearing any proposal which M. Dumouriez may 
have to make, without expressing in any manner an opinion what terms 
of conciliation would now be deemed satisfactory under circumstances 
which have so materially varied. And you will expressly state that you are 
now only authorized to hear his proposals, to ascertain under what 
authority they are made, and to transmit them home for H.M.'s considera- 
tion." 

Ibid. Auckland to Grenville. 

Hague, Feb. 15, 1793. 
Joubert arrived with a passport from Dumouriez and stated that " de 
Maulde on arriving at Antwerp found Commissioners of the French Con- 
vention who brought a requisition for Dumouriez to recall de Maulde 
and to march against those [the Dutch] Provinces; that Dumouriez was 
preparing to obey and that de Maulde had set out for Paris on the 13th." 

F.O. France, 41. 

Petition from French Planters of San Domingo 
(through the medium of M. Malouet) 1 . 

Londres, Feb. 25, 1793. 
" Les Proprietaires de S. Domingue soussignes, considerant l'oppression 
et l'anarchie qui devorent la colonie et leurs proprietes, autorisent Mon- 
sieur Malouet, l'un d'eux, de solliciter aupres du Gouvernement anglais 
la protection et les secours necessaires pour les en delivrer, s'en rapportant 
a ses lumieres sur les details et adoptant d'avance les moyens qu'il prendra 
pour parvenir au succes de leur voeu." [About 70 signatures.] 

1 These letters etc. are not printed in the Memoir es de Malouet (Paris, 2 vols. 
1874) which contain scarcely a reference to this episode. 



APPENDIX B 551 

F.O. France, 42. GRENVILLE to MALOUET. 

Whitehall, April 3, 1793. 
" Je vous envoye, Monsieur, conformement a ce que vous avez desire, 
la Minute ci-incluse de ce qui a ete convenu dans les conversations que 
nous avons eu l'honneur, M. Pitt et moi, d 'avoir avec vous par rapport a 
la position de Ste. Domingue, et au voeu manifeste par les proprietaires de 
la partie Francaise de cette Isle de recourir a la protection du Roi." 

Ibid. Malouet to Grenville. 

Londres, 78 Titchfield St., April 4, 1793. 
"La Minute de l'acte que vous avez la bonte de me communiquer et 
les additions qui y ont ete faites sont parfaitement conformes aux sentimens 
que je vous ai exprimes, aux propositions que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous 
faire et me laissent dans la ligne dont je n'ai pas du m'ecarter. Agreez done, 
My Lord, mes remercimens et la priere que je vous fais de vouloir bien 
me renvoyer l'acte signe avant le depart deM.de Charmilli qui doit avoir 
lieu Samedi.. . ." 

Ibid. Minute signed by Grenville. 

April s, [1793]. 
After stating that Malouet was deputed to the British Government by 
the planters of St Domingo he continues — "Les Colons sollicitent tres 
humblement de S.M.B. protection et secours a l'effet de chasser de Ste 
Domingue les usurpateurs de la puissance publique, d'y retablir un 
gouvernement legal sous ses auspices, et de conserver la Colonie, jusqu'a 
ce que son sort futur soit regie a la conclusion de la paix entre l'Angleterre 
et la France, epoque a laquelle les Colons Francais selon les conditions de 
cette paix rentreront sous la domination d'une autorite legitime en France 
ou continueront d'obeir a S.M.B. comme a leur souverain, et deviendront 
sujets de l'Empire Britannique. Les dites propositions ayant ete mises 
sous les yeux de S.M.B., S.M. a bien voulu y acceder et donner aux dits 
Colons l'assurance de son Intention d'employer ses forces a l'effet ci-dessus 
mentionne au premier moment que les circonstances le lui permettront." 

Ibid. Grenville to Lebrun. 

[Draft.] Whitehall, May 18, 1793. 

He received on the 26th his letter and declined to give passports to 
any person until convinced by the most satisfactory proofs — "qu'elles (les 
Autorites) ont entierement change de Principes et de conduite a l'egard 
des autres Nations. S.M. ne juge pas apropos de se departir en ce moment 
de sa determination de ne pas reconnoitre dans les circonstances actuelles 
une nouvelle forme de gouvernement en France. Mais si on y est reelle- 
ment dispose a terminer la Guerre qu'on a injustement declaree a S.M. 
et a ses Allies, et a leur donner une juste satisfaction, surete, indemnisation, 
on pourra transmettre par ecrit aux Generaux des Armees sur la Frontiere 
les propositions que Ton aura a faire a cet effet ; ce moyen de communica- 



552 BRITISH WAR POLICY 

tion eviteroit les difficulties de forme, et Ton pourroit alors juger de la 
nature de ces propositions et de l'esprit qui les dirige." 

Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,448. 

Grenville to Starhemberg. 

Whitehall, June 26, 1793. 
Lord Beauchamp will go to the Headquarters of H. P.M. for an intimate 
concert on the war, so as to pursue it with vigour. Hopes for an alliance 
with Prussia on the same terms as with Austria and the Dutch Republic. 
The promise of the restoration of the conquests formerly made by France 
on Austria may entail heavy exertions; but H.M. gladly makes them for 
H.I.M. and hopes for a new barrier for his Belgic lands, but will not bind 
himself to secure this. 

Ibid. Grenville to Eden (at Vienna). 

Whitehall, July 26, 1793. 
Signature of Convention with Prussia between Lord Yarmouth and 
Lucchesini on same basis as that with Russia. Lucchesini said that, after 
taking Mainz, the combined armies would separate — 64,000 Austrians 
and nearly 20,009 Germans being under the Emperor and a limited 
co-operation only would take place. 

F.O. Spain, 27. GRENVILLE to St HELENS. 

[Secret.] Whitehall, July 19, 1793. 

The chief bar to Anglo-Spanish friendship is the jealousy at Madrid 
about the West Indies. England will seek indemnities for the expenses of 
this war, and they will probably come in part from the West Indies. Spain 
must surmise that. St Helens will avoid entering into details, but state 
the general principle of indemnity. If this be well received, "Your Ex- 
cellency may then try the ground of pointing the views of that Court to 
acquisitions on its own frontiers as preferable to distant conquests, es- 
pecially in the West Indies, where Spain is already possessed of territory 
far beyond what the capital or industry of its subjects will enable them to 
cultivate." No details to be discussed until the Allies have further succeeded. 

French politics are so confused that no views can be stated with profit. 
"Under these circumstances any declaration on the part of the Allied 
Powers in favour of a particular party or of a particular form of Govern- 
ment in the interior would tend only to unite all those who were opposed 
to that system, but could not be looked to as affording a reasonable prospect 
for the establishment of solid peace and permanent security. 

" The acknowledgment of the authority claimed by Monsieur as Regent 
is evidently a measure of the nature which I have described, and as such 
has been avoided here.. . ." 

St Helens is to point Spain towards French territory in preference 
to the West Indies, or even to Corsica, and to keep out of discussion our 
views in the West Indies unless there should be a certainty that Spain may 



APPENDIX B 553 

be brought to concur in them, which seems little probable; and to prevent 
the Court of Madrid from committing itself with any description of emigris 
or any party in the interior [of France] . 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

Whitehall, Aug. i, 1793. 

The Nootka differences ought to be adjusted without difficulty 1 . 

" H.M. has no intention of making a settlement at Nootka, nor is there 
any peculiar advantage in that port which should render Spain desirous 
of establishing herself there. It appears from the reports of Lieutenants 
Broughton and Mudge that the port of Nootka is clearly situated on an 
island, and gives therefore no access to the Continent; that it is by no 
means a better port for shipping or trade than many others on the same 
coast, and that the furs are neither better in quality nor so abundant in 
quantity as on other parts of that coast and of the islands adjacent. The 
national honour of Great Britain will be satisfied and the rights (as first 
disputed by Spain) of the King's subjects to settle on those coasts [will] 
be sufficiently established by the actual restitution of any tract however 
small, provided it is understood that the intention of the Court of Spain 
in making such restitution is to restore thereby all that was actually possessed 
by the British subjects, and that the restitution itself is not accompanied 
by unjustifiable reserves, or by claims of exclusive possession in the lands 
immediately adjacent, which render it nugatory." Nootka shall be con- 
sidered as a port "where it shall be free for the subjects of both nations 
occasionally to resort and to make temporary buildings for their accommo- 
dation, during the time of their being there, but where neither [Power] 
is to make any permanent settlement or to establish any claim of territorial 
sovereignty or dominion to the exclusion of the other, but mutually to 
assist each other in maintaining such free resort and liberty of commerce 
and residence against any other nation that shall attempt to establish there 
any claim of sovereignty or dominion." 

F.O. Austria, 34. EdEN to GRENVILLE. 

Vienna, Aug. 31, 1793. 
The Austrian Minister, Lehrbach, in a first interview with Lucchesini, 
suggested the Belgic-Bavarian exchange as an equivalent to the Prussian 
gains in Poland, and as indemnifying Austria for the expenses of the war. 
Lucchesini expressed great surprise, as Austria had promised to give up 
that project. If it were pressed, H.P.M. would object to any serious 
diminution of the power of France as upsetting the balance of Europe. 

F.O. Genoa, 6. Paoli to Drake (at Genoa). 

Murato di Nebbio, Oct. 7, 1793. 
"... Si S.M.B. veut accepter la Corse sous sa domination directe, alors 
la forme du Gouvernement pourra etre reglee, autant qu'il sera possible, 
d'une maniere analogue a celle de la Grande Bretagne, dont les lois 

1 For the dispute about Nootka Sound, in Vancouver Island, see Rose, Pitt, 1. 
ch. xxv. 



554 BRITISH WAR POLICY 

garantissent aux citoyens la liberte la plus assuree et la plus tranquille." 
The Government of Ireland, or that of some of the British colonies, might 
serve as model. 

F.O. Austria, 36. GRENVILLE to EDEN. 

Whitehall, Jan. 3, 1794. 
Grenville acknowledges Eden's despatch stating that Austria would 
now fulfil her original promise of sending 5000 men to Toulon. Doubtless 
"if the first promise had been fulfilled, agreeable to the expectation which 
H.M. was justified in forming, the assistance of such a body of disciplined 
troops would have sufficed to ensure the defence of that important post ; 
and the injury which the common cause has sustained on this occasion 
can be ascribed only to the tardiness and indecision which so strongly 
characterise the Austrian government." Eden is not to expostulate but 
to try to infuse more vigour, and to get at last some definite plan about 
the Flemish campaign. Only by renewed efforts will he succeed in getting 
this settled. H.I.M.'s journey to Flanders should be expedited, as negotia- 
tions depend on that. The return of Mack would inspire confidence which 
at present is not felt here. But something must be settled and at once. 
Hopes that Malmesbury's mission at Berlin may be helped "by the part 
which the Empress of Russia appears to have taken." 

Ibid. Eden to Grenville. 

Vienna, Jan. 4, 1794. 
News of Toulon causes consternation, especially owing to weakness of 
Piedmontese army and the defencelessness of Italy. Austrian troops and 
engineers were now being sent to examine and fortify the passes of Alps. 
Delay in Emperor's departure for Flanders. Austria will now limit her 
offensive plans to Flanders and la Vendee. The retreat of Wurmser's and 
Brunswick's armies on the Rhine is alarming. Lucchesini behaves pettily, 
also at times imperiously and with intrigue. Prussia ought now to co- 
operate honestly. Thugut has ability and experience but he has no family 
influence, and nobles scorn and often thwart him. 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

Vienna, Jan. 18, 1794. 
Prussia's demand for financial support from Austria will probably be 
declined. Prussian Ministers say that, as French principles are no longer 
dangerous, peace need not be delayed. Thugut declares that, if the Prussian 
King is at head of a great army and gains successes, he will urge terms of 
peace hurtful to Austria. The Prussians ought to be split up in corps and 
be included in the Austrian armies. 

Ibid. Grenville to Eden. 

Downing Street 1 , Feb. 18, 1794. 

Mack has conferred with Ministers on next campaign, the plan of 
which had been sent by Coburg after the conference at Brussels. That 

1 After mid-January 1794, the F.O. despatches are dated from Downing Street. 



APPENDIX B 555 

plan is generally approved. But Flanders must not be defended solely 
by troops in British pay. Part of these must take part in the advancing 
army of 25,000 men on the right of the Austrian main army, the rest, with 
Austrians, being left for defence of Flanders. British objections to the 
command of Arch-duke Charles are waived, as tending to delay the cam- 
paign. If Coburg retires (as is desirable) then Mack may really direct 
under the Emperor. Clerfait, and next to him Cornwallis, might possibly 
command the Flanders army. 

F.O. Prussia, 32. 

Grenville to Malmesbury (at Berlin) 1 . 

Downing St., March 7, 1794. 
Rebuts Prussia's financial demands for her army. Austria and the 
Empire will also decline. " By treaty with Great Britain, Russia and Austria 
H.P.M. is bound to consider the present war as one of common cause and 
to prosecute it with vigour as a principal. Instead of this he proposes to 
charge the other confederates with the whole expense of his efforts, which 
he is to make only as an auxiliary. By his defensive alliances with Great 
Britain, Holland and Austria he is bound to furnish as an auxiliary 52,000 
men besides his contingent to the Empire, which cannot be less than 7000 
men, which he is to maintain at his own charge, the requiring parties 
finding bread and forage except for the contingent to the Empire." But 
he now asks Allies to supply bread and forage for all his 100,000 men 
besides -£2,000,000 towards the pay. This must be refused. Fear that 
H.P.M. is protracting this dispute so as to prevent the Allies preparing 
their defence. We will raise his subsidy to £1,000,000; but Malmesbury 
will resist further demands. Means may be taken to fill the gap caused by 
the withdrawal of the Prussians, though the time is very late; but this 
"would be infinitely preferable to a disunion of the other confederates." 

Ibid. Eden to Grenville. 

Vienna, March 11, 1794. 
H.I.M. will set out for Pays Bas early in April, and be nominally in 
command. England must therefore not press the question of the commands. 
Mack was now found to have departed from his instructions, (1) to wage 
a defensive war from Basle to Luxemburg, and (2) not to reckon on 
Prussian succours beyond the number stipulated to Austria. 

F.O. Prussia, 33. GRENVILLE to MALMESBURY 

Downing St., March 28, 1794. 
Austria's refusal to Prussia's demands breaks up the extended plan of 
co-operation. We object to the plan of employing the Prussian army 
(subsidized by the Maritime Powers) between the Moselle and Rhine, 
and H.P.M. also objects to it after what had passed between him and 
Austria. She should not dictate to the Maritime Powers where that army 

1 See Malmesbury's other despatches in his Diaries, m. pp. 70 et seq. 



556 BRITISH WAR POLICY 

should be employed. Her other proposals are equally unreasonable. If 
she persists, these Powers must defend themselves in their own way. 
This will bring her to reason and she will then admit the Dutch demand 
for indemnity and make some contribution towards bringing forward the 
Prussian force. In that case the Allied conquests in Flanders might go to 
her in return for a contribution towards the expense of the war. He 
approves Malmesbury's plan of securing the more limited co-operation of 
Prussia. Much caution is needed. 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

[Private.] Downing St., April 4, 1794. 

Approves his plan of making the treaty for the duration of the war. 
Hopes of a happy issue; chief difficulty will be to arrange with Austria 
any general distribution of force: as she wants to "keep the Prussians back 
from any effective share in military operations which can lead to acquisi- 
tions." 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

[Draft.] Downing St., April 21, 1794. 

Directs him, after signing Conventions, to return from the Hague to 
London to inform Ministers on many points which he may learn at Brussels, 
and to advise how the Prussian co-operation may take place with the least 
friction, "in the most efficient manner but on separate plans of attack." 
Hope that the weakness and slowness of Austria's policy may end with the 
arrival of the Emperor, which will at least shorten the time of framing 
plans. Whoever commands her forces, should be impressed with the gravity 
of the crisis and "the necessity of a solid and substantial union of the 
Principal Powers." The Duke of York will inform Malmesbury of the 
inconsistent way in which Austria has acted with respect to the plan 
framed by Colonel Mack and agreed to in London. Her gains in the Low 
Countries must be discussed, also the Dutch demands for indemnity 
which she has so unjustly resisted. All bears on " the main object of H.M. — 
the keeping together by influence and weight that great Confederation 
by which alone the designs of France can be resisted, and which, if left 
to itself, would be too likely to fall to pieces from the jarring interests of 
the Powers engaged in it." No opinion yet quite formed here as to the 
best line of operation for the Prussian army: but Ministers favour the 
line of the Meuse if the line Mosel-Rhine can be fitly defended. 

Ibid. Malmesbury to Grenville. 

London, May 7, 1794. 
He reached Brussels on April 26, and saw Thugut and Mercy. He 
read to them the treaty of the Maritime Powers with Prussia but (as it 
was not ratified) did not give them a copy. Mercy spoke sensibly of the 
need of vigour and union and declared this treaty to be one of the best 
ever signed. Its use would depend on the good faith of H.P.M. and of 
his advisers, whom he suspected. If the Prussians acted along with the 



APPENDIX B 557 

Austrians "they would inevitably palsy each other." He thought the 
Belgic provinces a heavy charge to Austria and so would any conquests be 
on that side. 

Thugut was complimentary, but full of jealousy of Prussia and of so 
many Prussians acting together near them. Malmesbury tried to show that 
H.P.M. was less dangerous employed than unemployed. If not with us, 
he might be against us. 

At Cateau, Malmesbury dined with the Duke of York, and then saw 
H.I.M. at Catillon, who highly approved the treaty and hoped the Prussian 
army would be placed on the borders of Luxemburg with its left on Treves 
and its right stretching to the Meuse. H.I.M. then said, "We want nothing 
here but a few more men to put an end to this war; and (with the most 
spirited animation he said) we must spare neither force nor money in the 
prosecution of it. We saw the day before yesterday (turning to the Duke of 
York) to what the British cavalry is equal, and their intrepidity and example 
will be followed by us all 1 . The resources of my monarchy are great. I trust 
I may rely on the love and fidelity of my subjects, and I cannot call upon 
them for a proof of that allegiance and affection more . . . than to come 
forth on this occasion. I have already made great efforts. I am ready to 
make more and shall never consider any as too great in this cause.". . . 

F.O. Austria, 37. GrENVILLE to STARHEMBERG. 

Dropmore, June 24, 1794. 

Ministers have always wished to have the Prussian subsidized army 
in Flanders where it is much needed: hopes it will soon move there: 
" Je suppose que l'idee de ne pas separer les troupes Prussiennes et d'em- 
ployer avec les 62,000 hommes les 20,000 que S.M.P. doit fournir a S.M.I, 
par leur traite d Alliance, sera tres-acceptable a S.M.P. , mais c'esta la cour de 
Berlin a en juger. Nous ne pouvons avoir aucune raison de nous y opposer." 

The placing of the Prussian army must be decided on the spot by 
military reasoning. England can do no more to help the Austrian loan. 
If there are any difficulties they only arise from the rumours occasioned 
by the departure of H.I.M. from the army. 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

Dropmore, June 28, 1794. 
Good news from army. Moira's force has arrived at Ostend. All is 
being done to hasten the march of the Prussians to the Low Countries, 
but many difficulties arise, and (in part) from the Austrian Generals them- 
selves. England can spare no more troops for that part. 

F.O. Austria, 38. 

Grenville to Spencer and T. Grenville. 

Downing St., July 19, 1794. 
Need of an explanation at once with the Austrian Court so as to frame 
a close concert for stopping the French advance and resume offensive 

1 Battle of le Cateau (April 26, 1794). 



558 BRITISH WAR POLICY 

operations this year or next spring, on an effective scale. Prince of Coburg 
is unequal to the command, and real command has rested on Mack, 
Hohenlohe or Waldeck. The last has not the confidence of the Austrian 
army, or the British H.Q., owing to constant retreats. Suspicion even 
of disloyalty to the plan arranged with England for defence of Pays Bas. 
Complete change is needed. Would Arch- duke Charles (with Mack) do 
well? General Browne also is trusted. 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

Downing St., Sept. 14, 1794. 

News had arrived of the disgraceful surrender of Valenciennes and 
Conde. This event will not greatly alter the plans formed by the Duke of 
York and Clerfait for rest of campaign : but a forward move is still thought 
desirable so as to regain part of the Pays Bas and improve the Allied posi- 
tion for winter. Poor prospects for next campaign. There is little induce- 
ment to help Austria in the Netherlands. It is therefore desirable to limit 
the operations there (as Thugut often hinted) and leave Austria freer to 
act more in Italy and on the Rhine. " Instead therefore of proposing a 
great addition of Austrian force to serve in the Low Countries under an 
English General, in return for the transfer of the Prussian subsidy to 
Austria, it will be desirable that you should confine your proposals to the 
continuance of the present force in the Netherlands, only stipulating for 
its being completed to its full establishment. This may be stated roughly 
at 100,000 Austrians, 50,000 British etc., and about 10,000 Dutch." 

This force of 160,000 men could recover and hold the Netherlands in 
next campaign and attack the barrier where suitable. The guarantee of 
Austria's loan entitles H.B.M. to require that her force be kept up to 
100,000 men. "In this situation of things above all others, it is evident 
that no propositions of peace can hold out the smallest prospect of security." 
The Allies would now get bad terms; but when circumstances at Paris 
render peace a matter open to question, England will forego her plan of 
acquiring French land for Austria in Flanders, and will only guarantee 
the restitution of the conquests made by the French, if she will vigorously 
proceed with the war. England's separate conquests will not be used so 
as to procure better terms for Austria. 

F.O. Prussia, 35. MALMESBURY to GRENVILLE. 

Frankfort, Sept. 26, 1794. 
"Part of the Prussian army had actually put itself in march on the 
19th in order to support the intended attack on Treves. . .when on the 
preceding day intelligence arrived of the success of the French on the 
Ourthe and letters from General de la Tour to Generals Nauendorf and 
Melas, directing them to give up all thoughts of moving towards Treves. 
These letters . . . expressed great apprehensions for the consequences of 
this defeat and doubts as to the position which was next to be taken. 
Marshal Mollendorf, finding he was not to be supported by the Austrians, 
did not hold himself obliged to make the attack alone, although there is, 



APPENDIX B 559 

I believe, very little doubt but his force was fully equal to it, and that if 
he had undertaken it cordially and with spirit, it would have been attended 
with compleat and easy success. Fortunately Prince Hohenlohe had carried 
into effect that part of the plan which fell to his share ... his conduct on 
this occasion deserves great praise. 

"The day after. . .1 got accounts that the army under Pichegru had 
made a forward movement ... it was also confidently reported that the 
enemy had actually passed the Meuse ... I did not lose a moment in re- 
presenting through Baron de Hardenberg to Marshal Mollendorf, the 
critical situation of the United Provinces and the urgent necessity of the 
army under his command taking some immediate steps to preserve them. . . . 

" Baron Hardenberg joined with us in lamenting the complexion and 
principles of the Prussian H.Q. He is extremely anxious to counteract 
this and endeavours to persuade himself and me also that on the King of 
Prussia's return (which is to be to-day) all will go right.. . . 

"As the moment draws nigh for the subsidy ending, the Court of 
Berlin grows apparently more tractable. To this consideration, which from 
what I know of its general character I am sure is the governing one, may 
be added the disgraceful termination of the siege of Warsaw, the in- 
creasing insurrection in South Prussia and above all an extreme jealousy 
from Lord Spencer's mission to Vienna that we are drawing towards 
Austria. This. . .is the clue of their whole conduct and it will serve to 
explain as well what Count Haugwitz may say to Mr Paget as what Baron 
Hardenberg says to me.. . . " 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

Frankfort, Oct. 13, 1794. 

" . . .Three days previous to the arrival of Hertslet with Your Lord- 
ship's letter of the 30th inst. Marshal Mollendorf had received an estafette 
from Baron Jacobi acquainting him with a conference he had had with 
Mr Pitt and in which he had been told . . . that the subsidy for the month 
of October would be suspended. I found therefore Baron Hardenberg 
fully prepared on this point (although he had not mentioned his being so 
to me) and I need not say that Baron Jacobi, in his reports, had not 
softened the conversation he had with Mr Pitt. Thus circumstanced it was 
impossible for me to suppress any part of my instructions.. . . 

I called to Baron Hardenberg's recollection the state of supineness in 
which the Prussian army had remained from the moment of my arrival 
near it to this day and the harsh inattention Marshal Mollendorf had 
thought proper to show to the repeated representations my colleague and 
myself had made on this subject.". . . 

F.O. Prussia, 37 SPENCER to GrENVILLE. 

Berlin, Jan. 20, 1795. 
" . . .The greatest variety of opinion prevails here among the different 
advisers of H.P.M. relative to the present negotiations with the French. 
General Bischoffswerder openly differs with Prince Henry on the proba- 



560 BRITISH WAR POLICY 

bility of success, and Count Haugwitz said the other day that if the present 
overtures, which he heartily condemns, should not meet with a completely 
favourable reception, H. P.M. would be beyond measure anxious to enter 
into a concert for prosecuting the war with the utmost vigour. . . 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

Berlin, Feb. 28, 1795. 
"Though I have no reason to suppose that this Court is less deeply 
committed with the French than I stated... yet so great is H.P.M.'s 
personal eagerness to make another campaign that I believe it would be 
still possible to carry that point in opposition to Prince Henry of Prussia 
and all the ministers if I were to receive immediate instructions for that 
purpose.. . .1 have found means to insinuate to H.M.. . .that it was of the 
highest importance to wait . . . before any completely decisive step should 
be taken at Basel. The news. . .of the spirited exertions of our government 
and above all the vote for 150,000 seamen produced a very great effect 
here both on the public in general and on the king in particular. Ever 
since the receipt of this intelligence H.M.'s manner with me has been 
unusually gracious and in his private society he constantly expresses his 
determination to wait as long as possible for our proposal. This he has 
indeed done in so marked a manner that I am convinced he wishes it 
should be repeated to me. Prince Henry of Prussia, who probably wishes 
to destroy every degree of connection between our two Courts, took an 
opportunity the other day of entering with me into a long discussion on 
the war, in the course of which he vented his spleen against our ministers, 
our officers, our soldiers and our whole conduct, and concluded by telling 
me that England had forced the French to make war and could not now 
make peace if she were inclined to it ; that the continental powers had not 
an interest to continue the war, that their resources were exhausted and 
that though by new subsidy treaties it might enable them to keep their 
troops in the field, it would not make the country amends for the losses 
it occasioned. This unfriendly language. . .is totally inconsistent with the 
daily professions of H.P.M.. . ." 

Ibid. Same to Same. 

Berlin, April 21, 1795. 
"Colonel Calvert arrived here last night and brought me the three 
despatches from Mr Dundas. Had I received them a few days sooner I 
may venture to assert that England would have had at her disposal the best 
appointed army in Europe.. . .At present this is out of the question, but as 
I have not yet officially learned the conclusion of the treaty with France, 
as I know that the king is at heart extremely vexed at the success of the 
negotiation, and as the Duke of Brunswick gave his opinion that a partial 
communication of my instructions would certainly produce a good effect, 
I have determined to endeavour to obtain a private interview with H.P.M. 
for that purpose. Should this be granted I shall mention in general terms 
the wish entertained by my Court to renew its connection with Prussia 
and shall proportion my further communications to the encouragement 



APPENDIX C 561 

I may receive from H.M. At all events the overture will make a very 
favourable impression on his mind. It will relieve him from the suspicions 
he has long entertained of H.M. being entirely abandoned by England 
and sacrificed to the two Imperial Courts, and it will delay if not wholly 
prevent the alliance which he feels himself under the necessity of con- 
tracting with France " 



APPENDIX C 

THE SPANISH CRISIS 

(April 1795 — September 1796) 
Those from Grenville are all from Downing Street ; those from Bute are from Madrid. 
F.O. Spain, 37-42. 

Grenville to Bute. 

April 13, 1795. 

In spite of the ill humour and despondency of Spain, he hopes that she 
will persevere to the end of the war. Bute must seek to infuse vigour, 
especially after the recent Spanish successes in Catalonia. Spain should 
renew her claims to indemnity from France, which we favour in proportion 
to the exertions and successes of Spain in war. Bute will protest amicably 
against any negotiations with France. It is not probable that Spain will 
propose the renewal of the English alliance in an active form. 

"The nature and limits of the respective acquisitions of the two 
countries in S. Domingo are not sufficiently ascertained to enable me to 
authorize Your Excellency in the present moment to propose any specific 
agreement to the Spanish Court with respect to the boundaries to be 
established to our respective possessions in that island." 

Jackson to Grenville. 

Aranjuez, April 15, 1795. 

The Spanish Government inclines to reciprocate the wishes for peace 
recently expressed at Paris. Overtures made in Switzerland, also between 
opposing Generals in Catalonia. Owing to distress in Spain, Alcudia 
favours them. Recently he said to Jackson "that H.B.M. ought to have 
abstained from any interference in S. Domingo, upon the whole of which 
H.C.M. had a well-founded claim ; or that if any enterprize was undertaken 
there by Great Britain, it should have been in the way of auxiliary to 
Spain, in order to restore to her her ancient possessions in the West 
Indies." 

Grenville to Bute. 

June 12, 1795. 

Encloses instructions for Malouet, who has been appointed British 
Commissary in S. Domingo, to arrange the claims of the inhabitants in 
the British part. Desire to satisfy the claims of Spain there. 

w.&g. 1. 36 



562 THE SPANISH CRISIS 

Grenville to Bute. 

June 15, 1795. 

Death of Lewis XVII does not alter their conviction that "the restora- 
tion of monarchy in France, if it can be effected, would afford the best 
prospects of tranquillity both to that country and to the rest of Europe"; 
but Monsieur will not be recognized as Regent until a sufficient party in 
his favour is formed in France. 

Same to Same. 

Dec. 25, 1795. 

Wish to avoid, if possible, a rupture with Spain despite her arming 
and her evident partiality to the French. We will not make peace through 
her. She now complains of our plan to attack them in S. Domingo, as if 
it were Spanish and not French. Whose is it? She should not complain 
of our balancing French successes on the Continent by our successes in 
the French colonies. 

Bute to Grenville. 

May 10, 1796. 

He protested against French squadron continuing at Cadiz. A Spanish 
fleet will soon sail for West Indies. Spain is urging Sweden to revive the 
Armed Neutrality. Denmark seems to agree. 

Same to Same. 

May 18, 1796. 

Godoy (Prince of the Peace) says Spanish preparations due to rumours 
of British schemes against Buenos Ay res and Mexico. Bute denies these, 
and asks about the reported Franco- Spanish alliance. Godoy says it "is 
perhaps not far distant." Spain must seek help from France. Bute reports 
plan of the French squadron to leave Cadiz with a Spanish fleet. 

Grenville to Bute. 

June 3, 1796. 

Alarm at Godoy 's words. England desires friendly relations with Spain. 
Denmark and Sweden now reluctant to join an Armed Neutrality though 
French victories in Italy assist that scheme. 

Same to Same. 

June 18, 1796. 
We have no designs on Mexico or Buenos Ayres. When S. Domingo 
becomes French, we may attack it. We must stamp out French principles 
in the West Indies because they sap the foundation of all European colonies. 

Bute to Grenville. 

June 22, 1796. 

Godoy spoke to him of the necessary connexion of Spain with France. 
Bute said that implied war. He expects a rupture, as the French control 
Godoy. 



APPENDIX C 563 

Grenville to Bute. 

July 15, 1796. 
We wish still to conciliate Spain, but her conduct points to a rupture. 

Bute to Grenville. 

July 22, 1796. 
He thinks that "Spain is actuated by her fears. Those fears engage 
her, much against her inclination, to go to war with England. She will 
postpone it as long as the perpetual threats of the French will admit, and 
even then, unless we force it, [will] not absolutely engage until the several 
preparations are completed, which will be carried on in the same slow 
negligent manner." He encloses Godoy's private appeal that the late 
treaty [of S. Ildefonso] with France may not lead to war. 

Grenville to Bute. 

Aug. 26, 1796. 
Though Spain has let out the French squadron under the protection 
of a Spanish force, we will await the result of the overtures at Madrid 
which give Spain a chance of reconsidering her resolve which can only 
benefit France. Bute must not leave Madrid without fresh instructions 
from London or orders from Court of Madrid. 

H. Dundas to Major-General Forbes (at S. Domingo). 

Aug. 28, 1796. 

"Intelligence has been received of the departure of a squadron con- 
sisting of 7 French and 19 Spanish ships-of-the-line from Cadiz on the 4th 
of this month, of which number 9 at present and 2 more after touching at 
Carthagena are supposed to be destined for S. Domingo. The prevailing 
influence of French Councils at Madrid, the unfriendly disposition mani- 
fested on several late occasions by that Court towards this country and 
particularly the departure of their fleet in company with that of H.M.'s 
enemies afford the strongest grounds to apprehend an approaching rupture 
with Spain." The commander is to be on his guard against Spain; but he 
is to avoid all hostilities (unless attacked), until authentic news arrives of 
hostilities. 

Bute to Grenville. 

Sept. 10, 1796. 

Godoy stated that " Should Spain be obliged to draw her sword against 
England, one comfort remained — it could not be for any length of time; 
he hoped soon to see revive the most intimate union." He would never 
wish Bute to leave Spain. Bute asked "Was it impossible to make matters 
up? Why not at once form some agreement?" Godoy said Spain had 
many insults that might justify war, but the war (if it came) could not last, 
for they ought to be friends. 



36-2 



564 ANGLO-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS 

APPENDIX D 

ANGLO-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS 

{November 1795 — November 1797) 

Grenville's despatches are from Downing Street; those from Eden are from Vienna. 

Eden to Grenville. 

Nov. 10, 1795. 
Thugut says Austria cannot wage an active war unless (1) Great 
Britain support her with a loan of £3,000,000, (2) Russia help on the 
Rhine, (3) the Empire form an army on the Lower Rhine. Otherwise 
she will act defensively, "waiting the effect which the distresses and dis- 
tractions of France may produce." 

Same to Same. 

Dec. 5, 1795 1 . 
News of Allied defeat at Loano. He will help Trevor at Turin reassure 
that Court of Austria's desire to regain its lost territories. Else it may 
make peace with France in hope of securing part of Milanese. 

Same to Same. 

Jan. 28, 1796. 
"A jealousy of the views and sentiments of the Sardinian Government 
has long existed here, and M. Thugut now expressed his conviction that, 
if the plan of concluding a separate peace be pursued at Turin, it is with 
the view of obtaining some compensation on the side of the Milanese for 
the loss of at least Savoy, the recovery of which he considers as unattain- 
able.. . .And he expressed the wish that, if the King of Sardinia persisted 
in his negotiation, the arrears of the subsidy due to him from England 
should be withheld, on the principle that he has not on his part fulfilled 
the conditions engaged for, and to prevent his having the means increased 
of acting against this country." 

Same to Same. 

Feb. 27, 1796. 
Thugut thought that the proposed Anglo-Austrian Declaration might 
produce favourable effects on the French nation, but did not, from the 
principles of the present rulers in France, expect that it would be met by 
any conciliatory step on their part. 

Grenville to Eden 2 . 

March 1, 1796. 
Much concerned that the mission of M. de Castel Alfer from Turin 
to Vienna had aroused "distrust and resentment in the minds of the 

1 For Grenville's important despatch of Dec. 22, 1795 to Eden see Rose, 
Napoleonic Studies, pp. 47-9. 

3 See also documents in Eng. Hist. Rev., April, 1903. 



APPENDIX D 565 

Austrian Ministry." The defection of Sardinia would be a serious blow. 
She had striven loyally, and Eden was to represent this. 

Eden to Grenville. 

[Most secret.] March 2, 1796. 

Though H.I.M. declined making at this moment the declaration pro- 
posed by H.M., yet it was H.I.M. 's intention, at the same time he put an 
end to the Armistice, to issue a similar paper, stating that H.I.M. took 
that step in consequence of being actuated by the same sentiments as the 
King. 

Same to Same. 

March 5, 1796. 

H.I.M. was gratified by the frankness of the British Government. " No 
reliance whatever could be placed on the most solemn assurances of the 
Prussian Government," and it behoved the two Governments to guard 
against its bad faith. The assembly of a Prussian army in Westphalia was 
merely that Prussia might act as arbiter in case of peace. H.I.M. would 
strive to regain his Netherlands along with Liege ; but failing that he must 
seek another indemnity. "He (Thugut) intimated for this purpose the ex- 
change of the Belgic provinces for part of Bavaria, or even for the Duchy of 
Wurtemberg ; in which case these should be guaranteed to the prince put in 
possession of them." Eden dissented. 

Same to Same. 

March 12, 1796. 

"Wretched evasion" shown by Russia in her offers of help. She was 
absorbed in preparations for a Persian war — a probable prelude to an 
attack on Turkey. 

Grenville to Eden. 

April 12, 1796. 

Eden is urged to press on cordial co-operation with the Court of Turin 
as any " relaxation in the efforts of either Court might lead to consequences 
the most fatal to the future peace and safety of Europe." 

Same to Same. 

April 29, 1796. 
An advance of £100,000 may be made to Austria at once, to relieve the 
"immediate and pressing distress" of that army. 

Eden to Grenville. 

July 21, 1796. 

The late unexpected disasters have produced no panic at Vienna. 
Resolve that Belgium must not remain in French hands. Austria grateful 
for our help and promise of its continuance. England need not fear an 
armistice by Austria, unless it became absolutely inevitable. 



566 ANGLO-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS 

Same to Same. 

[Most secret.] July 27, 1796. 

After a conference with the Emperor, Thugut was very dejected ; said 
the disasters had shaken the alliance; rumours current that Austria was 
the dupe and tool of England. The Emperor however speaks with dignity 
and firmness. Financial distress of Austria. 

Grenville to Eden. 

Aug. 2, 1796. 

Hammond's mission to Berlin to be explained fully to Thugut, as 
arising solely from the urgent need of bringing in Prussia so as to stop the 
French. Hammond will open this subject at once to H.P.M. without 
waiting for Austria's consent, but any arrangement will depend entirely 
on her consent. 

Hammond is directed to find out whether H.P.M. wishes for indemni- 
ties in Germany or in the Netherlands. Eden must seek to reconcile 
Thugut to one of these alternatives; for no advantageous peace can be 
made, either jointly or separately, without the aid of Prussia. 

Same to Same. 

Sept. 7, 1796. 

Failure of our negotiation at Berlin ; but it ought to convince Austria of 
our wish to help. Dark military outlook; the only hope is from union, 
firmness and vigour. As Eden had failed to convert Thugut to British 
views, H.M. will seek to influence the Empire through the King of Den- 
mark. In view of the advanced season H.M. must make an effort for a 
general peace; and if the French Government sends passports, Jackson 
will be sent to Paris with Instructions ; he is authorized to discuss terms 
of general pacification at some neutral place, where the Emperor's repre- 
sentative would be invited. This has been found to be the only effectual 
means of restoring peace to Europe. If France accepts, she will probably 
bring in Holland. If she refuses, Jackson will try to bring this also to a 
clear issue, and in writing. 

With a view to facilitating peace, H.M. is ready to restore as many of 
his overseas conquests, "as may be judged reasonable in consideration 
of advantages to be procured to his Allies and particularly to Austria." The 
principle uti possidetis to be taken as a general basis, so as to regulate re- 
ciprocal cessions and to maintain the influence of Austria and oppose 
French efforts at further conquests on the Continent. The Pays Bas must 
be restored to Austria, "an arrangement which the King would be willing 
to purchase at the price of very considerable sacrifices on his part of the 
nature above stated." 

Same to Same. 

Sept. 20, 1796. 

Proposal (through Vorontzoff) of Catharine to offer 60,000 troops against 
France for next campaign, if England pays them by a subsidy. No answer 
yet given to this last condition, as our finance is heavily drained by Austria. 



APPENDIX D 567 

Same to Same. 

Oct. 7, 1796. 

Russia expects nearly £8,000,000, — an impossible sum; the utmost 
would be about £3,000,000; even that depends on consent of Parliament, 
which will not be granted unless objects of war are deemed to warrant it. 

Though Great Britain and Austria desire to see the restoration of 
monarchy in France, it is believed that they do not "mean to bind them- 
selves to continue the war for that object, supposing that terms of peace 
in other respects reasonable and acceptable can be established on a secure 
and solid foundation." If this negotiation with Russia fails, Thugut will 
probably claim the full amount for Austria. This must be resisted. 

On Wednesday a resolution of the Directory arrived from Paris. There- 
fore Lord Malmesbury would be sent in about a week ; but he will reject 
at once "all idea of separating H.M.'s interest from that of Austria or of 
treating for any other than a general peace." This last is very doubtful ; but 
a failure would give new spirit both to Great Britain and Austria. 

Same to Same. 

Oct. 14, 1796. 
Long delay in Eden's despatches. Nevertheless Malmesbury would 
set out this evening for Paris. His Instructions enclosed. The substance 
of them may be told to Thugut; but no copy be given or allowed. It is 
known that France longs for peace. Hope for close union with Austria. 

Same to Same. 

Oct. 18, 1796. 
Glad at Austrian successes. Thugut seems to fear our overture will 
encourage France and that Catharine may find in it an excuse for with- 
drawing her help. But we know that it greatly embarrasses the Directory, 
which tries to elude the King's demand, while pretending to consider it. 
If French ambition and obstinacy continue the war, both Great Britain 
and Austria will make greater efforts than before. We are seeking to prepare 
for them on a great scale, as she ought to recognize. But before making 
them, we want to know as to possibility of peace. If war continues, then 
Russia's help will certainly be of high value. 

Same to Same. 

Oct. 28, 1796. 
Malmesbury will soon see Delacroix. Malmesbury had said that we 
would act in close concert with Austria for a general peace. Austria should 
decide on her terms. Naples has made peace with France at Paris. Spain 
is said to have declared war on us, and this is probable. 

Same to Same. 

Nov. 7, 1796. 
Delacroix's note leaves small chance of peace. It demands the produc- 
tion of full powers from H.I.M. before any negotiation begins in which 
Austria is concerned. Great Britain and Austria must obviously not place 



568 ANGLO-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS 

difficulties in the way of such a negotiation for which France seems rather 
more disposed than before. But if France is disposed to break off the 
negotiation, we must still try to bring it to a clear issue. She may cavil 
as to place, time and mode of the negotiation. Austria must be informed 
that, if she declines the negotiation, "it might eventually become necessary 
for H.M. to go even one step further and conclude peace with France, 
securing only to his Ally the offer at the same time of such terms as the 
faith of treaties and the King's regard to the general interests of Europe 
would in such case induce him to require from France. This extreme case 
would not be resorted to by H.M. without the utmost reluctance and 
concern." But it may become necessary, and good faith compels us to 
state the fact. 

Same to Same. 

Nov. 7, 1796. 
There ought to be the closest confidence between Great Britain and 
Austria; but Starhemberg has shown much reluctance to enter into any 
explanation, and this may arise from Austria entertaining plans unfavour- 
able to us, e.g. perhaps on the Belgic-Bavarian exchange. On this Eden 
will say that H.M. wants Belgium back in Austria's hands, if solidly held; 
for this too is a link of union between Great Britain and Austria. But even 
that exchange would be duly considered by H.M. as an item in the negotia- 
tion if desired by Austria; and the Pays Bas should be in hands able to 
defend them against France. This is essential to the balance of Europe. 
Prussia is the only Power except Austria that could hold them: and, if 
Austria objects to this she should remember that Prussia will oppose the 
exchange unless she gets a good indemnity; and her interests must be 
considered in a general settlement. "Any overture to Prussia formed on 
such grounds, explained with frankness and supported by the joint weight 
of the Imperial Courts, might possibly be attended with success. Much 
explanation would be necessary with respect to the various arrangements 
affecting other parts of the Empire, which might be connected with this 
idea." In any case Austria must form her decision and formulate her 
plans without delay. 

Eden to Grenville. 

Nov. 16, 1796. 

Thugut insists on the need of great caution lest we offend Catharine ; 
but " if it were ascertained that the French would treat with the Emperor 
on the basis of the status quo ante bellum for his dominions, and if the King, 
in order to fulfil his engagements to the Emperor by the Convention of 
1793, should press upon him the acceptance of a negotiation on that basis, 
H.I.M. must acquiesce in it, and the necessity under which he would 
then act would be sufficient to justify his conduct in the eyes of the Empress 
of Russia; but that otherwise it would not be prudent for H.I.M. to take 
any active or public share in the business without previously concerting 
it with the Empress." 

Thugut feared that Russia was already cooling in her offers of help. 
Therefore it was impossible "that the Emperor could either send a Pleni- 



APPENDIX D 569 

potentiary to Paris or full powers to Lord Malmesbury to treat in his name 
or take any positive share in the negotiation until it be ascertained that the 
Directory has ceased to consider the union to France of the countries 
conquered from the Emperor as irrevocable, and consented to restore 
them to H.I.M." 

In reply Eden said H.M. had made a long and most honourable series 
of efforts in the common cause, and the present negotiation must lead 
either to an honourable peace or fresh energy in conducting the war. 

Grenville to Eden. 

[Draft. Most secret.] Nov. 26, 1796. 

French conduct seems to denote a wish to break off; but the state of 
opinion at Paris compels the Directory to appear to continue. Public 
opinion there favours the restitution of Pays Bas to Austria if Great Britain 
will grant to France a sufficient compensation. On these lines the enclosed 
memoir is drawn up, presuming that the principle of compensations is 
ultimately agreed to by the Directory. 

Eden to Grenville. 

Nov. 26, 1796. 
On Eden naming to Thugut the possible alternative of the Pays Bas 
going to Prussia, he expressed great astonishment and some degree of 
passion, and said the Emperor would oppose it by force of arms. Austria 
had rejected French offer of armistice on Rhine, but Austrian Generals 
insisted on it owing to fatigue of troops. 

Same to Same. 

Dec 14, 1796. 
Death of Catharine a great calamity. Paul offers to fulfil her engage- 
ments to Austria; but his first acts arouse distrust. Thugut hopes the 
British subsidy to Russia will be transferred to Austria. 

Same to Same. 

Dec. 31, 1796. 
H.I.M. thanks Great Britain for her care of his interests. If the British 
proposals are accepted by the Directory, he will send to Paris a plenipo- 
tentiary, or will vest Lord Malmesbury with sufficient powers to treat in 
his name. (This last will be resorted to only if the Directory requires from 
Austria the recognition of the French Republic.) Thugut insists that 
Prussia be kept out of the negotiation and be prevented from making any 
further gain of territory, which (as it must be at expense of the Germanic 
Body) must cause the dissolution of the Empire. All hope of acquiring 
Liege is at an end, since the death of Catharine it is no longer attainable 
without Prussia gaining some equally valuable acquisition. 

Grenville to Eden. 
[Most secret.] Jan. 3, 1797. 

Probable that Paul will not help us. But if so, H.M. will advance to 
Austria a subsidy of £200,000 per month ; but the first two months shall 



57o ANGLO-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS 

be at the rate of £300,000. These payments shall be terminable at two 
months' notice; H.I.M. shall open a loan in England which shall go to 
the discharge of these advances. Renewal of the 1793 Convention would 
be censured here, because it was then fully understood "that Austria 
was bound by former treaties towards Great Britain not to alienate without 
the consent of the latter any part of the Low Countries." 

These are still binding. But in recent discussions with France she 
has proposed so many projects of exchange and equivalent, all tending 
to alienate the Netherlands from Austria and this has weakened those 
treaties. We would prefer by an article of the new Convention to renew 
"the engagements by which the King is bound not to make peace (but 
by the consent of Austria) without the restoration to H.I.M. of all his 
dominions as before the war, and that by which Austria is bound not to 
alienate the Low Countries without the consent of Great Britain." Believes 
that another vigorous effort in 1797 will make France sue for peace — 
such is the exhausted state of her finances . Desire to sign a Convention with 
Austria on these terms. H.M.will immediately advance £300,000 for January . 

Eden to Grenville. 

March 8, 1797. 
Thugut agrees that the recent favourable terms offered to Austria by 
the French through General Clarke are a trick to separate the Allies, or 
indicate the weakening of French resources. H.I.M. will reject them, 
especially as his acceptance of an indemnity west of the Rhine would in- 
volve the dissolution of the Empire, which he is resolved to preserve "in 
its present form." He will direct the Grand Duke [of Tuscany] not to 
interfere further in the business but refer General Clarke to Vienna through 
official channels. H.I.M. has directed Arch-duke Charles not to listen to any 
overtures from Bonaparte nor to grant him any interview. H.I.M. will (if 
further pressed by these offers of France) intimate that only a Congress of 
all the Powers can initiate negotiations for peace. Thugut then set forth 
Austria's great difficulties, her steadfastness to the alliance, but also the 
urgent need of a corps of auxiliaries and the co-operation of a naval force. 

Grenville to Eden. 

[Most secret.] March 17, 1797. 

Austria's requests for British naval support in the Adriatic are being 
carefully considered; but no promise can yet be given. "The fleet under 
Sir John Jervis which is destined to oppose itself to the forces which the 
enemy may be able to draw from their southern ports, must of necessity 
be directed in some degree by the motions of the enemy ; and while the 
principal Spanish force is collected at Cadiz it can hardly be expected or 
even desired by the Austrian Government that Sir John Jervis's fleet 
should proceed up the Mediterranean; but I am not without considerable 
hopes of being shortly able to announce to you that such arrangements of 
a more limited nature have been adopted as may be sufficient amply to 
provide for the safety of the navigation of the Adriatic, which appears to 
be the principal object of M. Thugut's solicitude in the present moment." 



APPENDIX D 571 

Eden to Grenville. 

March 25, 1797. 
French advance to Tarvis. Arch-duke Charles's journey to Vienna had 
delayed his arrival on that front, and his plans for ending the confusion 
there. Colonel Graham reported grave abuses there. Clamour for peace 
renewed at Vienna. Complaints of want of our financial succour; but 
Thugut still hopes if we grant naval co-operation. 

Same to Same 1 . 

April 1, 1797. 

The Directory has signified to Prussia its desire for peace with Austria, 
restoring to H.I.M. such conquests as have not been annexed to the 
French Republic and requesting H.P.M.'s good offices. H.P.M. has 
announced this at Vienna but (as a member of the Germanic Body) can 
announce the fact only on the ground of integrity of the Empire and a 
general pacification being made. 

Thugut thinks it a Prussian trick to increase clamour for peace at 
Vienna and will inform M. de Cesar that H.I.M. cannot entertain the offer 
until he has consulted his Allies. Thugut dwelt on the uniform bad faith 
of Prussia, and suggested that the Tsar become a joint mediator so as to 
hold Prussia in check. 

Grenville to Eden. 

April 4, 1797. 

Glad at Austria's repulsing the French offer of peace through Grand Duke 
of Tuscany. Such a peace would give free play to Prussia's ambition. Hope 
that the new elections in France will send up more moderate men. But 
the Allies might declare that they will not refuse to enter into joint negotia- 
tions for peace, "carried on by their Ministers at one and the same place, 
and with one person authorized by France to treat with those Ministers 
conjointly." If France agrees, then Great Britain leaves it to Austria to 
fix the place, if not too far from London. "The King's wishes would be 
to direct and employ any restitutions of conquests to which he might be 
induced to agree in such way and to such objects only as may be best 
calculated, according to the present state of affairs in Europe, to promote 
the interests, welfare and future security of his Ally, on which H.M. holds 
that of Europe essentially to depend." 

Same to Same. 

[Secret.] April 4, 1797. 

Orders now have been sent to Jervis to send to the Adriatic such force 
of frigates as shall suffice for the service required. But we cannot send a 
fleet into Mediterranean as that would mean dividing Jervis's fleet now 
doing splendid service off Cadiz: neither have France nor Spain any 
squadrons capable of service in the Mediterranean. The sending the 
frigates shows our regard for Austrian interests. 

1 For Eden's second note of April 1 see Hiiffer, Quellen, Pt 11. vol. 1. p. 153. 



572 ANGLO-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS 

Grenville to Eden. 

April ii, 1797. 

Prussia's strange proposal to the Czar will probably incline him towards 
Austria and Great Britain, unless France persuades him that the Allies 
are against peace. But we urgently desire it, on the terms and in the way 
now proposed to H.I. M. He therefore encloses a Note Verbale for Austria 
and Great Britain to be presented jointly to the Emperor of Russia (in case 
Austria agrees) ; also a Note for Whitworth authorizing him to present that 
Note or a similar one as approved at Vienna. 

He then discusses the cession of the Austrian Netherlands to France 
and fears that the disastrous opening of the campaign makes it inevitable . . . 

Same to Same. 

[Most secret.] April II, 1797. 

Mr Hammond is sent with this despatch to assist Eden with his thorough 
knowledge of the situation. " The King confidently relies on the assurances 
he has received from Vienna that no separate negotiation will have been 
entered into with the enemy in the interval." But if at the time of Mr 
Hammond's arrival the Court at Vienna thinks that the delay of a refer- 
ence to Russia involves too great a risk, the following are the best lines 
of conduct which seem to be open for them to pursue, and Eden has 
authority to accede to them : 

"The first measure might be to endeavour to conclude a general 
armistice, avowedly for the purpose of allowing time for the intervention 
of the Courts of Petersburg and Berlin (as the French would, in such a 
case, certainly require the adjunction of the latter) extending such armistice 
to all the belligerent Powers and stipulating respecting the naval war that 
proper time should be allowed for notices in the distant parts of the world 
and that no change should be made in the stations of the respective naval 
forces after the receipt of such notices and until the expiration of the 
armistice." Eden has full authority to accept such an arrangement.. . . 

But H.M. is sensible that the situation may demand immediate negotia- 
tion with France, and to avoid unnecessary delay which might seriously 
prejudice the common interests, he is ready to refer the decision as to the 
necessity to the Austrian government, which can alone pronounce on the 
exigency of its own situation.. . . 

If the Court of Vienna wishes to proceed to direct negotiations, Eden 
and Mr Hammond will act as follows : 

"You will enter with the Austrian Minister into the fullest and most 
unreserved discussion of the different points which may come in question 
respecting the terms of peace both for Great Britain and Austria. With 
respect to the latter you will remark that from the moment that the resolu- 
tion is taken by this government to consent to and even to advise the 
cession of the Netherlands to France, if absolutely necessary as the price 
of general peace, the most important and pressing interest which this 
country can possibly have with a view to the affairs of the Continent is 
that the House of Austria may by some just and adequate compensation 



APPENDIX D 573 

be continued in a situation capable of opposing, as it has hitherto done, 
a powerful barrier to the ambition of France. But the mode of providing 
for this must naturally be left to the decision of the Austrian government, 
and you will therefore explain that your instructions are to co-operate 
with the views of the Emperor in this respect 

The terms which H.M. would propose are: 

(i) Restitution of all conquests except Martinique, which is not nearly 
the equivalent for the great accession of maritime, commercial and colonial 
power which France would derive from the possession of the Netherlands 
and San Domingo. (2) Restitution to Spain of Trinidad, unless it is 
settled that H.M. retains this with Tobago or St Lucia or some other 
conquest in the West Indies, in lieu of Martinique. (3) Restitution to 
Holland of all conquests in the East and West Indies except the Cape and 
Ceylon, the possession of both which points is of the greatest importance 
to the defence of the East Indies under the new state of things which would 
arise in Europe from the possession of the Netherlands by France. (4) Peace 
for Portugal.. . ." 

Grenville to Eden. 

April 11, 1797. 
" I hoped before this to have advised you of the Convention with the 
Emperor, but the question of pecuniary aid can only be brought forward 
as a part of the general financial arrangements and the loan about to be 
negotiated. But the loan is delayed and it is not proper that the Convention 
should be signed before this is settled. To remove disappointment and 
obviate despondency at the delay you are authorised to give M. Thugut 
most positive assurances that 3! millions of the loan are for H.I.M., 
subject to the consent of Parliament, destined in part for the repayment of 
advances made by H.M. to the Emperor, and the rest for aid to H.I.M. 
for the current year. The terms will be made as favourable as possible to 
the Emperor, though in the great financial distress of this country they 
must unquestionably be very disadvantageous. The whole will be sub- 
mitted to Parliament as expeditiously as possible." 

Grenville to Eden and Hammond. 
[Most secret.] April 18, 1797,, 

"As it is possible that the cession of Trinidad may be repugnant to 
engagements between France and Spain, you are authorised to accept 
instead Tobago with either St Lucia or Demerara or the part of S. Domingo 
held by H.M. when the preliminaries were signed. This is the utmost 
H.M. thinks proper to concede. But if Vienna is in actual peril the King 
would consent to confine his demands to Tobago only, which he desires 
to retain as it is settled wholly by British planters. But in case of extreme 
necessity, rather than this peace of Austria should be concluded separately, 
the King will ultimately abandon all claim to West Indian acquisitions, 
provided the fullest liberty is given to individuals to remove their pro- 
perty. In such case there would be left of the acquisitions only the Cape 
and Ceylon.. . ." 



574 ANGLO-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS 

Grenville to Eden. 

May 2, 1797. 
Uneasiness about the issue of the negotiations with Buonaparte. 
"From your silence about the terms which Mersfeldt is instructed to 
propose or accept, we conclude a reserve has been observed towards you 
on this subject very different from the open and ample communications 
which were made from hence during the whole course of Lord Malmesbury's 
negotiations. It is impossible not to feel that this reserve is incompatible 
both with the faith of existing engagements and with the conduct which 
is on every account due to H.M., and it has accordingly given occasion to 

much remark, and that of the most unpleasant nature If a precipitate 

and separate Peace has been concluded without any previous communica- 
tion to this Government as to the terms to be agreed to, this can only be 
lamented as a striking addition to the instances, already much too frequent 
in this war, in which our enemies have been allowed to triumph not only 
over the rights and interests but over the honour, good faith and probity 
of the old and established governments with which they have had to 
contend...." The House of Commons voted the subsidy [to Austria] 
last night by a majority of nearly four to one 

Hammond to Grenville. 

[Private.] May 3, 1797. 

" I cannot avoid expressing to Your Lordship the concern and mortifi- 
cation with which I have learnt from every quarter the present helpless 
condition of the Austrian army from the total want of discipline and 
subordination and the lassitude of the war which universally pervades it." 

Grenville to Hammond. 

May 26, 1797. 

Order to return home. "The late conduct of the Prussian Government 
is such as to afford very little prospect of any measure being adopted there 
consistent with the general interests of Europe or in any manner favourable 
to those of this country." 

Grenville to Eden. 

May 28, 1797. 

Extreme disappointment at the conduct of the Austrian Government, 
equally contrary to the faith of treaties and to those sentiments of friend- 
ship which have been professed. That Mr Hammond was allowed to leave 
without being charged with any communication must be considered a 
strong indication of a change of sentiment and system towards this country . 

Same to Same. 

June 2, 1797. 
Overtures for peace are being made at Paris. The natural consequence 
of the treaty (sic) between Austria and France and the silence of the former 
about the stipulations. Eden will communicate this to the Austrian 



APPENDIX D 575 

Minister with no other reminder than that the communication itself, at 
such a moment, is the best proof of H.M.'s anxious desire still to maintain 
harmony with the Court of Vienna. 

Pitt MSS. Pub. Record Office. 

Pitt to Lord Carlisle. 
[Private.] June 4, 1797. 

"... I can also venture to assure you that I feel not less strongly than 
yourself the expediency of taking every step towards peace, that can be 
likely to effect the object consistent with the safety and honor of the 
country ; and I have no difficulty in adding (for your private satisfaction) 
that steps are taken of the most direct sort, and of which we must soon 
know the result, to ascertain whether the disposition of the enemy will 
admit of negotiation. On this point the last accounts from Paris seem to 
promise favourably. You will have the goodness to consider the fact of a 
step having been actually taken as confidentially communicated to your- 
self." 

Grenville to Eden. 

June 30, 1797. 
Notification of pourparlers with the Directory for peace, to include 
Portugal, Spain and Holland. Malmesbury appointed plenipotentiary. 
Remains to be seen if French are sincere. If so, little doubt remains of 
speedy and favourable termination. 

Same to Same. 

July 7, 1797. 
Difficulties made by Thugut as to ratification of the Convention signed 
by Starhemberg re the Austrian Loan. Such a breach of faith in satis- 
faction of our financial claims on Austria is incredible. We insist on com- 
pletion of the affair. 

Grenville to Starhemberg. 

Juillet 21, 1797. 

In treating for peace separately we might each get better terms, but 
without being nearer its accomplishment in fact. "On nous propose done 
de renouveler le concert et de ne traiter notre paix definitive qu'au Congres 
futur. Nous repondons que, pour ce qui est du concert, nous rendrons 
bien volontiers confidence pour confidence, mais que pour attendre le 
Congres, il est deja trop tard. Nous avons attendu (comme vous le savez 
bien) des nouvelles de ce Congres autant qu'il etoit possible d'attendre. 
On ne nous a pas voulu communiquer un mot, ni sur les conditions de la 
Paix, ni sur la tenure du Congres jusqu'a ce qu'il n 'etoit plus possible de 
garder un secret que tous les papiers de Paris auroient annonce aux cafes 
de Londres et de Paris. La communication qu'on nous a fait enfin etoit 
aussi bornee et aussi peu amicale qu'il etoit possible de l'etre. 

" Voila notre justification. . .pour avoir consenti d'ouvrir des negocia- 
tions avec l'ennemi pour une Paix definitive sans attendre pour cela un 
Congres qui tres probablement ne s'assemblera jamais. Que cette demarche 



576 ANGLO-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS 

soit bonne ou mauvaise, elle est faite: 1 'engagement est pris de traiter 
de bonne foi pour une paix definitive, et S.M. le remplira comme Elle 
remplit tous ses autres engagements. Cependant le resultat de cette nego- 
ciation n'est rien moins que certain. II se peut que l'ennemi, qui par la 
desunion qu'il a jete entre nous se flatte de nous jouer tous les deux, in- 
sistera avec nous sur des conditions inadmissibles et continuera a en- 
freindre, comme il le fait journellement, les stipulations des Preliminaires 
qu'il a signe[s] avec vous. Dans ce cas nous pourrions encore nous en- 
tendre et renouveler sous de plus heureux auspices un concert, qui, s'il 
avoit ete observe de bonne foi de votre part, comme il l'a ete de notre part, 
aurait indubitablement sauve l'Europe. Disci — et c'est a vous de broder ce 
cannevas et donner a cette verite toute nue les habits et les ornemens dont 
elle auroit besoin pour se presenter a des etrangers. Tout a vous." 

Grenville to Eden. 

July 23, 1797. 

"The long perseverance of the Court of Vienna in its refusal to make 
to H.M.'s Government any communication of the terms of the separate 
peace between Austria and France and the unfriendly manner in which 
that communication was at last made, unaccompanied as it was by any 
overture or measure which indicated any desire of further co-operation 
or concert, were among the leading motives which induced H.M.'s servants 
to advise H.M. to accede to the proposals of France in this respect. The 
King, having upon this ground entered into that engagement, no longer 
considers himself at liberty to depart from it, but will observe it with the 
same good faith with which he has executed on his part all his treaties 
with his Allies." 

Eden to Grenville. 

Aug. 16, 1797. 

H.I.M. has professed a desire for union with Great Britain but made 
no definite offer. As Great Britain had opened negotiations, and the Czar 
was indifferent as to a Congress, H.I.M. abandoned the idea. 

Same to Same. 

Sept. 16, 1797. 

News arrived through Basel of the coup d'etat of Fructidor. Thugut 
said this would break up the negotiations at Lille and Udine, and he 
inveighed bitterly against French perfidy and aggressiveness. He said he 
was not guilty of signing the Austro-French Preliminaries, "and repeated 
his opinion that Europe can be saved only by a thorough concert between 
the King and the Emperor and by the overthrow of the present ruling 
party in France." He lamented the prospect of an Anglo-French peace, 
as it must prejudice the chances of Austria obtaining reasonable terms at 
Udine. The seizure of Corfu by the French harmed both countries, 
and in case of war a joint expedition should be made by them to re- 
cover it. 



APPENDIX D 577 

Eden to Grenville. 

Sept. 18, 1797. 

General Meerveldt, who left Udine on Sept. 14, reported that before 
he left, Bonaparte had been dejected, but on receiving news of the coup 
of Sept. 4 at Paris, was much elated and then declared to the Imperial 
Ministers that France could not cede what she had promised to Austria in 
the Preliminaries, and demanded that the Emperor should treat at Udine 
for peace for the Empire, "evidently aiming to extort by this means the 
cession of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine as the price of the 
promised indemnification to H.I.M. in Italy. Bonaparte further declared 
that the Directory meant to retain Corfu and to annex Venice to the new 
formed Republic." He urged Austria to make peace on these terms, as 
France was about to conclude peace with Great Britain. 

Thugut said H.I.M. would not treat for the Empire, but would await 
the news from Lille and the opportunity of a further concert with Great 
Britain. He also asked whether Spain had offered to conclude separately 
with Great Britain ; and if so, could a British fleet be sent to the Adriatic 
to secure the transport of supplies to the Austrian army and cover the 
vulnerable coast of Istria? Cobenzl looks upon Bonaparte "as more than 
mortal," and combats him feebly. 

Grenville to Eden. 

Sept. 22, 1797. 

" I have to inform you that the negotiation which was carrying on at 
Lille has been abruptly terminated by a demand made to Lord Malmesbury 
by the new French plenipotentiaries, Treilhard and Bonnier ... that he 
should either declare whether or no he had full powers to agree to a com- 
plete restitution of all the conquests made by H.M. on France and her 
Allies, as a preliminary to the negotiation, or should quit Lille in 24 hours. 
A demand so unreasonable and unexpected undid at once whatever pro- 
gress had been made in the negotiation and threw the business back to the 
point from which it had started two months before, and in such a manner as 
to leave little hope that it can be further pursued with any prospect of success . 

" The French plenipotentiaries indeed continued to the conclusion of 
the very last conference to repeat and enforce in the strongest manner the 
most distinct assurances that nothing was further from the views of the 
Directory than an abrupt and unfavourable termination of the negotiation ; 
that they were desirous of pursuing it with the greatest rapidity and to a 
happy issue ; and that the very step which they were now taking was that 
which appeared to them the best calculated to lead to such an end; that 
so far from considering the business as completely terminated even by 
Lord Malmesbury's departure, they still conceived it to be capable of 
being resumed and prosecuted with success. It is not necessary for me to 
say that these assurances, however strongly urged, appear wholly in- 
compatible with the conduct which has been pursued by the Directory on 
the present occasion, and that but faint hopes can be entertained here, 
under such circumstances of any other issue than a continuation of the war." 

W.&G.I. 37 



578 ANGLO-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS 

Eden to Grenville. 

Nov. i, 1797. 

Thugut told him confidentially that he considered the Austro-French 
peace so unfavourable to Austria and so vague in its terms that it could not 
be concluded: that therefore H.I.M. wished to enquire from the British 
Government as to an eventual compact for the prosecution of the war, Great 
Britain sending a sufficient naval force to the Mediterranean and furnishing 
a loan to Austria. H.I.M. would confine "his views of acquisition to the 
side of Italy, from a wish of preserving the German Empire in its present 
shape." Eden in reply requested Thugut to state what were Austria's 
engagements to France. This Thugut refused to do, but he gave a vague 
outline of the terms. He said H.I.M. would ratify them but would keep 
his forces up to full strength, as the French troops would probably not 
evacuate E. Venetia. Eden replied that the fulfilment of Austria's financial 
responsibilities to Great Britain was a sine qua non to any agreement. 

Grenville to Eden. 
[Most secret.] Nov. 24, 1797. 

With reference to Starhemberg's proposal at London, Austria must 
state her obligations to France, etc., without which no proposal can be 
discussed. Great Britain and Russia have been kept out of the Austro- 
French discussions and agreements, probably because H.M. will disapprove 
them. Repayment of the loan is again insisted on; otherwise Parliament 
will not agree to any further efforts for Austria. 



APPENDIX E 
ATTEMPTS TO FORM THE SECOND COALITION (1798) 

Grenville 's despatches are from Downing Street ; those from Eden are from Vienna. 

Eden to Grenville. 

Jan. 3, 1798. 
H.I.M. orders the repayment of the Austrian loan to Great Britain in 
certain products (quicksilver, iron, corn, etc.), specie not being available. 
Eden pointed out that, as France controlled the Adriatic, the export of 
these was impossible; and long delays would result from this method of 
barter. 

Grenville to Eden. 

Jan. 16, 1798. 
Insists on the loan being repaid. The Austro-French peace creates 
universal disgust. "Europe can be saved only by the union of the four 
Great Powers." H.M. labours to effect it, but is hindered by the acts of 
Austria which create distrust. 



APPENDIX E 579 

Eden to Grenville. 

March 10, 1798. 

Prussia's subversive proposals re Empire at Rastatt. H.I.M. requests 
her to unite with him to preserve the Empire as far as possible. Reports 
of the French at Rome. Great alarm at Naples, whose King begs help 
from Austria. Thugut says if the French attack Naples or Tuscany, H.I.M. 
will defend them. 

Grenville to Sir W. Hamilton (at Naples). 

April 20, 1798. 

Hamilton will at once see the Neapolitan Ministers and " convince them 
in the strongest manner of the zeal and sincerity with which H.M. enters 
into the interests and feels for the present situation of their Sicilian 
Majesties." 

It would have been impossible for H.M. to witness the plain and 
undisguised declaration of the French Government of their intention to 
overwhelm the dominions of H.S.M. without feeling the most lively desire 
to interfere so far as he might have the means and opportunity to rescue 
from destruction a Power with whom he has always been anxious to main- 
tain the most friendly intercourse. The discussions which have lately taken 
place between H.M. and the Court of Vienna respecting the common 
interests of the two Governments and of Europe lead H.M. to hope that 
he may find occasion to interfere with effect, provided the period to which 
his assistance can be afforded be not too remote to prevent the difficulties 
which appear to be impending over Naples, and he has only to lament 
that the other Powers of Europe have so tardily awaked to the true sense of 
their general danger as to leave any doubt upon this point, and to have 
made it impracticable for him to be either more early in his offers of 
assistance or more certain of their success. H.M. has come to the deter- 
mination of sending a fleet into the Mediterranean for the protection of 
Naples so soon as it is possible for it to be brought forward without detri- 
ment to the indispensable objects of his naval service or imminent hazard 
to the safety of his dominions. 

Grenville to Eden. 

April 20, 1798. 

Refuses to consider Starhemberg's recent Memoire 1 for an alliance 
until the loan is repaid. When it is, we will consider a union either with 
her alone or with Naples. But success will more result from a Quadruple 
Alliance, including Russia and Prussia. Austria and Prussia must lay aside 
their jealousies. Great Britain strives to prepare for a Quadruple Alliance. 
He has explained to Starhemberg the British proposal to be made at 
Berlin by Elgin so framed as not to betray the confidence of Austria, 
also for the friendly intervention of Russia. The Quadruple Alliance would 
guarantee the respective dominions of the four Powers, and possibly also 

1 See Dropmore Papers, iv. 154-9. 

37-2 



580 ATTEMPTS TO FORM THE SECOND COALITION 

of the smaller Powers. Meanwhile "the great object appears to be that 
the plan of pacification for the Empire should be arranged by Austria 
and Prussia and presented at once as an ultimatum to France." If she 
refuses, the four Powers should make common cause against her. Our 
quota would then be partly in the British fleet to be sent into the Medi- 
terranean, partly in pecuniary succours. If Prussia refuses to join, H.M. 
will make a concert with H.I.M. Austria's pecuniary demands are in- 
admissible, but H.M. would eventually send a commissioner to Austrian 
H.Q. to supply her commander with monthly bills on H.M.'s treasury 
at the rate of £i ,000,000 for 12 months, for her armies in Italy and Germany. 
The general aim must be "that of reducing France within her ancient 
limits, particularly on the side of the Netherlands and of delivering 
Holland and Italy from the uncontrolled dominion which she now exerts 
over them." Fear that Austria may in the future make a separate peace. 
French attack on England would have the directly opposite effect. H.I.M. 
is invited to specify a plan of co-operation through Starhemberg. 

Same to Same. 

April 20, 1798. 

In view of a possible French invasion, H.M. cannot much weaken his 
fleet in home waters ; for if Earl of St Vincent's fleet were sent into Medi- 
terranean the Spanish fleet might join that at Brest, which would involve 
the recall of his fleet from the Mediterranean. And to detach only a part 
of it to that sea would expose it to the Spanish and Toulon fleets. A great 
increase to the British fleet is therefore necessary: and H.M. will incur 
that expense so as to be able to send thither an adequate force. Reinforce- 
ments to St Vincent's fleet will sail early in June. It must be admitted to 
any of the Austrian or Neapolitan ports, also into those of Leghorn and 
Genoa. It is expected that Austria will supply 3000 seamen from her 
Adriatic ports: also Naples the same number or even more. We cannot 
guarantee the continuance of that fleet in the Mediterranean indefinitely. 
Will not Naples seek to induce Spain to come to terms with us and then 
remain neutral or even join "the general defensive alliance now in agita- 
tion"? For this purpose Great Britain was and is ready to sacrifice her 
recent conquests from Spain. If the latter agrees, H.M. could safely 
engage to keep an adequate fleet in the Mediterranean during the 
war. 

Eden to Grenville. 

April 28, 1798. 
Continued friction between Austria and Prussia on German affairs. 
Prussia's aims subversive. The Czar's influence on her will be nil unless 
he places an army on her frontier. Thugut fears for the safety of Naples, 
and thinks the French armament at Genoa [sic] is destined for Malta, 
Sicily or Sardinia 1 . 

1 These despatches prove that Bonaparte's Oriental plans had not been 
surmised at London or Vienna. 



APPENDIX E 581 

Grenville to Eden. 

April 28, 1798. 
Bernadotte having left Vienna, and hostilities being imminent, H.M. 
is ordering St Vincent to send at once to the Mediterranean a force 
sufficient to hold in check the enemy's force there. Hopes that Austria 
will appreciate the magnanimity of this step which involves some danger 
to England. British finances prove the stability and power of the country. 
Eden must urge the necessity of obtaining for H.M.'s ships free admission 
to Naples and other Italian ports. St Vincent is at liberty "to treat as 
hostile all ports and countries in Italy by which, these demands shall be 
refused." Eden to forward a copy of this despatch to Hamilton at Naples. 

Same to Same. 

[Most secret.] May 15, 1798. 

"... Inconsequence of the publication of the despatches of the American 
Commissioners at Paris and of the scandalous scene of corruption and 
insolence there displayed, Congress has resolved on measures of hostility 
against France." If the Baltic Powers would concur, "there would then 
remain no neutral flag to protect the commerce or supplies of France." 

Eden to Grenville. 

May 23, 1798. 

Russia will promote an armed mediation, and will send an army to the 
Austrian frontier and despatch a fleet to help British fleet in North Sea. 
Thugut makes little of all this and says Czar is for peace, influenced thereto 
by Prince Repnin, who believes France irresistible; also by jealousy of 
Suvoroff whom he does not want to employ. Eden contested these state- 
ments but fears them correct. Thugut apprehensive for Germany in case 
of a war. Eden said Naples must be helped. Italy and Switzerland would 
probably rise against the French. This would derange their schemes, 
especially that of the Toulon armada, which Thugut thought might be 
against the Mediterranean Islands or Egypt, where there is plenty of ready 
money . H . I .M . urgently desired an entente with Prussia, and for it would see 
her acquire much land in Germany if it were under the mediation of Russia. 
Eden again urged the necessity of the Quadruple Alliance, and of the loan 
being settled. Thugut said this was impossible at present. The Austro- 
Neapolitan Treaty is a highly gratifying event. If followed up, it must 
bring a rupture with France, which Thugut expected. 

Same to Same. 

June 23, 1798. 
After the arrival of Hamilton's messenger, Eden informed Thugut of 
"the disposition of the Court of Naples to acquiesce in H.M.'s demands 
relative to the Mediterranean fleet." Thugut was gratified, and said that 
"H.I.M. would decidedly support the King of Naples against any conse- 
quences that might result, as H.S.M. was already assured of, by the de- 
fensive Treaty signed here on the 20th ult. which had arrived at Naples on 



582 ATTEMPTS TO FORM THE SECOND COALITION 

the 1 st inst. But, on my asking if he would enable me by this opportunity 
to transmit an answer to my note of Monday last, he requested that it 
might be deferred till positive accounts arrived of the determination of the 
Court of Naples, and of the measures adopted there, which, he said, 
must now be received in a very few days." 

Same to Same. 

July 4, 1798. 
After a letter from Hamilton, he regrets the timidity of the Neapolitan 
Government with regard to the "free and unqualified admission of H.M.'s 
fleet " into any Neapolitan port. The Austro-Neapolitan Treaty is of the 
usual defensive character. Gallo objects to it and says H.S.M. cannot 
ratify it in its present form; and presents a slightly different treaty for 
consideration, confining the casus foederis to a French aggression in Italy. 
Thugut objects to this as onesided seeing that Austria is strong in Italy. 

Hamilton to Eden. 

[Enclosure.] Naples, June 13, 1798. 

Had pointed out that the British fleet could not remain in Mediterranean 
unless it could enter the Neapolitan ports. Gallo always deferred an 
answer, and clings to half measures. He (Hamilton) anxiously awaits 
news from Sicily respecting the French and British fleets. 

Eden to Grenville. 

July 10, 1798. 
News of seizure of Malta by the French came from Rastatt, where it 
arrived by telegraph from Paris. Cobenzl made no progress at Rastatt. 
Naples has not ratified the Treaty with Austria. Eden begs Thugut to 
conclude some treaty now that Naples is in such danger. Thugut said 
H.I.M. would not abandon Naples. 

Same to Same. 

July 14, 1798. 
A messenger arrived from Naples bringing ratification of the Treaty 
of May 20. Thugut said both H.I.M. and H.M. should induce Naples to 
enter into the war eventually. A letter from Hamilton of June 20 stated that 
Nelson with 14 sail on June 17 appeared off Isle of Caprea (sic). Troubridge 
landed to inquire if Neapolitan ports were open to H.M.'s ships, and 
"attended Sir W. Hamilton to General Acton, who at length gave him an 
order in H.S.M.'s name to all the governors of the ports of Sicily to allow 
the British sick and wounded to be put on shore and taken care of in any 
of the ports of that island, and also that they might be allowed to get 
provisions for the fleet from any of these ports." 

Hamilton to Grenville. 

Naples, Aug. 4, 1798. 
Nelson had missed the French ; seven British frigates and a cutter had 
been for more than a fortnight looking for Nelson, who was very angry 



APPENDIX E 583 

that any difficulty was made by the Government of Syracuse in admitting 
all the fleet 1 . But " the Court of Naples could not without great risk throw 
off the mask until it had received the ratified Treaty with the Emperor of 
Germany and with the two supplementary articles by which the Emperor 
is bound to defend H.S.M. in case of an attack from any enemy, in conse- 
quence of his having opened his ports to the King's ships without any 
limitation ; and that Treaty arrived here in the night of the 30th of July 
and was officially communicated to me the next day by the Marquis di 
Gallo, the Treaty having been finally concluded at Vienna the 16th of 
July. As soon as I had received Admiral Nelson's last letters, I shewed 
them, abuse and all, to General Acton, as His Excellency mentions in his 
answer to that communication; but I flatter myself, having sent to Sir 
Horatio Nelson the original letter of General Acton of 1st Aug. that he 
will be perfectly satisfied, as I am, with this Ministry on this head." He 
hears that full powers are now given to M. de Circello to conclude a new 
treaty of alliance with Great Britain. "We already here look upon us as 
united, and there can be no doubt that the French will resent the King's 
fleet having been admitted into the port of Syracuse. Why then should the 
King of Naples hesitate one moment to take advantage of the present 
discontent and rising of the Roman peasantry, and march on Rome where 
there are not more than 3000 Poles and French ? " 

Eden to Grenville. 

Aug. 29, 1798. 
Prince Repnin and the Russian ambassador showed a letter from 
Sandoz-Rollin to his Court [Berlin] stating that France intends war against 
Austria. Thugut doubts its authenticity and says it is a plot between 
Prussia and France to feel the pulse of Austria. 

Grenville to Eden. 

Sept. 4, 1798. 
Russia is ready to aid H.I.M. with troops if war breaks out, if we can 
help her with funds. Thinks war more remote than is believed at Peters- 
burg. Our measures must depend on the ultimate decision of Austria. 
We deem it best now to help Austria by Russian troops rather than by a 
direct subsidy, and have suggested to Paul I to intervene so as to establish 
a concert between the three Powers. But the ratification and execution by 
Austria of her financial engagements is an indispensable preliminary. 

Eden to Grenville. 

Sept. 5, 1798. 
Prince Repnin before his departure assured Morton Eden that he 
[Eden] must give way on the financial dispute as Austria was desperately 
low in credit, and must be helped. Eden replied that the former con- 
vention must first be fulfilled. He conjured Repnin to persuade Paul I 
to encourage and stir up Austria; else Naples would be ruined. 

1 Nicolas, Sir N. H., Dispatches... of Nelson, in. 25-48 ; Rose, Napoleonic Studies, 
PP- 35°-3- 



584 ATTEMPTS TO FORM THE SECOND COALITION 

Same to Same. 

Sept. 20, 1798. 
News of Turkish declaration of war against France. Thugut asked 
whether the proposed Anglo-Russian convention would depend on the 
ratification of the Anglo- Austrian convention. Eden said it would be. 
Thugut said in that case Austria could not accept British proffered aid as 
her finances utterly forbade her fulfilling the loan. Eden showed how 
favourable was the time to attack France and save Europe. 

Grenville to Hamilton. 

Oct. 3, 1798 1 . 

M. Circello has received full powers to conclude a defensive alliance 
with England. The British Government glad to do so, on the basis of the 
Convention of 1793 whenever the King of Naples is ready to go to war 
with France. Grenville warns him that "H.M. was not insensible of the 
danger which must attend such a resolution, if taken without the fullest 
assurances of support from the Court of Vienna, though on the other 
hand it could not be denied that the other alternative, that of remaining 
a patient spectator of the intrigues, insults and aggressions of France, was 
also full of danger to H.S.M.'s interests and security." In this situation 
it appeared that the decision both in point of substance and of time must 
be left to H.S.M.'s own determination, and that the most friendly conduct 
which H.M. could pursue on this subject was to refer the negotiation to 
Naples and thus to leave it to H.S.M. to act in this respect as circum- 
stances may require and particularly as may be found most expedient from 
a view of the final resolutions (whatever they may be) of the Court of 
Vienna. " In pursuance of this idea I herewith transmit to you by the 
King's command H.M.'s full powers for negotiating and signing a treaty 
of defensive alliance with the Court of Naples ; such treaty to be either in 
the form of a general defensive treaty or in that of a special Convention 
applicable to the particular case of the present war with France. ..." 

P.S. "Since the above was written, the intelligence has been received 
here of the glorious results of the attack on the French fleet at Abukir. 
This happy event makes no change in H.M.'s disposition to consult the 
views and interests of H.S.M. respecting the conclusion of an alliance in 
the manner stated in the above despatch, and it evidently affords still 
greater facility for fulfilling the stipulations of it at present on both sides." 

Same to Same. 

Oct. 3, 1798. 
Need of attacking France at Malta. Numerous small armed vessels 
should be furnished by Naples: this would be a "sine qua non of future 
concert." A declaration should be made that all neutrals approaching 
Malta will be sunk. As to the future of Malta, " The communications made 
to H.M. on this subject from the Court of Naples are in the highest degree 
liberal and friendly. But H.M. does not entertain any idea of acquiring 
1 Received by Hamilton about November 19. 



APPENDIX E 585 

the sovereignty of Malta to himself, or of any of the Venetian Islands. He is 
ignorant how far any such wish is entertained by the Emperor of Russia 
or by H.S.M., though it does not appear to H.M. that such an acquisition 
would be advantageous to either of those Sovereigns. He has however 
directed the Court of Petersburg to be sounded on the subject, and in 
the meantime I have H.M.'s orders to transmit to you the copy of a sug- 
gestion which has been made here on the subject of the restoration of the 
Order as the best means of placing the Island in the most beneficial situation 
for the interests of all the Allies." 

Hamilton to Grenville. 

Naples, Oct. 9, 1798. 
State dinner to Nelson and the captains of the ten British men-of-war, 
on the ' Samnite,' commanded by Captain Carracciolo. General Mack 
expected at Caserta, whither the Royal Family had removed. "As there 
can be no doubt of the intention of the French army to plunder the rest 
of Italy as soon as they shall be in sufficient force, it is a mystery to us all 
why the Emperor and King of Naples, who have a sufficient force, 
do not profit of this most precious moment to drive these cruel robbers 
out of Italy. We hope the arrival of General Mack may clear up this 
mystery." 

Same to Same. 

Naples, Oct. 16, 1798. 

Nelson has sailed for Malta; will return early in November. General 
Mack will march northward with 30,000 men before Oct. 31, " the Emperor 
having consented and even promised his powerful support. The glorious 
victory of August 1 seems to have inspired all with courage and confidence, 
and we now hope that this fine country may be saved. It is certain that 
the French Government has ordered an army of 60,000 men to act against 
this country. Their Sicilian Majesties have the utmost confidence in the 
brave Admiral ; and the conferences we have had with General Acton have 
certainly decided this Government to the salutary determination of 
attacking rather than waiting to be attacked." 

Eden to Grenville. 

Oct. 27, 1798. 
Report that four Russian columns would cross the Russian frontier 
en route for Constance, to enter Switzerland by the plain, while the 
Austrians entered by the mountains; they would together invade France. 

Hamilton to Grenville. 

Caserta, Nov. 6, 1798. 
Mack now heads 30,000 troops ready to march. The French have only 
26,000, including Poles, etc. "According to the late treaty between the 
Courts of Vienna and Naples, when Naples furnishes 30,000, the Emperor 
is to furnish 60,000." 



5 86 ATTEMPTS TO FORM THE SECOND COALITION 

Eden to Grenville. 

Nov. 10, 1798. 
News that Naples would occupy the Roman States, and (as this might 
lead to war with France) he had called on Austria to help in pursuance of the 
offensive and defensive treaty. "Thugut then said with much agitation 
that he had been ordered by the Emperor to declare that if Naples acted 
thus, she would be left to her own means, but would receive help if France 
attacked her." Eden earnestly deprecated abandoning Naples. As to 
Thugut's statement that France must be made to appear the aggressor, 
why not issue a declaration that it was her ambition and aggression that 
called the Powers to action ? If Austria would do this, he [Eden] believed 
England would aid her. Thugut thought it a good plan but said he doubted 
Russia's constancy ; he did not know now whether the Czar would let the 
Russians enter Switzerland. 

[For Grenville 's important despatch of Nov. 16, 1798, to Whitworth at Petersburg 
see Rose, Napoleonic Studies, pp. 54-61.] 

Same to Same. 

Nov. 28, 1798. 
Thugut fears Prussia's conduct might hinder the despatch of Austrian 
troops into Switzerland. The Emperor will try to conciliate her. Eden 
said how easy it would be to arouse Italy, Switzerland, West Germany and 
Holland against their French oppressors. Thugut silent as to this, but 
deprecated the Czar's assumption of title of Grand Master of Malta [sic], 
as the Knights now in Russia could not legally depose the Grand Master, 
Hompesch, who had acted weakly but not treacherously and now wanted 
to head the Maltese rising. The Order should be re-established. 

Same to Same. 

Dec. 19, 1798. 
Has urged Thugut to help Naples and Tuscany; but Thugut blames 
Naples for beginning the war and compromising fate of Sardinia ; Austria 
not ready for war. Eden said France plotted to ruin Sardinia, conquer all 
Italy and finally Austria. H.I.M. might save Naples and all Europe: let 
Austria act with the energy of England, and success was almost certain. 

Same to Same. 

[Most secret.] Dec. 22, 1798. 

H.I.M. will not help Naples, having no confidence in her Government, 
which might make a separate peace. He said warmly that Naples "had 
allowed itself to be drawn into the measures it had adopted by England, 
who expected in this manner to force him into a war, in which the English 
Government, as they knew that he was without the means of carrying it 
on without them, would become in a certain degree the directors of his 
operations and of the conditions of peace." The Empress (by the Em- 
peror's express injunction) refrained from speaking. Thugut afterwards 
said the same, setting aside the promises so often made. Eden ascribes to 
Thugut the distrust of England to which this change of front is due. 



APPENDIX F 587 

Same to Same. 

Dec. 29, 1798. 
Confusion of Austria's finances. She dare not trust England because 
"conscious of her own offensive and faithless conduct towards H.M." An 
Anglo- Austrian union is therefore very difficult. Jealousy of Prussia acute. 
Austria hides her weakness "under the veil of mystery and cunning." 
She may come to terms with France. She maintains in her territory 
20,000 Russian troops sent at her earnest request to co-operate against 
France; yet refuses a union with England. 



APPENDIX F 
LETTERS OF LORD MULGRAVE TO PITT 

From Pitt MSS. no. 152, P.R.O. 

Speenhill, Jan. 5, 1806. 

" I think I may congratulate you upon something like hopes of Prussia. 
The information from the Hague of the 17th of December has probably 
decided the engagement of Prussia for the security of the British troops, as 
Kalkreuth with the right of the Prussian army would not be in security 
against the French force assembling without the assistance of the British 
and Swedish troops, in addition to the Russians under Tolstoy 1 . Nothing 
seems more likely to decide the hostility of France against Prussia than a 
junction of British troops with those of Prussia. The only objection seems 
to be the locking up those troops for so long a period, if peace should be 
patched up between Prussia and France, but that inconvenience is nothing 
compared to the chance of stirring up something. I suppose you will 
make no difficulty about the additional subsidies desired by Russia or 
even the loan of the million. Lord G. Levison's [sic] despatches are satis- 
factory except with respect to the determination of Czartoriski and No- 
vossiltzoff not to go to Berlin. You will decide whether Lord G. Levison 
will be most useful at Berlin or St Petersburg, probably at the latter if 
Harrowby comes away. You will observe that Czartoriski has already 
opened the subject of Greece and Egypt." 

Fulham, Monday, Jan. 6, 1806. 
" . . .However unwilling I am to press upon your time and attention at 
this moment I cannot avoid saying a few words to you on a subject which 
has occupied much of my thought since I received the despatches at 
Speenhill last night. I have so sincere and long-rooted a deference to your 
opinions that I am not disposed to press any ideas of mine very far, when 
you make any objection to them in the first instance ; nor do I ever recur 
again to my own suggestions when they are unconnected with the depart- 

1 For an explanation of these circumstances see ante, pp. 345-7, also Rose, Life 
of Pitt, Part 11. pp. 551-3. Mulgrave was then acting as Foreign Minister. 






588 LETTERS OF LORD MULGRAVE TO PITT 

ment which you have assigned to me; but I confess that so much seems to 
me to hang upon the half disposition to action which Prussia is manifesting 
that I cannot refrain from again calling your attention to the subject of 
Holland. It is not now possible to look back to the old system of European 
politicks or to the former state of Europe itself, as to objects which can be 
restored or even approached by any new arrangements, after the state of 
things which has now arisen. A Republic of Holland, supported by its 
own resources, making head against the power, or even successfully 
evading the influence, of France, can never again exist without a second 
Revolution in the state of Europe, which the time of life and character of 
the existing Sovereigns, and the nature of the political maxims of their 
Cabinets, does not place within the reach of any period of rational political 
speculation. A strong sense of obvious and impending danger is not alone 
sufficient to determine the Prussian Government. The powerful means of 
a general Coalition has not been sufficient ; an increase of territory has been 
its leading, and indeed only influencing object. Even for an exchange of 
Hanover the Court of Berlin would have been bound not to make peace 
without common consent. Holland, therefore, under present circumstances 
seems to me alone likely to purchase vigorous and immediate exertions on 
the part of Prussia, even for its own preservation. The Stadholder (besides 
his despicable character) is further disqualified by a voluntary compromise 
for his executive office in Holland, and by the ready acceptance of the 
sovereignty of Fulda, which might supply his enjoyments and supply his 
tranquillity. An honourable prejudice in favour of the House of Nassau 
being thus set aside, the question about Holland appears to rest on these 
broad grounds, which may be avowed without danger, and may be argued 
without the possibility of being disproved. Holland must become a province 
of France or of some other Power. Can it be placed in any other hands 
capable of defending it except Prussia ? Is there any other acquisition which 
can by its value tempt Prussia to come into contact with France, and which 
by its frontier will enable that kingdom to keep the French force at bay, 
except Holland? As long as Prussia shall hold its connection with this 
country, the United Provinces in her hands will secure all the northern 
and eastern parts of Great Britain against the danger of invasion.. . . 
We must look to large objects and to extensive innovations if we are to 
meet the gigantick measures of Bonaparte (who will give Tyrol and East 
Austria and North Italy to his vassals).. . .No bribe seems to me too high 
for Prussia at this moment. With that Power it now remains to determine 
whether Bonaparte is to be Emperor of the Continent of Europe or not. 
The well-earned exception of Russia from that description of the state of 
the Continent will alone operate but little for the general peace of the 
world, or for the ultimate terms for this country, which sooner or later 
must come to be considered." 



APPENDIX G 589 



APPENDIX G 

NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDEN AND RUSSIA 
IN 1811-1812 

F.O. Sweden, 70. 

A. Despatches from Thornton to The Foreign Office. 

H.M.S. Victory, Wingo Sound, Nov. 5, 181 1. 

Rendezvous at Amal is secretly arranged by the Swedish Minister, 
Count Rosen. Rosen "entered at once and with great earnestness into the 
favourite topic of the incorporation of Norway with Sweden." For this 
our naval co-operation was essential ; but Sweden would also need money 
to help her maintain from 60,000 to 70,000 troops and 17,000 seamen 
(figures which Thornton doubts). Thornton asked him not to mention 
the proposal about Norway, on which Rosen had clearly been told to sound 
him. We must defer this topic until later, and we might test the sincerity 
of Sweden by proposing, first, the independence of Norway, which would 
guarantee Sweden's safety as much as its annexation. 

Amal, Nov. 11, 181 1. 

At Amal Thornton saw M. Netzel (formerly Swedish charge 1 d'affaires 
at Hamburg) who acknowledged the noble conduct of Great Britain in 
this overture. The Prince Royal wished to preserve the present relations 
with Great Britain and France; i.e. to appear to be the Ally of France but 
undertake no hostility against England (though France might press for it) 
and to join England rather than yield to the French demand. Sweden 
had resisted Napoleon's demand last summer to allow French troops in 
small numbers to pass through Sweden into Norway for the invasion of 
Scotland. Denmark had allowed this (through Zealand). Sweden would 
rather fight France than accede to this demand. 

The Prince Royal would not take up the annexation of Norway now be- 
cause it would expose him to hostilities both from France and Denmark 
and possibly from Russia too. 

Thornton then opened the main topic of his mission and pointed out 
that a change of system was now needed, not as a threat to Sweden but 
because of "the intolerable burden which the System itself imposed upon 
Great Britain." He also referred to the probability of a League of the 
North, which Great Britain would help. 

[Private.] Amal, Nov. n, 181 1. 

He thinks Sweden will not take up this proposal seriously till she has 
sounded Russia, as she may do by a private overture to Romanzoff. 
Sweden would be in a difficult position if a Treaty with England exposed 
her to attacks both from Russia and Denmark. Russia resists some of 



59© NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDEN AND RUSSIA 

Bonaparte's demands. He suggests sending a British envoy to St Peters- 
burg as it may be that Russia only needs encouraging in order to resist 
Britain more firmly. 

Amal, Nov. 20, 1811. 
Sudden ending by Sweden of this negotiation, which had opened well. 
Netzel would not state in writing the reasons. Thornton thinks his own 
conduct has been quite correct. The Swedish Government stated that he 
was not furnished with clear and precise enough instruction as to terms of 
peace. 

[Secret and confidential.] Amal, Nov. 20, 181 1. 

The Prince Royal had been mortified by the announcement of a change 
of system by Great Britain which he took as a threat (needlessly, as Thorn- 
ton thinks). France had threatened Sweden and the Prince would resist 
threats from both sides. Thornton pointed out that this end to the negotia- 
tion would cause a bad impression in England and said no threats had been 
suggested or intended. 

[Private.] H.M.S. Victory, Wingo Sound, Nov. 25, 1811. 

He believes the failure due to Engestrom alone, and to his misrepre- 
sentations: he is under French influence. Nothing can be done now, or 
in future, except by direct communication with the Crown Prince himself 1 . 

From F.O. Sweden, 71. 

B. Despatches from Castlereagh to Thornton in 18 12. 

March 13. 

He refers to a Swedish overture for peace and a request that a negoti- 
ator be sent to Sweden. This change is due to the French invasion of 
Swedish Pomerania. Sweden does not consider herself yet at war with 
France ; but negotiations with England must be secret. Sweden proposes 
(1) peace, (2) alliance with us. To (1) we agree, especially as the war with 
Sweden has been nominal rather than real. We do not wish her to declare 
war on Napoleon if she desires to avoid it. But if he attacks her, we will 
defend her by sea. Thornton is to go to Stockholm if possible. If Sweden 
should decline all further negotiation, he is to return at once to England 
and declare that no further negotiation can take place except in London by 
a duly accredited Swedish Minister. 

If Sweden wants merely a treaty restoring peace and amity, he [Thorn- 
ton] may sign such a treaty (draft of which is enclosed) ; but a system of 
concert may be framed thereafter. Sweden now proposes (1) Protection 
by our fleet. (2) Transfer of a West India isle to her. (3) Military and 
financial succour. (4) Territorial extension, especially on the side of Norway. 

1 An unsigned letter, dated Stockholm, Jan. 19, 1812, expresses regret that the 
British Government had not understood the absolute necessity of giving Norway 
to Sweden, which may otherwise become a Russian or pseudo- French province: 
65 Swedish officers and some 3000 seamen had gone to equip and man Napoleon's 
Scheldt and Brest fleets. The Danes assisted in this owing to their hate of England. 



APPENDIX G 591 

(1) We agree to, and will agree to prevent any invasion of Sweden either 
directly or through Norway. But she must understand the burden this 
imposes. (2) is reserved for discussion as to details: but such an island 
must not be alienated by Sweden without our consent. (3) Great Britain 
cannot at once accede to, as she throws all her weight into the Peninsular 
War, which greatly assists the efforts of North Europe for independence. 
As we must give all our resources to Spain, we cannot subsidize Sweden. 
But we will send military clothing as far as possible. (4) As Sweden is not 
yet at war either with France or Denmark, she cannot expect us to frame 
precise engagements on this head. But if she will act vigorously against 
France, we will seek to strengthen her. It is natural that she seek an 
indemnity for loss of Finland and Swedish Pomerania ; but not while she 
is at peace with Denmark and France. Let Sweden therefore open herself 
clearly on this question. We will at least seek to prevent Danish or French 
troops being sent into Norway. There shall also be mutual restitution of 
ships seized. 

[Secret and separate.] March 13. 

Thornton will at once see at Stockholm M. Nicolai, Russian charge 
d'affaires, and state that Mr Liston will go as ambassador to Constantinople 
to seek to arrange peace between Russia and Turkey, and he will receive 
suggestions from Russia to this end. England can never see with in- 
difference Russian interests threatened by France. 

[Secret and separate.] March 13. 

Thornton will seek a personal interview with the Prince Royal, whose 
influence is so great in the Swedish Government: but a certain reserve 
must be maintained by us towards him, until his position is entirely estab- 
lished. His views are to be found out and transmitted minutely to H.M.'s 
Government. 

March 25. 

Our fleet will prevent landing of French and Danish troops in Norway: 
also despatch of Danish flotilla. 

When Sweden and Russia have more fully concerted their arrangements, 
we will send an officer to discuss the operations to be carried on against 
the enemy. 

March 27. 

So soon as peace is restored with Sweden the Orders in Council of 
January 1807 will be revoked (for Sweden), and our blockade under the 
Orders of April 1809 will not extend to the Baltic ports. Thus Sweden 
will become the depot of British trade with other Baltic ports, and we will 
encourage this. 

March 27. 

"In the Projet d'operations suggested in M. d'Engestrom's letter of 
1 2th inst. it is proposed that measures should be adopted to induce Den- 
mark to join the confederation against France and that in exchange for 
Norway (to be ceded to Sweden) an extension of territory should be 



592 NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDEN AND RUSSIA 

granted to Denmark on the side of Germany." The Prince Regent wishes 
it understood that no thought must be entertained of indemnifying Den- 
mark from his Electoral dominions. 

April 14. 

Nicolai has been charged to sound Denmark as to a concert against 
France on the plan of ceding Norway to Sweden and undertaking a diver- 
sion against the rear of the French army in North Germany. This may 
offend Denmark and may imply conquest of Norway and Zealand, which 
will require all the year, besides attaching Denmark to France. Why not 
offer to Denmark Swedish Pomerania and German land in exchange for 
Norway ? If she rejects really good offers it is clear she is welded closely 
to France. Thornton is to suggest this plan to Sweden. 

April 24. 

Proposal from Paris of an offer of peace to Great Britain if she will 
recognize Joseph as King of Spain. The Prince Regent resolutely declined 
an offer incompatible with his honour. This to be communicated to the 
Prince Royal. 

May 7. 

Regrets that Sweden makes the restoration of peace depend on a Treaty 
of Concert to be framed between Great Britain, Sweden and Russia. This 
would look as if we were obliged to purchase peace from Sweden. We de- 
clined and still decline to mix the question of Concert with that of Peace, 
especially since Russia has " become a party to discussions which opens [sic] 
a much more extensive view of the interests to be provided for than whilst 
the deliberations were confined to Great Britain and Sweden." We know 
nothing about Russia's views except through the confidential communica- 
tion made to you by the Swedish Minister as to the Russo-Swedish treaty 
signed on the (blank) at Stockholm. We must first know more about the 
views of Russia, and what will happen if she compromises with France, 
and how that would affect Sweden. 

The Swedish request for a subsidy of £1,200,000 is inadmissible, owing 
to our efforts elsewhere. Respecting Sweden's claims to Norway our first 
wish is to see Denmark leave France and join us on the plan proposed on 
April 14. But if Denmark adheres to France then we will aid Sweden 
against Danish territory and will dispose of the conquests as may be 
reasonable, especially respecting Norway. The Norwegian deputation now 
expected in England may furnish an opportunity of pointing out the 
advantages of a union with Sweden than (sic) by a Swedish conquest. 

[Secret.] May 8. 

His despatches (Nos. 13-16) x just received. The Treaty signed at St 
Petersburg has been delivered by M. Rehausen. Yet these facts do not 
influence greatly the considerations stated yesterday; for Russia has not 
yet shown any disposition to treat for peace with Great Britain. But the 
Tsar's firmness and his treaty with Sweden are hailed with satisfaction. 

1 Thornton's first despatches from Carlslund. For the Russo-Swedish treaties 
of April s, 8, 1812, see Koch and Scholl, III. 234. 



APPENDIX G 593 

We will at the proper moment be cordially disposed to unite with the 
Powers of the North for the general safety. 

May 22. 

Has received Nos. 17-24 from Thornton and commends his industry 
and zeal ; also his offer to General van Suchtelen 1 to acquire and produce 
full powers from both States for a Peace between Great Britain and Russia. 
These are sent to Thornton consonant with the Projet he has forwarded 
home, which was agreed on with the General. 

A British ambassador will be sent to St Petersburg. If the General 
signs such a treaty of peace with us, will not Sweden do the same ? Perhaps 
the General will use his good offices to this effect. 

June 7. 

Regrets that Sweden still declines to sign a Peace with Great Britain 
"without clogging that pledge of returning amity with ulterior conditions 
which would change the character of the measure." But Thornton's letters 
of May 20 and 21 open up the prospect of Sweden being ready to join us 
independently of her connexions with Russia, "considering herself strong 
enough with the assistance of Great Britain and the acquisition of Norway, 
to resist the continental Powers, Russia included." 

This proposal, if persevered in, will deserve serious consideration. 

July 3- 
"From the delays which are still interposed both by Sweden and 
Russia I much fear no peace between Great Britain and either of those 
Courts will be signed till hostilities shall have actually commenced between 
them and France. Sweden obviously shapes her conduct to the policy of 
Russia with whom she has recently connected herself; the latter has shewn 
so much indecision as to make the result as yet uncertain.. . .You hint 
that the Prince Royal feels some apprehension of not being fully supported 
by Great Britain in case of Russia yielding to France." Thornton may 
assure Sweden that, if she makes peace with Great Britain and adheres to 
her engagements, she may securely rely upon the utmost exertions of this 
country...." You will explain to him in the strongest terms the irresistible 
force of an appeal to British feelings when Great Britain is called upon to 
succour an Ally for adhering firmly to her cause against the efforts of a 
powerful and vindictive enemy, of which her conduct to Portugal and 
Spain are such conspicuous examples. You may further acquaint both the 
Swedish and Russian Ministers that Lord Cathcart hold himself in readi- 
ness to proceed to his destination so soon as the policy of the Northern 
Courts shall be decisively disclosed." 

July 18. 
Has received his notes 43-50. Sweden's request for a subsidy of 
£1,000,000 is declined. He regrets the delays to sign peace: unless she 
does Thornton must return. The claims of Spain are pressing and must 
be preferred to those of Sweden, which concern measures of aggrandise- 
ment. Until Sweden brings her troops into contact with the French, she 
1 Russian plenipotentiary, recently arrived at Stockholm. 
W.&G. 38 



594 NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDEN AND RUSSIA 

cannot claim the same support as those of Spain. But if she will sign the 
peace, we will, in case of a proper military concert being made, offer her 
stores equal in value to £500,000. He approves the reported move of 
Sweden against Zealand rather than Norway ; for it will act as a diversion 
for Russia and commit Sweden to continental operations: but better still 
would be a Russo-Swedish expedition to the south of the Baltic in the 
French rear. If this is impossible, then attack Zealand. Admiral Saumarez 
will be instructed to help. 

July 18. 

Cathcart will set out to St Petersburg at end of next week and will 
touch at Sweden [sic] so as to learn the situation there. Hopes that Russia 
will by then have made peace with us. 

Aug. 4. 

On July 3 1 received the treaties of peace signed by Thornton at Orebrd 
on July 18 with Russia and Sweden 1 . 

[Most secret.] Oct. 10. 

Great Britain wishes to give Sweden an island that will encourage her 
and induce her to resist the anti-commercial system of France. Sweden's 
desire for St Lucia has been changed to Guadeloupe, an isle of much 
greater wealth. "Naval considerations alone induce a reluctance with 
respect to St Lucia. These can be but of secondary importance to Sweden, 
whilst the great produce of Guadeloupe may be expected materially to 
improve the Swedish resources." It must not be alienated without our 
consent, nor shall it be used by enemy privateers. 

Oct. 10. 

Regret that Sweden will not make a treaty with Spain, which hinders 
formation of a confederacy against France. 

Oct. 10. 

(As Sweden no longer claims the stipulated services of 18,000 Russian 
troops, assembled in Finland, who are now gone to Riga to strengthen the 
Russian right) we will sanction the grant of £500,000 to her, but the 
additional aid offered by Cathcart cannot now be granted. Sweden wants 
us to acquiesce in her attack on Norway. We acquiesce reluctantly. But 
first an application must be made to Denmark according to Art. 8 of Treaty 
of Wilna. We will also accede to the Russo-Swedish Treaty (with a few 
reservations) so as to frame a confederacy for the continent. 

Oct. 10. 

Thornton will press that the Swedish annexation of Norway "will be 
conducted upon principles of the utmost indulgence and liberality to the 
feelings, interests, and privileges of those whom it is desired, with a view of 
securing Sweden against the common enemy, to bring under allegiance of 
H.S.M. The sentiments recently expressed by the Prince Royal in his 
letter to the Prince Regent on this subject, afforded H.R.H. the utmost 
satisfaction. You will represent that it is in a confident reliance upon these 
1 See Koch and Scholl. m. 235. 



APPENDIX G 595 

assurances, and under an expectation that the conciliatory system of Sweden 
will be announced at the very outset of operations to the Norwegians, 
that H.R.H. has been induced to consent to be a party to this attempt 
which Sweden has urged with such earnestness as essential to her national 
security. You will press this object with the utmost solicitude." 

(From F.O. Sweden, 72) 

C. Despatches from Thornton to Castlereagh in 18 12. 

[Most secret.] Carlslund, near Orebro, April 16. 

On the day after his arrival he submitted draft of his treaty to the 
Swedish plenipotentiaries Baron d'Engestrom and Baron de Wotterstedt in 
two distinct conferences. Engestrom said that Russia only waited to see 
Sweden conclude peace with us, to conclude likewise. Thornton replied 
that he believed Russia would gladly see the Anglo-Swedish Peace. The 
three met again yesterday when Engestrom showed a draft of the Swedish 
Russian treaty of April 8 from which Thornton (notes are enclosed) made 
notes. Sweden now demands of us double the subsidy offered by us in 
1808, — viz. £1,200,000. 

[Separate. Secret and confidential.] Ibid. May 3. Received May 17. 

After describing the means by which he obtained an interview with the 
Prince Royal, he continues: "He [the Prince Royal] immediately turned 
the conversation to politics.. . .He began with France. He said that they 
had just received new overtures from the [French] Emperor, [verbal over- 
tures] and that the Swedish Government would reply to them verbally. 
They had always, he said, observed the precaution to reply to such pro- 
positions in the way in which they were made; that it was a common 
stratagem of Napoleon to throw out verbally different propositions and 
to reduce the Governments to whom they were made to give replies in 
writing, which engaged them, while he in fact was left free by the disavowal 
of his verbal overtures. France, he said, was now willing to acquiesce in 
the perfect neutrality of Sweden, provided she would engage not to take 
part in the approaching war with Russia; she would in that case oblige 
Russia to restore Finland to Sweden, although (said the Prince) if I would 
agree, to behave well, sije veux me bien conduit e, Napoleon would do much 
more. He would transfer the Royal Family of Sweden to St Petersburg 
making for them a Kingdom out of Finland, Petersburg, Esthonia, Livonia 
and Courland, in fact the two entire shores of the Gulph of Finland, and 
he would have no objection to extend it to the North so as to include 
Archangel. And then, said the Prince, I should be the vassal of France; 
and he is the man soon to avenge himself of the affront which he thinks 
he has sustained from me. 

"I asked the Prince what was the intention, then, of France with 
regard to Sweden. He said it was certainly the intention of Bonaparte to 
put an end to it as a monarchy; that his system was, and always had been, 
by division, by exchanges and cessions, to obliterate every trace of the 
ancient system of Europe, and particularly of the independence of every 

38-2 



596 NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDEN AND RUSSIA 

State; and, as Sweden had tried to assert her independence, and was in 
fact by her position and by a connection with England more capable of 
maintaining it than almost any other Power in Europe, he was determined 
that this example should not be given by Sweden. He [Napoleon] intended 
to make a Grand Duchy, perhaps by the title of Sweden, or rather by that 
of Gothland (Grand Duche de la Gothie), the seat of which should be at 
Stockholm, and which should be composed of five or six provinces: other 
provinces might compose a second Grand Duchy, or, being annexed to 
Norway, might form an establishment for the House of Denmark, whom 
it was unquestionably the intention of Bonaparte to dispossess of the 
German Provinces to the Skaw, and of the Islands nearest to that coast of 
the Baltic. 

"With regard to the projects of Bonaparte for the present campaign, 
the Prince said that he had unquestionably good information from his 
personal friends (of whom he possessed many even near the person of 
Bonaparte) that Napoleon's intention and his expectation were to force 
the Emperor Alexander by one or two battles to a new peace and to a 
cession of several provinces, among others for the purpose of re-establishing 
the King of Poland (which, I understood the Prince, was designed for 
Jerome Bonaparte) and for making up that kingdom of which St Petersburg 
was to be the capital. The seat of the Russian Government was to be again 
fixed at Moscow; and that then, carrying 100,000 Russians along with him 
as auxiliary troops, he would proceed towards Turkey and establish the 
French Empire at Constantinople. The Prince Royal observed that he 
might not push his projects farther than this point for a year or two after 
he had attained it; but that he had assuredly not in the least degree aban- 
doned the idea of possessing Egypt and of conquering India." 

The Prince added that the French were requisitioning for this cam- 
paign vast numbers of artisans and quantities of seeds as if for founding 
colonies or acquiring new countries. He then referred to the signs of 
vacillation at St Petersburg, due largely to the timid counsels of Romanzoff . 
Thornton thereupon stated that the last proposal from that quarter did 
not seem to promise an amicable arrangement with Great Britain ; and he 
begged the Prince, who had great influence with the Emperor, to correspond 
directly with him. The Prince had urged him to make peace with the 
Turks; and he [the Prince] requested me to inform Your Lordship that 
the Emperor had given "instructions to make peace at all events with the 
Porte, and on any concession of his pretensions, provided only that they 
would enter into the alliance with England, Russia and Sweden." 

Respecting the British proposal to Denmark on the subject of Norway, 
the Prince said that it "had given him a good deal of pain; for that, cir- 
cumstanced as he was with regard to this country, and circumstanced as 
the country was with relation to Norway, it was impossible for him to 
move for the common Cause, or to induce the country to move without the 
preliminary possession of that Kingdom. It would at once redeem the 
debt he had contracted towards Sweden by insisting upon the eternal 
abandonment of Finland, and it would furnish an inducement to enter 



APPENDIX G 597 

into the Continental War, not less than a security against surprise on that 
side, while they were so engaged. On this topic the Prince entered a good 
deal into the arguments for this measure, such as I have stated them to 
Your Lordship on another occasion." The Prince then said that his dis- 
appointment at the British refusal of necessary succours would not cause 
him to relax his efforts for the common cause. With respect to the projected 
operations against the Island of Zealand, the Prince said "that if H.M.'s 
Government chose to keep possession of it with a garrison at Copenhagen, 
and in fact to become the Suzerain, Sweden would not have the smallest 
difficulty in acknowledging and consenting to it. If, however, the expense 
of keeping it were thought too great, and if the idea were adopted of razing 
the fortifications and leaving the island as a Place ouverte, it was of no great 
moment who possessed it ; he did not, however, see any necessity for putting 
it into the hands of Russia. In this I ventured most decidedly to acquiesce 
in opinion with the Prince, observing that I saw no occasion for bringing 
Russia in any manner to this end of the Baltic..." 

Ibid. May 6. 
He reports the arrival of a Russian despatch brought to Stockholm 
by Baron de Nicolai, who had just returned. In it Romanzoff (doubtless 
at the suggestion of the Emperor), urged the sending of the Marquis 
Wellesley as ambassador to St Petersburg, for which the Emperor had 
stated in writing his great desire. 

[Secret and confidential.] Ibid. May 15. 

M. Signeul had come from Paris with verbal offers to the Swedish 
Government. If it will join in the war against Russia it shall receive Finland 
(to be acquired by Swedish troops), recover Swedish Pomerania together 
with Stettin and the district as far as Wolgast, also Mecklenburgh, also 
6,000,000 livres as mise en campagne and 1,000,000 livres per month during 
the war. Also the Prince Royal shall receive back his appanage (Ponte 
Corvo). H.S.M. repelled these offers as dishonourable; and the Prince 
Royal replied that whatever he had done he had done for France, not for 
Bonaparte; and it was out of Bonaparte's power to offer him a proper 
recompense; that from the moment of being called to succeed to the 
Swedish throne he relinquished everything which depended on the will 
of a foreign Power. 

Ibid. May 20. 

The Prince Royal seemed to wish to conclude peace with England when 
Russia did. Thornton asked him to request the Russian Government to 
send full powers for that purpose. The Prince said that Russia, having been 
the aggressor, owed it to England to make a simple peace, preliminary to 
any other arrangement. 

Ibid. May 30. 

Thornton describes the alleged negotiations at Paris up to May 11 
between Kurakin and Due de Bassano before the former left Paris on May 9. 
He thinks they do not impeach the good faith of the Emperor Alexander ; 



598 NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDEN AND RUSSIA 

but Romanzoff had culpably suppressed news of them towards Sweden, 
with whom Russia had just framed a close alliance, and towards England 
"to whom the Court of Russia had made an overture of alliance six days 
before orders were despatched to M. de Kurakin to deliver the Note which 
is the subject of this despatch." On May 6, Kurakin presented a memorial 
so as to elicit a precise answer from the French Government and stated 
that the departure of M. Lauriston from St Petersburg would be regarded 
as a declaration of war, in which case he [Kurakin] would also demand his 
passports. Nevertheless Bonaparte gave no answer and left for Dresden, 
leaving Kurakin in uncertainty. 

[Separate. Secret and confidential.] Ibid. May 31. 

The Prince Royal confidentially urged him to warn Admiral Saumarez 
that a Swedish squadron of eight sail-of-line and five frigates would leave 
Carlscrona and cruise off Riigen and Pomerania and begs him to warn 
Saumarez so that there may be no collision. Thornton views this act as 
implying great confidence in Great Britain, with whom Sweden is still 
nominally at war. 

[Private and separate.] Ibid. June 6. 

In pursuance of Castlereagh's despatch of May 22 he requested a private 
interview with Prince Royal, who was very pleased with it. But he dis- 
trusted the Russian Minister exceedingly, especially RomanzofFs recent 
offer to France to continue all the measures of the Continental System 
(which were annulled by the recent Russo- Swedish alliance). Prince Royal 
thought that Bonaparte would attack the Russian centre, occupy Vilna, 
and then fall on the Russian coast. He hopes to begin the war in July. 

[Secret.] Ibid. June 24. 

A Russian messenger had just arrived with dispatches for General van 
Suchtelen, with full powers to conclude peace with England. But instead 
of signing a peace pur et simple, as agreed, Romanzoff now sent a treaty 
burdened with conditions, e.g. that Great Britain assume the Dutch debt, 
and shall have previously signed a treaty with Sweden both of peace and 
for subsidies (a condition which Sweden had waived!). Thornton was 
indignant and said such a treaty would never be agreed to: thus a fresh 
delay, of three weeks, is incurred, which is according to RomanzofFs 
desire to postpone action. 

Ibid. June 24. 

Engestrom assured Thornton that he had never urged the Russian 
Government to annex those conditions to a peace with England and 
Sweden. Thornton begged an interview with the Prince Royal and had 
to-day seen him ;for affairs now depend on him. He pressed him to urge the 
Russian Government to give up those conditions: and the Prince proved 
by letters that he had done all he could in that direction. The Emperor of 
Russia had said he expected war with France almost at once for the French 
were on his frontier. The Prince Royal then urged the extreme importance 
of receiving some help from England, e.g. £1,000 000 for one year, paid 



APPENDIX G 599 

monthly. Thornton said this would never be entertained as part of the 
Treaty of Peace with England, but might possibly be afterwards. The 
Prince assented to this form. Sweden could not go on arming if a Treaty 
of Peace with England were made, without further stipulations which 
would satisfy the Diet respecting Norway. 

Ibid. July 4. 

News that the French crossed the Niemen and so began the war without 
cause alleged. The casus foederis now arises for Sweden and Russia and 
Suchtelen is ordered to place himself under the orders of the Prince Royal 
so as to arrange the "attack on Island of Zealand and the consequent 
annexation of Norway to the Swedish Crown, the preliminary measure 
to the active co-operation of Sweden on the Continent." Thornton asks 
for guidance, especially as to the action of the British fleet in Baltic. The 
Archangel squadron will probably come to the Baltic and should be treated 
by Saumarez with the utmost forbearance. 

Ibid. July 18. 

He has now signed the two treaties of peace with Sweden and Russia, 
and will at once inform Saumarez. The Swedish and Russian plenipo- 
tentiaries then communicated the Russo-Swedish Treaty of Alliance, 
offensive and defensive, of April 1812, with the separate and secret articles, 
and (on the wish of the Prince Royal) urged Thornton to send it to England 
to invite the British Government to accede to it. He agreed, suggesting a 
change of procedure. One of the articles of the Russo-Swedish Treaty ran : 
In case of war taking place, H.M. the Emperor of all the Russias, and H.M. 
the King of Sweden will invite by common consent the King of the United 
Kingdom to accede as apartie integrante to this Treaty of Alliance, offensive 
and defensive, and to guarantee its different stipulations. 

Ibid. July 30. 
Sweden and Russia had decided that, when matters were duly arranged, 
joint invitations should be sent to Denmark for her accession to the 
Alliance, in which case she should acquire an indemnity. 

[For further despatches of Thornton to Castlereagh see Castlereagh Mems., 
vol. vm. pp. 283 et seq.] 



APPENDIX H 

EXTRACTS FROM STRATFORD CANNING'S 
DESPATCHES FROM CONSTANTINOPLE, 1812 1 

Feb. 21. 
". . .As soon as the deliberations of the Grand Council [at Constan- 
tinople] were closed I sent. . .to tell the Reis Effendi that I trusted every 
effort consistent with the dignity, and every concession not incompatible 

1 These are supplementary to those printed in S . Lane-Poole's Life of Stratford 
Canning, vol. 1. ch. 4. For affairs at Constantinople see ante, pp. 386-90. 



600 DESPATCHES FROM CONSTANTINOPLE 

with the safety, of the Empire would be made for the restoration of peace 
at the present crisis, and that in order to give a striking proof of H.M.'s 
sincere regard for the Porte I was ready to lend every assistance in my power 
towards the accomplishment of so desirable an object; in short that I 
would write to Russia in compliance with the wishes of the Porte. The Reis 
Effendi expressed the highest satisfaction at this and requested that I 
would do so without loss of time." 

March n. 

French efforts to court the Turks. Ill effects of the long silence of 
H.M.'s Government to the Porte. 

March 17. 

Full powers given to the Grand Vizier to make peace with Russia on 
the best terms that can be obtained. Probably due to fear of reconciliation 
between France and Russia. 

April 12. 

Constant but fruitless intrigues of French ; but at last a conference is 
arranged. Their disclosure of treaty between Austria and France shows 
lengths they are prepared to go. Mission from Sweden has a good effect. 
He has used the disclosure of Austrian plan against Turkey with effect. 

April 21. 
Communication of the treaty between Austria and France, with offer 
of help against Russia. Fear of peace not being made before the war in 
the North begins. The French are making every possible exertion. 

April 25. 
Strictures on the shameful part played by Austria. The Turks fear 
that peace with Russia may involve them in war with France. 

May 5. 
General Andreossi on the way as ambassador of France to Porte. His 
departure concealed even from the Turkish charge d'affaires at Paris. 

Canning to Italinsky [at Bukharest]. 

June 5. 
About Persia. Importance of peace between Russia and Porte. Two 
difficulties, (1) the alliance proposed with Russia, (2) the demand for 
certain establishments at the mouth of the Phase, with communication with 
the Russian army in Georgia. Repugnance of Porte to the first. Trusts 
this may not prove a reason for refusing to sign the treaty. (3) The system 
of the Cabinet of Russia since four years has sown the greatest mistrust 
everywhere, and nowhere more than here. "Cette mefiance diminue a 
mesure qu'on s'ecarte de la connection sinistre qui a servi de base au 
systeme auquel je fais allusion. Pour la deraciner entierement, la Russie 
doit d'abord prouver par sa conduite que ce systeme a deja cesse d'exister. 
Elle a fait vers cet objet un pas tres considerable par la modification 
genereuse de ses premieres pretensions. Mais pour y atteindre tout a 
fait il faut porter encore plus loin la generosite.. . .Jamais la Porte ne se 



APPENDIX H 601 

fiera cordialement a la loyaute de la Russie tant que celle-ci insiste sur 
une condition dont le but, dans son opinion, ne peut etre que de faire du 
mal a la Perse." 

Same to Same. 

June 7. 
Thanks for receiving Gordon 1 . 

Italinsky to Canning. 

May 19, N.S. 
On his arrival and state of the negotiations. Ready to correspond with 
him. Need for swift action to counteract the seductions of France. 

Gordon to Canning. 

[Bukharest], June 12. 

Journey to Bukharest. Arrived 9 May and was conducted to Italinsky. 
Gave him the two letters. " His first observation was that the information 
with respect to the measures of the Court of Vienna was very important, as 
he believed that at the moment the Austrian Cabinet held with that of 
Russia a quite different language. This information, I have good reason 
to believe, he had already received from another quarter, to which, however, 
he did not perhaps attach much credit. 

" He remarked that he believed the Emperor of Austria to be personally 
averse to such measures, but that his Minister 2 was very much a French- 
man.. . .1 endeavoured to impress him with an idea that the Turks were 
making formidable preparations, but he cut me short by answering that, 
let them make what preparations they would, this could not be formidable 
to the Russians, and that the only disadvantageous circumstance attending 
the war with them was that a body of troops was kept in the provinces 
which might undoubtedly be of much more use elsewhere. Nothing more 
took place at the time except that he expressed his gratitude to you for 
the information. 

" On the same day I had audience of the Commander-in-Chief, General 
Kutusoff . He only asked one question : Whether I thought the Porte was 
more disposed to connect itself with France than to be on terms of friend- 
ship with England and Russia. I replied that I thought the true interest 
of the Turks was to preserve a strict neutrality ; but I did not think they 
were disposed to purchase peace by any considerable concessions.... 
The General apologised for not seeing me more at his table, but the 
French consul was very suspicious and had remonstrated on my arrival. 
I saw Italinsky almost every one of the seven days of my stay. At first 
he said Russia was very moderate and could not become more so. Her 
present demands were lower by one half than those she had at first insisted 
on, and the Court was surprised at having moderation still recommended 
to it. He showed me a letter of Count Romanzoff expressing the hope for 

1 S. Canning despatched to Bukharest a Scottish traveller, Mr Gordon, to warn 
the Russian plenipotentiary, Italinsky, of a proposal for a joint Austro-Franco- 
Turkish attack on Russia (S. Lane-Poole, 1. 169). 

2 Metternich. 



602 DESPATCHES FROM CONSTANTINOPLE 

cordial relations with the Court of St James, and approving of the corres- 
pondence with you, charging him to cultivate and continue it. At first he 
said that the articles most obnoxious to the Porte had been dropped. Later 
he expressed chagrin at the negotiations being so much protracted, but 
he hoped for a favourable conclusion. He complained of the obstruction 
of the Turks. In the end they would pay very dear for the delay. By this 
I understood him to mean they would become the victims of French 
success." 

On the eve of my departure he communicated to me, for your in- 
formation, the state of the negotiations. In Europe the line of the Pruth 
as boundary. Difficulties about the fort of Ismail, but this rather a point 
of honour; not essential. Russians abandon all claim for contribution in 
money. Russians concede all conquests in Asia. Commissioners to decide 
about province of Imeritia. Desire for connection with Georgia from 
Black Sea, to avoid Caucasus. He said it would be impolitic of the Turks 
to drive the Servians to despair, as they were a warlike nation and, if re- 
duced to extremity, would certainly throw themselves into the arms of 
Austria. Not Russian intrigues but Turkish oppression caused revolts. 
The Russians could not make concessions about Moldavia and Wallachia 
without loss of honour. The Russian Government will not connect the 
affairs of the Turks and Persians or include the latter in this treaty. 

" Italinsky concluded by pressing me, as he had frequently done before, 
earnestly to entreat you to accelerate by your good offices the successful 
issue of the Congress ; in particular to mollify the Porte on the disputed 
point of Ismail, which seemed to be the principal difficulty; and it was 
plain from his conversation that he considered you as united in a common 
cause. He at the same time gave me positive assurances that the Russians, 
so far from having the design to destroy the Ottoman Empire, were rather 
anxious for its preservation, being well assured that it was impossible for 
them to have more quiet or less formidable neighbours. He commended 
Ghalib Effendi, but said the Grand Vizier was obstructing, from enmity 
to Ghalib. 

" He appeared anxious to impress on my mind that the principal reason 
for the Russians wishing for peace was that they might be enabled to turn 
the services of their army in the Provinces (consisting of at least 22,000 
good troops) to a quarter where they would be of great utility. He added 
that the Austrians had given an intimation that, were the peace once con- 
cluded, they might perhaps be enabled to preserve their neutrality. Some 
conversation also about Persia. Italinsky asked me if I thought peace with 
Persia could be easily brought about. I said, No. War had advantages for 
the Persians and the Russian's demands were high. He answered that his 
Court wished sincerely for peace in that quarter. 

"I tried to elicit information about the relations between France and 
Russia, but he did not seem desirous of explaining himself fully. Russia 
would not consent to observe Bonaparte's Continental System, as war with 
England was not only ruinous to its finances, but also, when carried on at 
the command of France, degrading to its dignity." 



BIBLIOGRAPHIES 



I. INTRODUCTION 

UNDER this head, no attempt has been made to accompany the Intro- 
ductory Sketch of British Foreign Policy before 1783 with a consecutive 
list of historical works illustrating its course. For these, including both 
contemporary and secondary authorities, the reader is referred to the 
bibliographies of Chapters dealing with the Foreign Policy of England or 
Great Britain in the Cambridge Medieval and Modern History and in 
Lavisse and Rambaud's Histoire Generate . The present Bibliography 
contains only the names of works which have been used in the com- 
position of the Introductory Chapter to this work, or which bear directly 
upon events and transactions specially noticed in it, or on their con- 
nexion with general features or points to which it refers in summarising 
the earlier course of our foreign policy. For a list designed to include 
references to all important bodies of material for the diplomatic history of 
England, from 1509 to 1783, referred to in the Reports of the Historical 
Manuscripts Commission, and in the Catalogue of the Manuscripts at the 
British Museum, see Appendix II to Eighteenth Report of the Royal Com- 
mission on Historical Manuscripts , by Miss Frances Davenport, presented 
to Parliament 19 17. 

Annual Register, the, 1758-83. Index, 1758-1819. 

Armstrong, Edward. Elizabeth Farnese, 'The Termagant of Spain.' 1892. 

The Emperor Charles V. 2 vols. 1902. 

Arneth,AlfredRittervon. Geschichte Maria-Theresias. iovols. Vienna, 1863-1879. 

[Vols. IV to VI : 1748-1763.] 
Ballantyne, A. Lord Carteret, a political biography, 1690— 1763. 1887. 
Bedford, John, Fourth Duke of, Correspondence of. With an Introduction by 

Lord John Russell. 3 vols. 1842-1846. 
Blok, P. J. History of the People of the Netherlands. Tr. by O. A. Bierstadt and 

R.Putnam. 5 vols. New York, 1898-1912. [Vols. 1-11, to 1559; III, to 1621 ; 

iv, to William III; v, 18th and 19th centuries.] 
Bourgeois, fimile. La Diplomatic Secrete au i8me Siecle. Paris, n.d. [The Regent 

Orleans, Alberoni, and Dubois: 1716-1723.] 
Manuel Historique de Politique Etrangere. 2nd edn. Vol. I. Paris, 1897. 

Les Origines. [From Richelieu to 1789; esp. Chap, v: L'Angleterre au dix- 

septieme siecle, and Chap, xi : La fondation de l'empire Anglais au dix-huitieme 

siecle.] 
Brewer, John Sherren. The Reign of Henry VIII to the death of Wolsey. Ed. 

J. Gairdner. 2 vols. 1884. 
Broglie, J. V. Albert, Due de. La Paix dAix-la-Chapelle. Paris, 1895. 
L Alliance Autrichienne. Paris, 1895. These two works form part of Histoire 

de la politique exterieure de Louis XV, 1741-1756. 10 vols. Paris, 1883-1889. 



6o 4 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

Brosch, M. Geschichte von England. Vols. vi-x. (Gesch. der europ. Staaten.) 

Gotha, 1 892-1 897. [From 1509.] 
Burrows, Montagu. History of the Foreign Policyof Great Britain. Edinburgh, 1895. 
Busch, W. Drei Jahre englischer Vermittlungspolitik, 1518-1521. Bonn, 1884. 

Wolsey und die englisch-kaiserliche Allianz, 1522-1525. Bonn, 1886. 

Cecil, Algernon. The Life of Robert Cecil, First Earl of Salisbury. 1915. 
Chance, J. F. George I and the Northern War. A Study of British-Hanoverian 

Policy in the North of Europe in the years 1709 to 1721. 1909. [Indispensable 

for this subject.] 
Clement, P. Histoire de la Vie et de I'Administration de Colbert. Paris, 1846. 

[Esp. Chap, xv : Commercial relations with England, 1655-1677.J 
Corbett, Sir Julian Stafford. Drake and the Tudor Navy; with History of the Rise 

of England as a Maritime Power. 2 vols. 1898. 
England in the Mediterranean: British power within the Straits, 1603-17 13. 

2 vols. 1904. 

England in the Seven Years' War. 2 vols. 1907. 

Coxe, William. Memoirs of the Life of Sir Robert Walpole (Earl of Orford). 
New edn. 4 vols. 1816. 

Diplomatic Relations of England with France and Germany. Edited by C. H. Firth. 
Lists of Ambassadors from England to France, and from France to England, 
1603-1688. Compiled by C. H. Firth and S. C. Lomas. Oxford, 1906. List 
of Diplomatic Representatives and Agents, England and North Germany, 
1689-1727. Contributed by J. F. Chance. Oxford, 1907. List of Diplomatic 
Representatives and Agents, 1 689-1763. Contributed by L. G.Wickham Legg. 
Oxford, 1909. 

Droysen, J. G. Geschichte der preussischen Politik. 5 parts in 14 vols. Part v, 
Friedrich der Grosse. Berlin, 1855-1886. 2nd edn. Vols. i-iv. Berlin, 1 868-1 872. 

Dupuis, Charles. Le Principe d'fiquilibre et le Concert Europeen de la Paix de 
Westphalie a l'Acte d'Algeciras. Paris, 1909. 

Egerton, Hugh Edward. A Short History of British Colonial Policy, 1569-1713. 1897. 

British Foreign Policy in Europe to the end of the 19th century 1917. [Of 

this outline Chaps. 11 and m deal with the period 1 570-1 789.J 

England, History of. Vols, iv-vi. Edited by C. W. C. Oman. 1905-1911. 
Vol. IV. England under the Tudors. By A. D. Innes. 
Vol. V. England under the Stuarts. By G. M. Trevelyan. 
Vol. VI. England under the Hanoverians. By C. Grant Robertson. 
[Contain useful bibliographies.] 

Firth, Charles Harding. The Last Years of the Protectorate, 1656-1658. 2 vols. 1909. 

The Study of British Foreign Policy. Quarterly Review, October 1916. 

[England's traditional foreign policy.] 

Gaedeke, A. Die Politik Oesterreichs in der Spanischen Erbfolgefrage. 2 vols. 

Leipzig, 1877. 
Gardiner, Samuel Rawson. History of England from the Accession of James I 

to the outbreak of the Civil War. 10 vols. 1885-1900. 
History of the Great Civil War. 4 vols. 1901. 

History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649-1656. New edn. 4 vols. 

i9°3- 

Hanotaux, Gabriel. Etudes historiques sur le xvi me et le xvn me siecle en France. 
1886. 

Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu. Vols. 1 and 11 (-1617). Paris, 1893-1896. 

Heatley, D. P. Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations. Oxford, 

1919. [Bibliographically serviceable as to particular subjects: The Sovereignty 
of the Sea ; the Literature of Recent British Diplomacy.] 
Hill, D. J. A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe. 

3 vols. 1905-1914. 

Vol. I. The Struggle for Universal Empire. 

Vol. 11. The Establishment of Territorial Sovereignty. 

Vol. in. The Diplomacy of the Age of Absolutism. 



BIBLIOGRAPHIES 605 

Hotblack, K. Chatham's Colonial Policy. 1917. 

Hunt, W. The History of England from the accession of George III to the close 

of Pitt's first administration. (The Political History of England, vol. X.) IQ05- 
Immich, M. Geschichte des Europaischen Staatensystems von 1660-1789. Munich, 

1905. 
Jones, Guernsey. The Beginnings of the Oldest European Alliance. Washington, 

19 19. [England and Portugal.] 
Klopp, Onno. Der Fall des Hauses Stuart und die Succession des Hauses Hannover 

in Gross-Britannien u. Irland. 14 vols. Vienna, 1875-1888. [1660-1714.] 
Lange, C. L. Histoire de l'lnternationalisme. Vol. 1. Christiania, 1919. [iv. 2: 

La Paix universelle du 2 Oct. 15 18.] 
Lavisse, Ernest. Histoire de France, jusqu'a la Revolution. 9 vols. [Each in 

2 parts; esp. from vol. vn onwards.] Paris, I90i-[i9ii]. 
Leadam, I. S. The History of England, 1702-1760. (The Political History of 

England, vol. IX.) 1909. 
Lecky, W. E. H. Hisjtory of England in the Eighteenth Century. 8 vols. 1878- 

1890. [Vols, i-vi.] 
Legg, L. G. Wickham. Matthew Prior: A Study of his Public Career and Corres- 
pondence. Cambridge, 1922. 
Legrelle, A. La Diplomatic Francaise et la Succession d'Espagne. 2nd edn. 

[1659-1725.] 6 vols. Braine-le-Compte, 1895-1899. 
Lord, W. F. England and France in the Mediterranean, 1660-1830. 1901. 
Mahan, A. T. Influence of Sea-Power upon History. 9th edn. [1890.] 
Malmesbury, James Harris, first Earl of. Diaries and Correspondence, containing 

account of his missions to Madrid, Frederick the Great, Catharine II and the 

Hague, etc. Ed. by the third Earl. 4 vols. 1844. 
Marcks, Erich. Deutschland und England in den grossen Europaischen Krisen 

seit der Reformation. Stuttgart, 1900. 
Die Einheitlichkeit der Englischen Auslandspolitik von 1500 bis zur Gegen- 

wart. Stuttgart, 1910. 
Michael, Wolfgang. Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Vols. 1 

and 11, Part 1 [to 1720]. Hamburg u. Leipzig, 1896-1920. [The retrospective 

are not the least valuable portions of this important work.] 
Pollard, A. F. History of England, 1547-1603. (Political History of England, 

vol. vi.) 19 10. 
Preuss, G. T. Wilhelm von England und das Haus Wittelsbach im Zeitalter der 

Spanischen Erbfolgefrage. Vol. I, Part 1. Breslau, 1904. [General survey of 

relations between England and France in 17th century.] 
Ranke, L. von. History of England, principally in the Seventeenth Century. 

[English Translation.] 6 vols. Oxford, 1875. 

Der Ursprung des siebenjahrigen Krieges. Leipzig, 1871. 

Reynald, H. La Succession d'Espagne, Louis XIV et Guillaume III. 2 vols. 

Paris, 1883. 
Rosebery, Earl of. Chatham: his Early Life and Connexions. 1910. 

Pitt. (Twelve English Statesmen.) 1891. 

Rousset, Camille F. M. Histoire de Louvois et de son Administration. 4 vols. 

Paris, 1 862-1 863. 
Russell, Earl. The Foreign Policyof England, 1570-1870. An historical essay. 1871. 
Ruville, A. von. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. Tr. by H. J. Chaytor and 

M. Morison, with Introd. by H. E. Egerton. 3 vols. 1907. 
Satow, Sir E. A Guide to Diplomatic Practice. 2 vols. 1917. 
Seeley, Sir J. R. The Expansion of England. 1883 and later editions. 
The Growth of British Policy. 2 vols. Cambridge, 1895. [From Elizabeth 

to William III.] 
Sorel, Albert. L 'Europe et la Revolution francaise. Vol. 1. 2nd edn. Paris, 1907. 

La Question de l'Orient au i8 me siecle. 2nd edn. Paris, 1889. 

Stanhope, Earl of. History of England; comprising the reign of Anne until the 

Peace of Utrecht, 1701-1713. 4th edn. 2 vols. 1872. 



606 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

Stanhope, Earl of. History of England from the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace of 

Versailles, 1713-1783. 5th edn. 7 vols. 1858. 
Temperley, Gladys. Henry VII. (Kings and Queens of England.) 1914. 
Teulet, J. B. A. T. Relations politiques de la France et de l'Espagne avec l'Ecosse 

au i6 me siecle. New edn. 5 vols. Paris, 1862. 
Torrens, M'Cullagh. The Industrial History of Free Nations, considered in rela- 
tion to their domestic institutions and external policy. 2 vols. 1896. [Esp. 

vol. 11: The Dutch.] 
Waddington, Richard. Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances. Paris, 1896. 
La Guerre de Sept Ans. Histoire Diplomatique et Militaire. 5 vols. Paris, 

n. d. [To 1762.] 
Waliszewski, K. Le Roman d'une Imp^ratrice: Catherine II de Russie. Chap. Ill : 

Politique Ext£rieure. Paris, 1893. 
Ward, Sir A. W. Great Britain and Hanover. Some Aspects of the Personal Union. 

(Ford Lectures.) Oxford, 1899. 
Weber, O. Der Friede von Utrecht. Verhandlungen zw. England, Frankreich, 

dem Kaiser u. d. Generalstaaten, 1710-1713. Gotha, 1891. 
Williams, A. F. Basil. The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. 2 vols. 1913. 
Winstanley, D. A. Lord Chatham and the Whig Opposition. Cambridge, 1912. 



II. CHAPTERS I— V 

In the following Bibliographies a general reference is in each case 
made to the Bibliographies of Chapters dealing with Britain in the 
Cambridge Modern History; but the titles of the works mentioned in 
these are not repeated. Titles of works mentioned in Sections A or B 
of the following Bibliographies are not repeated in later Sections. Col- 
lections of State Papers and Manuscript Sources are referred to in the 
notes to the text. 

CHAPTER I 

Pitt's First Decade 

See Bibliography to Chap, x of vol. vm of The Cambridge Modern History (1904). 

A. General 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America from... September 1783 

to March 1789. 7 vols. Washington, 1833-1834. 
Heigel, K. T. Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen. Vol. 1. 

Stuttgart, 1899. 
Leckv, W. E. H. History of England in the Eighteenth Century. Vols, iv-vi. 

(2nd edn.) 1887. 
Sagnac, P. La Revolution francaise, 1789-1792. (Vol. 11 of Lavisse, E., Histoire 

de France contemporaine.) Paris. 
Sorel, A. L'Europe et la Revolution Francaise. Vol. 1. (1st edn.) Paris, 1885. 

(Revised edn., 6 vols. Paris, 1897.) 

B. Special 
Bloch, C. Le Traite" de Commerce de 1786, in fitudes sur 1'histoire economique 

de la France. Paris, 1900. 
Burke, E. Correspondence. Ed. by Earl Fitzwilliam and Sir R. Bourke. 4 vols. 

1884. 
Butenval. Precis... dutrait£de commerce... signe...le 26 septembre 1786. Paris, 1869. 
Clapham, J. H. The causes of the war of 1792. Cambridge, 1898. 



BIBLIOGRAPHIES 607 

Clausewitz. Der Feldzug des Herzogs von Braunschweig von 1787. In Hinterlassene 
Werke. Leipzig, 1837. 

Doniol, H. Politiques d'autrefois. Le comte de Vergennes et P. M. Hennin. 
Paris, 1898. 

Franklin, B. Memoirs of the life and writings of B. F. written by himself and con- 
tinued by his grandson W. F. Franklin. London, 18 18. 

Geffroy, G. Gustave III et la Cour de France. Paris, 1878. 

Pallain, E. La mission de Talleyrand a Londres en 1792. Paris, 1889. 

Rose, J. Holland. The Franco-British Commercial Treaty of 1786. English Histori- 
cal Review, 1908. 

The Mission of William Grenville to the Hague and Versailles in 1787. Eng. 

Hist. Review, 1909. 

Pitt and the Triple Alliance. Edinburgh Review, 1910. 

William Pitt and National Revival. William Pitt and the Great War. 191 1. 

The Comte d'Artois and Pitt in December 1789. Eng. Hist. Review, 1915. 

Salomon, Felix. William Pitt der jungere. Erster Band, bis zum Ausgang der 
Friedensperiode. Leipzig and Berlin, 1906. 

Wolf, A. Leopold II und Marie Christine. Ihr Briefwechsel, 1781-1792. Vienna, 
1867. 

CHAPTERS II and III 

The Struggle with Revolutionary France and 

the Contest with Napoleon 

See Bibliographies in vols. VIII and IX of The Cambridge Modern History (1904 

and 1907). 
Adams, E. D. The Influence of Grenville on Pitt's Foreign Policy (1787-1798). 

Washington, 1904. 
(/'' Aulard, A. fitudes et Lecons sur la Revolution francaise. 7 vols. Paris, 1893-1913. 
Ballot, C. Le Coup d'fitat de Fructidor: Documents. Paris, 1906. 

Les Negotiations de Lille (1797). Paris, 1910. 

4 Basham (Lord), Letters of. 3 vols. London, Navy Records Society, 1906-1910. 
Blease, W. L. Suvorof. London, 1920. 

Brodrick, G. C. Political History of England. Vol. xi (1801-1837). London, 1906. 
Caudrillier. La Trahison de Pichegru. Paris, 1908. 
Channing, E. The American Nation. A History (ed. by A. B. Hart); vol. xn. The 

Jeffersonian System (1801-1811). New York and London, 1906. 
Chuquet, A. La Guerre de Russie. Notes et Documents. 3 vols. Paris, 1912. 
Colenbrander, H. T. Ed. Gedenkstukken der algemeene Geschiednis von Nederland 

1795-1840. The Hague, 1905. 
Cunningham, A. British Credit in the last Napoleonic War. Cambridge, 1910. 
Driault, E. La Politique exterieure du Premier Consul (1800-1803). Paris, 1910. 

Austerlitz (La Fin du Saint-Empire), 1804-1806. Paris, 1912. 

Tilsit (La Question de Pologne, 1 806-1 809). Paris, 1917. 

Les dernieres Theses d'Histoire sur la Politique exterieure de Napoleon. 

Paris, 1919. 
/ Dropmore Papers, The. The MSS. of J. B. Fortescue of Dropmore (Hist. MSS. 

Commiss.). 7 vols. Vols, ii-vii (1894-1910). 
Duboscq, A. Louis Bonaparte en Hollande d'apres ses Lettres, 1806-1810. Paris, 

1911. 
Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army. Vols. i-x. 1899-1920. 

British Statesmen of the Great War (1793-1814). Oxford, 191 1. 

Fortescue, J. B. See Dropmore Papers. 

Guyot, R. Le Directoire et la Paix de l'Europe (1795-1799). Paris, 1911. 

Handelsman, M. Napoleon et la Pologne (1806-1807). Paris, 1909. 

Hart, A. B. See Channing. 

Holland (Lady), Journal of (1791-1811); ed. by Lord Ilchester. 2 vols. 1909. 

The Spanish Journal of; ed. by Lord Ilchester. 1910. 



608 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

Huffer, H. Quellen zur Geschichte des Zeitalters der franzdsischen Revolution. 

Pt. II. Vol. i. Ed. by F. Luckwaldt. Innsbruck, 1907. 
Hunt, W. Political History of England. Vol. x (1760-1801). 1905. 
La Forrest, Comte de, Correspondance de. 7 vols. Paris, 1905-1913. 
Luckwaldt, F. See Hiiffer. 

Mathiez, A. fitudes Robespierristes. Paris, 1917. 
Melvin, F. E. Napoleon's Navigation System. New York, 1919. 
Oman, C. A History of the Peninsular War. 5 vols. Oxford. 1902-1914. 
Pariset, G. La Revolution francaise (1792-1799 and 1799-1815). (Vols. 11 and m 

of Lavisse, E., Histoire de la France contemporaine.) Paris, 1920 and 1921. 
Peez, A. and Dehn, P. England's Vorherrschaft, aus der Zeit der Kontinental- 

sperre. Leipzig, 191 2. 
Piggott, F. and Omond, G. W. T. Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities 

of 1780 and 1800. London, 1919. 
Robertson, C. Grant. England under the Hanoverians. (Vol. vi of History of 

England, ed. by C. W. C. Oman.) 191 1. 
Rose, J. Holland. Life of William Pitt. Pts. I and 11. 1911. 

Pitt and Napoleon : Essays and Letters. 191 2. 

Nationality as a Factor in Modern History. 1916. 

Scott, J. B.? The Armed Neutrality of 1780 and 18 10 (Carnegie Series). New 

York, 1918. 
Sichel, W. Life of Sheridan. 2 vols. 1909. 
Spencer Papers, The (1794-1801). (Private Papers of the second Earl Spencer.) 

2 vols. Edited by J. S. Corbett. Navy Records Society, 191 3. 
Temperley, H. W. V. George Canning. 1905. 
Trevelyan, G. M. Life of Lord Grey. 1920. 

Vogel, W. Die Hansestadte und die Kontinentalsperre. Munich and Leipzig, 191 3. 
Wellesley Papers, The. (Papers of Marquis Wellesley.) 2 vols. 1914. 
Windham Papers, The. (Introd. by the Earl of Rosebery.) 2 vols. 1913. 

CHAPTER IV 
The Pacifications of Europe, 1813-1815 
See Bibliographies in vol. ix of The Cambridge Modern History (1907). 

Antioche, Comte de. Chateaubriand, Ambassadeur a Londres. (Correspondence 

of Comte de la Chastre, 1814-1815). Paris, 191 2. 
Colenbrander, H.T. De Belgische Ontwentelung. The Hague. 1905. 
Confalonieri, F., Carteggio del. Part 1. [Conversations with Castlereagh at Paris, 

1814.] Milan, -1910. 
Edgcumbe, R. Diary of Frances Lady Shelley, 1787-1817. 1912. 
Fisher, H. A. L. Bonapartism. Oxford, 1908. 

Napoleon. 1913. 

Fournier , A . Die Geheim -Polizei auf dem Wiener Kongress . Vienna and Leipzig, 1 9 1 3 . 

Halevy, E. Histoire du Peuple Anglais. Vol. 1. Paris, 191 2. 

MacCunn, F. J. The Contemporary English view of Napoleon. 1914. 

Masson, F. Napoleon a St Helene. Paris, 1912. 

Maycock. The invasion of France, 1814. 1814. 

Mikhailowitch, Grand Duke Nicholas. Correspondance de 1'Empereur Alexandre 

I er avec sa sceur, la Grande Duchesse Catharine. Petrograd, 1912. (Diary of 

Princess Lieven in 191 2.) 
Phillips, W. A. The Confederation of Europe. 2nd edn. 1920. 
Rain, P. L'Europe et la Restauration des Bourbons, 1814-1818. Paris, 1908. 
Runciman, Sir Walter. The tragedy of St Helena. 191 1 . 
Ward, Sir A. The Period of the Congresses. Vols. 1 and 11. 1919. 
Webster, C. K. The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815. 1919. 
British Diplomacy, 1813-1815. 1921. 



BIBLIOGRAPHIES 609 

Weigal, Rachel. Correspondence of Lord Burghersh, 1 808-1 840. 1912. 
Weil, M. H. Joachim Murat, Roi de Naples. 5 vols. Paris, 1909-1910. 

Les Dessous du Congres de Vienne. 2 vols. Paris, 1917. 

Articles: 

Escoffier, M. La Restauration, l'Angleterre et les Colonies. Revue d'histoire 

diplomatique. 1907. 
Omond, G. W. T. Our War Aims in 18 14 — and to-day. Nineteenth Century 

and After. March, 191 8. 
Webster, C. K. Some Aspects of Castlereagh's Foreign Policy. Transactions 
of the Royal Historical Society, III, VI. 1912. 

England and the Polish-Saxon Problem at the Congress of Vienna. 

Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, in, vn. 1913. 



CHAPTER V 

The American War and the Peace of Ghent 
See Bibliographies in vol. vn of The Cambridge Modern History (1907). 

Gallatin, Count (Ed.). A Great Peace Maker. The Diary of James Gallatin. 

1914. 
Perris, H. S. A short History of Anglo-American Relations and of the Hundred 

Years' Peace. 19 14. 
Smith, T. C. The Wars between England and America. 1915. 
Updyke, F. A. The Diplomacy of the War of 1812. Baltimore, 191 5. 
Wood, W. (Ed.). Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812. Vol. I, 

(In progress.) Toronto, 1920. 

Article: 

Ford, W. The British Ghent Commission. Transactions of the Massachusetts 
Historical Society. December 1914 — January 191 5. 



39 



INDEX 



Abercrombie, Sir Ralph, 296, 299 
Aberdeen, George H. Gordon, Earl of, 

329, 396, 408-38, 455-6, 462 
Acadia, n, 50 
A'Court, William (Lord Heytesbury), 

327, 380, 457, 459, 485, 490 
Acre, 298 
Act of Settlement, 44, 49 

— of Union with Scotland, 44 
Acton, Lord (cited), 9, 30 

Acton, Sir J. F. E., 238, 288, 327, 349 
Adair, Sir Robert, 371, 386-7 
Adams, John (President, U.S.A.), 138, 
150 ff. 

— John Quincy (President, U.S.A.), 
530, 531 ff. 

— William, 534 

Addington, H. ; see Sidmouth, Lord 
Addington Ministry, the, 299-330 
Addison, Joseph, 60 
Adriatic Sea, the, 273, 493 
Africa, 138 

Ainslie, Sir Robert, 174, 183, 222 
Aix, Isle of, battle of, 90 
Aix-la-Chapelle, Conferences at (1748), 
9i 

— Peace of (1668), 31 

— Peace of (1748), 90-4, 96, 97; 103; 
115, 250, 275, 309 

Aland Isles, 72, 73 

Albania, 316, 329, 332 

Albany (U.S.A.), Congress at (1754), 128 

Albemarle, Wm Anne Keppel, Earl of, 
94 

Alberoni, Giulio, Cardinal, 67 ff., 72, 80 

Alcudia, Duke of; see Godoy 

Alexander I, Tsar of Russia (Grand- 
duke), 303-4, 31 1-2, 316, 319, 320, 
324, 328, 330-60 passim, 371, 377, 
385, ch. iv passim, 534 

Alexandria, 285, 299, 305, 359 

Algeciras, action off, 304 

Aliens Bill, the (1792), 232-3 

Ali Pacha of Jannina, 388 

Alison, A., Hist . of Europe, cited, 542 

Alliances and Leagues: 

(i) Armed Neutrality (1780), 135-6, 

238, 279, 292; (1800), 300 ff. 
of Augsburg (1686), 36 
against France (1674), 33 ff. 
idem First Coalition (1793), 245, 251, 
253, 264 ff., 287, 289, 292-3, 302; 
summarised 348 ; see App. A, B, C, D 
idem Second Coalition (1799), 287, 
289, 291-6, 299, 302, 348; App. E 



Alliances and Leagues: — cont. 

idem Third Coalition (1805), 336-48, 

352; (1806-7), 356, 359 
idem Coalition of 1812, 392-3, 458,479 
idem the Grand (1702), 39, 43-4, 49 
of Hanover (1725), 80 
the Holy (1815), 492, 515 
of Nymphenburg (1741), 88 
the Perpetual (1654), 20 
the Quadruple (1718), 57, 69-72, 

78-9, 81 et al. 
— of Chaumont (1814), 444 
of the Rhine (1658), 27 
the Triple (1668), 30 ff. 

— (1717), 62, 68-9, 81 

— (1787-91), 159, 177, 179 ff., 
190-3, 203-4, 208 ff., 222, 290 

— (1795), 269-71, 277 

(ii) Anglo- Austrian (1748), 90-9; 
(1809), 372; (1813), 408-10; see 
above Coalition 

— Burgundian, 4 

— Dutch, 10; (1788), 176; see above 
Perpetual, Triple Alliance 

— French (1656), 23 ff.; (1725), 
80 ff. 

— Neapolitan, see Naples 

— Portuguese (1654), 15, 16; 54; 
see Portugal (1814), 497 

— Prussian; see Seven Years' War, 
100 ff., 112, 119 ff. 5(1788), 177-81 ; 
see above Coalition 

— Russian (1793), 238; (1795), 252; 
(1804), 326, 332 

— Spanish, 5, 7, 9, 11; (1680), 37; 
(1715), 68; (1814), 495; see Penin- 
sular War 

Austro-French (1756), 98 ff., 102 ff., 
109-13, 145, 159, 189 

— Neapolitan (1798), 287; (1815), 
490 ; see Naples 

— Russian (1747), 9°, 92; (1756-7), 
101, 109, 122, 178; (1798-9), 291, 
294 

Franco-American (1778), 133 

— Danish (1807), 365 

— Dutch(i785), 143, 163-45(1795), 
256 

— Prussian ; see Austrian Succession 
War 

— Scottish, 3 

— Spanish (1761), n8ff.; see Family 
Compact 

— Swedish (1757), 109 
Prusso-Russian (1762-4), 122 



INDEX 



611 



Alliances and Leagues: — cont. 

against Austria, 102 

idem Britain; see Armed Neutrality, 
Family Compact, Franco-American, 
etc. 

idem Prussia, 98 ff., 126 

and see Partition Treaties, Subsidy 
Treaties 
"All the Talents," Ministry of (Fox- 

Grenville Ministry), 348-59, 366, 379 
Alopeus, Prussian Ambassador, 344 
Alost, 244 
Alps, the, 265, 273 
Alquier, C.-J.-M., 327 
Alsace, 509 
Altona, 361-2 

— Agreement of, 66 
Alvensleben, Count Philip Charles von, 

181 
Amboyna, 272, 378 

America, Spanish colonies in, 43, 83; 
see West Indies 

— see Canada, North America, United 
States, etc. 

American Loyalists, the, 139 

— War with Great Britain (18 12-4), 
392, 522-41 passim; causes of, 523 ff. 

— War of Independence, 129, 131 ff. 
Amherst, William P. Amherst, Earl, 

380 
Amiens, Peace of (1802), 268, 305-8, 

309-26, 351, 360 
Amsterdam, 43; Treaty (1780) with 

U.S.A., 136; 158-9, 172, 174, 175, 

177, 255, 322, 533 
Andr£ossi, Count A.-F. de, 310, 314, 

319-20, 323, 390 
Anglo-American Commercial Treaty, 

proposal of (1784), 150-1 

— Austrian Treaty (1795), 255, App. D 

— Dutch Treaty (1788), 236, 239 

— French Commercial Treaty (1786), 
232, 234 

— Portuguese Convention (1807), 365 

— Prussian Treaty (1788), 177-81 

— Russian Commercial Treaty (1758), 
113; (1766, 1793), 177, 238 

— — Convention (1801), 304 

— — Treaty (1798), 290-1 

— Sardinian Treaty (1793), 238 
Angouleme, Louis-Antoine de Bourbon, 

Due de, 447, 513 
Anne, Queen, 44 
Ansbach, 344, 348, 350 
Anson, Admiral George, Viscount, 87 
Anstett, Baron Hans P., 468 
Antwerp, 161, 226 ff., 236, 239, 372, 

430; siege of, 434; 452, 500, 519 
Aranjuez, Treaty of (1793), 238 
Arbuthnot, Charles, 358 
Arcis-sur-Aube, battle of, 446 
Areola, battle of, 271 
Armada, the Spanish, 8 
Armfelt, Baron G. M. von, 203 



Artois, Comte de; see Charles X 

Ascham, 16 

Asia, 149 

Asiento, the, 53, 86 

Assembly of Notables, see Notables 

Asturias, 368 

Atlantic Ocean, the, 5, 265 

Auckland, William Eden, Lord, 164-70, 
175-6, 190, 198, 205 ff., 220 ff., 
corresp. with Grenville, App. A 

Augereau, P. F. C, Marshal of France, 
446 

Augsburg, Peace Congress at (1761), 
119-20 

Augustus I, King of Poland, 74 

Austerlitz, battle of, 346, 348 

Austria, House of (from 1713), 56, 57, 
69. 77. 78, 84, 90, 95-127 passim, 
144-5, J59. 161 ff., 171, 174, 178, 182, 
188, 191-215 passim, 221 ff., 236-55 
passim, 260-97 passim, 310, 333, 
335 ff., 346; (1809), 371-2; 396; and 
the Liberation War, 402 ff., 453 ; and 
the Congress of Vienna, 465 ff. et al. 

— Marie Christine of, Archduchess, 
Regent of the Netherlands, 187 

— and Two Sicilies, Defensive Treaty 
(1798), 287 

Austrian Succession, War of the, 87 

— and Russian War against Turkey, 
181 

Austro-Neapolitan Treaty (18 15), 490 

— Russian Treaty (1795), 255 
Avignon, 67, 237, 512 
Azores, the, 501 n. 

Baden, Peace of (17 14), 54, 61 
Bahamas Is., 138 

Balance of Power, 6 ; 41, 44, 46, 84, 143, 
211,250,275,309,337,464-5,511,519 
Bale, 434 

— Conferences at (1814), 434-8 

— Treaties of (1795), 254 ff., 258 
Balearic Isles, the, 353, 355 

Baltic, the, 15, 73 et al., 93, m ff., 183, 
192, 203, 299, 300, 302-3, 360; 
British trade in the, 374, 377, 384 et al. 

— Powers, the, 63, 66, 69, 75, 81, 184, 
279, 300, 304; see sub nom. 

Bar-sur-Aube, 441 

Barham, Admiral Sir Charles Middle- 
ton, Lord, 359 

Baring, Alexander (1st Baron Ash- 
burton), 531, 533, 540 

— Sir Francis, 374-5 
Barnave, Antoine-P.-J.-M., 199 
Barras, Paul F.-J.-N. de, 282 

Barrier Towns, the Dutch-Belgic, 43, 
45; 57. 9 1 . 93; revived, 239-40; for 
Austria, 249-50, 275; system of, 410, 
424, 430, 434, 452, 509 

— Treaties, the Dutch, 54-7; 1st 
(1709), 46; 2nd (1713) and 3rd (1715). 
56, 62; dropped, 160 

39—2 



6l2 



INDEX 



Bartenstein, Treaty of (1807), 356 
Barthelemy, Francois, Marquis of, 167, 

254, 258, 263-4 
Bassewitz, Adolphus Frederick von, 75 
Bastille, fall of the, 191 
Batavian Republic, the, 310, 312 ff. 
Bath, 347 
Bathurst, Henry, 3rd Earl Bathurst, 373, 

394, 446. 464 
Bautzen, battle of, 402-3 
Bavaria, 161, 188, 237, 262 n., 264, 

267-8, 271, 282, 297, 337, 348 ff., 372, 

414, 461, 466, 478, 493 n. 

— Maximilian Joseph, Elector of (King 
Maximilian I, 1805), 343, 350 

— Joseph Ferdinand, electoral prince 
of, 41-2 

Bayard, American senator, 531 ff. 

Baylen, capitulation of, 369 

Beam, 241 

Beauchamp, Lord, 238 

Beaufort, Baron de, 263 

Beauharnais, Eugene (Viceroy of Italy), 
423, 456. 493 n. 

Beckenham, 210 

Bedford, John Russell, 4th Duke of, 108, 
122, 124, 128 

Belcamp, 148 

Belgic Provinces ; see Belgium 

Belgium (and see Netherlands, Austrian), 
96, 188-9, J 93, J 97» 2 °2, 213, 226, 
234 ff., 247 ft., 262 n., 263 ff., 274, 
281, 284, 290, 309, 328, 341, 343, 424, 
5°3-4. 519 

— Union of, with Holland, 430, 460 
Belgrade, 381 

— Peace of (1739), 86 
Bellegarde, Comte Henri de, 455 
Belle- Isle expedition, 119 
Benevento, 353 

Bennigsen, Count Levin A. T. de, 361 
Bentinck, Lord William, 380, 394, 415, 

455 ff., 485-90, 519 
Berbice, 272 
Beresina, the, 390 
Bergen, 295 
Berlin, 148, 180, 204-5 et al. 

— Court and Ministry of, 160,171,178, 
182, 185-6, 190, 193 ff., 206 ff., 237- 
94 passim, 311, 340, 347 

— Decree, the (1806), 356-8, 526 

— Swedo-RussianTreatyat(i72o),75 ; 
117 

Bernadotte, J. B. J. (Prince Royal, 
Charles XIV, King of Sweden), 353, 
361, 382-90 passim, 407, 416, 419; 
and Denmark, 422, 432; 428, 435, 
439, 442, 447, 449, 454; and Norway, 
App. G (cited), 593 ff. 

Berne, 261, 263, 265 

Bernis, Fr.-J. de Pierre de, Cardinal, 
101, 113 

Bernstorff, Andreas Gottlieb von, 61, 
66, 68-9, 74, 77 



Bernstorff, Count Andreas Petervon, 184 
Berry, Charles, Duke of, 42, 47 
Besborodko, Prince Alexander, 286 
Bessarabia, 178-9, 192, 202, 209, 390, 

464 
Bestucheff, Alexis, Chancellor of Russia, 

101, 104 
Birmingham, 168 
Bischoffswerder, J. R. von, 206, 208, 

209, 243 
Blacas, P.-L.-J.-C, Due de, 486-9 
Black Sea, the, 93, 149, 178, 223 
Blake, Robert, Admiral, 16, 18, 23, 25 
Blenheim, battle of, 45 
Blucher, Gebhard Lebrecht, Prince von, 
- 439,441,445, 504-5 
Bohemia, 10, 182, 194 
Bois-le-Duc, 250 
Bolingbroke, Henry St John, Viscount, 

46-8, 82, 85, 89 
Bombay, 29 
Bonaparte, Joseph (King of Spain), 307, 

321 ff., 349; King of Naples, 352 ff.; 

King of Spain, 368, 370, 385 ; 449 

— Lewis (King of Holland), 353, 356, 
374 

— Napoleon ; see Napoleon I 
Bonnier d'Arco, A.-E.-L.-A., 279 
Bordeaux, 18, 447 
Bornholm, 382 

Boscawen, Admiral Edward, 95 

Bosphorus, the, 286 

Bothmer, Count J. C. von, 61, 69 

Boulogne, 342 

Boulton and Watt, firm of, 169 

Bourbon-Cond£, Louis-Henri, Duke of, 

79 
Bourbons, Restoration of the, 433, 438 ff.; 

in exile, 502 ff. ; Second Restoration, 

504 ff. 

— the, of Naples, 353-5, 397, 432, 
455, 459, 484 ff- 

Bourgeois, M. Emile (cited), 10 «., 13 

Brabant, 186-7, 191 

Braganza, House of, 71 

Bragge, Charles, 464 

Brandenburg, Frederick William, the 

Great Elector of, 14, 32, 34, 39 
Brazil, 11, 21, 26, 365 
Breda, Conferences at (1746), 90 

— Peace of (1667), 30 
Breisach, 14 
Breisgau, 282 
Bremen, 26 

— and Verden, duchies of, 61, 64-5, 
75, 104, 332 

Breslau, Peace of, 88 

Brest, 247, 272, 285, 302, 327, 334 

Bretigny, Peace of, 3 

Bridport, Alexander Hood, Viscount, 

272 
Brissot de Warville, Jean-Pierre, 199, 

217, 232, 234-5 
Bristol, G. W. Hervey, Earl of, 121 



INDEX 



613 



British Columbia, 197 
Brittany, 258 
Bruix, Eustache, 293 
Brunswick, House of, 345, 410 

— Prince Ferdinand of, no, 112, 117, 
119, 123, 127; Duke C. Wm F., 143, 
174, 177, 215-6, 224, 243, 251-2, 283 

— Frederick William, Duke of, 372 

— Prussian Treaty with (1757), 107 
Brunswick-Luneburg, Dukes of, 39 

— Duchy of, 64 

Brunswick- Wolfenbuttel, Guelf House 
of, 59 

— Duke Charles of, 99 

Brussels, 187, 191, 202, 215, 225-6, 244, 

502 
Buckingham, George Villiers, Duke of, 

11, 12 

— George Villiers, 2nd Duke of, 31 
Bukharest, Peace of (181 2), 388-90 
Biilow, Fr. Wilhelm, Count von Denne- 

witz, 442, 445 
Bunbury, Sir Henry, 387 
Burdett, Sir Francis, 314; and Reform, 

376 
Burges, J. B., 210, 220 
Burghersh, Lord, 459, 500 
Burgundy and England, 4 
Burke, Edmund, 129, 130, 131, 158; 

Reflections on the French Revolution, 

211; Letters on a Regicide Peace, 2 1 7-8 , 

229, 265-6, 275, 360 
Burrard, Sir Harry, 369, 370 
Bute, John Stuart, 3rd Earl of, 118 ff., 

123, 124, 127 

— John Stuart, 4th Earl and 1st Mar- 
quis of, 257 ff. 

Buttafoco, Corsican leader, 241 
Byng, Admiral John, 103, 106 

Cabal, the, 31 

Cabinet, the British (1762), 124; 133; 

(1782), 137 et al. 
Cadiz, 12, 259, 273, 302, 334 
Cadogan, William Cadogan, Earl, 57 
Cadoudal, Georges, 330 
Cairo, 299 
Calais, 319, 324 

Calonne, Charles-Alexandre de, 169 ff. 
Cambray, Congress of (1722), 72, 79 
Cambridge, Adolphus, Duke of, 328 
Camden, Sir John J. Pratt, Earl and 

Marquis of, 331, 373, 429 
Campbell, Sir Neil, 500-2 
Camperdown, battle of, 280, 282 
Campo, the Marquis del, 257 
Campochiaro, Due de, 484-9 ; Memoire 

Historique of, 484-5, 489 
Campo Formio, Treaty of (1797), 281, 

283, 297 
Canada, 94, 106, 107, 113, 114, 124-5, 

137. 153, 232, 527, 535 ff. 
Canning, George, 270, 277, 307, 320, 

359-93 passim, 521 



Cape Breton, 90, 112, 124 

Cape of Good Hope, the, 173; taken, 

256; 268; and India, 2756°., 305-8, 

310, 313 ff., 431 ; 344 et al., 519, 573 
Cape Town, 310 

Capodistrias, John, Count, 468, 493 
Carelia, 77 

Cariati, Prince, 484, 489 
Carleton, Guy, Lord Dorchester, 157 
Carlisle, Frederick Howard, Earl of, 277 
Carlos, Don; see Charles III, King of 

Spain 
Carlowitz, Peace of (1699), 59 
Carlsbad Decrees, the, 494 
Carmarthen, Francis Osborne, Marquis 

of (Duke of Leeds), 140, 144, 151-2, 

154-208 passim, 331 
Carnatic, the, 136 
Carnot, L.-N.-M., 264, 281, 434 
Caroline, consort of George II, 82, 83 

— of Brunswick, consort of George IV 
(Princess of Wales), 252, 460, 485 

Carteret, John, Lord; see Granville 

Carvajal y Lancaster, Jose 1 de, 93 

Carysfort, Sir John J. Proby, Earl of, 300 

Caserta, 288 

Caspian Sea, the, 149 

Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount 

(2nd Marquis of Londonderry), 320, 

359, 3 6 3> 369-85, 390-521 passim; 

policy of (1813), 397 ; (1814), 429 ff. ; 

at Congress of Vienna, 463-516; and 

treatment of France, 507-514, 520; 

criticism of, 518 ff.; death of, 521; 

528, 532, 537 ff- 

— Lady, 463 

Catalonia, 46, 53, 257-8, 455 
Catharine I, Tsarina, 80 

— II, Tsarina, 113, 122, 126, 134-5, 
138, 144 ff., 174, 177, 182 ff., 190, 
192, 196, 203 ff., 222-3, 229 ff., 238, 
242, 245-55, 262, 266, 270 ff., 301, 
319, App. D 566 ff. 

— Grand-duchess of Russia, Duchess 
of Oldenburg, 460 

Cathcart, William, Earl, 360, 386, 396- 
421 passim, 434 ff., 462, 531-2 

Catholic Emancipation, question of, 359, 
373 

Cattaro, 387 

Caulaincourt, A. A. L. de, 420, 435-50 

Cayenne, 378 

Cecil, Sir Robert (Earl of Salisbury), 9, 
10 

— Sir Wm (Lord Burleigh), 8 
Cellamare, Prince, plot of, 72 
Central Powers, the, 482 

Ceylon, 268, 272, 275, 279, 280, 305-6 

Champagne, 222, 224 

Champagny, J. B. Nompere de (Due de 

Cadore), French Foreign Minister, 

355, 378 
Champlain, Lake, 154 
Channel Islands, 295, 366 



614 



INDEX 



Charles I (Prince of Wales), n; policy 
of, 12 

— II, double policies of, 30-7 

— V, Emperor, King of Spain, etc., 
6, 10 

— VI, Emperor (the Archduke), 41, 
42, 45 ff.; Emperor, 47, 53, 62, 71, 
74, 79, 80, 83, 86 

— X, King of France, "Monsieur" 
(Comte d'Artois), 313, 447, 449, 513 

— II, King of Spain, 41-2 

— Ill, King of Spain (Don Carlos), 
King of Sicily, 71, 79 ff., 88; King of 
Spain, H4ff., 118, 121, 134, 198 

— IV, King of Spain, 258-9, 311 

— X, Gustavus, King of Sweden, 24, 
25, 26, 27 

— XI, King of Sweden, 32 

— XII, King of Sweden, 63, 65-74 

— XIII, King of Sweden, 374, 382 

— XIV, King of Sweden; see Berna- 
dotte 

— Archduke (Austrian general), 293-4, 
296, 342, 372 

— the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, 4 
Charlotte, Princess, daughter of George 

IV, 430, 434, 452, 460 
Charter, the French, 516 
Chatham, John Pitt, 2nd Earl of, 253, 

278, 322, 359, 372-3 

— William Pitt, Earl of, 95, 100-6; 
ministry of, 108-21; and Spain, 115, 
118 ff.; 124-5, 128-9, 132-4 

Chatillon, Conference at (18 14), 437-48 
Chaumont, Treaty of (18 14), 410,444 ff., 

479.491, 502, 514, 516, 519 
Chauvelin, F.-B., Marquis de, 213, 216, 

225, 229, 231-5 
Cherbourg, expedition to, 112; 170 
Chesapeake, the, 367, 525 ff. 
Chesterfield, Philip Dormer Stanhope, 

Earl of, 85, 91 
Choiseul, Istienne-Francois, Due de, 

113, 116, 118 ff., 123; 130, 131 
Chotusitz, battle of, 87 
Christian IV, King of Denmark, 12 
Christina, Queen of Sweden, 22 
Chur, 294, 296 
Cintra, Convention of, 370 
Circles, the German, 254-5, 333 
Cisalpine Republic, the, 281, 310-1; 

and see Italian Republic 
Clancarty, Richard Le Poer Trench, 

Earl of, 394, 396, 462-3, 489, 492, 

500, 503 
Clarendon, Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of, 28 
Clarke, Henri-J.-G. (Due de Feltre), 

273, 354 
Clarkson, Thomas, 398, 495-6 
Clausewitz, Carl von, 172 
Claviere, Etienne, 217 
Clay, Henry, 533^4 
Clerfait, Fran90is-S.-C.-J. de Croix, 

Comte de, 246, 249 



Clive, Robert, 11 1 

Coalition Ministry (1783), 139 

— the Second, War of the, 292 ff. 
Cobbett, William, The Porcupine, 307; 

374 
Cobenzl, Count Lewis, 290, 342 

— Count Philip, 195, 239, 281 
Coburg, Prince Frederick Josias of, 239, 

240, 246, 249, 558 
Cochin, 268 
Cochrane, Admiral Sir Alexander, 334, 

372 
Collingwood, Cuthbert, Lord, 349 
Cologne, 2, 341 ; Congress at (1673), 33 
Colombo, 272 
Colonial conquests of Britain, 422, 427, 

430 ff. 
Colonies ; see sub nom. 
Colpoys, Sir John, 272 
Committee of Public Safety, the, 256 
Commonwealth of England, the, foreign 

policy of, 1 5 ff . 
Conde\ Louis II de Bourbon, Prince of, 

18 
Conferences, method of; see Congress 

system 
Congress, a European, suggested, 119, 

255. 263, 341 
" Congress system," Castlereagh s 

scheme of a, 517-20 
Connecticut, and the War of 1812, 528 
Consalvi, Ercole, Cardinal, 485 
Constantinople, 146, 174, 183, 222, 313, 

358, 384-5 

— Treaty of (1790), 191 
Continental System, the, 349, 350, 356-8, 

365-6, 374-82; Russia and, 377, 381 ; 
Sweden and, 374, 381 ff.; Holland 
and Germany and, 377; 378-9; see 
Orders in Council, United States 

Convention of June 29th (1814), the, 461 

Cooke, Edward, 463 

Copenhagen, besieged, 27; 300; at- 
tacked (1801), 303 ; 361 ; surrender of 
(1807), 363:386 

Corfu, 299. 313, 321, 329. 332, 335, 349, 
353, 387 

Cornwallis, Charles, Marquis (Earl), 
143-73 passim, 247, 278, 304, 307 

— Admiral Sir William, 327, 334 
Corsica, 107; 130, 256 ff., 270, 316, 553 
Corti, 256 

Corunna, 333 

Counter-reformation, the, 8 

Courier, the, 307 

Cracow, 453, 482 

Craggs, James, the younger, 60, 78 

Craig, Sir James, 256, 338, 349 

Craonne, battle of, 446 

Crepy, Peace of (1544), 7 

Crete, 321 

Crimea, the, 207 

Cromwell, Oliver, policy of, 18-27; 42 

Cronstadt, 182, 303, 386 



INDEX 



615 



Cumberland, George, Duke of, no 
Curacoa, 365 

Custine, Comte A.-P. de, 215 
Cuxhaven, 300 

Czartoryski, Adam George, Prince, 316, 
332-41, 442, 460, 468, 470 

Dalberg, E.-J., Due de, 448 
Dalmatia, 281, 348, 351 
Dalrymple, Sir H. W., 369, 370 

— John, Viscount (Earl of Stair), 145, 
163 

Danby, Thomas Osborne, Earl of 

(Duke of Leeds), 34 
Danton, Georges-Jacques, 217, 262 
Danube, the, 192, 202, 272; (1805) 

342-3. 349, 381 
Danzig, 179, 192, 204; taken, 360; 386, 

4°3 
Dardanelles, the, 358 
Darnley, John Bligh, Lord Clifton, 

Earl of, 364 
Debry, J. -A., 285 
Decaen, Comte, 316, 326 
Declaration of Independence (American), 

131, 137, 138 

— of Indulgence, 38 

— of Neutrality (1792), 213-4 
Delacroix, Charles, 270, 272, 278 
Demerara, 259, 272 

Democrats, the, in U.S.A., 527-8, 540 

Dendermonde, 57 

Denmark, 12, 14; Commercial Treaty 
with England (1653), 22; and Grand 
Alliance, 43, 63-4, 73, 75, 86, 182 ff., 
191-2, 203, 206-7, 230, 268, 290-303 
passim, 332, 341 , 343 ; fleet of, 361 ff. ; 
and Norway, 382-5 ; 454 

Derby, 224 

Desmoulins, Camille, 186 

Dettingen, battle of, 88 

" Devolution, Right of," 28 ff. 

— War of, 30 

Devonshire, Wm Cavendish, 4th Duke 

of, 106 
Diet, the Germanic, 96, 251, 255, 260 
Dietz, H. F. von, 183 
Dijon, 448-9 
Directory, the French, 263-4, 268-96 

passim 
Dniester, the, 204, 208-9 
Dobrudja, the, 202 
Doris, frigate, 327 
Dornberg, Baron W. C. von, 372 
Dorset, John F. Sackville, Duke of, 169, 

175 
Dover, Secret Treaty of (1670), 31 
Downs, the, 226, 228 
Drake, Sir Francis, 8 

— Francis, diplomatist, 207, 242, 330 
Dresden, 405-6 

— Peace of (1745), 89 
Droysen, J. G., cited, 83 
Drummond, Sir William, 379 



Dubois, Abbe 1 (Cardinal), 67, 69, 75 

Duckworth, Vice- Admiral Sir James, 358 

Dumont, P.-F..-L., 213 

Dumouriez, C.-F., 202, 214-5, 217, 
225, 227-8, 233, 239 

Dunbar, battle of, 15 

Duncan, Adam (Viscount Camper- 
down), 280, 282, 295 

Dundas, Henry (Viscount Melville), 
220, 254, 278, 295, 298, 303, 331, 334, 
347, 412 

Dunes, battle of the, 26 

Dunkirk, 18, 22, 25, 26 ; sold, 28 ; 49-50 ; 
138 

Duquesne, Fort, 112 

Duroc, Michel (Due de Friuli), 328 

Dury, John, 22 

Dutch, the, n, 24-7, 73, in; and the 
French War, ch. II passim, 315, 319 

— War, the (1652), 17 ff.; (1664), 29; 
see Netherlands, the United 

East Frisia, 345, 482 

— India Company of London, the, 10, 
in, 298 

— — — (the Dutch), n, 162, 165, 

255 

— — — (the French), 165 

— Indies, the, n, 90, 138, 232, 243, 
273, 275, 280, 306, 313, 431, 440, 573 

— — the French, 316, 440 

— Prussia, 178 

Eastern Question, the, 178, 318, 326, 
332 

— Venetia, 281 

Eden, Sir Morton (Lord Henley), 178, 
222, 236-7, 241, 255, 263-4, 269, 271, 
273-4, 277, 288 ff., foreign corresp. of, 
App. A, B, D, E 

— William ; see Auckland 

Eden's Commercial Treaty (1786), 164- 

70 
Edward I, 2, 3 

— Ill, alliances of, 3, 4; 226 

— IV, 4 

Egremont, Charles Wyndham, Earl of, 

121, 124, 127 
Egypt, 149; Napoleon's expedition to, 

282, 285-6, 296-329 passim 
El Arisch, Convention of, 298 
Elba, 259, 297, 306, 311, 320, 387; 

Napoleon at, 449, 488, 500-1 
Elbe, mouth of the, 14, 64, 300, 303, 

343, 350 
Eldon, John Scott, Earl of, 359, 373, 

394, 446 
Elective Capitulation, the (1658), 27 
Elgin, Thomas Bruce, Earl of, 206, 

208-9, 274, 283, 313 
Elizabeth, Queen, 8 

— Tsarina, 88, 101, 103, 112, 113, 
116, 122 

Elliot, Sir Gilbert (Earl of Minto), 257, 
284, 293, 296 



6i6 



INDEX 



Elliot, Hugh, 183-4, 201, 206, 349 
Elphinstone, George Keith (Viscount 

Keith), 256 
Emigres, the, 210, 212, 216, 242, 266, 313 
Empire, the Germanic, the Holy 
Roman, 13, 28; attacked by Lewis 
XIV, 36; 43, 48, 93, 267, 292; dis- 
solution of, 282, 285, 569-70 
Ems, mouth of the, 303, 350, 482 
Enghien, Louis- A. -H. de Bourbon- 

Cond£, Due de, 331-2 
England and Peace of Westphalia, 13 ff. 
Erfurt, negotiations at (1808), 370, 386; 

482 
Erskine, David M., 2nd Lord, 367, 524 

— Thomas, Lord, A View of the 
Causes and Consequences of the present 
War with France, 273 ; 364 

Essex, Rob. Devereux, Earl of, 9 

Esthonia, 66, 77 

Etruria, kingdom of, 320, 365 

— Charles Lewis, King of (Duke of 
Parma), 365 

Eugene Francois, Prince of Savoy- 

Carignan, 46, 53, 55, 62 
Ewart, Joseph, 161-2, 177 ff., 190-208 
Exclusion Bill, the, 37 
Eylau, battle of, 356 

Fagan, Emigre, 375 

Falkland Isles, 130 

"Family Compact," the Bourbon (1733), 
84 ff.; renewed (1743), 89, 115; the 
3rd (1761), 120, 121, 134, 145, 198 ff., 
454 

Federalists, the, in U.S.A., 527, 540 

Ferdinand II, Emperor, 10 

— VI, King of Spain, 93, 114 

— VII, King of Spain, 370, 375, 454 

— I (IV), King of the Two Sicilies, 
238, 287-9, 322, 327, 349, 353, 379, 
380, 408-9, 456, 459, 485-93 

— of Brunswick ; see Brunswick 
Finisterre, battle of, 90 
Finkenstein, Count Fink von, 160, 178 
Finland, 77, 182, 185, 381, 464 

First of June, battle of (1794), 247 
Fitzherbert, Alleyne (Lord St Helens), 

138, 199 ff., 222, 242 
Flanders, 2, 4; see Netherlands, 245, 

248, 254, 282, 510 

— (Province of), 187, 191 
Fleurus, battle of, 247 

Fleury, Andre" Hercule, Cardinal, 80, 

83 
Florence, 193, 500 

— Treaty of (1801), 297, 332 
Florida, 125, 138, 527, 535 

— Blanca, don J. M., Count of, 134, 
198, 200 

Flushing, 233, 256, 372 
Fontainebleau, Peace Preliminaries at, 
123-4 

— Treaties of (1785), 163 



Fontainebleau, Treaties of (1807), 365; 
(1814), 449, 485, 487, 492-3, 500, 501 , 
503-4 

— Decree, the, 377 
Forster, Georg, 206 
Foster, A. J., 524, 526 

Fouch£, Joseph (Due d'Otrante), 330, 
333». 375. 502, 504; arranges con- 
vention (1815), 506-7, 513 

Four Great Powers, the (1814), 444; 
Ministers of, at Vienna, 462 ff. ; 493, 
502, 514 

Fox, Charles James, 137, 139-40, 150, 
160, 192, 228-9, 260, 272, 314, 320-50 
passim; negotiates with Napoleon, 
351-5; death, 355; 359 

— Henry, 95, 100, 106 

France, and England, 2 ff., 5 ff., 9ff.; 
and Thirty Years' War, 13 ff.; and 
Cromwell, 18 ff.; Treaty of 1655, 
23; 28-58 passim; succession in, 67; 
see Lewis XIV and Seven Years' War, 
97-127; 130; and U.S.A., 131-8; 
chs. 1 and n passim; and Peace of 
Amiens, 305-25; see Napoleon; after 
Waterloo, 507 ff. ; occupation of, 509 ff. 
Franche-Comti, 34, 36, 291-2, 294 
Francis II, Emperor (Francis I, Em- 
peror of Austria), 211, ch. 11 passim, 
311, 331, 340-1, 403, 442, 448, 481 

— I, King of France, 6 
Franco-Germanic Treaties (1796), 269 

— Neapolitan Treaty (1796), 269 

— Portuguese Treaty (1797), 278 

— Prussian Secret Treaty (1796), 274 

— Russian Commercial Treaty (1787), 
177 

— Sardinian Treaty (1796), 268, 290 

— Spanish Convention (1803), 333 
Franconia, 255 

Frankfort on the Main, 215,224,244,416 
" Frankfort Proposals," the, 416 ff., 429, 

435, 437 
Franklin, Benjamin, 137, 138, 150, 153 
Frederick IV, Kingof Denmark, 65, 66,75 

— VI, King of Denmark (Prince 
Royal), 184 

— I, King of Prussia, 39 

— II, King of Prussia, 92, 98-127 
passim; 132, 135, 143 ff., 160, 162, 
170, 243-4 

— I, King of Sweden, 73 

— Augustus I, King of Saxony, 470, 
473, 478 

— — Elector of Saxony; see Augus- 
tus I, King of Poland 

— William I, King of Prussia, 87 

— — II, King of Prussia, 162, 
170 ff., 191 ff., 197, 204 ff., 222-3, 
237 ff., 244-66 passim, 283 

— — III, King of Prussia, 283-95 
passim, 311, 328, 333, 343-50 passim, 
37i, 453, 459, 469, 471, 480; and 
Poland, 545-6 



INDEX 



617 



Frederikshald, 74 

French Empire, proclamation of the, 331 

— Republic, the, 221, 223, 228-88 
passim 

— Revolution, the, 220, 235, 253, 267, 
280, 302, 465 

Frere, John Hookham, 334, 369 
Friedland, battle of, 356, 360 
Front, Comte de, 238 
Fructidor, coup d'etat of, 279-81 
Fulda, the, 267 

Gabbard, naval battle of the, 20 
Gagern, Hans C. E., Baron von, 512 
Galicia, 179, 186, 188, 191 ff., 204 
Gallatin, Albert, 531-41 
Gallo, Marzio M., Marchese di, 288 
Gambier, James, Lord, Admiral, 362-3, 

372, 534 
Gardiner, Colonel Wm, 214, 222 
Garlike, British Envoy, 361-2 
Geneva, 341 
Genoa, French annexation of, 293, 296, 

340, 342, 351 ; offered to Savoy, 432, 

453, 464, 473 > 483, 485 et al. 
Gentz, Friedrich von, 491 
George I (Geo. Lewis, Elector ol 

Hanover), 58-78 passim 

— II, 81, 84, 87, 88, 95, 100, 106 ff., 
114, 118, 250 

— Ill, 118, 125, 133, 137, 138, 139, 
140, chs. 1 and 11, 311, 314, 322, 324, 
328 ff., 345-6, 350-2, 376 

— IV (Prince of Wales), 192, 252, 314, 
330; (Regent), 377, 394-5, 400, 439, 
446, 453, 459, 460, 5°4, 5°7, 5H-5 

German Confederation, the, 482, 493 

— Ecclesiastical States, secularisation 
of, 307, 311 

— League of Princes against Austria 
(1785), 161-2 

Germany, 100 et al. ; French invasion of, 
215, 269, 273, 240 ff. ; rearrangements 
in, 274, 282, 335, 465 ff. ; see Empire, 
North Germany 

Gertruydenberg, Conferences of (17 10), 
46 

Ghent, Treaty of (1814), 480, 522, 530- 
42 

— Louis XVIII at, 502 

Gibraltar, 45, 52 and note, 79-83 et al.; 
Spain and, 134, 279; battle in Gut of, 

.3<>4 
Girondins, the, 234-5 
Gitschin, 403, 404 n. 
Glatz, 124 
Gloucester, William Henry, Duke of, 

364 
Gneisenau, Augustus N., Count, 371 
Godolphin, Sidney Godolphin, Earl of, 

45,46 
Godoy, Manuel de, Duke of Alcudia 

and Prince of the Peace, 223, 257 ff., 

3", 364 



Gondomar, Diego Sarmiento d'Acuna, 
Count of, Spanish Ambassador, 9 

Good Hope, Cape of; see Cape of Good 
Hope 

Goree, 125 

Gortz, George Henrik, Baron, 66-7, 72 

— Johann Eustach, 171 
Gothenburg, 182, 184, 533 
Goulburn, Henry, 534-40 

Gower, G. Leveson Gower, Earl (Mar- 
quis) of Stafford, 136 

— John Leveson-Gower, Earl, 212, 216 
Grafton, A. H. Fitzroy, Duke of, 129 
Graham, Thomas (Baron Lynedoch), 

273, 424 
Grantham, Lord; see Robinson, T. 
Granville, Granville - Leveson - Gower, 

Earl, 334, 338 ff., 361, 363 

— John Carteret, Earl, 75, 78, 85 ff., 91 
Grasse-Tilly, F.-J.-P., Comte and Mar- 
quis de, Admiral, 134 

Great Britain (from 1603), 8 ff. passim; 
and Baltic States, 63-78; and Spain, 
79-86; and Seven Years' War, 97- 
127; and colonies, 125 et al.; and 
North America, 128-40, 149-57; in- 
ternational position of, 143—215 ; neu- 
trality of (1789), 216-25; and the 
Scheldt, 225-36; and the Revolu- 
tion War, 237-304; and Peace (1801), 
305-8 ; and Napoleonic War, 309-91 ; 
diplomatists and influence of, 392 ff. ; 
and peace negotiations (181 3-4), 401- 
59 ; and Congress of Vienna, 459-500 ; 
and the return of Napoleon, 501 ff.; 
and French settlement, 506-21 ; and 
American War (18 12), 522-42; see 
Castlereagh, Orders in Council, etc. 

Gregoire, Abb6, 495 

Greifswald, Treaty of (1715), 66 

Grenada, 272 

Grenville, George, 124, 127 ff. 

— Thomas, 137, 249, 251, 290, 306, 
322, 330, 347-8, 372 

— William, Lord, 140, 155 ff., 175, 
206 ff., ch. 11, 31 1-2, 314, 322, 330- 
47; Ministry of, 348-66; 372, 377, 
391, 399, 495; correspondence on 
foreign affairs, App. A (1792-3), B 
(1793-5), D (1795-7), E (1798) 

Grey, Charles, 2nd Earl (Lord Howick), 
262, 327, 348, 351, 359, 373, 377, 
399, 5°3 

Grimaldi, Marquis de, 118, 120, 130 

Grisons, the, 294 

Guadaloupe, 139, 306, 378 

Guastalla, duchy of, 449 

Guelfs, the ; see Brunswick, Hanover 

Guiana, 307 

Gustavus III, King of Sweden, 182, 
184, 203, 212, 218 

— IV, King of Sweden, 332, 341, 343, 
374 

Gyllenborg, Carl, Count, 67 

39—5 



6i8 



INDEX 



Habsburg, House of, 6, 7, 10, 12, 47; 

see Austria, House of 
Hague, Court and Ministry of the, 159, 

163, 172, 174, 205-6, 221, 226, 233, 

244, 246, 462 

— the, Convention of (1710), 63; 
(supplement to, 1718), 57;(!733)> 84; 
(1748), 90 

— negotiations at (1760), 116; 158 

— Treaty of (1794), 246 
Hailes, Daniel, 204 
Hainault, 187 

Halifax, Nova Scotia, 537 

— G. M. Dunk, Earl of, 124, 127 
Hamburg, 64, 300, 333, 358, 416 
Hamilton, Alexander, 155, 157 

— Emma, Lady, 222, 288-9 

— Sir William, 222, 238, 288-9, 297 
Hammond, George, 155, 157, 221, 267, 

274, 276-7 

Hanau, 416 

Hanover, 58, 59 et al. ; see Seven Years' 
War; Treaty with Denmark (17 15), 
65; and Sweden, 65, 72; Alliance of 
(1725), 80; Neutrality Treaty for, 
99 ff. ; 303, 328-47 passim ; annexed to 
Prussia, 349 ff. ; 395 ; Prussian cessions 
to, 400-1, 479, 481-2 

— House of, 49, 96 

Hanoverian "Junta" and interest, 61 

and note, 74, 78 ; 92 
Hansa League, the Baltic, 2, 5, 403 
Harburg, 64 
Hardenberg, Charles, Prince of, 247, 

254, 320, 340, 34s ff., 371, 395, 401, 

404, 411, 419, 434, 436, 44°. 4 0I > 

466 ff., 510, 559 
Hardy, Thomas, 224 
Harley, Robert (Earl of Oxford), 46-7 
Harrington, Wm Stanhope, Earl of, 70, 

82,89 
Harris, James; see Malmesbury, Earl of 
Harrowby, Dudley Ryder, Earl of, 331, 

333, 335-6, 343 ff., 394, 428, 446 
Hartley, David, 138, 150, 155 
Hastings, Francis Rawdon-Hastings, 

Earl of (Lord Moira), 364 

— Warren, 148 

Haugwitz, Count C. A. H. Kurt von, 

246-7, 254, 267, 283, 291, 346-7, 35° 
Havana, 123, 125 

Hawke, Edward, Lord, Admiral, 114 
Hawkesbury, R. B. Jenkinson, Lord; 

see Liverpool, 2nd Earl of 
Hayti, 247, 257 ff., 266, 272, 315, 318, 

323 ; see St Domingo 
Heinsius, Grand Pensionary, 43, 45 
Helder, the, 295 
Heliopolis, battle of, 298 
Helvetic Republic, the, 307, 310, 312, 

336 
Helvoetsluys, 181 
Henry II, 2 

— V, 4 



Henry VI, 4 

— VII, policy of, 5, 6 

— VIII, 6, 7 

— IV, King of France, 11, 262 
Herald, the, 307 

Hertzberg, Count Ewald Fr. von, 173-4, 

178-206 passim 
Hervey, Lord, 193-4 
Hesse-Cassel, 74; Treaty with, 80, 97; 

343, 353 

— Landgrave Charles of, 39 

— Prince Frederick of, 96 
Hildesheim, 400-1 
Hispaniola (San Domingo), 23 
Hobart, Robert, Lord (Earl of Bucking- 
hamshire), 302, 314 

Hoche, Lazare, 271-2 

Holderness, Robert d'Arcy, Earl of, 94, 

97 ff., 118 
Holland, Province of, 17, 172, 174 

— (the state of) before 1806; see 
Netherlands, the United 

— (kingdom of) from 1806, 374-5, 
377; liberation of, 424, 430, 450; at 
the Peace (1814), 452, 460, 479 ff., 
502, 525 

— Henry R. V. Fox, 3rd Lord, 354-5, 
495, 507 

Hollandsdiep, the, 239 
Holstein, 64, 184, 361 
Holstein-Gottorp, Charles Frederick, 

Duke of, 74-5 
Holyrood, 313 
Honduras, 138 

Hood, Samuel, Viscount, 238, 241, 259 
Hope, Messrs, 158 
Horn, diplomatic agent, 395 
Horner, Francis, 486, 495 
Hotblack, Kate (cited), 108 n. 
Hotham, Sir Henry, 259 
Howe, Richard Howe, Earl, 247 
Howick, Lord ; see Grey, Charles 
Hubertusburg, Peace of (1763), 126 
Hudelist, Josef von, 434 
Huguenots, the, 8, 12, 18, 21 
Hungary, 186, 193 
Huskisson, William, 347, 394 
Hutchinson, John Hely-Hutchinson, 

Lord (Earl of Donoughmore), 299, 

361, 363-4 
Hyder Ali, 136 

Illyria, 403 

India, 107, in, 113, 125, 136, 138, 148, 

157, 256, 285, 298-9, 306-8, 313, 316, 

326, 355, 451-2 
Indians in North America, the, and the 

Treaty of Ghent, 535~42 
Indies ; see East, West 
Ingelheim, Countess, 181 
Inquisition, the Spanish, 21, 22 
Intercursus Magnus (1495), 17 
International Rivers, Commission for, 

500 



INDEX 



619 



Ionian Isles, the, 281, 306, 316, 317, 
329,365>387.493.5i9 

Ireland (1689), war in, 39; invasion and 
revolts (1759), 114; (1796), 232, 272, 
279, 280, 282, 285; (1799), 295; and 
Union, 148, 304; 136, 167, 364 

Ischia, 380 

Ismail, 202 

Istria, 281, 348, 351 

Italian Republic, the, 310-1, 320, 322 

Italinski, Russian Envoy, 388-9, 600, 601 

Italy, 208-9; and the French Revolu- 
tionary War, 264-90; 309, 329, 343, 
351; and the Peace Treaty (18 14), 
455 ff., 483, 486-500, 519 

Jackson, Sir George, 311, 344, 361, 
398 ff., 416, 418, 428-9 

— Francis J., 222, 257, 262, 362-3, 
367, 524 

Jacobi Kloest, Baron von, 237, 251 
Jacobins, the, 218, 234-5, 243, 245, 262, 

278, 281 ; attack on British Empire, 

357 
Jacobites, the, 82, 85, 90, 98 
Jamaica, taken, 23 ; 138 
James I, King of Great Britain, 9 

— II (Duke of York), 33 \ 38, 43 

— Prince of Wales (Pretender, Che- 
valier), 43, 49, 67, 68, 80, 82 

Java, 378 

Jay, John, 138, 150, 156, 523 

— Treaty, the (1794-5), 156, 357, 523 
Jefferson, Thomas, President U.S.A., 

152, 357-8, 367, 526 
Jemappes, battle of, 215, 224 
Jena (Auerstadt), battle of, 346, 356 
Jenkinson, Charles; see Liverpool 
Jervis, Sir John (Earl St Vincent), 270, 

273, 287, 302, 321, 331, 570-1 
John, King, 2 

— IV, King of Portugal, 16 

— VI, King of Portugal (Prince 
Regent), 365 

Jomini, Baron Henry, Russian General, 

423 
Joseph I, Emperor, 45, 46 

— II, Emperor, 132, 138, 144-5, 149, 
160, 163, 174, 182, 187 ff., 193 

— Archduke, 92 
Juliers, 341, 345 

Junot, Andoche, Marshal (Due d'A- 

brantes), 370 
Jutland, battle of, 226 

Kalisch, palatinate of, 179 

— Treaty of (1813), 396, 398, 401, 466 
Kaunitz, Wenzel Anton, Prince von, 92, 

96 ff., 119, 127, 182, 185, 195, 197 
Keene, Sir Benjamin, 86 
Keith, George K. Elphinstone, Viscount, 

296, 298-9 

— J. K. Elphinstone, Viscount, 96, 

IO3, 112 



Keith, Sir Robert Murray, 158, 194-5, 

202, 210, 221 
Kentucky, 533 

Kersaint, G.-P. de C, Comte de, 232 
Kiel, Treaty of (1814), 454 
Kinckel, Dutch Vice-admiral, 244, 247 
King, diplomatic agent, 395 
Kingsbergen, Dutch Admiral, 206 
Kl£ber, J.-B., 298 

Klosterseven, Convention of (1757), no 
Kolin, battle of, no 
Korsakoff, Alexander, 291 ff. 
Kulm, battle of, 399 
Kurakin, Prince Boris, 65, 66 

Labouchere, Pierre C, financier, 374-5 

Labrador, Don Pedro Gomez, 484-5, 
498 

Lacey (Lasci), General, 338, 349 

Lafayette, M.-J.-P.-Roch-Yves Gilbert 
Motier, Marquis of, 148, 202 

La Harpe, Frederic C. de, Swiss poli- 
tician, 423 

Lakes, the North American, 537, 539-40 

Lampedusa, 321-2, 326 

Lancashire, 367 

Landau, 452, 512-3 

Langara, Don Juan de, 241 

Langres, 434, 437 

Laon, battle of, 442, 445-6 

La Rothiere, battle of, 439 

Lauderdale, James Maitland, Earl of, 

354-5 
Laudon, Field-marshal, 119 
Lauriston, J. A. B. L., Marquis de, 323 
Lebrun, Pierre, 216-7, 225, 231, 235 
Leeds, 5th Duke of; see Carmarthen 
Leghorn, 288, 456 

Lehrbach, Count L. K. von, 244-5, 297 
Leipzig, 481 ; battle of, 411, 416, 485 
Leith, 384 

Leoben, Preliminaries of, 276-7, 283 
Leopold I, Emperor, 27-8, 34, 36, 43, 

44, 59 

— II, Emperor, 145, 193 ff., 202-12 
Les Saintes, 431, 451 

Levant, the, 52, 93, 313, 316, 326, 329 
Leveson-Gower; see Granville 
Lewis IV, Emperor, 3 

— XIV, King of France, 18, 28-58 
passim; death of, 61; 228, 263, 325, 
5°9 

— XV, King of France, 84, 115, 131 

— XVI, King of France, 132, 164, 
199 ff., 209, 213, 216, 221, 223, 232, 
234-5 

— XVII, son of Lewis XVI, 242 

— XVIII, King of France (Count of 
Provence), 242, 262, 439, 449, 461-2, 
477-8, 487, 492, 501-16 passim 

— Dauphin, 41 
Liege, 228, 239, 245, 263 

Lieven, Christoph Andreievich, Prince, 
421-43 passim, 531 



620 



INDEX 



Lieven, Princess, 460 

Ligurian Republic, the, 307, 310-1, 320, 

322, 338-9, 342 
Lille, 239, 249, 509; negotiations of 

(1797), 278-80, App. D, 576-7 
Lionne, Hugues de, Marquis de Berny, 

28 
Lisbon, blockaded (1650), 15; 365 
Lisola, Baron Franz Paul von, 28, 32 
Liston, Sir Robert, 206, 384, 390 
Lithuania, 386, 468 
Liverpool, Charles Jenkinson, Earl of, 

169, 278 

— Robert Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of 
(Lord Hawkesbury), 302, 305-6, 310- 
3 1 , 359, 372 ff.; Prime-Minister, 386, 
396-464 passim, 474 ff., 537 ff. 

Livonia, 77 and note 

Lobanoff, Prince, 360 

Lombardy, 268, 345, 457 

London, 188-9, 1 9^, 216-7, 224, 231, 

238, 242, 295, 459, 464, 497-8, 532 

et al. 

— City of, 83, 108, 374 

— Court and Ministry of (Court of 
St James's, Whitehall, Downing 
Street), 200, 203 ff., ch. II passim, 310, 
314, 318-22, 340, 361 

— Declaration of (1758), 112 

— Preliminaries of (1802), 310 
Long Parliament, the, 18 

Loo, the, 180 

Lorraine, 33 et al., 509 

Loughborough, Alexander Wedderburn, 
Lord, 278 

Louisa, of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, con- 
sort of Frederick William III, 283 

Louisiana, 125, 200, 311, 315, 526, 535, 
54° 

Liibeck, 2 

Luc, M. de, 284 

Lucchesini, Jerome, Marquis de, 185, 
240, 243 ff. 

Luddite Riots, the, 381 

Luneville, Treaty of (1801), 297, 307, 
310, 321, 325-6, 339, 345 

Lutter, battle of, 12 

Lutzen, battle of, 401-2 

Luxemburg, 37, 339, 482, 512 

Lyons, 261 

Lys, the, 246 

Maastricht, 161, 163, 228, 249, 256 
Mack, von Leiberich, Frhr. Charles, 

288, 342, 344, 346 
Mackenzie, diplomatist, 361-2 
Mackintosh, Sir James, 319 
Madeira, 365 
Madison, James, President U.S.A., 367, 

377-8, 505, 526, 533, 536, 540 
Madras, 90, 136 
Madrid, 115, 197, 199, 200, 206, 222, 

241-2, 256 ff., 333,368, 495 
Mahan, Admiral A. T., 523 



Mahmoud II, Ottoman Sultan, 388 

Maida, battle of, 349 

Main, the, 343 

Mainz, 215, 247, 297, 466, 469 

— Frederick von Erthal, Elector of, 251 

— Treaty of (1793), 238 
Maitland, Sir Frederick Lewis, 505 
Mallet du Pan, Jacques, 283 
Malmesbury, James Harris, 1st Earl of, 

13°, 135, 136, 158, 160-81 passim, 
221, 243 ff., 269 ff., 278-9, 301, 319, 
322, 367 ; corresp. with Grenville, App. 
B, 556 ff. 

Malplaquet, battle of, 46 

Malta, 285, 297-300, 306-8, 312-56 
passim, 366, 379, 431, 451-2, 519, 
App. E; see St John, Knights of 

Mamelukes, the, 315 

Man, Isle of, 366 

Manchester, 224 

— George Montagu, 4th Duke of, 138 
Manilla ransom, 130 

Mansfeld, Count Ernest von, 10, 12 

Mantua, 269, 273, 345 

Marat, Jean-Paul, 216 

Mardyke, 50, 68 

Marengo, battle of, 296 

Maret, Hugues B. (Due de Bassano), 

229, 231, 233, 279, 280, 407, 414, 417, 

420 
Margaret Tudor, Queen of Scotland, 5 
Margarot, Maurice, 224 
Maria Carolina, Queen of the Two 

Sicilies, 269 «., 288-9, 349, 379, 380; 

death of, 485 

— Theresa, Queen of Hungary, Em- 
press, 79, 87, 88, 90-2, 97 ff., 1 19, 124 

— — consort of Francis II, Empress, 
269 n. 

Marie Antoinette, consort of Lewis XVI, 
145, 218, 221, 223, 244 

— Louise of Austria, Archduchess, 
consort of Napoleon I, Empress of 
the French, 375, 435, 449, 485, 487, 
492 «., 501 

Mariembourg, 513 
Maritime Code, the, 336-42 

— Powers, 246, 498 

— Rights of Britain, 397, 419, 420, 
426, 429, 437, 524, 531-42; see Right 
of Search 

Markoff, Russian Ambassador, 319, 323 
Marlborough, John Churchill, Duke of, 

45, 46, 55 
Marmont, A. F. L. Viesse de (Due de 

Raguse), Marshal of France, 448 
Martinique, 247, 275, 306, 378, 573 
Mary I, Queen of England, 7 

— II, Queen of England, 34-5, 59 

— Queen of Scots, 7, 8 
Massachusetts, and the War of 1812, 528 
Mass£na, Andre, Marshal (Due de 

Rivoli), 294, 296, 349, 375 
Maulde, French Envoy at the Hague, 233 



INDEX 



621 



Mauritius (lie de France), ill, 378, 

451-2, 519 
Mazarin, Jules, Cardinal, 14, 18, 19, 23, 

25, 26, 28 
Meadowe, diplomatic agent, 26 
Meares, John, 198 
Mecklenburg, 61, 73 

— Schwerin, Duke Charles Leopold 
of, 66, 67 n. 

Mediterranean Sea, 15, 16, 44, 70, 111, 
130; British policy in, chs. 11 and in; 
at the Peace, 452, 465 ; 501 

Melas, Michael, F. B., 292 

Melcombe, George Bubb, Lord, 68 

Melville, Viscount ; see Dundas 

Memel, 361-3 

Menou, Baron J.-F. de, 305 

Mercy d'Argenteau, Count F. C. von, 
244, 250 

Merfeldt, Count von, 416-8, 460 

Merry, Antony, 197, 307 

Messina, 349 

Methuen, Sir Paul, 54 

— Treatv (1703), 166 
Metternich-Winneburg, Clement W. N. 

L., Prince of, 320, 396; ch. iv passim 
Meuse, the, 225-6, 228 
Michigan, lake, 154 
Mier, Austrian Envoy, 455 
Milan, duchy of, 41 

— Decrees, the (1807), 366, 526 
Miles, William A., 201, 206 
Mincio river, frontier, 345, 453 
Minden, battle of, 114 

Minorca, 52, 79 et al., 109, 119, 124, 

136, 138, 339, 340 
Minto, Lord; see Elliot 
Mirabeau, Honore-G. de R., Count, 177, 

199 ff. 
Miranda, Francisco, 199, 201, 233 
Mississippi, the, 537, 540-1 
Missouri, the, 259 

Mitchell, Sir Andrew, 104-5, *27, 130 
Modena, 336 

— Hercules III, Duke of, 282 
Mohilev, 145 

Moira ; see Hastings 
Moldavia, 178, 192 

Mollendorff, R. J. Heinrich von, 245 ff. 
Moniteur, the, 313, 315 
Monroe, James, President U.S.A., 528, 
537 

— Doctrine, the, 530 
Mons, 215 
Montmorin-Saint-Herem, Count Ar- 

mand-Marc de, 172, 175 ff., 199, 200 
Moore, Captain Graham, 334 

— Sir John, 370 

— political agent, 311 
Moravia, 182, 194 
Morea, the, 313, 316, 329 ff. 
Morier, David, 388 

Morning Chronicle, The, 307, 504 
Morning Post, The, 307 



Morocco, Emperor of, 285 

Morris, Gouverneur, 154, 267, 272, 367 

Mortier, E.-A.-C.-J. (Due de Treviso), 

328-9, 448 
Moscow, 182; Napoleons march to 

(1812), 390 
Miihlberg, battle of, 7 
Mulgrave, Henry Phipps, Earl, 336, 338, 

341, 343 ff., 362, 373, 394; corresp. of, 

App. F 
Munster, bishopric of, 267 

— Count Ernest von, 395, 400, 436, 
446, 453, 493 

Murat, Joachim, Marshal (King of 
Naples), 379; dispossession of, 408- 
10, 413-4, 423, 432, 455-5 00 passim, 
521 ; see App. E 

Murray, Sir James, 238 

Muscovy, 13 

Nagel, Dutch Ambassador, 226-7 
Namur, 57 

Nantes, Edict of, 18; revocation of, 38 
Napier, Sir William F. P., 376 
Naples, kingdom and government of, 
72, 218, 222 ; negotiations with (i793)> 
238; Treaty with France (1796), 269, 
with Austria (1798), 287 ; at war, 288- 
308; (1803), 327; 479 et al.; Bourbon 
restoration in, 484-9 ; 493 ; see Murat ; 
see App. E 
Napoleon I, 226, 256, 264-308 passim, 
ch. in passim; declared King of Italy, 
339; and the Treaty of Fontaine- 
bleau, 449; return from Elba, 484, 
488-9, 500-4 ; abdication of, 504, 532 ; 
described by Bernadotte, 595 

— Duke of Reichstadt, 449, 485, 487, 
492, 501, 504 

Narrow Seas, England and the, 49 
National Assembly, the French, 199, 
200 

— Convention, the French, 217, 224 ff., 
357; November Decrees of (1792), 
225 ff., 236; December id., 229; 
October decrees (1795), 262 «., 265; 
see Scheldt Decree 

Navigation Act, 132 

— Code, the British, 152 ff. 
Neerwinden, battle of, 239 
Negapatam, 148, 176-7 

Neipperg, Count Albert Adam von, 455 
Nelson, Horatio Nelson, Lord, 279- 

308 passim, 313, 329, 335, 582 
Nesselrode, Charles Robert, Count von, 

403, 404 n., 418, 422, 440, 449, 466 ff. 
Netherlands, the Austrian (from 17 14), 

13; 48, 54-7; 79, 84, 96, 104; 112, 

160-1, 186 ff., 211, 224, 236, 249, 250, 

266 and see Belgium 

— the Seventeen Provinces of the (to 
1584), 8 

— the Spanish (Belgic) (1584-17 14), 
13. 14,34,36,41-2,44,54 



622 



INDEX 



Netherlands, the United (the Dutch Re- 
public), 13; Treaty with (1654), 21; 
and Cromwell, 17-27 ; and Lewis XIV, 
28-58; 32-3; and Grand Alliance, 
55 ff.; Treaty with England (17 16), 
62; with Sweden (1700), 63; 68, 70, 
79, 83, 90, 93, 96-7; uoff., 131, 133, 
136, 138, 143, 147, 159-213 passim; 
and Revolution War, 222-355 passim, 
477 et al. ; see Barrier Treaties ; from 
1806, see Holland 

Nettement, M., 268 

Neutrality Treaties (Hanover, 1755), 99, 
101 ff.; of the Baltic (1759), 117 

Newcastle, Thomas Pelham- Holies, 
Duke of, 78, 85, 88, 94, 100 ff., 122 

New England, 94, 132 

Newenham, Sir Edward, 148 

Newfoundland, Gulf of, and the Fish- 
eries, 114, 125, 138, 279, 306, 535-41 

New France, 50 

Newington, 224 

New Orleans, 541-2 

— York, 155 

Ney, Michel (Due d'Elchingen), Mar- 
shal of France, 506-7 
Nice, 234, 237-8, 263, 268, 290, 292 
Niemen, the, 361 
Nile, battle of the, 285, 289, 298 
Nivernais, Due de, 100, 124 
Non-intercourse Act (U.S.A. 1809), 377, 

529 
Noot, Henri van der, 187-8, 191, 202 
Nootka Sound, 195, 197-201, 211, 223, 

256, 279, 553 
Nore, mutiny at the, 277 
Norfolk, Charles Howard, 1 ith Duke of, 

364 
Norris, Sir John, Admiral, 65, 66, 73, 75, 

76 
North, Frederick North, Lord (Earl of 

Guildford), 129, 131, 133, 134, 136, 

139, 140 

— America, British Colonies in, n, 
12, 16; see Canada, Nova Scotia; 
under George III, 128-9; and Seven 
Years' War, 1 1 1 ; see United States 

— — French, 50, 93, 98; see Acadia 
North Briton no. 45, 127 

North of Europe, the ; see Baltic Powers 

— Germany, 254, 328; ports block- 
aded (1803), 329; (1806), 350; 357, 
377 et al. 

Norway, 332; Sweden and, 382-5, 397; 
410, 450, 454; see Sweden 

Norwich, 224 

Notables, First Assembly of, 170 

Nova Scotia (Acadia), 11, 50, 94, 137 

Novossiltzoff, Count Nicholas, 335 ff., 
400 

Nugent, Count Laval, Austrian Field- 
marshal, 485, 489 

Nymegen, Treaties and Peace of (1678), 
34-6; 172 



Nymphenburg, Treaty of (1741), 88 
Nystad, Peace of (1721), 73, 76-7 

— Conference of (172 1), 76 

Oczakoff, 178 ff., 204 ff., 212 
Oder, mouth of the, 14 
Odessa, 204 
Oginski, Count, 204 
Ompteda, L. von, 395 
Orange, 290 

— House of, 16, 21, 131, 143, 160, 172, 
J 77i 290, 306-8, 341 ; see William II, 
William III, William V, William I, 
King of the Netherlands 

— Anne, widow of William IV of, 93 
Orders in Council (1793-4), 1 5^~1'< 

(1807), 358, 366, 374-8, 384-5, 525-6, 
528; see Continental System, United 

Orebro, Peace of (1812), 386 

Orleans, Henrietta, Duchess of, 29, 31 

— Louis Philippe, Duke of (King of 
the French), 439, 459, 484, 503 

— Philip, Duke of, Regent of France, 
■ 67, 79 

Orthez, battle of, 445 
Ostend, 104, 109 

— East India company of, 79, 80, 81, 
84 

Oswald, Richard, 137 

Ottersburg, 65 

Otto, Lewis G., Comte de Mosloy, 305, 

313 
Ottoman empire, the, 146 
Oubril, Comte de, 345, 353-4 
Oudenarde, battle of, 45 
Ouseley, Sir Gore, 388 
Ouvrard, G. J., financier, 375 
Oxford, Edward Harley, Earl of, 485 
Oxus, the, 149 

Pacific Ocean, the, 87, 201 
Padua Circular, the, 209, 212 
Paget, Sir Arthur, 254, 342 

— Sir Augustus, 297, 311, 364 
Pahlen, Count Peter, 303 
Palatinate, the, 34, 291 

Palatine, Frederick V, Elector, and 

James I, 10 
Palermo, 289, 349, 380, 457 
Palmella, Pedro de Souza, Count of, 498 
Palmer, John, 147 
Palmerston, Henry John Temple, 3rd 

Viscount, 394 
Panin, Count Nikita Ivanovich, 135, 

303 
Paoli, General Pasquale de', 130, 241, 

256 
Papacy, the, and our early kings, 2 ; and 

Elizabeth, 8; and James I, 10; and 

Peace of Westphalia, 14; and Murat, 

485 
Pardo, Act of the (1728), 82 

— Convention of the (1739), 86 



INDEX 



623 



Paris, 215-24 ; Commune of, 217 ; march 
on (1814), 437 ff.; the Allies and, 
448 ff. ; second capitulation of, 504 ; 
after Waterloo, 506 ff. 

— Government and Ministers at, chs. 
1 and n passim 

— Commercial Treaty of (1778), with 
U.S.A., 133 

— Peace of (1763), 106, 124-7, I 3§ 

— First Peace of (1814), 429, 450-9, 
462, 464, 467, 473, 479, 480, 483, 494, 
500 

— Second Peace of (1815), 493-4, 500 

— Peace Preliminaries at (1727), 81-2 ; 
(1782), 137-8 

— Treaty of (1815), 290 

— and Versailles, Treaties of (1778), 
138-40 

Parker, Sir Hyde, 303 

Parliament (1802), 314-5; (1803), 327 

Parma, Philip, Duke of, 115 

— and Piacenza, duchies of, 71, 311, 
449, 485, 487, 492 

Partition Treaties of Poland (1772), 131 ; 
of Prussia (1757), 113; of Spanish 
dominions (1648), 41; (1689), 40; 
(1698), 41,43 

Passamaquoddy Bay, 541 

Passaro, battle of Cape, 72 

Passarowitz, Peace of (1718), 59, 70 

Patras, 329 

"Patriotic" Party, the Dutch, 160-1, 
172, 174, 176, 225, 227-8, 251, 
255-6 

Paul I, Tsar, 222, 271, 276-303 passim; 
assassination of, 303 

Peel, Sir Robert, 412 

Pelham, Henry, 89, 91, 94 

Peltier, French refugee, L'Ambigu, 319 

Pembroke, George Augustus Herbert, 
Earl of, 361 

Peninsular War and policy, 369-77, 
379, 381, 384-92, 405, 410, 432 

Perceval, Spencer, 359, 373-4; assassina- 
tion of, 386, 393 

— Ministry, the, 376 

Peter I, Tsar of Russia, 64, 66, 73, 76 

— Ill, Tsar, 122 

Petion de Villeneuve, Jerome, 199 
Petrograd, 182, 205, 461 

— Court and Ministry of, 73, 146, 158, 
192, 222, 230, 248, 252, 283, 286, 292, 
316,335 

Philip II, King of Spain, 8, 301 

— Ill, King of Spain, 10 n. 

— IV, King of Spain, 16, 23 

— V, King of Spain (Duke of Anjou), 
42, 46, 47, 78-9, 82, 83 

Philippeville, 513 
Philippine Islands, 123 
Philippsburg, 14 
Piacenza ; see Parma 
Picardy, 282 
Pichegru, Charles, 293, 330 



Piedmont, 311, 317, 327, 329, 345, 348, 

351,473,485 
Pigot, Sir Henry, 297-8 
Pillnitz, Declaration of (1 791), 210 
Pitt, William, the elder; see Chatham 

— — the younger, 139-40, 143-214 
passim, ch. 11 passim, 312, 317-47; 
death of, 347; 359, 360, 391, 393-4, 
412, 458, 490-1 

Pius VI, Pope, 237 

Planta, Joseph, 463 

Plantagenets, the Early, 2 

Plassey, battle of, 107 

Plaswitz, Armistice of, 402-3 

Po, the, 349 

Poland, 13, 74, 77, 93 ; First Partition of, 
131-2, 177-8, 188; Second Partition 
of, 191 ff., 231, 237, 239, (Prussian) 
240, 247-8; Third Partition of, 248, 
252, 255; 282, 335-6, 417, 423, 453, 
460 ff., 519 

Polish Succession War, 84 

Pomerania, 75, 332, 343, 365, 383-4 

Pompadour, J. -A. Poisson le Normant 
d'£tioles, Marquise de, 98, 113 

Pondicherry, 247, 316 

Ponsonby, George, 364, 464 

Pontecorvo, 353 

Ponza, 455 

Porte, the, 174, 177, 193, 196-7, 204, 
286, 313, 358; negotiations of 1810-2, 
386-91, 492 

Portland, naval battle off, 20 

— W. H. Cavendish Bentinck, 3rd 
Duke of, 139, 260, 278, 359, 373 

— Ministry, the, 361, 367, 372 
Portugal, 11, 25; alliance with England 

(1654), 15, 16; 22, 29, 54; and Seven 
Years' War, 121-3 ; 126, 133, 166, 170, 
239, 258, 275, 278, 306-7, 341, 358, 
363-4, 372-81 ; and the Slave Trade, 
497-8 

— Prince Regent of; see John VI 
Posen, palatinate of, 179 

Potemkin, Prince Gregori Alexandro- 

vich, 135 
Potsdam, 104 

— Secret Treaty of (1805), 345 
Pozzo di Borgo, C. A., Count, 420 ff. 
Pragmatic Sanction, 79, 83 ff., 91 
Prague, negotiations of (1813), 404-10, 

532 
Princes Islands, 358 
Provence, 296 

— Count of; see Lewis XVIII 
Prussia, 65, 74-6, 84, 86, 88, 91, 95, 97- 

127 passim, 132, chs. 1 and 11 passim, 
318, 332, 336-65 ; and the War of 1813, 
3 96-7 ; and Reichenbach Treaties ,399- 
406; 408; and Saxony, 417, 423; 453, 
461, 465 ff. et al., App. D 

— Prince Henry of, 246, 560 
Prussian Secret Treaty (1787), 177 
Prusso-Dutch Treaty (1788), 176 



624 



INDEX 



Prusso-Polish Alliance (1790), 191, 194 

— Turkish Treaty (Jan. 1790), 194, 
196 

Pultawa, battle of, 63 

Pulteney, William (Earl of Bath), 85 

Pyrenees, the, 258, 265 

— Peace of the (1659), 28, 35, 40 

Quadra, Bishop Alvaro de la, 86 
Quadruple Alliance, the (1814), 444, 

461,491 ; renewed (1815), 514; Treaty 

of (sixth article), 516-7 
Quebec, 114, 117, 537 
Quiberon Bay, battle of, 1 14 

— expedition, 261 

Radziwill, Prince, 442, 460 
Rammekens, 227 

Rastatt, Conferences and Peace of 
(1713-14), 13, 54 

— Congress of (1797), 282-92 
Ratisbon, Truce of (1684), 37 
Rayneval, Gerard de, 164, 168, 171 
Razumoffski, Russian Plenipotentiary, 

438-9, 480 
Reformation, the, and English policy, 7, 

8 
Regency question (1810-2), 377 
Reichenbach, Congress of, 196, 203, 

209 

— Treaties of (1813), 401-11 
Reign of Terror, the, 242 
Repnin, Prince, 469, 474, 583 
Reubell, J.-F., 279 

Reuss, the, 294 

— Prince Henry (1770), 196 
Reval, 66, 303-4 
Revolutionary War, 215-305 
Rheede, van, 196 

Rhine, the, 222 seq., 249, 265, 291 seq., 
478-82 et al. 

— frontier, the, 53, 265, 267, 284, 410, 

465 

— Confederation of the, 353, 403, 416 

— League of the (1658), 27 
Rhineland, the, 237, 266, 268, 275, 

282-3, 290,293,341, 351 
Richard II, 4 
Richelieu, Armand-E.-S.-S. du Plessis, 

Due de, 508, 513 

— Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal, 
Due de, 12 

Riga, 77 n. ; Napoleon and, 391 
Right of Search (British), 111, 136, 357, 
524; (Spanish), 85-6, 135; (Swedish), 

J* 

Rio, 54 

Ripon, F. J. Robinson, Earl of (Viscount 

Goderich), 433-4, 464 
Ripperda, Jan Willem, Duke of, 79, 80 
Robespierre, Maximilien M. I., 199, 217 
Robethon, Jean de, 61 
Robinson, F. J.; see Ripon 

— John, Bishop of Bristol, 53 



Robinson, Sir Thomas, 95, 137 
Rochefort, expedition to, m ; 285 

— (Aix roads), action in, 372 
Rochelle, siege of, 12 
Rockingham, C. Watson-Wentworth, 

Marquis of, 128, 129, 134 

Rodney, George B., Baron, Admiral, 134, 
137, 138 

Roell, Dutch Foreign Minister, 374 

Roeskilde, Peace of (1658), 26 

Roland de la Platiere, J.-M., 217 

Romanzoff, Count Nicholas, 385, 530-1 

Rome, 145, 280, 283 

Romilly, Sir Samuel, 351 

Rose, George, 245, 317 

Rosen, Count, 382 

Rossbach, battle of, no 

Roumelia, 387 

Roussillon, 241 

Ruhr, the, 267 

Rumbold, Sir George, 333 

Rumyantseff, Count, 76 

Rupert, Prince Palatine, 16 

Russell, Jonathan, 527, 529, 533 

Russia, 66, 73-7, 88, 90; Treaties with 
( x 755)> 97-ioi, 103-5; and Seven 
Years' War, 109-13, 116, 117, 122-6; 
Commercial Treaty with. 113, 132, 
134-5, chs. 1 and II passim, 318-86; 
and Turkey (1810-2), 386-92; Na- 
poleon's retreat from, 390-1; 396; 
393 » 397 ff- ; and Reichenbach Treaty, 
406; 408, 461, 464 ff.; 536 

— White, 468 
Russians, the, 330, 370 
Russo-Danish Convention (1800), 300 

— Swedish Convention (1800), 300 

— — peace negotiations (18 1 2), 384-5 

— Turkish Armistice (1811), 388 

— — War (1790), 197; (1812), 389 
Rutland, Charles Manners, Duke of, 

148 
Ryswyk, Peace of (1697), 40, 51, 53; 
declarations of (1760), 116 

Saarlouis, 452, 513 

Saar valley, the, 512 

St Aignan, French agent, 417 ff. 

St Christopher ; see St Kitts 

St Cloud, 323 

St Domingo, 257, 259, 496, 550-1 ; see 

Hayti 
St Eustatius, 133, 136 
St Germain, Peace of (1632), n, 50 
St Gothard, 292, 294 
St Helena, 501, 505 
St Helens, Lord ; see Fitzherbert 
St James's Chronicle, the, 307 
St John, Knights of, 285, 297-9, 3°°> 

308, 313, 318, 320-1, 586 

— Henry ; see Bolingbroke, Viscount 

— Oliver, C. J., 17, 20 
St Kitts, 51 

St Lawrence, gulf of, 124-5 



INDEX 



625 



St Lucia, 247, 272, 275, 306, 354, 451-2, 

573 
St Malo, expedition to, 112 
St Petersburg, Treaty of (1764), 122 n.\ 

see Petrograd 
St Priest, F.-E. Guignard, Count of, 173 
St Thomas, Island of, 365 
St Vincent, 272 

— Earl ; see Jervis 
Salonica, 381 

Salzburg, archbishopric of, 282, 466 

Sambre, the, 246 

Saratoga, 133 

Sardinia, 16, 70, 224, 237, 241, 260, 

263-4, 290, 292, 306, 335-6, 339, 453, 

457 

— Charles Emmanuel III of Savoy, 
King of, 71, 90 

— — — IV, King of, 292 

— Victor Emmanuel I, King of, 318, 
320, 322, 332, 338, 345, 432 

Saumarez, James S., Baron de, vice- 
admiral, 304, 374, 382, 386 

Savona, 265 

Savoy, 224-5, 237-8, 263, 268, 290, 452, 
512 

— House of, 308 

— Charles Emmanuel II, Duke of, 23 ; 
see Sardinia 

— Victor Amadeus II, Duke of (King 
of Sardinia), 40, 48, 70-2 

Saxe-Teschen, Albert, Duke of, 187 
Saxony, 105, 114, 124, 126, 254, 343, 

416-7, 423, 453, 461, 464 ff.; see 

Poland 
Scania, 65, 66 
Schaffhausen, 293 
Schaub, Sir Luke, 71 
Scheldt, closing of the, 161, 163, 189, 

312,430,452 

— Decree, the, 225 ff., 227, 231 ff. 
Schill, Friedrich von, 372 
Schleswig, 75 

Schonwalde, 195 

Schouvaloff Treaties, the (1760), 117 

Schwarzenberg, Karl Philipp, Prince 

von, 439, 441-2, 445 
Schweidnitz, 119, 123 
Scotland, 3 ff. ; and union, 7 
Sebastiani, F.-H.-B., Comte, 315, 317, 

358 
Sebastopol, 182, 223, 332, 388 
Secret Treaty (1676), 34 
Sedan, 249 
S6gur, Louis-Philippe, Comte de, 146, 

1.77 
Selim III, Ottoman Sultan, 192, 196-7, 

285-6, 492 
S6monville, C.-L. Huguet, Marquis de, 

202 
Senegal, 125, 134, 378 
Serbia, 387, 390 
Seven Years' War, the, 92 ff., 99 ff., 

105-27 



Seville, Treaty with Junta of, 370, 373 

— Treaty of (1730), 83 
Shelburne, William Petty, Earl of (Mar- 
quis of Lansdowne), 123, 136-40, 165 

Sheridan, Richard Brinsley, 262, 273, 

.314, 359, 368 
Sicilies, kingdom of the Two, 16; 41-2, 
93, 349; see Naples, Sicily 

— Francis I, King of the Two (Prince 
Royal), 354, 380, 456 

Sicily, 71, 329, 338, 349, 353-7, 375, 

379, 450, 455; new Constitution in, 

.380, 457; 459, 485, 490 
Sidmouth, Henry Addington, Viscount, 

299, 302, 305-8, 309-3 !> 348, 360, 

364, 394, 446 
Sieyes, Comte E. J., Abbe, 286 
Silesia, 90-2, 97, 100 ff., 113, 119 
Silesian War, the First, 87 ; the Second, 89 
Sinzendorf, Count P. L. von, 53, 55 
Sistova, 2ii 

— Congress of, 202 ff. 

— Peace of (1791), 205, 209 

Slave Trade, abolition of the, 348, 398, 
440, 451, 464, 494-5, 504, 514, 54i-2 

Slavs of the East, Projected Russian 
Protectorate of the, 335 

Sluys, battle of, 226 

Smith, Adam, 149, 167 

— Joseph, 268 

— Sir William Sidney, 296, 298 
Soissons, Congress of (1728), 82 
Somerset, Edward Seymour, Duke of, 

Protector, 7 
Sorel, Albert, cited, 211 
Soult, Nicolas J.-de-D. (Due de Dal 

matia), Marshal of France, 445 
Sound, the, 300, 353, 361 
South America, 213, 258, 279 

— Sea Bubble, the, 76 

— Sea Company, the, 86 

Spain, power of, 10; see Philip II; after 
Peace of Westphalia, 15 ff.; Cromwell 
and, 22 ; War with, 23 ff. ; weakness of, 
27 ff . ; Succession to, see Partition, 
Spanish Succession; and Peace of 
Utrecht, 45, 51-3; Treaty with Por- 
tugal (1715), 54; Treaty with England, 
68 ; under Alberoni, 67 ff. ; and Quad- 
ruple Alliance, 71 ff. ; War on England, 
85 ff. ; and the Seven Years' War, 
114 ff., 120-5; 130; and U.S.A., 132- 
4; 135, 138-9, 143, 145, 171, .195, 
197 ff., 211, 223, 230, 237 ff.; crisis of, 
255 ff., App. C, 268, 278-9, 305, 311, 
333, 34 1 , 3 5; rising against Napo- 
leon, 368 ff.; 405, 450, 454, 457, 484, 
495 ; and the Slave Trade, 497-8 ; 525 ; 
and U.S.A., 526 

— Queens consort of: Elizabeth Far- 
nese, 67-8, 72; Maria Amalia, 118 

— Marie-Anne, Infanta of, 79 
Spanish dominions, in Italy, 68; in 

America, see South America 



626 



INDEX 



Spanish Succession, 40-58 

Sparre, Baron, 67 

Spencer, George John, Earl, 249, 251, 

253-4, 278, 300, 348 
Spezzia, 322 
Spiegel, Lorenz Pieter van de, 171, 176, 

188, 205 
Spielmann, Baron Anton, 196 
Spithead, mutiny at, 275, 277 
Stadion, J. P. K. J., Count of, 237, 340, 

403,406,434,445,469 
Stair, John Dalrymple, Earl of, 68 
Stamp Act, 128-9 
Stanhope, James Stanhope, Earl of, 57, 

60, 62, 67-76, 78 

— William; see Harrington, Earl of 
Star, the, 307 

Starhemberg, Count George Adam, 98, 
101, 104 

— Prince Ludwig, 250, 276, 284, 469, 
575 

Stein, H. F. K., Freiherr vom, 421, 423, 
468, 493 

Stepney, Sir John, 160 

Stettin, 65, 74, 76, 77 

Stewarts, the, 58 

Stewart, Charles William, Lord [Vane] 
(3rd Marquis of Londonderry), 398- 
438 passim, 462-3, 494, 500, 512, 515 

Stockholm, 206 

— Peace of (1719). 65, 75 
Strachan, Sir Richard, 373 
Stralsund, 65, 343, 360, 372 
Strangford, P. C. S. Smythe, Viscount, 

365 

Strassburg, 37, 509 

Stratford de Redcliffe, Stratford Can- 
ning, Viscount, 367, 373, 387-91, 395, 
494; corresp. from Constantinople, 
App. H 

Stuart, Sir John, 315 

— de Rothesay, Charles, Lord, 369, 
462, 504 

Suabia, 275, 294, 337 
Subsidy Treaties, British (early), 3, 54, 
80, 82, 90; described, 253 

— — with Austria, 101-4; (1800), 
296; (1813), 413; 424; see Alliances, 
Anglo-Austrian 

— — with Baden (1793), 239; with 
Bavaria and Wurtemberg (1800), 297 ; 
with Hesse (1755), 97, 100; (1793), 
239 ; with Prussia (1758-62), 112, 114, 
119, 121 

— — with Russia (1755), 97, 100, 
101 

— — general (1814), 443 5(1815), 504 

— — French, for Denmark and 
Sweden, 113 

Suhlingen, capitulation of, 329 
Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan, 388 
Sun, the, 307 

Sunderland, Robert Spencer, Earl of, 
36, 60, 68-9 



Superior, Lake, 537 

Surinam, 354 

Suvoroff, Alexander V., 202-3, 252, 287 
291-456 passim 

Sweden, 12-15; Commercial Treaty 
with (1653), 22 ; Treaty of 1656, 25-6 ; 
30 fT. ; Treaty with England (1700), 
63; Neutrality Treaty (17 10), 64; 
league against, 656°., 72-7, 93; and 
Seven Years' War, 98, 109-13, 117, 
122, 126, 146, 177, 183 ff., 206, 223, 
230, 290-1, 294, 299-303, 364, 374; 
and Britain, 382-6; and Turkey 
(1812), 390-2; 396; and Norway, 397, 
589 fT. 

Swiss, the, 312 ff., 327 ff. 

Switzerland, 13, 22, 263; and the 
French Revolutionary War, 280-94; 
313, 317, 319-20, 329, 339, 341, 348, 
405, 423, 435, 493-4 

Syracuse, 287 

Tagus, the, 370 

Talavera, battle of, 373 

Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles M. de, 
Prince of Benevento, 212-3; Lettres 
sur les Anglais, 213 ; 216-7, 235 278-9, 
286, 303, 307, 312, 317, 317-24, 35i, 
353, 435, 448 

Tandy, J. Napper, 148 n. 

Tarnopol, 476 

Taylor, Brooke, 362-3 

Teheran, 388 

Temesvar, banat of, 182 

Temple, R. Temple Grenville, Earl, 121, 
140 

— Richard T. N. B. Grenville, Earl 
(Duke of Buckingham and Chandos), 
314 

— Sir William, 30, 36 
Teneriffe, 280 

Tess£, M.-J.-B.-R. de Froulay, Comte 
de, Marshal, 52 

Texel, the, 328 

Thames, the, 228, 277 

Thiers, Louis-Adolphe, 342 

Thirty Years' War, the, 13, 22 

Thorn, 192, 204, 453, 481-2 

Thornton, Edward, 382-6; foreign cor- 
resp. of, App. G 

Thugut, Baron Franz M., 222, 239, 241, 
245, 247, 249, 250, 255, 261 ff. passim, 
App. D passim 

Thurlow, Edward, Lord, 140 

Tilsit, Treaty of (1807), 360-2, 364, 386 

Times, The, 307, 441, 475 

Tobago, 247, 275, 305, 354-5, 451-2, 

573 
Toco, the Chevalier, 488, 490 
Toplitz, Treaty of (1813), 413, 417, 

424 
Torgau, battle of, 117; 482 
Torres Vedras, 370; lines of, 376-7 
Touche, M£h6e de la, 330 



INDEX 



627 



Toulon, 89, 241 ff., 256, 259, 261, 285, 

302, 329, 335 
Toulouse, battle of (1814), 445 
Tournay, 57 
Townshend, Charles, 129 

— Charles Townshend, Viscount, 46, 
55, 60, 61, 68, 69, 76, 78, 80, 83 

Trachenberg, 407-8 

Trafalgar, battle of, 345-6, 348 

Transylvania, 182 

Trave, the, 350 

Travendal, Peace of (1700), 63 

Treilhard, Comte J.-B., 279 

Trevor, John Hampden (Viscount 

Hampden), 222, 233 
Trianon Decree, the, 377 
Trincomalee, 173 
Trinidad, 259, 275, 280, 305-6 
Triple Alliance (1668), 30 ff. 
Tromp, Martin Harpertzoon, admiral, 

20 
Troyes, Conference at (1814), 439, 442 

— Convention of (1814), 448 

— Treaty of (1420), 4 
True Briton, The, 307 
Turcoing-Roubaix, battle of, 247 
Turgot, A. R. J. (Baron c*e l'Aulne). 

Comptroller-general, 15 2 
Turin, 222, 233, 237, 26 +) 288, 292 
Turks, the Ottoman /Turkey, Turkish 
empire), 37, 40, ;b, 93, 149, 179, 183, 
191, 202 ff., 223, 255, 285-6,291; 
Napoleon a^ \ t 3I3> 3I5) 332 ff.; war 
on, ^°-9; 368, 371; and British 
trade, 380-1 ; 392, 464, 491-2, 515 
Tuscany, 71, 260, 336, 456, 500-1 

— Ferdinand III, Grand-duke of, 273, 
459 

Tyrol, 294, 371 

Udine, 281 
Ukraine, the, 388 
Ulm, capitulation of, 343 ff. 
Ulrica Eleanora, Queen of Sweden, 74 
"United Irishmen," Society of, 273 
United States of America, the, and 
France, 131 ff. ; and Spain, 132; 
(1783), 136-40, 146; Neutrality of 
(i793). 156; 200, 231, 258, 315, 350, 
357. 367. 375 ; and Orders in Council, 
377-8, 385, 525; at war with Great 
Britain (18 12), 528-9 ; and the Pacific, 
527 

— — — Congress of, 357 
Upper Gelderland, 345 
Ushant, 327 

Utrecht, Peace of (1713), 43, 47 ff., 68, 
71, 81, 125, 138, 259 

— Treaties of (1713), 47-58, 166 

Valdez, Spanish Minister of Marine, 

257-8 
Valenciennes, 239, 240; surrendered, 

247, 558 



Valetta, 288, 297, 300, 308, 314, 318, 

321,339 
Valmy, battle of, 215 
Valtelline, the, 494 
Van Berkel, Pensionary, 136 
Vancouver, George, 223 

— Island, 197 

Vansittart, Nicholas (Lord Bexley), 394, 

446, 464, 473 
Varennes, flight to, 208-9 
Vatican, the ; see Papacy 
Vaubois, C.-H. Belgrand, Comte de, 297 
Vaudois, Protestants, 23 
Venetia, 348 

Venetian Republic, the, 276, 281-2 
Venice, 10, 255, 281, 358, 409 
Venloo, 57 

Vera Cruz, naval battle of (1657), 25 
Verac, Ambassador, 172-3 
Verden, 61 ; see Bremen 
Verdun, 352 
Vere, Sir Horace, 10 
Vergennes, Charles G., Count of, 132, 

135, 138-9, 146-73 
Vergniaud, P.-V., 262 
Vernon, Admiral Sir Edward, 87 
Versailles, Court and Ministry of, 146, 

J75 

— Treaty of (1^83), 148 ff., 164, 535 

— negotiations at (1756), 101, 102 

— Treaties of (1756), 102 ff., 120; 
( I 758), 117; see Paris and Versailles 

Vesoul, 447 

Victor Amadeus III, King of Sardinia, 

.225 
Vienna, 37, 182, 193, 291, 372, 462 ff. 

— Treaty of (1725), 79-80 

— Second Treaty of (1731), 83 

— Third Treaty of (1738), 84 

— Treaties of (1814-5), 29, 370, 483 ff. 

— Congress of (1814-5), 453, 459, 
461-500; Secret Treaty of Great 
Britain, France and Austria, 479—80, 
488; Treaty of January 3rd (181 5), 
483, 502; Declaration of March 13th, 
502-3 ; Treaty of March 25th, 503-4; 
539 

— Court and Ministry of, 158, 185, 
196, 206, 209-10, 218, 221-2, 237-92 
passim, 311, 342, 365 

— Final Act, the, 492-8 

View of the State of the Republic, 318 

Vilna, 386 

Vimeira, battle of, 369 

Vincent, Freiherr Karl von, 487 

Virginia, 11, 94 

Vistula, the, 186, 204, 222, 243, 423, 

465, 47o 
Vitrolles, E.-F.-A. d'Arnaud, Baron de, 

448 
Vittoria, battle of, 405 
Volney, Constantin F. C, Comte de, 199 
Voltaire, Fr.-M. Arouet de, 116 
Vonck, Francis, 188, 202 



628 



INDEX 



Vorontzoff (Woronzow), Count Michael, 
192, 238, 295 

— Count Simon, 324-5. 332. 336-7, 
340, 345-6 

Vosges, the, 215 

Waal, the, 251, 253 

Walcheren expedition, the, 372-4, 383 

Waldeck, Prince George Frederick of, 39 

Waldegrave, James, Earl, 83 

Wales, 3 

Wall, Don Ricardo, in, 115, 121, 130 

Wallachia, 178, 192 

Walpole, Horace (Lord Walpole), 68, 82 

— Lord (afterwards Earl of Orford), 

369 

— Sir Robert (Earl of Orford), 60, 69, 
76, 78, 81-8; 128 

Walsingham, Sir Francis, 9 

Warren, Sir John Borlase, 316, 332, 334, 

528 
Warsaw, 204, 222, 252, 358, 461 

— duchy of, 403, 482-3 
Washington, 221 ; capture of, 538, 540 

— George, 156-7, 198 
Waterloo, battle of, 504 
Wedgwood, Josiah, 167-8 
Wellesley, Sir Henry (Lord Cowley), 

395,457.495,497 - . ' ' 

— Richard Colley, Marquis Wellesley, 
373 ff., 378, 382-91, 446, 503 

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 
in Spain, 368-83 passim; 394, 405, 
407; at Paris, 444-62 passim; at 
Vienna, 477-96 passim; 501-12, 539; 
makes a Convention with Fouch£, 
506-7 
Weser, mouth of the, 14, 64, 303, 350 
Wessenberg, Baron John von, 402 
West Indies, the English, and conquests 
of, 17, 125, 153 ff., 232, 241 ff., 272, 
275, 304, 306, 315, 35i, 366, 384, 431, 
440,496, 551, 573 

— — war in (1762), 123 

— — the French, 132, 156, 440 

— — the Spanish, 22, 41, 48-9, 
258-9 

Westminster, Peace of (1674), 33 

— Treaty of (1716), 62; (1756), 100 ff. 
Westphalia, 254-5 

— Peace of (1648), 13 ff., 40, 225 
West Prussia, 179 
Weymouth, 218 

— Thos. Thynne, Viscount (Marquis 
of Bath), 131 

Whigs, the, 128, 140; and the War of 

1812, 528 
Whitbread, Samuel, 314, 327, 364, 454, 

464, 473, 486, 504 
Whitelock, Bulstrode, 22 



Whitworth, Charles, Earl, 179, 204, 
222-3, 230-1, 247, 286-7, 289, 290, 
300, 303, 312-25 

— Charles, Lord, 75 

Wickham, William, 261, 263, 293, 297-8 
Wilberforce, William, 260, 314, 398, 

495 ff. 
Wilhelmina, consort of William V of 

Orange, 162, 171 ff., 180 
Wilkes, John, 127 
William the Conqueror, 1 

— I, King of the Netherlands (181 5), 
of Holland (1830) (Prince of Orange), 
422, 424, 430, 434, 452, 460, 462, 482 

— II (of Orange), Stadholder, 17 

— Ill of Orange, Stadholder, 32, 
34-8 ; King of England, 39 ; policy of, 

40-4, 57, 59 

— IV, of Orange, Stadholder, 116, 
143, 159; described, 160, 162; 171, 
226, 234, 251, 255, 290, 295; criti- 
cised, 588 

Williams, Sir Charles Hanbury, 104 
Wilson, Sir Robert, 361, 399, 412, 456, 

459, 460 
Windham,William,2i9,229, 260,265-6, 
. 272, 27778, 281,298,311,314-5,330, 

348, 36o,l'(»4 
Windsor, 253 
Wingo Sound, 380 
Wintzingerode, Ba'i^n Ferdinand von, 

442, 445 
Wismar, 66 
Witt, John de, Grand Pen^ : "*ry, »? 

26, 28, 30, 32 
Wolfenbuttel, Treaty of (1728), 82 
Wolsey, Cardinal, 6 
Wordsworth, William, Sonnets of, 315 
Worms, Treaty of (1743), 88 
Wotton, Sir Henry, 10 
Wrede, Karl P., Prince von, 416 
Wurtemberg, 297 

Wusterhausen, Treaty of (1725), 80 
Wyndham, Sir William, 85 

Yarmouth, Francis Seymour- Conway, 
Earl of (2nd Marquis of Hertford), 
240, 243-4, 352, 354 

Yorck von Wartenburg, Hans D. L., 
Count, 391 

York, Frederick, Duke of, 240, 244, 246, 

249, 253, 295 
Yorkshire, 367 
Yorktown, 136, 169 
Ypres, 57, 246 
Yriarte, Spanish Envoy, 258 

Zealand, 233, 321 
Zuboff, Platon, 303 
Zurich, 292, 294 



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